FAMAGUSTA, Cyprus: A Third Way in Cultural Heritage

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“Uncle, I feel so small…”

“That’s because you’re alone. That’s what the war has done: now, all of us are alone, the dead and the living. There is no nation any more.”

Mia Couto,
“Sleepwalking Land”
Acknowledgments

Throughout my practice as an architect and heritage practitioner, I have learned that ‘dogmas’ lead to certainties while skepticism paves a road of experience. Jaime Salcedo Salcedo showed me that difference. He was a mentor and a colleague who shaped the early part of my career. From Jaime, I learned that truth is entirely relative. This work is in honor of his memory.

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To the loved ones scattered around the world, always in my mind, and in my heart, as permanent connections to the world, for them, that rare mixture of respect and a sense of wonder fed by distance and memories.
Summary

The forty-year neglect of Famagusta’s heritage is the result of, among other things, a crevice in the overarching, internationally endorsed system that established, and now maintains, the universal framework for heritage assets. The unresolved political contestation in Cyprus has led not only to the serious decay of Famagusta’s heritage assets, but also to the difficulty in any potential international effort to recognize, develop, conserve, and sustain its heritage. Crucial questions arise: How can Cultural Heritage in politically unstable and contested territories be maintained? More specifically, is there a way to produce a sustainable and efficient management and utilization strategy for Famagusta’s heritage? In this study I identify the gaps and caveats created by the ‘international system’ through an analysis and assessment of the concept of Cultural Heritage. That established, I propose two complementary approaches that offer an alternative way, a third way, for the future feasibility of Famagusta’s heritage sites. This proposal then falls into, and utilizes, two further interacting categories: a legal framework aimed at assessing Famagusta’s current condition within the context of Transitional Justice (to empower stakeholders to initiate proactive schemes to develop its heritage); and secondly a management strategy called Public-Private-Partnership (PPP), founded on an economic model, to meet the legal, technical and conceptual requirements of the former. At the core of this study, I establish an alternative method, grounded on economic sustainability and Transitional Justice, which can serve as a way for the development of heritage assets in Famagusta as opposed to mere maintenance. This method, I maintain, rests on the hitherto untapped potential of empowering the private entrepreneurial sector in the development and conservation of Cultural Heritage and on the facilitation of the civil society throughout the process via a shift in the fundamental conceptualization of what Cultural Heritage is.
This work is divided into five linked, cumulative sections. Initially, I examine the evolution and definition of the term Cultural Heritage and its applicability to Famagusta. Next, I present a personal vision of history, based on professional experience, in relation to Famagusta and highlight five aspects that I consider to be of fundamental importance: scholarship, technology, multiculturalism, personas and conflict. In the third chapter, I explore a suggested alternative platform of analysis: Transitional Justice; this concept helps the discussion of the relationships between Cultural Heritage, memory and memorialization, and a legal framework for developing Cultural Heritage in conflict or post-conflict territories. I then tighten the focus to discuss the economics involved in ‘heritage’ and present a Cost-and-Benefit Analysis of a walking tour in Famagusta based on a survey I conducted in-situ. This analytical sample provides substantial evidence that strongly suggests the feasibility of implementing the two aforementioned frameworks. Finally, I conclude by highlighting the potential of a sustainable and effective management strategy to conserve and develop significant heritage in conflict areas. It is a pilot project for a transitional process in Cyprus that relies on the collaboration between the public and the private sectors, but by extension could be applied to other sites around the world that also are unable to access the international systems created for Cultural Heritage. My conclusions, therefore, present an understanding of how this anomaly, the lack of a standard approach for heritage assets in politically problematic or unstable places, or sites where states/governments do not exist, emerged in the first place. They also suggest, how a ‘third-way’, outside the convoluted web of political and social issues associated with Cyprus, may yet be created to rehabilitate and develop a heritage that is a universal inheritance.
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# Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>Bienes de Interés Cultural</td>
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<td>CBA</td>
<td>Cost – Benefit Analysis</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>ICCROM</td>
<td>International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property</td>
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<td>ICOMOS</td>
<td>International Council on Monuments and Sites</td>
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<td>INHA</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Historia y Antropología</td>
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<tr>
<td>K-FOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KURP</td>
<td>Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project</td>
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<td>M-19</td>
<td>Movimiento 19 de abril</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NPV</td>
<td>Net Present Value</td>
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<td>OUV</td>
<td>Outstanding Universal Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEMP</td>
<td>Planes Especiales de Manejo y Protección</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public – Private Partnership</td>
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<td>PV</td>
<td>Present Value</td>
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<td>RDAC</td>
<td>Report of the Department of Antiquities</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP-ACT</td>
<td>UNDP – Action for Cooperation &amp; Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP-PFF</td>
<td>UNDP – Partnership For the Future</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Heritage Site</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>World Tourism Organization</td>
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<td>WTP</td>
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<td>YMCA</td>
<td>Young Men’s Christian Association</td>
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Introduction

My arrival in Cyprus\(^1\) in 2010 to coordinate the technical aspects of a project called the Study on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus for the UNDP-PFF demonstrated similarities to my previous experience in Kosovo as the Cultural Heritage Advisor for the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports. Like the Balkans, Cyprus represented a connection between East and West, and the coexistence of Islam and Christianity. Like the Balkans, ethnic cleansing had erupted at the edge of nation-state formation. Like the Balkans, Cyprus had a war that separated neighboring communities. As in the Balkans, ‘green zones’ had emerged to separate communities and prevent additional conflict. In the Balkans, enclaves were protected by international forces (K-FOR in the case of Kosovo) that have been (and still are) protecting Serbian Orthodox Churches and convents. In Cyprus, a ‘green line’ bisects the last divided city in Europe (Nicosia) and has left Famagusta’s suburb of Varosha inhabited only by wildlife. As of 2014, we have seen forty years of regression and stagnation throughout the entire island.

A politically unreliable system and a set of institutions unable to project alternative social, economic and political structures of its own developed in North Cyprus, a place that remains under the long shadow of an increasingly fundamentalist Turkey. The estimated US$3.5 billion expenditure from Turkey to North Cyprus over the past four decades speaks of the deep connections North Cyprus has built over the years with Turkey at political, economic and social levels. This also points to a high dependence of North Cyprus on Turkey for aid, given that otherwise its economy would suffer greatly and probably not survive\(^2\).

\(^1\) When mentioning Cyprus I refer to the island.  
\(^2\) In this regard Feridun explains: ‘North Cyprus’ economy is highly dependent on foreign aid, which [is] almost exclusively donated by Turkey, for fiscal expenditures, investments on infrastructure, and for defense spending. Total Turkish assistance to North Cyprus since the division of the island into North and South in 1974 is estimated to be over 3.5 billion US dollars [...] More precisely, the present article has yielded strong evidence that an increase in AID results in an increase in non-development military expenditures. This can possibly be attributed to the lax restrictions imposed by the donor country, Republic of Turkey, on how AID must be spent. Each year, Republic of Turkey provides North Cyprus
Normal circumstances (i.e. recognized international status for a state) set the discussion about Cultural Heritage, its management, ownership, property, and tenure flows, under the umbrella composed by legal systems, policies, international law and capital. These are all regulated by general agreements among communities and the state as a whole. However, conflict and unresolved territorial issues reconfigure the above-mentioned aspects and place them into transitional stages. In other words, in cases where the state lacks international recognition or when the state is threatened, any discussions or approaches to develop heritage assets are either put on hold or rendered ineffective, causing further decay and degradation of the heritage assets. This work, I believe, helps cast light on the core issues that have prevented sustainable actions in securing heritage expression under threat, highlights unresolved ‘dead-ends’, and formulates a potential alternative scenario from the current framework on Cultural Heritage.

Decades of irreconcilable antagonistic positions between the North and the South, Muslims and Christians, and between ethnic groups, are echoed in the findings of Simon Harrison, who argues that cultures have similar ways to express differences, and that when those expressions are vulnerable and at risk of being assimilated by the ‘other’, the similarities then become a threat. My work in Cyprus as well as in the Balkans left a number of questions that I present in this thesis, before offering a potential escape route from the complex architecture of diplomacy, power and politics.
in heritage. As war and conflict generate enormous income and business, so security, or the lack of it, has become dominant on the agenda for many societies. Along with war, conflict and chaos, comes a well-structured international bureaucracy in the form of international agencies. In the case of Cyprus, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been on the island for decades, since 1964. The UNFICYP has been responsible for ensuring that ceasefire agreements are observed as well as securing the buffer zones on the island. Although this is a testament to the role of the international system in Cyprus, from the perspective of Cultural Heritage development, this is far from effective. To date, there is no coherent approach to maintain and preserve the heritage assets of the island that are continuously degrading as the political problem of the island remains unresolved.

The conclusion of the Second World War left the most terrifying vestige of destruction the modern world has ever seen. It also left a number of lessons that would be carved in humanity’s consciousness. At the core of this was a general consensus to prevent similar future devastation in lives, property, culture, and governments. The destruction of war also meant the loss of pieces of the complex phenomenon that we call memory: our own (individual) and the memories that we build among the members of a community collectively. In a wider context, this is the memory of humanity. The spectre of war reverberated across Europe, Africa, Asia, and beyond, driving states to reconsider their foreign policy and eventually to leave behind the concept of empires or caliphates. The system of nations was now filtered through the United Nations, and UNESCO was created as its main agency for education, science and culture to prevent – among other considerations – further destruction caused by war. Since then, most issues arising from conflicts around the world are assessed by the agencies that take

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5 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
part in the UN system: Human Rights, Refugees, Development, Food, and Cultural Heritage.\(^6\)

After the war, other global organizations were created such as ICCROM\(^7\) and ICOMOS\(^8\) which were actively involved in the reconstruction of Europe, the configuration of a body of knowledge to deal with assets coming from previous generations, and the recognition of culture as relevant, significant, and/or valuable.

This came to be called Cultural Heritage and was developed to explain those assets that transcend time and history, and are valuable witnesses of human memory reaching back to our ancestors.\(^9\) The scholarship for the past six decades on heritage and heritage assets has assumed a direct link between the international level (UNESCO) and the local level exclusively through established national governments. These conditions have been applied to the majority of heritage sites in the world, however there are a few places that for some reason cannot be framed under these conditions.

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\(^6\) According to UNESCO, Cultural Heritage is considered as “monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.” Accessed Nov 7, 2014. http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/.

\(^7\) International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.

\(^8\) International Council on Monuments and Sites.

\(^9\) As I will discuss in Chapter I, the predecessor of the term Cultural Heritage which was “‘Monument’ from the Latin: ‘monumentum’ as ‘remembrance’” Werner Von Truetzscheler, “The Evolution of Cultural Heritage in International Law.” ICOMOS, 2005, accessed March 4, 2014, http://openarchive.icomos.org/303/. Throughout the 16th and most of the 17th centuries the term ‘Antique’ was used to address items from the past. Juliana Forero and Liangping Hong, “Cultural Heritage Concept, Genealogy and Contemporary Challenges,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 3 no.16 (2012), accessed Nov 15, 2014, http://www.mcserv.org/images/stories/MJSS-Special-issues/MJSS%202012%20Special%20Issue%20vol%203%20no%2016/Juliana%20Forero%20and%20Liangping%20Hong.pdf. After the Enlightenment and the French Revolution in 1789, the concept of monument was confronted with additional elements arising from post-colonial regions of the world where ‘remembrance’ had wider meanings. Over the past decades, especially after the armed conflicts of the 20th century, there has been a shift from ‘remembrance’ to ‘memory’ as the main pillar of the Cultural Heritage concept. For the purpose of this work I will highlight one aspect of Cultural Heritage that is not openly recognised within the set of standards and regulations in place: politics. The following text reflects partly the fundamentals of this work: “However, one should not forget the political aspect of the decision as to what is to be preserved for future generations. A central idea which accompanies the view of cultural heritage as a form of inheritance is its characterisation as a non-renewable resource akin to the environment or even mineral resources.” Janet Blake, “On Defining Cultural Heritage,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 no. 1 (2000): 69, accessed Nov 14, 2014. http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1529480.
This is precisely the case today in the vibrant city of Famagusta in North Cyprus. Its opulent, albeit vanishing, heritage remains cast out of the universal framework that was, in fact, created to protect it. The current state of Famagusta proves the failure of the ‘system’ at large and highlights the serious consequences for communities, and their heritage, in regions experiencing a transitional status, such as contested territories. Famagusta’s heritage expressions have been left outside the system of nations (UN), and outside the international recognition of Cultural Heritage as part of a transitional political stage. They are symptomatic of many heritage expressions that are not framed under UN endorsed international standards, and so exist in a state of limbo. This is true in North Cyprus after the events of 1974. The key role Famagusta has played in the history of humanity is undeniable. Nevertheless, as we have witnessed for nearly four decades, the world has chosen to turn its back on a Cultural Heritage that represents an important piece of human civilization.

After the Second World War, the concept of cultural expressions evolved as a way to understand our own experience in life and in the projection of our ‘self’. Nevertheless, the concept of Cultural Heritage remained within the UNESCO framework and thus subject to the international system of nations which, has an important political component. Conflicts and political disputes require different ethics than countries at peace. Cyprus - at least the northern part of the island, and in particular Famagusta - is a case in point, which helps in understanding transitional periods among communities and highlights the difficulties of dealing with ‘issues’

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10 This aspect will be discussed in chapter I.
11 I will be discussing the history component in Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage in chapter II. Conceptualization: Cultural Heritage in Famagusta, a definition and a framework in the context of Memory in Chapter I.
within the political realm (at the local and the international level) that have a direct effect on the preservation of heritage assets.

At this juncture, I will lay out the general objectives of my work in the context of transitional stages of communities, where relevant Cultural Heritage is left without any contingency plan to prevent further degradation. In this study, I explore a potential ‘way out’ to overcome difficulties in Cultural Heritage management that are commonly found in conflict and post conflict regions as well as in territories that are unrecognized, and others that are hybrid areas, i.e. places in between countries and continents that have developed their own cultural expressions. In the current international framework for Cultural Heritage, as previously mentioned, Famagusta has been left to decay precisely, or partly, because the political status of the community remains unresolved. This study aims to fill this gap by asserting that there is an alternative route (or routes) that can set the tone for sustainable management and development of heritage in those places. The subject is driven by a fundamental conundrum: if Cultural Heritage has accommodated a moral rightness within its doctrinal package, why has Famagusta been left abandoned for four decades? What would an alternative way out of that limbo include? To answer those two questions, I have developed five diverse, yet thematically linked chapters.

Chapter I, Cultural Heritage Conceptualization: Famagusta, a Definition at the Center of Conflict, gives an account of the configuration and reconfiguration of the concept of Cultural Heritage from 1954 up to the present. Here I examine the main international agreements and charters that ICOMOS and UNESCO have endorsed and that contributed to the evolution of concepts in Cultural Heritage. This section also navigates the redefinition of the 19th century concept of monument to the emergence of Cultural Heritage as its successor. The former is deeply linked to memory and the latter to property. This shift and deviation is crucial not only in the broader discourse on Cultural Heritage but also in the resulting approach to conservation, management, and
development. This shift also, I surmise, directly impacts the situation of Famagusta. I discuss how Cultural Heritage moved away from the connection to memory, and instead welcomed features tuned to nation building such as cultural identity, nationality and sovereignty – among others. In such a process, exclusion became inevitable, and dismissal of other features and properties ensued. A discussion of these aspects of the current scholarship, and its inapplicability to the case of Famagusta, is partially offset by a proposed new definition of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage, necessary to establish a sustainable future.

