The United States involvement in Singapore, 1953-1960.
Long, Joey Shi Ruey.
Date of Issue1998
Revisionist Eisenhower scholars have praised the Eisenhower administration's diplomatic record. The revisionists credited President Dwight D. Eisenhower for showing remarkable prudence and restraint during crises over Indochina, Quemoy and Matsu, Suez and Berlin. The president worked for peace and he kept the peace. In contrast to the views of contemporary pundits and analysts during the Eisenhower years, the revisionists also argued the president actively shaped, led and ran the policymaking process. Some scholars—labelled postrevisionists—qualified the revisionists' assertions. While the postrevisionists agreed Ike was very much in control of the decision-making process, they argued there were flaws in the Eisenhower government's conduct of foreign affairs— particularly in the manner the administration handled Third World affairs. The administration consistently misjudged Third World nationalism for communism. The US formulated and executed policies directed toward newly emerging nation-states on faulty Cold War premises. In the end, rather than orienting these newly emerging states to the West, the Eisenhower administration alienated them. This study, by relying on previously unused primary sources, details the Eisenhower administration's involvement in the newly emerging nation-state of Singapore.
DRNTU::Humanities::History::Asia::Singapore::Politics and government