朝「孔子之邦畿」：耿天台思想之重构与再议 耿天台思想之重构与再议 = Into the kingly domain of confucius : a reconstruction and re-evaluation of Geng Ding-Xiang’s philosophy
洪耀通 Hoon, Randall Yao-Tong
Date of Issue2015
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
耿定向（1524 年－1597 年），湖⼴黄安⼈，字在伦，号楚侗，⼈称天台先⽣，累官⾄户部尚书，乃有明中叶之世的⼀代名⾂钜儒。他活跃于嘉靖万历期间明代思想发展的关键时期，并以卫道之笃、觉⼈之⼴⽽显赫当时。然⽽，天台虽然有如此显著的历史重要性，但由来专研者其⼈其学者不多，究其原因则有⼆：⼀则因为天台并未体现丰富的概念创造⼒， 并被《明儒学案》评为思想平庸之辈；⼆则因为天台评议不佳。⽽或有专研其⼈其学者，则往往侧重发挥天台与卓吾的争执，或以天台所云“不容已处”为核⼼展开其学问的探讨，这是从明代⼼学传统的⾓度审视并且约束天台的思想，⽽并未得天台学问之全观。笔者在细读《耿天台先⽣⽂集》后发现，天台之学实是以其所津津乐道的“孔⼦之学”为核⼼，并且围绕其“学孔”的主张⽽展开。⽆论是就“求仁为宗”的思想宗旨⽽⾔，或是就“知天⽴⼈”的道德实践体系⽽⾔，抑或是“鉴材善⽤”的异教（主要是佛教）态度⽽⾔，天台乃于其学问的每⼀⽅⾯朝向「孔⼦之邦畿」、为其每⼀个主张从孔孟经典中觅得依据，字⾥⾏间反复重申⾃⼰乃直接孔孟之统。有鉴于此，本⽂即尝试以天台“学孔”的主张为主轴⽽从思想宗旨（第⼆章）、道德实践（第三章）、和异教态度（第四章）三⽅⾯重构其思想核⼼，并以此重构后的思想体系分析天台“学孔”的特⾊所在、再议天台在有明思想史上的地位（第五章）。在这个重构中，“不容已处”不过是天台提供的道德实践路径之⼀，并⾮其学问之全部，⽽从分析这个重构后的体系可知，天台之学虽然没有哲思创造⽅⾯的贡献，但也影响不浅。具体⽽⾔，天台之学在明代“学孔”的脉络底下扮演⼀个承前启后和焦点的作⽤，即⼀⽅⾯在历史的横切⾯上围绕⾃⼰⽽形成⼀个“学孔”的儒者⽹络，另⽅⾯在历史的纵向发展中继承前说并开启晚明“⼈⼈皆以孔⼦为宗”的思想⾯貌。本⽂因⽽断⾔：天台之学实⼀孔⼦之学矣。 Geng Ding-xiang was a reputed scholar-politician of the Middle to Late Ming era, who was, in particular, well known as a staunch defender of the Confucian Way and as a teacher to many thinkers who later became important in their own right. However, despite said historical significance, the scope of literature on him till date is fairly limited: most are either concerned with his enmity against Li Zhi, or are centered on exploring Geng’s notion of the “moral impulse”. There are scarce few who made Geng’s system of thought the main focus of their study; and not without good reason, for Geng was not particularly renown for his ability in developing new concepts, and his moral integrity as a Confucian was cast in doubt both then and now. Nevertheless, he stands as one of the influential thinkers of his time, and his thought, creative or not, warrants a detailed review. Following up on this impetus with a close reading of Geng’s writings, this thesis has found that Geng was supremely concerned with “a learning of Confucius”, and his learning was, in fact, centered on the notion of “learning from Confucius”. Be it the purpose of his learning, the theory of moral practice he proposed, or his stance against Buddhism and Taoism, he had consciously aligned himself with “a learning of Confucius” as reconstructed from the Confucian Classics. Hence, this thesis will attempt to reconstruct our understanding of Geng’s system of thought from the point of “learning from Confucius”, and subsequently, propose to consider Geng under the vein of “learning from Confucius”, rather than under the vein of the School of Mind (or Taizhou) where he is traditionally placed. Namely, this thesis’s efforts will be focused on elucidating the relationship between Geng’s “learning from Confucius” and his purpose in learning (Chapter 2), his theory of moral practice (Chapter 3), and his refusal of Buddhism and Taoism (Chapter 4). Thereafter, this thesis shall attempt to outline the unique characteristics of Geng’s notion of “learning from Confucius” (Chapter 5), and thereby re-evaluate his position in the Confucian intellectual history. In summary, this thesis finds that the “moral impulse” was but one of the means for moral practice provided by Geng, and does not constitute the entirety of his learning. Additionally, though Geng may be lacking in the development of new concepts, his “learning of Confucius” was nonetheless historically significant in that it served to succeed previous generations of “learning from Confucius”, as well as to focus and inspire discussions regarding said learning within his contemporaries and juniors. It is in this sense that this thesis concludes Geng’s learning to be a “learning of Confucius from Confucius”.