The second chapter is entitled **History in Famagusta: a Tailored Perspective for Transition**. It offers an alternative view on history in its relationship with Cultural Heritage and to Famagusta’s heritage sites. I maintain that the historic component of Cultural Heritage has proven difficult, even counter-productive, in valuing and assessing heritage expressions. For historians, ‘events’ are the main asset imbued within Cultural Heritage and its practice. History offers a time frame in which to locate events and relate them to different contexts. I stand on the premise that it does not, and should not, dominate, as by doing so we risk mistaking Cultural Heritage as equivalent to **historic events**. In the case of Famagusta, therefore, I have chosen to avoid the linear narrative of chronology. Instead, I observe the various other important components that have simultaneously shaped Famagusta, and our understanding of it, through time, such as scholarship, technology, multiculturalism, personalities, and conflict.

To be sure Famagusta has been a permanent source of scholarship on history, social sciences, ethnography, and many other academic pursuits that involve the study of the past. This is due to the fact that Famagusta is strategically located between Europe, Asia, and Africa and hence it became a nexus for critical junctures in politics, economics, and cultural transmission. In fact the production of knowledge, as a permanent activity, associated with Famagusta is, I argue, a Cultural Heritage product in itself. But here I would like to broaden the focus to incorporate other vital
considerations. For example through the lens of technology previously overlooked, aspects of Famagusta can be revealed. Focusing on the relevance of the fortification system of Famagusta in the context of the study of war, urban settlements and the transnational aspects of defense in Europe, I illuminate how this neglected piece of heritage is linked to narratives on technological innovations, warfare, and conquests in Europe and beyond.

Multiculturalism is another aspect that I will highlight as a characteristic of Cyprus and of course of Famagusta. Famagusta, and what we understand as its Cultural Heritage expressions, have been built, developed, destroyed and reconstructed in cycles and waves that made it difficult to frame under a particular culture or a single sense of identity. It is difficult to argue that Famagusta actually corresponds or belongs to any known homogeneous nation, but through understanding the island’s multicultural aspect through time, I hope to establish its historical relevance as well.

The fourth aspect is personalities. I argue that it is crucial to understand the key personalities who have impacted on the documentation, formation, and work on Cultural Heritage in the island and particularly in Famagusta. These personalities contributed to all subsequent understanding of Famagusta itself.

Suffice to note at this point that the first two chapters lay out the main framework and aspects for understanding Famagusta. Ranging from its legal limbo, the role of politics in Cyprus, the role of the politics of UNESCO, four decades of international bureaucracy in Cyprus, and scholarly production (in the form of books, reports, conferences), such a fundamental understanding is imperative before any possible ‘solution’ or ‘way-out’ can be presented.

In the succeeding parts of this thesis, I depart from retrospective analysis and offer a technical, pragmatic, and practical approach that demonstrates a potential feasibility for the management of Famagusta’s heritage expressions without taking into account or relying on the political resolution of Cyprus’ international status.
In Chapter III, entitled **Famagusta, Transition between Memory and Justice: a Framework**, I elaborate on each of the components of my proposed redefinition of Cultural Heritage in Famagusta: conflict, diaspora, value and social construction. In particular my argument is centered on the need to recover the memory component of Cultural Heritage. As a way out for conflicting heritages, I use the permutations of ‘memory’ to highlight the inapplicability of the UNESCO framework in unrecognized territories, hybrid cultures, or transitional areas. It is clear that in these places, there is a need to provide an alternative platform from which to discuss what is not possible under the UNESCO umbrella such as diasporic heritage, heritage without identity, cultural rights, politics of heritage, power, remembrance, and development. This chapter ends with a discussion of Transitional Justice as an alternative platform from which to frame, discuss and secure Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage expressions.

In Chapter IV on **Economics: a Cost-Benefit Analysis in Cultural Heritage Development**, I recognize, then postulate on, the role of economics in Cultural Heritage management, by exploring one independent action to evaluate and improve the feasibility of Famagusta’s heritage assets. In this section, I look into the potential of a comparatively simple, yet effective, action: a tourist oriented walking tour in Famagusta’s historic core. The idea comes from a similar proposal in Valdivia, Chile where two scholars with backgrounds in Economics and Statistics prepared a study to support the idea of generating resources - mainly from tourism - that could support the restoration of heritage buildings.\(^{13}\)

Using a similar rationale, what I propose is a multifaceted approach. Firstly, revenue derived from Famagusta’s walking tour should be utilized to prepare a nomination dossier (1,000,000 Euros approx.) for UNESCO’s consideration of Famagusta as a World Heritage Site (WHS). Although inscription is not feasible under

\(^{13}\) The article ‘Using contingent valuation and cost-benefit analysis to design a policy for restoring cultural heritage’ by Andrea Báez and Luis César Herrero served as a guide in the Cost-Benefit Analysis for a walking tour in Famagusta’s historic core.
the current political circumstances, the lack of a nomination dossier is, in any case, the main impediment to any proposal for the site being considered. Secondly, when converted into a 10-year programme, the walking tour shows interesting figures that prove its potential as an effective regeneration source that can be implemented in Famagusta. In fact, a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) demonstrates that UNESCO, or indeed any international (or domestic) agency could have implemented this or a similar idea for the past four decades with significant fiscal impact. Next, I elucidate how Cultural Heritage increases its chance of survival when using platforms different from culture, history, politics, religion, ethnicity or nation – i.e. a view of heritage based on economics and sustainability. Lastly, I highlight the isolation of the conceptualization of Cultural Heritage from the changing discourse and evolution of societies, showing that this negatively impacts heritage assets.

In the final section, Famagusta: a Pilot Project for Cyprus’ Transitional Justice Process, I then further develop and propose, an economically feasible short-term policy to secure, restore, and develop at least 50% of the area of the historic core, into a long-term management alternative to complete a cycle of controlling decay in Famagusta. This section presents the design of a Public – Private Partnership (PPP) from which to implement the walking tour as a project. The current status of Famagusta, the lack of any coherent initiative for it, and the lack of any prospective policy from the international community, local institutions or any close partner to Cyprus, are reasons enough to explore other alternatives outside their authority.

It is important to note that in the past few years, the concept of Public - Private Partnership has developed as an alternative way to benefit from private expertise in managing, exploiting, researching, and producing goods that are necessary for the economy. Traditionally PPPs have been linked to the exploitation of non-renewable resources such as mining and oil, where a private party shares the risk with a public agency and benefits through the process of production and marketing (among other
goods) that, for a number of reasons, the state cannot deliver. A shared responsibility in a communal endeavor guarantees the conditions for fluid interaction between the public and the private sector. This has proven to bring greater economic benefits to the general public. In management activities, the public sector relies more on private intervention, partly because of efficiency and cost issues, but also because the private sector is more flexible in adjusting to a range of variables in order to deliver a more efficient service. I argue that PPP can, and should, also be applied to Cultural Heritage, especially when it is neglected by the state. Cultural Heritage exists based on scientific, social, and governmental recognition. Cultural Heritage is patently situated in an intermediate realm: as a concept it belongs to society, as a flag it belongs to politicians, and as an aspect of identity it belongs to the communities (in general). In a context as complex as Famagusta, the management of its heritage assets has proven to be, at best, inefficient. This, above all, represents the loss of an important part of our memory as well as of collective assets and necessitates the re-thinking in this doctoral study.

The ideas which follow are built on two fundamental pillars: my personal experience in regions of the world that for various reasons have faced the consequences of an armed conflict and transitional stages (such as Colombia, Kosovo and Afghanistan); and my involvement as the Cultural Heritage Technical Specialist of the Study on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus (UNDP-PFF\textsuperscript{14} 2010). In these cases, the stakeholders (recognised or not) of the Cultural Heritage practice were driven by political agendas rather than technical aspects of public policy.

My work as the coordinator in Kosovo of the Council of Europe Regional Programme for Cultural and Natural Heritage from 2005 to 2006 also showed me the importance of the sustainability of local economies during transitional stages. I realized that Cultural Heritage can actually help stabilize the flow of tourists and rebuild trust among communities when heritage assets recover the capacity to adjust to new

\textsuperscript{14} United Nations Development Programme – Partnership For the Future.
meanings and new symbolisms. The lack of response at the local and international levels on the Cyprus issue, and the subsequent repercussions on Cultural Heritage sites, suggested that a data-driven hypothesis might or should be attempted. To bridge this gap, in 2013, I conducted a 1000-respondents survey in Famagusta’s historic core to calculate the economic feasibility outside their connection to Cyprus’ Cultural Heritage as well as to calculate its economic feasibility, outside their connection to Cyprus’ life or the so-called identity of the site.

Since the Famagusta case reflects limited possibilities for a sound management structure, I prepared a Cost-Benefit Analysis for a walking tour in Famagusta’s historic core as the main source of income to finance the preparation of the dossier.

An alternative approach to enhance the feasibility of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage is by separating cultural assets from the current political and diplomatic situation through demonstrating how core concepts (identity, nationality) and the current framework (nation-states), both important pillars in Cultural Heritage, have failed to secure a site such as Famagusta. My proposition to employ the principles of PPP in Cultural Heritage permits a decisive action to be made beyond and outside the state and its political conundrums. It also permits the sourcing of resources from the private sector to the public in order to deliver a service that will eventually enable the conservation, preservation, and management of the significant heritage assets of Famagusta.

Cyprus, as one of the oldest, persistently unresolved, conflicts plays an important role in understanding the factors and facets that contributed in the destruction of heritage assets. An in-depth examination of the causes and roots of the Cyprus issue will not be undertaken in this study. The consequences, and suggested

15 Constantinou and Hatay argue that: “[…] most discussions in heritage destruction in Cyprus point to the reason to deliberate targeting or neglect of the heritage of ‘the other side’ linking these to the explicit or implicit attempts of ethno-cultural denial and cleansing […] At the same time, the political agenda has driven positive actions on each side regarding the heritage of the ‘other’ to show political will, but not realistically implemented.” Costas M. Constantinou and Mete Hatay. “Cyprus, Ethnic conflict and conflicted heritage,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, April (2010): 1.
way out of it, will. Suffice it to say that different scholars propose different perspectives and theories on how and why the division of the island emerged and why it has remained unresolved. Key causes include: the lack of a common Cypriot identity, the failure of peace talks and discussions, economic disparities between sectors of the population, the historical divide between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (and mother countries), and the militarization of the issue, to name but a few. Undeniably, in the 1950s, the dominant political inertia in the island was to unite with Greece (Enosis), and this was championed by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) who staged a violent, on-going, terrorist campaign against the British administration. Following a series of conferences between the British, Greeks, Turkish, and representatives from the Cypriot groups, the new Republic of Cyprus was created in 1960. As a newly independent state formed out of a volatile society without a strong sense of trust and shared identity, cracks in the system soon began to emerge. Turkish Cypriots, who feared the union of Cyprus with Greece, simultaneously clamored for the division of the island. The decade following independence was characterized by a sporadic intensification of inter-communal disputes. As Nathalie Tocci argues, “Real conditions of division and the total absence of a multiethnic society complemented by the irrational fear and prejudice, together with the further complicating factors such as extensive militarization and immigration flows, explain the persisting inter-communal conflict on the island.”

By 1963, following proposed changes to the constitution, fighting erupted and in 1974, inter-communal conflict in the island reached its peak when the Cypriot National Guard, supported by Athens, declared a coup against the elected President Archbishop Makarios III. When the skirmishes between the two groups intensified, and when the union of Cyprus with Greece looked imminent, Turkey made the decision to send troops to invade the island. Within the summer,

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Turkey’s forces occupied about 30% of the island, causing a massive population flow from north to south (by Greek Cypriots, and from south to north by Turkish Cypriots). Famagusta’s suburb of Varosha was cleared of its inhabitants and remains unoccupied to this day. As Tocci asserts, “the military intervention and subsequent partition of the island left both ethnic communities in a state of total economic disarray.”

The division of the island was formalized in 1983 with the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a state unrecognized by the United Nations, and this has remained in place until the present day. It is within this complex dynamic of occupation, war, and conflict that I set my study of the condition and management of heritage assets in Famagusta.

My experience in conflict zones and my work as Cultural Heritage practitioner in such environments where ethnic components have driven war, has shown me how often Cultural Heritage is used as a tool to reinforce nationalistic discourses and therefore also exclusion. This was seen in the Yugoslavian conflict and Israel-Palestine, to name but two, where UNESCO had limited capacity to maneuver outside the mandate of member states. For the case of Palestine, its recognition as a UNESCO member state in 2011 produced an automatic suspension of funds from the Israeli and American governments. Who would risk that for North Cyprus?

I do not intend to go un-necessarily deeply into the obscurities and difficulties of ethnic conflicts and wars, and the conditions of Cultural Heritage expressions caught in the middle. Instead I provide a conceptual and pragmatic approach to deal with those heritage assets. The present focus is to explore a way to measure the potential contribution of Cultural Heritage to the local economy in northern Cyprus by carrying out a Cost-Benefit Analysis on the preparation of a nomination dossier for UNESCO’s

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consideration of Famagusta as a World Heritage Site, giving the site additional maneuverability and representation in the international arena.

Does Famagusta have the capacity to deliver UNESCO’s requirements to comply with the rehabilitation of its Urban Cultural Landscape and become a member of the World Heritage club? My response to this question seeks to veer away from the political cladding that is present among member states of UNESCO from its original aim, which was to favour the expressions that ‘matter’. I seek apart to use Cultural Heritage as a bridge for resolution rather than a source of conflict. I focus on the inherent capacity of heritage assets to sustain themselves outside the World Heritage club and within the confines of the Cyprus issue. In so doing, my hypothesis aims to allow places like North Cyprus, and other unrecognized territories that cannot guarantee a ‘government’, to benefit from international sponsorship in managing heritage sites of relevance, and also to open the door for international and non-governmental organizations to step in and create management structures to fill the blind-spots in the system. The objective here is to formulate a feasible alternative to open the World Heritage Site trademark to all heritage sites and to eradicate the limited use of it to selected members. Moreover, this study proposes to separate the political implications from the trademark, patent, or logo itself, thereby opening the possibilities for external non-members to access the trademark and, consequently its (economic and other) spillovers. This perspective helps us understand Cultural Heritage and its linkage and fracture to the societal remains, where it loses significance in a new context. This approach can bring new insights to the governability of heritage assets where governance would otherwise remain unresolved under the perspective of the monolithic nation-state.

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18 Although under the current conditions UNESCO is not entitled to consider such a proposal, the preparation of the Nomination Dossier is in essence a management plan that can be implemented with or without UNESCO’s consent. The Cost-Benefit Analysis proposed helps in assessing alternative forms of acquiring resources to invest in heritage rehabilitation in Famagusta.
The governability and potential resolution of the contested territory in Cyprus remains uncertain, while the decay of Famagusta is an unquestionable and continuing reality. A serious analysis of the number of attempts to solve the Cyprus issue (e.g. Annan Plan, 2004) requires expertise that is beyond the scope of this work. But one of the lessons learned from the case of Famagusta is that Cultural Heritage is a card that is often played to defend political arguments. For example, in the nation-building campaign, nationalistic meanings and ideologies are often attached to or imposed upon, Cultural Heritage in order to support and promote the idea of a nation.

In Famagusta, the lack of any effective and recognized government adds to the difficulty of addressing its heritage assets. The continuous decay of Famagusta proves that none among politicians, NGOs, international organizations or even the general public are willing to act in favour of solving the difficulties surrounding heritage assets in the northern part of Cyprus. The scattered investment in conservation does not address the central issues, acting only as a palliative that heals symptoms, but does nothing to rectify the cause. It is not in the interest of the stakeholders involved in the political conflict to act in favour of Cultural Heritage, and local communities have gravitated towards similar polarities that are strategically exclusive and has led to the destruction and decay of many sites, including the historic core of Famagusta.

A scenario in which politics and diplomacy (and not technicians) are the major players in the discussion on heritage demonstrates that in any potential future agenda, Cultural Heritage will have a secondary role. The preparation of a Master Plan for Famagusta (under UNDP-PFF endorsement in 2006) and policies for the revitalization of its heritage or plans for housing improvement, are good projects suitable for those heritage places in the world where stakeholders recognize each other and agree on

joined efforts to address the preservation of heritage assets. Can we see this sense of acknowledgment and accord among the stakeholders in Famagusta? No. What is important at this stage is the recognition that heritage does not stand alone, it requires a number of conditions for it to play a role in society, and if these conditions are not met, then heritage is condemned to suffer.

More than a technical investigation on Famagusta’s heritage assets, my hypothesis is an attempt to reflect on the future of Famagusta’s built heritage, starting with the assumption that the failure of previous attempts such as the Annan Plan lie in the connections made with heritage assets in reference to the past (a distant past subject to manipulation and polarization), without any regard for future transformation and reconfiguration. In fact, the future is the only guarantee for a level of sustainability. The recognition of the current situation in Famagusta calls for an alternative approach (from theoretical to pragmatic) capable of improving governability of heritage assets through a management structure based on a Public – Private - Partnership model. As history, or better yet, as physical proof of historic events, Cultural Heritage is a transnational asset, and therefore cannot be subject to local inefficiencies and prejudices in dealing with domestic issues. Although states hold accountability over those assets, the ownership resides with the broader community of humanity. The Mediterranean is one case that reflects the different layers of events and the formation of modern nation states that divided east and west, ethnicities, religions, and languages under nationalistic agendas, far from the reality of history and detrimental to the composition of a sound narrative to reflect connections instead of differences. Famagusta serves as a crucial piece of this narrative.

My position in this research challenges a number of issues: the international status quo on Cyprus Cultural Heritage; Cyprus’ unresolved internal issues that have led to decades of neglect of Famagusta’s heritage sites; local governance and its limited capacity to maneuver the current political status of Famagusta; and the
nationalistic approach to heritage assets, versus a contemporary vision of Transnational Justice, culture and communities. Alternative systems for framing activities and events from the past (such as the FAO’s Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems) face similar difficulties in endorsement, accountability, indicators and benefits. The intention is not merely to create a new framework but to isolate a number of aspects that have placed Famagusta out of reach, and then to secure its place in the memory of humanity. The objective, in approaching the issue of Famagusta, is not to tailor a framework hoping to address an international convention to find who should be responsible or to find fault in UNESCO. Rather, this work simply questions the formation of exclusive clubs of heritage sites around the world, and postulates that Cultural Heritage does not require ‘membership’ status. Cultural Heritage simply belongs to humanity. If Cultural Heritage had the relevant weight in the international agenda, the issue of Famagusta would have been resolved at an early stage. What is needed, therefore, is to find the arguments, actions, and potential partners to act in a newly designed scenario to limit the capacity of current actors to obstruct proposals that have the possibility to overcome the difficulties Famagusta faces. It also creates a potential platform to separate the political debate from a resource that belongs to humanity, and that has been neglected for many years. This approach brings the discussion to the international level and recognizes alternative paths to deal with highly politicized international situations where the international agencies have limited maneuverability. It also facilitates the participation of global NGOs willing to engage in a sound, feasible, and sustainable agreement towards the preservation and development of Famagusta.

This introduction offers the reader the opportunity to approach key terms and ideologies that support the theoretical framework to help understand the content of the proposal to follow. It broadens the concepts of Cultural Heritage, nationality, and identity, and offers a vision that includes the interconnections among culture, politics,
nation, communities, and boundaries - or the absence of those - giving a realistic and pragmatic perspective on the issues that play a role in Cultural Heritage. Nowadays, the general public is increasingly aware of the expressions of culture as connectors to explain the elasticity of boundaries despite differences of languages, continents or nation-states.\textsuperscript{20} Culture, then, can project itself in a continuous transitional location, ‘in-between’ times, spaces or frameworks. Platforms like Transitional Justice, in fact, give a fresh and revitalized perspective that helps in understanding heritage as a constant dialogue between the past and the future, memory and remembrance. The ideas reflected in this work challenge the assumption that Cultural Heritage is dependent on rigid identity and nationality and explains how the current framework (within the umbrella of nations-state and UNESCO) has led to the exclusion of some vital heritage assets and, therefore, contributed to their destruction.

The 20\textsuperscript{th} century has shown us new cultural expressions which include contemporary ways of living that were not fathomable in the past such as diasporas, flows of people, knowledge, traditions, and capitals that have homogenized the platform of what we call culture. In-between cultures and post neo-colonial communities such as those in Latin America, the Balkans, and some in South East Asia, have initiated a comprehensive plan to define their own identities (nation-building) as a dynamic process. This includes, for example, embracing the notion of heritage formation as a process not as a consequence, and acknowledging characteristics that can be encouraged, supported and nurtured. By comparison, traditional recognition of Cultural Heritage expressions has remained static, framed by politics, politicians and structures with limited possibilities. However, contemporary

concepts such as hybridity and multivocality are helping in setting and orienting alternative scholarships to include the excluded, or perhaps to reframe universal concepts such as Cultural Heritage. In those terms, heritage expressions left from the past - a distant past that very few consider as inherited and most recognise as ‘given’ - can be developed to help understand: i) why some of those heritage expressions are left abandoned, ii) how the abandoned heritage assets can facilitate in bridging the coexistence of different cultures and communities, and iii) how the new hybrid communities, the ones in-between continents, countries, and nations, can be recognised as part of a holistic platform.

When looking at the new composition of eastern European countries, the focus of a pan-European perspective is present, at least in economic terms, which in practical actions helps to develop an identity, or reformat old discourses around European endeavors. In those cases, the new platform for national development is prearranged, while in other cases like Palestine, with a strong sense of ‘self’, pride, and culture, hybridity is a concept restrained within geography, but is not enough to lead to the consolidation of a nation. When analyzing Famagusta it is interesting to see its connections to French architecture, Venetian military engineering, or British technology. However these are not enough to consider it European in political terms, or Middle Eastern in the intangible expressions, or Cypriot in its connections all over the island. It is only considered ‘illegal’ or simply ‘unrecognized’.

The final question therefore must be: How do we deal with hybrid communities that fall between east and west, between religious beliefs, languages, and ethnicities? How do we recognise the construction or deconstruction of the cultural assets of a number of communities left by the international community with an indeterminate status and in limbo? The current era insists that exclusion is only a status, while the excluded does not disappear but remains in ambiguity. Those excluded by fixed national conditions have been the source of hybridity and a new
organization among numerous marginal expressions. Music, language, culture, and gastronomy in ‘fusion’ have become a plethora of trends difficult to incorporate in the frames of policies. Those in-between places or peoples have become sites of vibrant cultural production, of hybrid cultures, of cultures that cannot be framed within the national or political structure. How, then, do we create a bridging strategy to incorporate all regions in centralized policies? Or to recognise the collapse of the current system that is so closed to permeability and connections between the establishment of state governments and the cultural expressions outside of them? Cyprus has been one of the main connectors between East and West throughout an extended period of time, a mixture of beliefs, languages, ethnicities, and a key piece in the puzzle of history, with Famagusta as its best representation in grandiosity of the past and shortcomings of the present. This is why my work contests the current impediments to secure Famagusta, and offers an alternative setting to prevent the continuous decay of its Cultural Heritage. Having understood the issues that have immersed Famagusta in a state of escalating decay, my intention is to offer a pragmatic management model outside the current international framework where the notion of universal heritage is entrenched. The present work naturally questions the role of the international organizations created to prevent loss as it happened in Second World War. It also contests the highly politicized component of Cultural Heritage around the world and the ‘official’ scholarship that has chosen to deny conflict, polarizing the world between legal and illegal realms, consciously refusing to acknowledge the transborder and transitional component of heritage. But most of all, I acknowledge the current political, ideological, and managerial framework of Cultural Heritage which was designed in denial of a key feature in the history of humankind that has remained present in all societies, continents, and cultures, war.

My work intends not only to bring Famagusta back to the international debate through a feasible proposal to prevent its decay, but also to re-open the discussion of
the role of international organizations in the light of transitional stages and communities. An analysis on the applicability in Famagusta of the doctrinal body of literature that supports the work of UNESCO would require a separate study. I would rather understand Famagusta bared on its current heritage condition. Instead, to improve the possibilities for Famagusta’s heritage assets, I employ Transitional Justice, a framework that accepts Famagusta’s troubled past and present and sets the conditions for a feasible future. The existing scholarship on Transitional Justice shows it as a flexible platform designed to provide alternatives to the dead end created by war and conflict. One of those limitations comes from the relationship between victims and perpetrators, and the judicial system that is required in the light of settlement or peace processes. There are no formulas for Transitional Justice, as there are no formulas to define what triggers conflict. It requires to be tailored on case to case analysis.

Cultural Heritage is an asset with the capacity to induce, then nurture ‘memories’ that never flourished in the minds of the beholder, rather like a sense of melancholy for the past. As such, it has the capacity to attract people from different cultures to become immersed in it. Since the existence of communities ‘in-between’ is not framed by traditional schemes of governance which tend to hold the dominant historiographies, the accountability over those cultural assets requires alternative frameworks, recognition of new stakeholders, and above all, a de-politicized platform to begin a more inclusive discussion where it would be possible to isolate Cultural Heritage from permanent destruction. Famagusta is the perfect location for such a study.

21 As delineated by the United Nations: “Each transitional justice programme is unique and implemented in a specific societal context, often marked by broken institutions, exhausted resources, diminished security, and a distressed and divided population. The careful consideration of the particular transitional justice needs of a country may include assessing factors such as the root causes of the underlying conflict, involving related violations of all rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, […] To enhance the sustainability and relevance of transitional justice processes, these should be carried out, where feasible, by local and national actors.” United Nations Rule of Law, see full text accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=29.
Chapter I
Cultural Heritage Conceptualization:
Famagusta, a Definition at the Center of Conflict
1. Departure Point: a Personal Perspective

Reflecting on Cultural Heritage – on the concept as well as the process of its conceptualization – requires a personal perspective as a starting point. It necessitates an acknowledgment of one’s own understanding of heritage and culture before one starts assembling a general view of it. I will use my own professional experience in the field of Cultural Heritage, particularly in relation to Famagusta itself, to set the tone for this discussion, thus arriving at the key aspects of the main argument of this dissertation.

Having been born and raised in Colombia, where I spent the first 30 years of my life exposed to the harsh reality of death and destruction caused by the country’s internal conflict, the first instantly recognizable aspect of the society, for me, is the vestige of conflict. I grew up cognizant of the processes by which conflict permeates the multiple strands of society – from economics, politics, education, religion, and heritage, especially Cultural Heritage. However, conflict is not unique or exclusive to my personal history or to Colombian society, as in many societies around the world at different moments in time, the same is apparent. Conflict is also visible in the history of numerous societies, which in one way or another possess Cultural Heritage expressions that reflect conflict-laden events. One could argue further, in principle, that heritage is inevitably formed by different layers of influences or characteristics, which are triggered by changes – and changes are often violent in nature and manifest as conflict in form. It is against this background, of the complex relationship between conflict and heritage (though this complexity includes more aspects), that I examine the transformations in the conceptualization of Cultural Heritage in order to assess its applicability to the specific case of Famagusta.

What do we really see when we observe structures, statues, or buildings linked to heritage and the past? Do we see a single narrative of heroism, nationalism, pride, ____________

22 Though this relationship is composed of more than simply conflict and heritage, I limit myself to these two aspects since they most clearly illustrate my claims. Other aspects are grounds for future research in this area and are beyond the scope of my thesis.
and national identity? I would argue against this and suggest that it is imperative to note that these structures are not neutral and static – they undergo different layers of destruction, reconstruction, and alterations that, in some instances, were brought about through imposition and force. In architecture for example, fascism in Europe left impressive buildings and public spaces that are assessed in current times with the associations and perhaps guilt of the legacies of fascist policies. These buildings, though they meet the standards as great architectural achievements, are viewed and interpreted, on the one hand, in terms of painful memories (of fascism) and on the other hand, through the political framework within which these buildings were constructed. As I will point out later in this chapter, this tendency to view heritage within the framework of highly selective memories which are necessarily embedded in the present context and of political meanings attached to it, serves as one of the key difficulties in the current international framework of Cultural Heritage. The inability, or unwillingness to acknowledge that conflict is permanent in the shaping of heritage, and that heritage is inevitably grounded on distinct political and social structures (rather than in the present or in the future), is a significant obstacle in the redefinition and development of Cultural Heritage.

For the past fifteen years, I have been living as a part of the Colombian diaspora, practicing in various sectors of the Cultural Heritage industry in different

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23 It is important to keep in perspective the definition of ‘monument’, which is originally embedded memory: “MONUMENT: (Lat. monumentum, from moneo, to remind), anything durable made or erected to perpetuate the memory of persons or events. Their chief kinds of monuments are described under their special names. See cairn; Cromlech; Sepulchral; Mounds; Pillar; Obelisk; Pyramid; Arch; Triumphal; Brasses; Tomb; Stupa; Mausoleum, &c.” Chamber’s Encyclopedia, vol. VI, s.v. “Monument” Edinburgh: Chamber’s Encyclopedia, 1860, <https://archive.org/details/cu31924087904664> (accessed Nov 7, 2014).

24 To understand the term diaspora Tölölyan argues: “[...] since the late 1960s, ‘diaspora’ has come to mean what it does in its imbrication with the terms transnationalism, globalization, migrancy, ethnicity, exile, the post-colonial and the nation. Since the 1980s, the changing meanings of ‘belonging’ and ‘citizenship’ have further complicated the conceptual situation.” Khachig Tölölyan, “Diaspora Studies: Past, Present and Promise,” International Migration Institute, Working Papers (2012): 4. Tsagarousianou proposes: “I suggest that diasporas should be seen not as given communities, a logical, albeit deterritorialized, extension of an ethnic or national group, but as imagined communities, continuously reconstructed and reinvented. I argue that it is in the context of this intersection of connectivity and cultural reinvention and reconstruction that media technologies and diasporic media become crucial factors in the reproduction and transformation of diasporic identities.” Roza Tsagarousianou, “Rethinking
parts of the world where there is an evident and deep relationship between politics, conflict and Cultural Heritage, such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Cyprus. I have acquired skills and knowledge that have helped me understand and make the connections between my initial conceptions on heritage (at least what I was taught heritage should be) and the aspects that shape its recognition. This, I would suggest, include: identity\(^{25}\) and the narratives of nation state\(^{26}\), and/or a sense of ownership and inheritance. I have also come to realize the complexity of various societies’ construction as nations, their association with identities, and with relevant heritage. I have become increasingly aware of the shortcomings of the current system that governs our understanding of Cultural Heritage. The associations and links I have acquired, with various places - not by inheritance but acquired by choice – have allowed me to establish an understanding of colonialism, religion, ideology and myriad socio-political idiosyncrasies.\(^{27}\) As a transitory inhabitant of various places, I have been afforded a different gaze, one that is different from the perspective of the locals in those places. In

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\(^{25}\) Blake asks: “How is identity conceptualized in a culturally diverse community and how does the process of identity formulation pave the way to the exclusion of minorities and, worse, of material destruction? I believe, as other scholars have asserted that part of that answer lies in the recognition of our own sense of collectivity and the role of political structures in the definition of what is national, what is local, what identifies the nation, and what threatens the unity of it. This leads into: ‘the identification of cultural heritage is in itself a political act given its symbolic relationship to culture and society in general’.” Blake, On Defining Cultural Heritage, 69.

\(^{26}\) Together with the narratives designed in support of larger portions of the history of communities arose the need of building national identity. Cultural Heritage played a substantial role in nation definition. According to Bruce Trigger: “Archaeology, like modern forms of tourism, arose during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in tandem with industrialization, colonialism, and the Euro-American search for national identity.” Junko Habu, Claire Fawcett and John M. Matsunaga. Evaluating Multiple Narratives: Beyond Nationalist, Colonialist and Imperialist Archaeologies (USA: Springer),7. Nations as we know them now, correspond to a modern concept given by international recognition subject to a political role built by the elite (politicians and intellectuals) and then endorsed by the society as the main beneficiary. Along with nations as defined by Scott: “[...] nation-states find themselves at the intersection of two conflicting trends: one, towards the inclusivity of the global; the other towards the exclusivity of the national, with its focus on borders and boundaries of various types.” Scott, World Heritage as a Model for Citizenship: the case of Cyprus,100.

\(^{27}\) On the topic of deterritorialization Bida explains: “For Tomlinson deterritorialisation ‘weakens the ties of culture to place’ through its ‘penetration of local worlds’ and ‘dislodging of everyday meanings’ […] He mentions the related terms of delocalisation and dis-placement in a discussion of how this complex and ambiguous phenomenon, one that is uneven and sometimes contradictory, has been embraced and at times reversed. Deterritorialisation includes the effects of untethering cultural notions and artefacts from locality as well as opening them to individuals and groups of any culture.” Aleksandra Bida, “Cultural Deterritorialisation: Communications Technology, Provenance and Place,” Platform: Journal of Media and Communication 5 no. 1 (2009): 34.
other words, my viewpoint has become one in between an outsider and an insider. This has allowed me to contest, negotiate, and deconstruct identities and national narratives on heritage within an ever-changing, global, context.²⁸ Facing questions of identity, ownership, connectivity and significance towards places and their own cultural platform, by default, questions my own role and rights in those cultures’ historical narratives.²⁹ This is certainly the case for Cyprus where I ask: Are we irrevocably embedded in closed environments where identity, boundaries, and settings give an unquestioning sense of relationship between community and culture?

2. From Monument to Cultural Heritage: a Dismiss of Memory

The principle that gave birth to the Cultural Heritage industry and scholarship was the acknowledgement that events from the past are relevant in the present. It hinges on the idea that there are important sets of memories that we should not forget and that must be commemorated. One might ask: When did we lose that connection between events and how they are commemorated, in urban spaces, architecture, archaeology and other disciplines that deal with physical representation? In order to address this fundamental question it is necessary to trace back the changes of the conceptualization of what we now call Cultural Heritage and assess the current connections between the term and its political, sociological and cultural surroundings. Here, I intend to elaborate on the transition of a concept that for centuries dominated the public domain when referring to the memories of the past: monument, into a contemporary approach: cultural heritage. I then highlight the connections of the new

²⁸ The relationship between globalization and diaspora is explained by Tsagarousianou: “diasporas themselves are deeply affected by their position at the centre of contemporary globalisation flows. In that sense, there is no going ‘home’ again.” Tsagarousianou, Rethinking the concept of diaspora: mobility, connectivity and communication in a globalised world, 56-7.

²⁹ The concept of narrative was developed to help in providing scientific grounds to the history of ancient communities, as has been rigorously explored by scholars such as Trigger, Renfrew and Bahn, Snodgrass, Maier, and others. Narratives were designed to create the needs for knowledge and they were also influenced by the political scenarios, especially the ones with colonial, imperial, and national discourses as discussed in Habu, J et al., Evaluating Multiple Narratives: Beyond Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist Archaeologies (USA: Springer, 2008): 1-11. It is well documented that archaeology was and still is deeply linked to the traditional principles of culture, history, and to economic values that constrain the recognition of other forms of heritage such as spiritual or symbolic expressions.
term, Cultural Heritage, to the set of international scenarios ruled by politics and power. I also discuss how the legal framework of the concept of Cultural Heritage and the influence of UNESCO have established, on the one hand, a direct connection to conservation, and, on the other hand a turn away from memory, in favor of the aspects of nationality, identity and collectiveness that have institutionalized (although some would argue: perhaps unintentionally) the dismissal of minorities, contested territories and memories that challenge the United Nations’ international system.

All of these represent problematic conceptions in the case of Famagusta, given its background, the current situation, and the geopolitics of the region. I do not, however, expect to present a solution within the system (UNESCO – UN – general public). In current times when ideas such as urban resilience, sustainability in development, and urban ecological systems are a must in any urban discussion, we find that Cultural Heritage, and its theoretical settings, does not yet fully incorporate those aspects into its framework – it does not adhere to one agreed definition, a set of values compatible with other urban, ecological, economic and development systems that rule the existence of communities, and societies. At least not yet. What this study offers to fill this void is a contribution to a framework where Cultural Heritage can establish connections and links to its counterparts of contemporary life, especially when profoundly disturbing events such as conflict happen and a transitional stage is triggered. This is necessary to draw a complete picture of what Famagusta represents through the lens of the past and also with the challenges of the present. In short, the following sections lay out the components of a sound definition of Famagusta’s heritage assets before a potential political agreement in Cyprus can be discussed.

A detailed account of different moments when the concept of heritage has been acknowledged is the main concern at this juncture. I will use two fundamental documents on which to build my approach, one prepared by Werner Von
Truetzschler\textsuperscript{30} and the other by Jukka Jokilehto.\textsuperscript{31} Through this discussion, three important arguments become clear: first, Cultural Heritage is a concept that emerged and was developed within UNESCO and its consultant organizations (ICOMOS and ICCROM), conditioning its doctrinal foundations to the political system of the UN member states. This aligns the meaning, definition, and characterization of heritage following with what nations allow in terms of their boundaries, forms of government, national narratives, recognized ethnicities, religions, gender and human rights approach. Second, Cultural Heritage, as defined and dictated by UN agencies, is not sufficient to frame, assess, promote and develop contested heritage and heritage sites as in the case of Famagusta in North Cyprus, where aspects such as the lack of identity, mobility, connectivity, memory, diasporas, conflict and transborder forms of culture give meaning to its heritage. Thirdly, since Cultural Heritage is an expression that captures moments and events that enriched, presumably, the narrative of the nation and its corresponding national memory, the propensity of heritage management leans more on the simplistic and rigid method of heritage preservation (an approach that is focused on conservation to restore the ‘authentic’ features of the heritage asset). I maintain, quite simply, that the current doctrine requires a shift in trajectory in order to capture the evolving nature of social and cultural relationships today. In the case of Famagusta, this first step is essential in order to appreciate and develop its heritage assets.

For the past sixty years, Cultural Heritage and preservation have been two overlapping concepts and, on occasion, have been used interchangeably. It is assumed that what is considered Cultural Heritage must be preserved in its physicality, according to UNESCO’s underlying principles and practices. It is important to note, however, that the two (Cultural Heritage and preservation), though clearly connected,
do not refer to the same thing. What does preservation aim to achieve? To preserve a snapshot of our time? One dominant narrative? The national discourse? Gender supremacy? Ethnic and religious makeup of the present generation? Indubitably, Cultural Heritage is more than these. Cultural Heritage reflects, or should reflect, the memory of multiple narratives, trans-culturation and trans-border significances. In any case, the answers are confined to our own limited vision of the past and uncertainty towards the future. But more than that, Cultural Heritage should be kept as a live memory that challenges the framework that for over sixty years has built its own structures that have, and still are, used in support of nation building. In an era of globalization these definitions and priorities need, I suggest, to be re-cast.

At this juncture, I would like to take a step back and examine the evolution of the concept of Cultural Heritage starting from the notion of ‘monument.’ In the specific case of Famagusta, it is important to understand in which context Cultural Heritage expressions have been left ignored for decades, despite their relevance for the memory of all mankind. The result addresses how the current established international system locks in doctrine, sovereignty, and the international system of nations. Therefore, the system became a solid and uncontested body of ‘truths’ that preclude the existence of realities outside the UN system of nations. It also precludes the interactions between Cultural Heritage and other systems in the territory where it exists. The reasons for this are: a) the difficulties of Famagusta lie in the current framework under which Cultural Heritage is assessed, kept, and assisted, which prevents the international community of countries from recognizing Famagusta as a fundamental asset to humanity, b) the previous attempts to secure Famagusta (e.g. Ottoman law on heritage and British Law on Famagusta Stones) do not apply in current circumstances, only because they correspond to a different political setting, one that is no longer recognized in the doctrinal documents that emerged under UNESCO’s tenets, and c) because the current structure of local legislation in North Cyprus (fundamentally similar to the ones
implemented during British rule) have failed in preventing Famagusta’s decay since 1974. Geopolitics has changed and Cultural Heritage gives evidence of that.

I will then use the Hague Convention to define a breaking point where the concept of Cultural Heritage emerged as the main framework for cultural expressions from the past. It is necessary to highlight that the dates and locations of the meetings and scientific committees that gave birth to these documents, charters and conventions had limited connection to events and geopolitics of those times (e.g. the Cyprus case cannot be seen in the light of the Venice Charter, or vice versa), and does not correspond to a personal choice or intentional sequence. It reflects the disconnection between political events (e.g. the shift in the administrations of Cyprus from Ottoman to British) and the doctrines that will be analyzed in the following paragraphs.

2.1 Before the Hague Convention (1954)

The term Cultural Heritage coined for the first time in the Hague Convention of 1954 (*Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict*). I use 1954 as a critical juncture therefore because in the convention, there occurred a change in the meaning of a concept used for centuries, which had reflected more accurately what heritage is about, that is, memory.

This is the concept of ‘monument’, also identified by Truetzschler as the predecessor of Cultural Heritage, used long before the 19th century. It refers to “anything durable made or erected to perpetuate the memory of persons or events.” This principle strongly attaches Cultural Heritage to something physical and material, in a sense, as defined by UNESCO:

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32 Truetzschler, The Evolution of Cultural Heritage in International Law, 1; Jokilehto, Definition of Cultural Heritage: References to Documents in History, 15.
33 In the case of change of meanings it is important to understand how international organizations operate: “IOs [International Organizations] can fix meanings in ways that orient action and establish boundaries for acceptable action. IOs often play a central role in establishing meanings for a broad range of international actors. For example in the development field IOs have been at the center of efforts to define (and redefine) what development is, who gets to do the developing (usually states or IOs), and who is to be developed (usually local groups).” Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, 2004. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 32.
34 Truetzschler, The Evolution of Cultural Heritage in International Law, 1.
35 Chamber's Encyclopedia Vol. VI, 564.
“cultural heritage may be defined as the entire corpus of material signs - either artistic or symbolic - handed on by the past to each culture and, therefore, to the whole of humankind. As a constituent part of the affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities, as a legacy belonging to all humankind, the cultural heritage gives each particular place its recognizable features and is the storehouse of human experience. The preservation and the presentation of the cultural heritage are therefore a corner-stone of any cultural policy.”

This raises a number of key issues and observations that are important in understanding the changing nature of Cultural Heritage as: 1) the meaning, and indeed the mention, of memory disappeared, 2) became fragmented by cultures, 3) and subjected to cultural identity, which is in turn subjected it to a physical setting, and 4) limited it to an act of recognition and preservation.

I maintain that these developments are counter-productive in the conceptualization of heritage and Cultural Heritage, but that they were necessary then (in the 1950s) to frame aspects of culture in the light of nation building agendas and the protection of a post-war political system. In the 1954 Hague Convention, the term ‘monument’ emerged as a fundamental concept. It was mentioned nine times in the text of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954. Interestingly, the term was also always accompanied by an additional addendum: “of great importance”. This is significant because it links monuments with greatness in size that is physically expressed or located in space (tombs, mausoleums, and memorials), to a kind of memorial that is valued for its artistic expression. At the same time the Hague Convention was being drafted, factions within Cyprus were strongly opposing British rule that later resulted in independence and subsequent inter-ethnic conflict throughout the island. Famagusta also suffered the effects of Internal Displaced Persons, refugees and ethnic harassment, and this prepared the ground for simplistic, nationalistic driven narratives, that could claim for example, ‘Famagusta was always Ottoman’, therefore

36 Jokilehto, Definition of Cultural Heritage: References to Documents in History, 4-5.
Turkish, therefore non-Greek. Escalation of totalitarianism from both sides embroiled in the conflict was immediate, radical and seemingly permanent as the basic discourses have traversed four complete decades by now.

In the 19th century the meaning of heritage was intrinsically linked to land and its corresponding legal framework. When establishing the connection between Heritage, Heritage Bond, Heritable Jurisdiction, Heritor and the contemporary understanding of Cultural Heritage, we must also understand its linkage to ownership and value, therefore, by extension, exclusion and sovereignty linked to statehood. The intention of tracing the meanings of ‘monument’ and Cultural Heritage is to give the reader a better understanding of the reasons behind the emergence, and evolution of ‘monument’ into ‘Cultural Heritage’, and the ramifications it had on sites such as Famagusta.

In the 1931 Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments the term ‘monument’ was mentioned thirty one times (title included) and it clearly states that restoration (also known as conservation) was applicable to monuments only. At this time, the term ‘monument’ was covered by the scope of historic, valuable, assets in need of an action to preserve them. Those remembrances or memories could not be mistaken by aspects of inheritance because that would distort the spirit of the charter, which is the preservation of the past. The document further elaborates on the nature of monuments and divides it into two major categories: ancient and historic. It is important to remember the state-centered conception of Cultural Heritage that has guided this sector from the beginning, and its difficulties in framing regions of the

37 Since the term ‘heritage’ corresponds to the English language, it is relevant to trace it back to its roots and its context to what is now known as the United Kingdom to highlight its relationship with ownership and property, which will be discussed in this chapter: “Heritage and Movable from ‘Heir and Executor’, Heritable Bond from its value in land area in the Scottish law, Heritable Jurisdictions refer to the exercise of law in special areas of Scotland, Heritor from land property in Scotland, as explained in: Chamber’s Encyclopedia, Vol V, 336. See complete text from: https://archive.org/details/cu31924087904656. Accessed Nov 7, 2014.

world that are imbued with different sets of ethics. In the *Carta Italiana del restauro*, a key document written by Gustavo Giovannoni in 1932, which was adopted as the regulating framework for the intervention of buildings, cities, and other environments that can be classified as of historic importance in Italy, the term ‘monument’ is cited twelve times (title included). It equates ‘monument’ with architecture and urbanism that holds importance given its trajectory and historic meaning. Here, ‘monument’ is also used as the object of preservation, conservation, or restoration without any attempt to classify or categorize based on its significance. ‘Monument’ then is the representation of a past which restoration will secure. In previous documents, like one from 1904 corresponding to the resolution adopted in *The 6th International Congress of Architects in Madrid*, the concept of ‘monument’ is divided into dead monuments and living monuments. Documents dated before 1954 back to the end of the French Revolution in 1799 are constant in the use of the concept of ‘monument’ as of historic relevance. In practice, the work archaeologists faced in the 19th century already reinforced the validity of Cultural Heritage as a carrier of diverse memories of multiple narratives. As I will demonstrate in Chapter II, one of the relevant persons belonging to this era and mindset, and who has contributed to scholarship on Famagusta, is Sir George Jeffrey. His fundamental publication entitled *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, *Studies in the Archaeology and Architecture of the Island* in 1918, gives evidence that Famagusta has been studied as a site of memories, a concept that has remained in contemporary scholarship.

The relevance of the account of events that led to the solidification of the term Cultural Heritage and the transformation of the meaning of ‘monument’ permits space

in which to reflect on the authority\textsuperscript{41}, representativeness\textsuperscript{42}, autonomy\textsuperscript{43} and legitimacy\textsuperscript{44} of international organizations such as UNESCO. Using scholarship on other UN agencies we may establish parallels that help understand the current case of Famagusta. My objective is to frame the discussion concerning the possibilities that at present are offered to Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage and other heritage sites that are located in territories outside the system of nations; establish a linkage between urban systems with which Cultural Heritage is concomitant (at legal, economic, managerial and development level); and veer away from the current conceptualization that represents a dead end for Famagusta and other Cultural Heritage expressions.

\textbf{2.2 After the Hague Convention (1954)}

The changes and characterization of the concept of ‘monument’ were altered most significantly after the Second World War, in particular with the Hague Convention. It is necessary to discuss how different doctrinal documents have institutionalized ‘monument’ and Cultural Heritage as two different concepts, dismissing the fundamental principle common to both, memory. During the UNESCO Convention held in New Delhi in 1956, the two terms took on additional meanings that were not previously acknowledged.\textsuperscript{45} Furthermore, there was an attempt to differentiate

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\textsuperscript{41} For the case of UNESCO’s consolidation of the term Cultural Heritage, the following is applicable: “Expertise not only makes IOs authoritative but also shapes the way these organizations behave. Just as IOs authorized by a moral principle must serve that principle and make their actions consistent with it to remain legitimate and authoritative, so too must IOs authorized by expertise serve that specialized knowledge and make their actions consistent with it.” Barnett and Finnemore, \textit{Rules for the World}, 24.

\textsuperscript{42} For the case of UNESCO and its relationship with conflict-laden regions of the world, the following applies: “States know that if IOs [International Organizations] were not autonomous then they would have not been able to help states further their interests. Consequently they deliberately designed some autonomy for the IOs and IOs use their autonomy to advance mandates that are directly connected to state interest.” Barnett and Finnemore, \textit{Rules for the World}, 28.

\textsuperscript{43} On the issue of autonomy Barnett & Finnemore say: “One important reason states delegate to IOs in the first place is precisely that they want some other actor to take charge of a problem and sort it out. At some level, delegation creates autonomy precisely because being autonomous is the mandate.” Barnett and Finnemore, \textit{Rules for the World}, 22.

\textsuperscript{44} Regularly international organizations such as UNESCO remain unquestioned on the legitimacy of their actions of omissions, nevertheless for the case of Cultural Heritage in North Cyprus and Famagusta in particular the question is relevant. “Legitimacy of most modern public organizations on whether their procedures are viewed as proper and correct (procedural legitimacy) and whether they are reasonably successful at pursuing goals that are consistent with the values of the broader community (substantive legitimacy).” Barnett and Finnemore, \textit{Rules for the World}, 166.

‘monument’ from Cultural Heritage. ‘Monuments’ are defined as different from museum collections, exhibits, works of art, archeological and historic sites, books or works from the past, and regarded as of ‘great value’. It was further recommended to classify the essential elements of any archaeological heritage as ‘historic monuments’. Cultural Heritage, on the other hand, became the umbrella under which diverse cultural expressions could be framed. In a way, ‘monument’ as a concept was relegated to the background and understood now as objects and movable items.\textsuperscript{46} Simply put, in this document we see a gradual change in the perception of the concept of ‘monument’ transforming it into \textit{Cultural Heritage} and relegating its original significance to aspects of size, bulk, uniqueness and property, and most importantly diluting the meaning of memory. In November 19, 1964, UNESCO published a manuscript entitled \textit{Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property}. The same year, the UN resolution No. 186 set up a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus - UNFICYP. A relevant connection between both UN decisions would probably have benefited Cultural Heritage in Cyprus setting a path that effectively could secure sites and assets. Here, a significant change occurred however. The term ‘monument’ failed to appear and was replaced with the concept of ‘heritage’, which then became the main subject of the recommendation. It is crucial to point out at this juncture that the usage of the term heritage was, and still is, inevitably attached to, negotiated by, and meditated within member states. The robust cord that linked heritage to state was now evident in the provisions of the document which stated:

\textsuperscript{46} For example, resolution 4.52 states: “The Director-General is authorized to encourage Member States to develop and improve technical and legal measures for the protection, preservation and restoration of cultural property (museum collections and exhibits, monuments, and archaeological or historical sites) Ibíd., 24. In section 7.91, it further states: “Considering that, on account of recent and current events in the Middle East and in other regions of the world, monuments and other cultural property of great value, the destruction of which would be a serious loss to the cultural heritage of the world, are in danger.” Ibíd., 37. This highlights the category of monuments as property which emphasizes the accountability of nation-states over its properties and the direct responsible of its destruction.
“In a spirit of international collaboration which would take into account both the universal nature of culture and the necessity of exchanges for enabling all to benefit by the cultural heritage of mankind, each Member State should take steps to stimulate and develop among its nationals interest in and respect for the cultural heritage of all nations. Such action should be undertaken by the competent services in co-operation with the educational services and with the Press and other media for the communication and dissemination of information, youth and adult education organizations and groups and individuals concerned with cultural activities.”

The complex roles of international organizations and states now require a finer assessment and a deep reflection, to understand dismissal of significant examples of heritage as in the case of Famagusta and North Cyprus. The fact that Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage assets remain unrecognized, neglected and ignored by the international community, speaks of the difficulties of opening an honest discussion on the complexity of Cultural Heritage and its role in everyday life as well as the limited role of the international community in implementing mitigation measures.

During the time when the first sound analysis of Cultural Heritage, which also attempted a complete set of criteria to follow for Cultural Heritage intervention, was being enforced (International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, also known as the 1964 Venice Charter), Cyprus was already a UN Member State (24 August and 20 September, 1960) and also a UNESCO Member State (6 February, 1961). The committee drafting the Venice Charter was composed of individuals from Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia, Netherlands, Denmark, France, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, Peru, the Vatican, France, Greece, Austria, Poland, Tunisia as well as representatives from UNESCO.

The Venice Charter focuses on restoration principles, which by that time was understood as a discipline that intended to secure special moments of history. The prevailing idea was the preservation and the restoration of ‘monuments’ as works of art but also as crucial historical evidence. This document is relevant to the current study of UNESCO, “Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,” accessed Nov, 14, 2014, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13083&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Section 14.
Famagusta as it sets restoration as an activity to be performed to ‘monuments’. Here, the proposal “regard[s] ancient Monuments as a common heritage.” The charter recognizes ‘monument’ as something more all-embracing than previously understood, stating that: “The concept of a historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or a historic event.” The concept of ‘monument’ was flexible enough, it appears, to welcome additional classifications of events that were relevant for the memory of the world (for instance, architecture, archaeology, and urbanism) and should therefore be safeguarded as historical evidence.

In the Recommendation on the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public of Private Works (1968), there is a fundamental relationship between the doctrine prepared within and endorsed by UNESCO and the implementation of policies on heritage and culture at the regional and local levels. Moreover, the concept of ‘monument’ is addressed as something different from ‘historic, artistic, archaeological and scientific sites’, accentuating the increasing complexity in the conceptualization of heritage. The fact that most legal systems establish binding effects between international agreements and the national judicial system, and that UNESCO is exactly that, a group of member states, helps in understanding the difficulties of contesting UNESCO’s ideological hegemony at the national level. Moreover, it helps in understanding the difficulties of addressing sites like Famagusta. A place like Famagusta, whose main asset is to remind, remember, and recall the turbulent past of the Mediterranean basin and its connections between East and West, cannot be

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49 Ibid., Article 1.
50 UNESCO, “Recommendation on the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public of Private Works,” UNESCO, 1968, accessed Nov 14, 2014, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13085&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. This document states: “The General Conference recommends that Member States should bring this recommendation to the attention of the authorities or services responsible for public or private works as well as to the bodies responsible for the conservation and the protection of monuments and historic, artistic, archaeological and scientific sites. It recommends that authorities and bodies which plan programmes for education and the development of tourism be equally informed”
understood if one veer from the value of memory. Faced with an international setting that is not receptive to issues that counter or negate its basic tenets, the possibilities for a site like Famagusta remain limited.

In the *Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property*, the term ‘monument’ is only mentioned twice. Initially this was done in reference to the ‘dismembered parts of historic monuments,’ and so limited its reach to items that can be dismembered (i.e. separated into smaller parts) leaving architecture, archaeology, groups of buildings and other expressions, beyond definition. In the same document, ‘monument’ is understood as cultural property of religious or secular and public settings, different from museum pieces. At this juncture, it is important to note that the further we go from the Hague Convention in 1954, the closer we come to more specialized forms of heritage, in their conceptualization, acknowledgement and intervention, always moving away from memory as a core aspect. This includes the acknowledgement that in times of conflict Cultural Heritage becomes a target of destruction, and that as well as human rights, cultural rights have had limited effect in securing heritage assets as well as lives. Paradoxically, during the times when the Hague Convention came into force, Cyprus was beginning a process of internal unrest that lead to the current division and the abandonment of Cultural Heritage in the northern region.

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52 Ibid., Article 1 numeral d.

53 On that regard “to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another State Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for the States concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining to the inventory of that institution.” Ibid., Article 7 (b) (i).

54 Regarding specialization and categorization the following can help understand these Conventions in the context of international organizations (IOs): “Having established rules and norms, IOs are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and often act as a conveyor belts for the transmission of norms and models of good political behavior.” Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World*, 33.
During the 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Cultural Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (also known as World Heritage Convention), the concept of Cultural Heritage took a more distinct form, while the term ‘monument’ was relegated as its subset. UNESCO identified three divisions of Cultural Heritage: groups of buildings, sites, and monuments.\textsuperscript{55} Clearly, this classification moves ‘monument’ from its original meaning – something that reminds us of a person or event – and reinforced the idea of a ‘monument’ as a singular item of great scale, an archaeological remain, and a structure that is unique.\textsuperscript{56} More importantly, at the World Heritage Convention, the concept of ‘monument’ was totally annulled from the context and spirit of the convention, whose intention was to create a framework for recognition, promotion and cooperation among states on relevant sites. Although the spirit of this convention intended to open the door wider to include topics such natural heritage and intangible heritage, the results clearly detached Cultural Heritage from its principle of ‘remembering’. Since the World Heritage Convention came to life, it has complicated not only the framework of Cultural Heritage but also its management and accountability over preservation. The convention, moreover, opened a new classification of Cultural Heritage, one that was relevant for the ‘world’ – but notably, this was a world composed of member states only. This is a crucial point, as by 1974 a large portion of Cyprus no longer belonged to the ‘system of nations’. Politics, diplomacy and lobbying now had a direct impact resulting from the fact that the role of UNESCO in North Cyprus’ heritage sites changed. In retrospect, its role has become morally questionable, especially in the political maneuvering that positioned it to


\textsuperscript{56} On this regards: “As IOs classify the world, promote and fix meanings, and diffuse norms, they frequently legitimate and facilitate their own expansion and intervention in the affairs of states and nonstate actors.” Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 33.
enforce the damaging embargo on North Cyprus.\textsuperscript{57} This embargo remains in place to the present day. It is easy to see why a World Heritage Site nomination for Famagusta, or any other site located in North Cyprus, is unfeasible on political, not to mention ethical grounds. To take a reverse viewpoint for a moment, however, we might also ask: why would the community of a divided island seek, or give, authority to an institution that for decades has failed in fulfilling its mandate to secure, preserve and develop Cultural Heritage?

Famagusta, as I have explained above, has been placed outside the international ‘system of nations’ mainly because the doctrine created under the umbrella of UNESCO impedes actions in North Cyprus and its heritage sites. The transition in the Cultural Heritage field from a 19\textsuperscript{th} century understanding of heritage as a site of memory towards Cultural Heritage and its ramifications in politics, diplomacy and the exercise of power is, in my experience and opinion, key to producing any sound analysis of Famagusta. It is important to analyze then, how at the regional level, the European Union, the European Commission and the Council of Europe have played a role in exacerbating Famagusta’s current condition. Although this discussion will not delve deeply into such matters, the use of various charters and documents on Cultural Heritage by European organizations constitute the framework of their approach to Famagusta. That is, despite the lack of tools to implement Cultural Heritage legislation in Northern Cyprus, international organizations continued producing doctrinal papers.

The draft \textit{Charter of the European Architectural Heritage}\textsuperscript{58} from 1975 offers no major changes in the assessment of ‘monuments’ from an isolated and singular

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\item To explain the role of UNESCO in Cyprus and the Cultural Heritage located in the island, the following gives a relevant perspective: “\textit{IOs, then, were conferred authority because of the various functions they were expected to perform and their standing as experts and as moral agents. Once created, international organizations, acting like the bureaucracies they were, used their authority to expand their control over more and more of international life.” Barnett and Finnemore, \textit{Rules for the World}, 44.
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perspective, neither does the *Declaration of Amsterdam*, also from 1975. The *Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property* from 1976 did not mention ‘monument’. Instead, an additional meaning is imposed on ‘monument’: ‘homogeneous monumental group.’ This isolates ‘monuments’ and the reach of its meaning from other categorizations of Cultural Heritage. The *Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe* (known as the Granada Convention) held in 1985 is more explicit in defining ‘monument’ as “all buildings and structures of conspicuous historical, archaeological, artistic, scientific, social or technical interest, including their fixtures and fittings.” Suffice it to say, European countries have kept a more stable approach to heritage and its relation to the principle of memory. In this document, it is evident that the concept of ‘monument’ is able to satisfy a broad scope including most of the existing classifications regarding the concept of Cultural Heritage. Other significant documents are: The *Charter for the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas* (1987) which completely abolishes the concept of monument, while in contrast the Charter for the *Protection and Management of the Archaeological Heritage* (1990) links ‘monument’ to archaeological remains. The *Nara Document on Authenticity* (1994) endorses the concept of monument established by the World Heritage Convention, which transforms ‘monument’ as a component of the Cultural Heritage sector. ‘Monuments’ from that moment on are understood as: “architectural works, works of monumental sculpture

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60 Definitions Article 1.a. states the following: “Among these `areas`, which are varied in nature, it is possible to distinguish the following `in particular`: prehistoric sites, historic towns, old urban quarters, villages and hamlets as well as homogeneous monumental groups, it being understood that the latter should as a rule be carefully preserved unchanged”. UNESCO, “Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property.” UNESCO, 1976, accessed Nov 7, 2014, <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13133&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>


and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave
dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from
the point of view of history, art of science.‖

From the documents that I have examined here, I point out three main
conclusions. The transition from ‘monument’ to ‘Cultural Heritage’ seems to be
designed to: 1) shift from a concept that in the light of nation states is problematic to
embrace (that is, memory) into another concept that from a legal point of view
identifies property (that is, heritage), giving a new platform for nation building, 2)
develop an industry around Cultural Heritage expressions, which has obliged
international organizations to re-define and re-assess the conceptualization of ‘Cultural
Heritage’, and 3) create the need for a categorization of Cultural Heritage by
‘importance’, leading to the creation of a brand that unifies cultural and economic
valorization, transforming events of memory into a commodity and the formation of an
exclusive club. The World Heritage Site club, and a set of criteria known as
Outstanding Universal Value is the result.64

The doctrines and international agreements mentioned here disclose and
regulate the behavior that countries should now follow when dealing with Cultural
Heritage. The combination of management, conceptualization, and guidance is the
product of political agreements among UNESCO member states. It is not, I would
argue, an approach on behalf of Cultural Heritage expressions. The transformations
and constraints in the concepts of ‘monument’ and Cultural Heritage discussed above
directly shape the reality of Famagusta and other heritage sites located in North
Cyprus, and others further afield. Cultural Heritage is destined to exist as, or within, a

64 When trying to understand the succession of events following the World Heritage Convention, the
geopolitics involved in it, the brand created to portion exclusivity, it is important to remember the
following: “Bureaucracies map social reality as they collect and store files and data, create divisions of
labour and specialized units, and construct rules that define, categorize, and classify the world. In this way,
bureaucratic knowledge not only reflects the social reality as defined by the bureaucracy but also
constructs the reality.” Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 30.
distinct political arena, therefore, its future depends on, and will depend on, political arguments and agreements beyond its reach.

The location of Famagusta in an unrecognized territory triggers a number of questions: was not UNESCO created to prevent the loss of Cultural Heritage and destruction globally? Has UNESCO been transformed into an ideological body universally recognized in the name of humankind? If both answers are yes, then there is a moral rightness that accompanies UNESCO towards Cultural Heritage expressions in general. But then should not the deliberate choice of ignoring Famagusta and North Cyprus be seen as threat against humankind, or at least its memory? Is deliberate ignoring not a form of premeditated negligence? If so, is the design of the World Heritage Site brand dominated by politics, as opposed to heritage aspects, and therefore, exclusive. Must Famagusta be excluded permanently?65

3. World Heritage Site -WHS: An exclusive 1000 member club and Outstanding Universal Value

In 1975, a new categorization of Cultural Heritage (the World Heritage Site) was created to favor sites that are above others in relevance and importance (condensed in a set of criteria now known as Outstanding Universal Value).66 This category is unfeasible for Famagusta. Since UNESCO67 works on the premise of a four-pronged strategy (to guarantee education, protect heritage sites, promote international scientific collaboration, and secure the freedom of expression) as well as within the principles of


66 The World Heritage brand has placed heritage on a level that is better explained by Blake: “This reference to ‘universal heritage’ brings into the equation a further characterisation of cultural heritage as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (CHM), placing it alongside a broader category of non-renewable resources.” Blake, On Defining Cultural Heritage, 68.

human rights, the preservation and management of Cultural Heritage has been extrapolated from international to universal values: from national ownership, to global management. The establishment of UNESCO and its commitment to intercultural discussions and Cultural Heritage preservation was, I surmise, a defining moment in that it became the leading global agency responsible for two things: identifying (and in some instances neglecting), recognizing, and benefiting heritage sites with Outstanding Universal Value, and clearly stating or defining what constituted the matrix of universal values. All of this seems very positive. The present study, however, through interrogation of the framework formulated by UNESCO, argues that it does not sufficiently take into consideration areas that are of political conflicts. To such contested territories, or as I argue, the communities in transition, Famagusta belongs. UNESCO’s framework on Cultural Heritage pays no heed to disputed cases like Famagusta, which continues to be laden with confounding identities and a plethora of political concerns.

When UNESCO prompted the creation and institutionalization of World Heritage Sites, the political, economic, and socio-cultural impact on Cultural Heritage management became evident. Traditionally, tourism followed inscription and commercial endeavors escalated. In fact, this serious economic effect, and the complexity of assessing the impact on heritage sites arising from the World Heritage Convention, forced UNESCO and its main consultant organization, ICOMOS, to articulate a set of criteria or guidelines for the nomination process of World Heritage Sites. In due course, additional components of heritage sites were acknowledged,
inspired by growing publicity and highly specialized types of tourism, as a direct effect of World Heritage Site acceptance. This trend eventually produced the first scientific document on cultural tourism in 1999.\textsuperscript{70} In addition to the legalistic labyrinth Cultural Heritage has become, the idea of ‘universality’ complicates its understanding further. It argues for the transborder character of heritage expressions and deconstructs the idea of national heritage as a preamble to a radical proposal for Cultural Heritage to be managed by non-governmental bodies that can also be called transnational. At the same time, however, it reinforces boundaries.

Given this political complexity, I argue that a solution needs to be identified for the case of North Cyprus. More than one generation has lived ‘unrecognized’ and this has resulted in communities whose sense of identity, nationality, belonging, and ownership, has been disoriented. The general relationship between inhabitants and their physical environment was not framed under any of the analyzed conventions, charters or agreements existing at the regional level, or within the international system of nations. In fact, there are heritage sites of great importance for the memory of the world, or in UNESCO terms, possessing Outstanding Universal Value (OUV), that fall outside the system. The indeterminate position of Famagusta, and its valuable Cultural Heritage, simply does not fit into the universal standard, thus robbing the city of the superfluity of potentials, inherent and rightful to it, and immediately excludes it from the possibility of listing as a World Heritage Site.

The World Heritage Site status, its logo, and the heavy implications for local economies and tourist industries, shifted UNESCO’s identity into a highly profitable brand. In Chapter IV, a Cost-Benefit Analysis proves that the risk of preparing a nomination dossier for UNESCO is minimal, while the value of the brand is important.

This ‘patent’ (WHS) is also a trademark with a logo linked to commercial activities (as seen in the case of, for example, the tequila cultural landscape in Mexico, the cultural landscape of coffee in Colombia, and the rice terraces in the Philippines, among others). Does Famagusta have the capacity to deliver the UNESCO requirements in order to comply with the rehabilitation of the Urban Cultural Landscape and thus become a member of the World Heritage club? This question, and its answer, expose the political complexities among member states of UNESCO, and illustrate how the organization can be diverted away from its original aim. Instead of favoring and protecting the expressions that matter, Cultural Heritage can become an additional reason for conflict rather than for resolution.

It is crucial to ask a simple question: If ‘World Heritage Site’ is already a trademark and a ‘patent’, as well as an economic indicator with a set of conditions for access that limits its use only to selected members, is it then possible to separate the political implications from the trademark and logo itself and open up the possibilities to external non-members to access the trademark and therefore also its (economic and other) spillovers? The eligibility of a Cultural Heritage site to be part of the WHS club should be based on the definition of its Outstanding Universal Value (UNESCO), which helps in understanding the transition from ‘monument’ (an expression of memory) to Cultural Heritage (a notion of property), and converts the system of values into ‘significance’. OUV, not political status, embraces a broad narrative where Cultural Heritage becomes a bridge that establishes connections among communities, nations, and continents, and helps to interpret the current reality through a coherent and structured lens.\(^1\) So far, the scholarship on Cyprus, in general, and Famagusta, in particular, is fundamentally historical and addresses the importance of the location of stones, sites, decorations, features, and labour that was required to create the heritage

\(^1\) As seen for example in the cases of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.
expressions as we see them now. Applying the concept of Outstanding Universal Value to Famagusta, I take our understanding a step further, and in a different direction, going beyond the appreciation of memory to reflect on the significance of different connections that can be established to argue the preservation of places and their irreplaceable role in the evolution of humankind. In this respect, as in so many others, Famagusta’s significance can hardly be denied.

We have, earlier in this chapter, made a detailed assessment of the shift in the conceptualization of what is now known as Cultural Heritage, and observed how it was in part due to other shifts in specialization, scope, and technical improvement in the field of conservation, and additional areas (such as natural heritage). However, we may also observe how effectively Cultural Heritage is dominated by doctrines designed to avoid contested visions that might challenge (though not exclusively) the following aspects of the discussions in this chapter. In particular we must focus on four. The first is memory – which initially shaped the concept of ‘monument’ – and was by definition the capacity to preserve the memories embedded in selected sites. The second is Politics - current framework documents have been designed with the political consent of a group of countries bounded by the United Nations framework. The third, nationality - most of the documents examined are binding agreements between nations whose main pillar is represented by collective constituents and the unity of the country. And the fourth is cultural identity – this exclusive term which reinforces boundaries and prevents other forms of identities from arising, such as distinct from the ruling identity or the official nationality. I assert that these aspects of contemporary doctrine in Cultural Heritage underscore, and support, the preservation of the geopolitics of the nations under the UN system. I further assert that these discourses do not necessarily benefit heritage assets since unless those assets are represented by a member state the system has nothing to offer. There is no provision for contested expressions of heritage. This does not mean that they do not warrant preservation or development, but
that the international framework is simply not equipped to deal with them. Contestation within or around the heritage assets – which is the main characteristic of Famagusta – cannot fit the framework of nation states. Various other examples from around the world consistently show how contestation is commonly followed by conflict, and how conflict leads to the destruction of memories expressed in heritage assets. These are the scenarios in which UNESCO and its doctrine have failed. It is certainly the case of Famagusta, North Cyprus.

To pave an alternative path for Famagusta I propose a tailored definition of its Cultural Heritage, and by consequence a re-assessment of the concept as a whole. I suggest an understanding that restitutes the concepts of change and evolution to heritage increasing its flexibility to adjust and accept alternative forms of culture, peoples, linkages and connections between the past and the future. I present Cultural Heritage as:

A dynamic social construction that recognizes traces of acts and conjunctures of the past which show evidence of the interaction of people in the society in their own time. Those acts and conjunctures permit the development of various narratives of peoples in its connections with the present, and in the future roles and meanings ensuing generations might discover. Cultural Heritage is, hence, a set of collected memories that help us understand our own experience.

This definition, I believe, can help Famagusta: 1) in the design of a new vision for its heritage expressions, 2) in side-stepping the political discussion that has impacted heritage and its relationship with the UN system that has been so harmful to Famagusta and 3) in responding to the arguments that have prevented the control of Famagusta’s decay.

4. Famagusta, the Antithesis of Cultural Heritage, as we know it today

This section outlines a brief theoretical background and conceptualization to help strengthen the rationale for the new definition of Cultural Heritage I have proposed above.
4.1 Conflict and Recognition

From Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Lewis Coser and Ralf Dahrendorf to Randall Collins, social sciences scholarship has moved from the notion of conflict as a disturbance of peace towards the recognition of conflict as a natural part of society.\(^\text{72}\) For some, symbolic items and emotional identity become weapons of conflict, as well as targets. According to Weber in particular,\(^\text{73}\) the main characteristics that frame the field of culture are class, status and power. The frustration that generally leads to conflict is driven by emotional involvement and transcendent goals, and those seem to be consistent triggers for violence. When violence transcends from internal to external conflict, boundaries grow stronger and separateness is more evident, which can also be reflected in heritage expressions. A new social order is established and as a potential consequence, heritage assets that represent the ‘other’ also emerge. In other words, there is a tendency in the process of societal building derived from conflict that any form of heritage expression that is not aligned to the current ideological predilections will be excluded, erased, or abolished.

A case in point can be seen in Famagusta where even the name of the city changes from Mağusa or Gazimağusa in Turkish and Ammochostos in the Greek language. St. Nicholas Cathedral in Famagusta became Lala Mustafa Pasha in the 1950s and transformed from a church to a mosque in 1571.\(^\text{74}\) Throughout the island - especially after 1974 - towns, streets, buildings and areas have modified their names according to incoming communities and outgoing rulers. The strong link between emotions and heritage is therefore a constant source of conflict in its recognition or understanding.

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\(^\text{73}\) On this regard Dahrendorf explains: “Thus, legitimation is one of the critical issues in the idea of conflict. Weber also saw that class is more complex than Marx initially supposed, and that there are other factors that contribute to social inequality, most notably status and party (or power).” Dahrendorf and Collins, Conflict and Critical Theories, 212.

dismissal. While the sense of unity among the members of a society can often improve in times of conflict, less permeability for, or no tolerance of, alternative forms of culture is accepted. In this sense Weber’s systems of stratification based on status, class and power may also be extended to the way heritage is internalized.75

Others like Ralf Dahrendorf claim that social order is established through power, thus giving heritage an additional component that is more evident when analyzing current scholarship.76 As I have established, the current system of recognition, promotion and preservation of heritage assets follow the line from UNESCO down to regional and local levels throughout its governmental institutions. Since governments are by principle the rule of power, it is possible to establish the connection between Cultural Heritage and its limited role in contesting power, when Cultural Heritage is by definition the result of power contestation in history. Dahrendorf also argues that culture reflects the interest of the powerful elite and not the interest of the rest of society. Similarly, this helps in understanding how the framework established by UNESCO cannot steer away from the existing status quo, as the members of UNESCO are legitimate states. Without a doubt, the current condition of Famagusta is the result of a number of facts, not only internal, but pertaining to powers outside Cyprus, especially, Greece and Turkey. By considering conflict as a part of the process of heritage formation, we can understand the role power plays in heritage and how heritage acts as an instrument of power.

Randall Collins,77 when studying conflict, argues that nationalism and nation-state legitimacy has a direct link to threat. I believe this is also accurate when analyzing

how the recognition of Cultural Heritage can in fact challenge the feelings of national identity and its legitimacy, or in Famagusta’s case, the legitimacy of the conflict itself. When a community recognizes its contender as part of its own self, it also delegitimizes the threat and the conflict. Axel Honneth argues for the need of a theoretical framework to establish the conditions for identity formation that is based on recognition of the ‘other’. In the case of a heritage site like Famagusta, the current community does not fully identify themselves with the heritage assets of the city. The recognition of conflict is an alternative form of finding connections that acknowledge other heritages with different meanings from those linked to ethnicity, religion or nationality. Mutual recognition is necessary for the re-ordering of socio-political life and a catalyst in totalitarian authorities. The rationale is that recognition is the acknowledgment of persons as individuals as well as members of a community channeling discontent, suffering, and conflict towards an equal opportunity to participate in the definition of community. This rationale opens the possibility of various forms of identity, which under the current conceptualization of Cultural Heritage conform to what is advocated at the national level, and therefore recognized by UNESCO.

Central to our understanding of Famagusta is the emphasis Honneth places on forms of morality in international relations towards human rights. As I will discuss in Chapter III, Cultural Rights are part of Human Rights, in the light of globalization. Honneth sees the circle of rights going beyond state borders in an attempt to recognize all aspects of human difference and individuality. Simply put, the definition of a relationship between conflict and heritage has been designed (within UNESCO) not to prevent conflict but to prevent the changes conflict aims for, which in some cases are a


re-assessment of boundaries, authority, legitimacy, sovereignty, rights, and difference, among others. In the case of Famagusta this has already happened.

4.2 Diaspora and Globalization

One of the conditions that have been present in Cyprus throughout its history is the presence of travelers, settlers, newcomers and foreigners. The events of 1974 triggered the creation of a new, radically different demographic. The disconnection I have identified between those communities and Famagusta sets the context by which to discuss what in contemporary times is known as diaspora.79

Although human migration and mobility are as old as civilization itself, the technology of the past fifty years has facilitated the movement of people (now called ‘diaspora’), consumption of goods, and transfer of ideas on a scale never experienced before. The effect and consequences are to be found in the endless forms of connections, offset against comparatively few frameworks (i.e. scholarship) to understand it. I will begin with a term that helps us understand diasporas and, in particular, the concept Tomlinson called ‘deterritorialization.’ 80 According to Tomlinson, this is “when people come to include distant events and processes more routinely in their perceptions of what is significant for their own personal lives.” 81 I use this approach to better frame the diaspora as part of a greater dynamic of globalization and its implications in terms of the conceptualization of Cultural Heritage, its understanding in the context of Famagusta, and its relevance to argue issues such as the exclusion of communities that cannot fit into the concept as it is. Since corporate enterprises impact across national boundaries through communication channels such as the internet, with the implications of re-shaping communities and culture (or better yet,
how culture is imagined), we are faced with a phenomena that challenges core aspects that previously functioned as pillars. Within boundaries, frontiers, legitimacy, and sovereignty Cultural Heritage remains static in its accountability and limited in its conceptualization, while its consumption, connections and recognitions are global.

When associating diasporic communities around the world with technology, the possibilities of new forms of communication, discourses, and in general, cultural mutations are likely to happen, reinforced by new links and new meanings to cultural expressions. This is particularly interesting when trying to understand the re-shaping of the traditional ways from which Cultural Heritage is conceived, described and recognized. In the case of this study, giving space for hybridity as a new lens to assess heritage assets is of utmost importance. In short, if culture has been re-shaped by technology, deterritorialization, hybridity and globalization, why does Cultural Heritage remain as a pillar for national identity, national boundaries and national narratives? The notion of Cultural Heritage remains static against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world. It is embedded in politics, sovereignty, and national identity, among others, while dismissing those cultural expressions that are left outside the system of nations. Cultural Heritage then becomes an exclusive club that lacks the recognition of that sensation or feeling of being at home when we visit a heritage site, no matter where we are from. Would that be an expression of cultural identity? Or is it a diasporic construction of outsiders in reference to the place we inhabit as ‘visitors’

82 Hybridity refers principally to the creation of dynamic mixed cultures. Sociologists and anthropologists, who use the expression ‘synchronism’ to refer to such phenomena, have long observed the evolution of commingled cultures from two or more parent cultures. Using the literature and other cultural expressions of colonial peoples, Bhabha (1986) introduced a new twist to the idea. He saw hybridity as a transgressive act challenging the colonizers’ authority, values and representations and thereby constituting an act of self-empowerment and defiance. Robin Cohen. and Paul Kennedy, Global Sociology (London: MacMilan, 2000): 377.

83 The role of Cultural Heritage on identity formation is better understood by analyzing the reclamations of heritage objects: “The debate over the Elgin Marbles has evolved and transformed over the last three decades. Though the issue of legality has been decided and the arguments over preservation and integrity are unresolved, the recent cultural heritage argument has added another level of depth to the debate. Unfortunately, the clash between national cultural heritage and world cultural heritage has further complicated the debate over the Elgin Marbles. On a national level, cultural heritage objects materialize and support a nation’s continuous national narrative, fostering unity and pride amongst the citizens, thus molding national identity.” Alexandra Zeman, “A Game Changer? The Complexities of Cultural Heritage in the Debate Over the Elgin Marbles.” Senior Capstone Projects, Vassar College, paper 67 (2012): 104.
with a degree of objectivity towards what we see? I believe diasporic communities can appreciate that, as Stuart Hall puts it: “[…] as well as many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant difference which constitute ‘what we really are’; or rather – since history has intervened – ‘what we have become.’”

For the case of Famagusta, this materializes the disjunctive between the current diasporas and the Cultural Heritage expressions present in the city: and to establish a sense of identity between contemporary society and traditional heritage that fosters a sense of ownership and belonging.

The recognition of diasporas as part of the cultural vision present not only in physical territories but also in imagined places and communities, is a necessary step in fusing a dynamic tone into Cultural Heritage. This also facilitates the recovery of memory and its key role in defining what Cultural Heritage is, beyond fixed boundaries, communities, identities, ethnicities and religious beliefs. Moving towards the connections between culture and diaspora, and having described the de-territorialization as a dynamic frame to cultural mutation and particular ways of culture formation, let us move on to establish the linkage between Cultural Heritage and diaspora that is relevant to the history of Famagusta. Khachig Töloöyan observes that: “[…] since the late 1960s, ‘diaspora’ has come to mean what it does in its imbrication with the terms transnationalism, globalization, migrancy, ethnicity, exile, the post-colonial and the nation. Since the 1980s, the changing meanings of ‘belonging’ and

85 Back in 2010 I walked into one of the twin churches in Famagusta, Cyprus (a 14th century Templar edifice): A rock band was located where the altar once was. Icons were replaced by sound system. A comfortable timber bar was laid along the left wall. A place capable of hosting laughter and fun in a city that could not care less about what we –the rest- call heritage, in other words, the desacralisation of Cultural Heritage (in such urgent need worldwide). Curiously, music, dancing and drinking inside churches is how the Jesuits have managed to introduce Catholicism to the Tarahumaras in the desert of Chihuahua in Mexico. This occurs until today.
86 I refer to imagined places and communities, the connections established between people and space, linked by cultural components such as landscape, flavors, sounds and others that are part of people’s journeys elsewhere. This idea supports the multidimensional character of heritage that is not limited by space, therefore by boundaries.
‘citizenship’ have further complicated the conceptual situation."\(^{87}\) This brings an alternative perspective that accommodates flows of people. This idea includes additional forms of establishing connections between home and elsewhere by means of acquiring education, jobs or protection.\(^{88}\) Diasporic communities are in need of recognition within the context of their cultural contributions to different places that become, or became, ‘home’ and home meaning belonging.\(^{89}\) Simply put, Cultural Heritage is also created by diasporas and/or by groups of people who were at one time part of diasporas. This concept is particularly important in the context of Famagusta, a place that for centuries has been positioned between somewhere and somewhere else, because of its location, its history, and its linkage to overlapping cultures, cults, ethnicities and diasporic communities.\(^{90}\)

Though there are still debates on the scope of diaspora and dispersion its framework and characteristics, what is clear with many scholars is the way technology has triggered and established additional connections and erased or lessened the limitations in time and space between different ‘homes’ that diasporas create or imagine.\(^{91}\)

\(^{87}\) Töölöyan, Diaspora studies: Past, present and promise, 4.
\(^{88}\) “The earliest application of the term ‘diaspora’ to Greeks seems to date to the period after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and is firmly established only in the 1650s” Ibid., 5.
\(^{89}\) On this matter: “Other forms of mobility and dispersion include migration intended to acquire education, jobs, land, settlement, new citizenship, or a combination thereof; there are also mobile traders and itinerant laborers who circulate between homeland and extraterritorial opportunities; there are victims of mass deportations, refugees and asylum seekers – some choose mobility, others have it thrust upon them; some are uprooted, others uproot themselves. Some eventually return home, many are assimilated, and the remainder may become consolidated into diaspora communities” Ibid., 5.
\(^{90}\) Also Töölöyan includes former colonies that were decolonized to become a diasporic community that was left without ‘homeland’ or became (due to a change in regulation) a diaspora of the former colonizer territory. In this regard it is important to note how Cyprus had its latest colonial stage under British rule from 1878, formally a colony from 1925 until 1960.
\(^{91}\) In this context home stands necessarily outside geography or location and therefore from ownership, I refer to a text by John Berger: “[…] Originally home meant the center of the world--not in a geographical, but in an ontological sense. Mircea Eliade has demonstrated how home was the place from which the world could be *founded*. A home was established, as he says, "at the heart of the real." […] Home was the center of the world because it was the place where a vertical line crossed with a horizontal one. The vertical line was a path leading upwards to the sky and downwards to the underworld. The horizontal line represented the traffic of the world, all the possible roads leading across the earth to other places. Thus, at home, one was nearest to the gods in the sky and to the dead of the underworld. This nearness promised access to both. And at the same time, one was at the starting point and, hopefully, the returning point of all terrestrial journeys.” The Meaning of Home, accessed March 17, 2015. http://grammar.about.com/od/shortpassagesforanalysis/a/bergerhomepass.htm.
4.3 Value and Significance

Throughout the construction of the concept of Cultural Heritage, the field of preservation has also grown in parallel. How do we preserve something that is not defined in detail? Or, what is the use of defining something that cannot be preserved? The set of values given to heritage assets (beginning with the concept of ‘monument’ already discussed) has evolved from a division between what is historic, aesthetic, social and economic to another term: ‘cultural significance.’ This emerged through the need to standardize the system of values, to balance all aspects to give each the same importance (though avoiding the economic value, a fundamental component of heritage), and to establish a connection between cultural significance and ‘fabric’ - the physical expression of heritage. The line of rhetoric that links significance to fabric, cannot exist without something to secure it. This reinforces my original argument in that the concept of Cultural Heritage has an indissoluble relationship with preservation and ‘management’. Around the same time that the Burra Charter was prepared in the United States a similar discussion on ‘significance’ was taking place. I now present some of those findings, especially those I consider relevant to this discussion in support of the symbiotic relationship between Cultural heritage, significance, and preservation. I surmise that significance has grown as part of the Cultural Heritage concept; it is a condition inherent to heritage. Commonly, Cultural Heritage is recognized by a number of criteria that establish the level of significance the site represents for society, hence there is no need to state the significance of a place that has already been acknowledged (following the set of criteria). When analyzing

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93 Aspects of significance have been studied by Tainer and Lucas: “Significance is thus assumed to be an essential attribute of a cultural property, observable and recordable in much the same way as its dimensions, condition and contents, and subject to loss or destruction. […] Moreover, the meaning and
Famagusta against the sequence of Cultural Heritage significance and preservation, two simple questions need to be answered: first, whose significance must we acknowledge? And second, what physical materials do we preserve (its fabric, its meaning – for locals, for diasporas, or simply the ones that claim a return to pre-1974)?

Randall Mason⁹⁴ argues that: “In significance, preservationists pack all their theory, ideology and politics—and their wonder at the capacity to use historic fabric to reflect on the past”.⁹⁵ In his approach, Mason agrees with the idea that by preserving heritage sites and their significance, current scholarship has identified conservation as synonymous with the representation of memory and history.⁹⁶ But what exactly is significance and if it is indeed significant, for whom is it significant? Significance, in short, in relation to Cultural Heritage as stated by Tainter & Lucas is:

“an essential characteristic of cultural resources [which] falls squarely within the empiricist-positivist tradition. Significance, as applied to historic properties, [...] so cultural properties are seen as possessing or lacking an inherent, immutable quality, significance that gives rise to our understanding of their importance. Thus, significance, in the empiricist-positivist view, will be present in a cultural property, rather than in the mind of the observer.”⁹⁷

When trying to establish the criteria based on importance, significance, or value, there is always the issue of subjectivity. There is always the possibility of failing to address characteristics outside the criteria or, as in the case of UNESCO, the influence of geopolitics in decision making over heritage sites to be included in the World Heritage list. This line of argument, and with these references, epitomizes the

knowledge embodied in these primitive terms and/or statements derive only from their direct connection with sense experience.” Joseph Tainter and John Lucas, “Epistemology of the Significance Concept,” American Antiquity 48 no. 4 (1983): 711.


⁹⁶ “There are problems, though, with the use and conceptualization of significance. The overriding one is that the preservation field fails to fully appreciate its contingent nature. By making the fixing of places and their meaning the primary emphasis of preservation, we have unduly objectified and scientized our understanding of memory and historicity” Ibid., 64.

⁹⁷ Tainter and Lucas, Epistemology of the Significance Concept, 712.
difficulties for a site like Famagusta, not only because it is difficult to state for whom it is significant but under which timeframe can it be viewed. If significance is a form of interpretation then who are the actors, the stakeholders, and under which framework can it be structured?

From a different angle, and coming back to the idea of Cultural Heritage being in principle an expression of memory, Mason has an interesting approach to the connection between memory, fabric and significance. He asks if the effort of preserving built heritage is to some extent an effort that reshapes memory. This question parallels my previous statements on the difficulties of explicitly addressing Cultural Heritage as memory, that it has implications for national narratives, national boundaries and therefore national significance. Nevertheless, when looking at Cultural Heritage as a dynamic concept, overlaps in history would clearly open the discussion to the addition of memories to heritage sites in recognition of heritage as a witness - not a protagonist - of events and facts.98 Others like Jeremy Wells would argue that it is necessary to go back to the set of values embedded in heritage, in particular the values that are connected to the socio-cultural and experimental setting of the heritage asset.99 Undoubtedly, Famagusta offers additional arguments to be considered when assessing a site whose significance goes beyond one single society, community, boundary, physicality and history.

I prefer the approach taken by the Getty Institute in its publication *Values and Heritage Conservation* when it states that values determine the conservation approach, that Cultural Heritage and preservation are symbiotic, and that the set of values used

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98 Mason explains it as: “This has led us to ignore the essential nature of significance—which is that as an expression of cultural meaning, it must be expected to change, involve multivalence and contention, and be contingent on time, place, and other factors.” Mason, Fixing Historic Preservation: A Constructive Critique of “Significance,” 65.

strongly impacts final decisions about what to forego.\(^ {100}\) If Cultural Heritage opens the door for its conservation, what would be the impact of Cultural Heritage turns to development instead? Would the set of values change? Would the preservation process add values to a site (e.g. economic value)? And would if the site itself be capable of producing additional forms of value when framed under broader perspectives and connections, such as memory? The linkage between Cultural Heritage, value and preservation inhibits a realistic definition of the term, and reduces it to a process of preservation. This excludes the formation of additional meanings, connections and associations that can naturally be nurtured if the dynamic and not merely the preservation oriented capacities of Cultural Heritage are recognized. I have always questioned whether the value and nostalgia that Famagusta offers is the same as great need to preserve a half broken city - as the first image after an earthquake, the decay of the long gone luxury. Maybe a ruined city better reflects what Famagusta has become, the failure to transcend from the past to the present, where the stones have more value than the buildings. Would there be a powerful psyche in the city capable of rebuilding, reinterpreting and risking an alternative cityscape, one that could identify them all in the present? That, in my opinion is the difference between preserving the stones and developing its Cultural Heritage.

4.4 Social Construction

The recognition, acknowledgement and management of Cultural Heritage is, in the current system, a responsibility given to states, which misses the fact that what is considered heritage (and in consequence memory) is a construction that emerges from society beyond what governments recognize. Reflecting on how the evolution of the term ‘monument’ has impacted the creation of this ‘industry’ surrounding the past and Cultural Heritage, we need to acknowledge that Cultural Heritage has its basic

principle embedded in a legal term. The verb to ‘inherit’ is what can be passed on from one generation to the next: it means ownership and therefore value, which in my opinion (had it stayed as such) would have kept the exercise of its assessment simple and clear. Nevertheless, I believe that the concept has shifted from its legal principle towards a social construction of its meaning. In effect, it is grounded in the social sphere, in what the societal environment recognizes as heritage. This has been the argument that for decades has supported its existence. Theoretically, the recognition of Cultural Heritage has a principle in the community. Its definition, though, comes from a different rationale, principle and legacy.

The definition of Cultural Heritage I proposed earlier can serve Famagusta in its complexity. I stated that Cultural Heritage is a social construction, and in this respect I will cite the works of Pearce (2000), Cerullo (1992), Owen (1995), MacNamee (2004), and Boghossian (2001) to build my argument that 1) a social construction changes with time and circumstances, 2) facts, items or ideas recognized under the societal realm reflect society, therefore its system of values, and 3) the subject under assessment as a social construction need not necessarily be recognized as such in the present, as it reflects memories of a society. This discussion allows me to explain that the system of values is, in fact, intrinsic to its recognition as a social construction because it reflects society’s beliefs and imaginaries. My fundamental premise is that without those ‘social constructions’ the society we live in would have been different. The same is true in the case of Cultural Heritage. This is central to my

101 Pearce offer a perspective that better explains this view: “Cultural heritage is cognitively constructed, as an external expression of identity, operating in a range of ways and levels. It is a social fact, and like all social facts, it is both passive and active. Its passivity rests in its role as an arena of selection: most elements (of whatever kind) do not make it into the heritage zone. Its activeness lies in its influence: once particular elements are established as heritage, they exercise power; they have a life of their own that affects people’s minds and that consequently affects their choices. Heritage becomes a representation of beliefs about self and community which nest in with other related belief systems to create a holistic structure that ramifies through all the areas - politics, economics, use of resources - where social life touches us as individuals.” Susan M. Pearce, “The Making of Cultural Heritage,” in Values and Heritage Conservation, ed. Erica Avrami, Randall Mason and Marta de la Torre (Los Angeles: The Getty, 2000): 59.
102 Ibid., 53.
argument: we are who we are because we choose to believe that those events from the past (and therefore memories) are important to their time, in our time and probably to the future.

The analysis of my proposed definition of Cultural Heritage, rooted in constructionist theory,\(^{103}\) assures us that the term stands for beliefs (social), acts, and conjunctures (construction). Nevertheless, the differentiation between the rational and the social has proven to be illusory, as acts and conjunctures are also social constructs. What might give credence to this approach is that the same ‘act’ (understood as a decision) and ‘conjuncture’ can be interpreted or justified by a particular society or culture. In the case of Cultural Heritage, it is necessary to state that the difference is derived, inevitably, because social contexts change from culture to culture. That is also to say that what is considered Cultural Heritage by one society might not represent the same for another society. Boghossian comments on this kind of belief system, saying:

“When we believe something we believe it because we think there are reasons to think it is true, reasons that we think are general enough to get a grip even on people who do not share our perspective. That is why we feel entitled to recommend it to them. It’s hard to imagine a way of thinking about belief and assertion that precluded the possibility of that sort of generality.”\(^{104}\)

The general intention of this section is to re-assess the system of values established within UNESCO. What is now known as Outstanding Universal Value is an attempt to classify that which has no classification because Cultural Heritage does not peer through one lens only, but through a simultaneity of interests. This simultaneity is expressed in terms of significance with different meanings within and for different societies. With the system of values UNESCO has tried to standardize, Cultural Heritage (in the principle itself), has faced the loss of memories in the form of

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\(^{103}\) See McNamee, 1994; Rhodes & Brown, 2005; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000.

events, buildings, and archaeological findings. This is because its recognition is problematic for the system of nations itself, not for Cultural Heritage at large.

This takes me to the question of meaning and significance in Cultural Heritage, since the primary premise in the process of social construction includes society in a broad sense, and not an individual.\textsuperscript{105} In any case, social constructionism has an emphasis in distinguishing that which has been constructed by a society (community) corresponding to a particular time. This approach matches with the dynamic nature of Cultural Heritage.\textsuperscript{106} When analyzing Cultural Heritage in terms of this theory we come to understand that social constructionism is what anthropologists call culture and sociologists, society.\textsuperscript{107} As such, Cultural Heritage when understood through the lens of society has a more viable form of legitimacy than when developed through the vision of an organization heavily involved in politics and with an agenda with clear limitations in addressing issues and aspects of society at large. In a broken society such as the Cypriot, the recognition of Cultural Heritage has taken a nationalistic path. However the mix and heterogeneity that has shaped the past decades with new communities in both parts of the island deserves a deeper analysis of how heritage has transformed, and what society considers heritage to be now.

5. The Impact of ‘Nationality’ and ‘Identity’ on Cultural Heritage

There are a number of elements in the previous paragraphs that can help in analyzing the context in which Cultural Heritage has been framed, conceptualized and understood. I maintain that to understand the current ambivalent status of Famagusta, it is necessary to assess important aspects of UNESCO’s framework. Although I


\textsuperscript{106} On social construction see McNamee: “Social construction, instead, urges us to attend to the traditions, the communities, the situated practices of the participants at hand-to local understandings in identifying what becomes real, true, and good. To attend to traditions, communities, and situated practices requires a constant flexibility on the part of those involved.” Ibid., 10.

recognize the political implications of the current framework on Cultural Heritage globally, as well as the centrality of the construct of identity within that framework, I will focus now on a case that is considered to be outside of the framework itself. I probe into the facets of the recognition of Famagusta as vital heritage, embedded in an unrecognized territory, and observe how identity is to be constructed or deconstructed here. As a disclaimer, though, I will not concentrate on the inoperability of the international and multilateral agencies nor will I explore the political nature of UNESCO, or its capacity or incapacity to act in favour of unresolved post-conflict issues. The purpose of this section is not to propose an improvement in any way to the functioning of the UN system and its organizations. What I attempt here is merely a reflection upon the heritage sites that have been left beyond recognition, despite their relevance to humanity. What is more important at this point is to acknowledge the key terms in the current legislation, such as Identity and Nationality, as they are strategic points from which to develop a realistic perspective on Cultural Heritage, especially in Cyprus. For this case study, I assert that there is a need to respond to the difficulties in Famagusta and to scrutinize the core aspects of the conceptualization of Cultural Heritage, as a consequence of unresolved ethnic, religious, and political issues.

A broad look at previous scholarship pertaining to Cultural Heritage practice, starting from the 19th century, reveals how the concept of identity has been, and remains, superfluous. The understanding of ‘identity’ has changed through time...
according to political scenarios, governability, and religion, among others. The evolution of the concept of nationalism leads to the acceptance of multifaceted and more inclusive perspectives that are entitled to ‘speak’ of more than one story at a time, of simultaneous narratives flowing alongside one another. Since Cultural Heritage is an act of recognition and social construction, the identity of what is collectively recognised must be scrutinized. The notion of ‘identity’ figures in political rhetoric, historical expositions, and even popular culture. But a crucial part of it is linked to the nation. The use of ‘identity’ to reinforce the concept of nation and a predominantly occidental vision of the world is present in UNESCO’s conceptualization of heritage. That alone represents a significant challenge for the definition of Cyprus’ sense of culture, history, and the construction of its self-identity. The understanding of identity and its linkage to territory, ethnicity, religion and other key concepts that

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112 García Canclini helps in understanding how other parts of the world with colonial backgrounds have discussed this topic with a degree of acceptance from the academic community: Néstor García Canclini,
configure the ‘social realm’ serve as one of the central foundations of a tailored definition of culture, citizenship, and diversity. Identity, as a nebulous and highly contested notion, rests at the very core of various political, economic, and social predicaments. Needless to say, it also permeates pertinent issues in Cultural Heritage. In this study, the concept of identity represents not only an important bridge between events that shaped the city’s past as well as its prospects in the future, it also serves as a basic point in understanding the complexities of Famagusta as heritage in a transitional territory. Simply put, the fabrication of identity is intimately linked with recognition and assertion as well as political maneuvering – two fundamental processes that are problematic in Famagusta.

The context of 19th century Europe is that of colonization and industrialization, and this set the milieu by which ‘westerners’ explored and produced their own corpus of knowledge. This systematic and widely structured epistemic production has been attached to Orientalism – the creation and definition of the (non-Western) ‘Other’ in comparison with the (Western) ‘Self’. In other words, it referred to a comprehensive attempt to produce binary identities. The fields of history, sociology, anthropology, and even Cultural Heritage were not immune to this. In fact, as a consequence, the building of history and cultural analysis with a ‘western’ perspective emerged on account of this, as noted in the following text: “[...] the nature of archaeology research is shaped, to a significant degree, by the roles that particular nation-states play, economically,


114 For the purpose of this work the used definition of Cultural Diversity is the one developed by UNESCO in its Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural expressions: “Cultural diversity is a driving force of development, not only in respect of economic growth, but also as a means of leading a more fulfilling intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual life;” UNESCO, “Cultural Diversity,” UNESCO, accessed March 20, 2014, <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=34321&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html>.

115 See the utilization of Transitional Justice as a legal framework for the implementation of this study in Chapter III.
politically, and culturally, as independent parts of modern world-system.” 116

Furthermore, nationality has been a term that has complicated the definition of cultural expressions, its influence (as we have seen) has redefined those expressions, not for what they are, but because of what they represent. A site like Famagusta that went from Christian (French, Genoese, Venetian) to Muslim (Ottoman), then back to Christian (British), is problematic to frame as a site with one identity, or one nationality, or any, particularly when viewed from a historical perspective. This fact alone becomes a starting point from which we can assess the current shape of the political world and from which we can begin to understand the role of Cultural Heritage in delivering discourses with deep political content. In a number of diverse countries, culture has been incorporated into welfare, which necessarily compels it to align closely with political, religious, legal and social discourses of the majorities. The case of Cyprus is not exempted from the intricacies of identity and western discourses. As a part of the larger Mediterranean region, the history of the island of Cyprus reveals dramatic transitions through a number of regimes. Famagusta was, and still is, at the center of these political transitions and conflict.117 In addition, the long history of external occupation and subjugation in Cyprus yields a tenuous and ill defined identity. This, I consider, is well worth exploring as imperative for the immediate conservation and management of the valuable fragments of the walls of Famagusta (and the rest) as it rests heavily on the process of constructing a genuine identity; such a task remains challenging.

116 Habu et al., Evaluating Multiple Narratives, 2.
Archaeological remains are by nature fragmented, and so is the reconstruction of the history entrenched in those remains. The work of archaeologists and historians is then not only to document ancient remains but also to rebuild the context and the narrative in which those physical vestiges can be understood. Their task is to reconstruct the story as part of a larger historic environment that included social relationships, economics, religion and ethnicity, to name but a few. The concept of narrative was then developed to help in providing scientific grounds for the history of ancient communities, as has been rigorously explored by scholars such as Trigger, Renfrew and Bahn, Snodgrass, Maier, and others. Narratives were, and still are, influenced by political scenarios, especially those associated with colonial, imperial, and national discourses. It is well documented that archaeology was, and still is, deeply linked to the occidental approaches of culture, history, and to economic values that constrain the recognition of other forms of heritage such as spiritual or symbolic expressions. As such, archaeology as well as traditional history is limited to what can be scaled in western terms, divorcing the present from the past, and communities from their own definition of the universe. Scholars in this field still remain heavily dependent, albeit with some attempts to deviate, on the grand narratives that were initiated by these occidental approaches. In these terms, the construction of ‘identity’


119 To understand the complexities of the Cyprus region see: Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyurek and Umut Ozkirimli, Nationalism in the Trouble Triangle : Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Lynn Meskell, Archaeology Under Fire : Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the EASTERN Mediterranean and Middle East (London: Routledge, 1998). See also UNESCO’s norms and standards for archaeological research.

120 On this aspect: “There is no doubt that archaeology was built upon and remains deeply entrenched in a Western paradigm of history, culture, and the past, and it is thoroughly steeped in Western ways of viewing the world. Such Western paradigms include a reliance on economic models of optimal decision-making that minimize the influence of spiritual or symbolic meanings; accumulation of knowledge production in the hands of a small elite (who set the research agenda and benefit most from its products); divorcing the people and places of the past from communities and situations in the present; and a strong privileging of written and material evidence over oral accounts and traditional knowledge.” Sonya Atalay, “Multivocality and Indigenous archaeologies,” in Habu et al., Evaluating Multiple Narratives: Beyond Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist Archaeologies. (USA: Springer, 2008): 33.
needs to be assessed in the light of several historic influences which represent an important input into what we currently call identity. When supporting the recognition of Cultural Heritage on the grounds of identity, the current international framework endorses historic influences on a particular community. It fails to consider the multiplicity of layers composing the community or its definition of the Self (composed by the coexistence of multifaceted visions of the community’s past – present – future) vis-a-vis the Other. As such, the international framework does not interrogate, though it may recognize, the obscure concept of identity. Instead, the international framework protects the current system of nations – as if nations are fixed, solid, and uncontested.

For the Cyprus issue and for Famagusta’s current situation, this appeal for a more comprehensive and sensitive definition of identity could, I surmise, serve to explicate the existing differences between North and South in their own respective dimensions. What is a Cypriot identity? What are the layers underneath it? What are the complexities within it? Where can we place Famagusta in this whole gamut of identity issues? A discussion on the concept of identity in the context of the crisis in Cyprus moves Cultural Heritage assets away from the political discussion. It gives a technical as well as a cultural undertone to the future of heritage sites located in the north. For the Cyprus case, and the scrutiny of the past, it is necessary to give

121 Some scholars on ‘Identity’ are: Bruce Trigger, Philip Kohl, Michael Rowlands, Michael Shanks, Christopher Tilley, Ian Hodder, Thrustan Shaw, among others.
additional visibility to non-Hellenic nationalistic groups, and other scholars who accept the fact of multiple layers with no predominance in particular.

I believe Cultural Heritage practice is currently influenced by tendencies to recognize more than one narrative at the same time, embracing plurality and ‘multivocality’.\textsuperscript{123} This approach allows a heritage site to speak about the multiple layers present in its different components. I argue that Famagusta, by definition, is embedded in a multilayered existence, influenced by its role in the Mediterranean Sea, its location, centrality to different ethnicities, religions, and its function in the politics of the region. This multifarious context of Famagusta only reminds us of how the current framework of ‘nations’ proves its limitations, fragmenting large-scale cultures, histories and peoples into small pieces. Leriou establishes a clear perspective from which to look at scientific activities in archaeology and how narratives, since archaeology by its nature is fragmentary and disconnected, give space to elaborate hypotheses and assumptions that lead to inaccurate conclusions.\textsuperscript{124} She suggests that Cyprus has influences from so many different cultures (including Turkish), that the narrative surrounding the Hellenistic principle of Cyprus is an inadequate framework for its ethnic composition. Throughout the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, western arguments pointed to the character of Cyprus as a crossroads between East and West to argue for the Hellenistic origin of the current Cypriot identity and culture. The focus over the past two decades has been to prove the supremacy of the Hellenistic influence while dismissing multiple influences throughout time, polarizing the political discourse on cultural grounds.\textsuperscript{125} The insistence on proving the origins of Cyprus’ culture speaks

\textsuperscript{123}Main scholars on this topic are: Bruce Trigger, Ian Hodder, Erve Chambers, Peter Gathercole, Philip Kohl, Robert Layton, among others.
\textsuperscript{124}Leriou, Constructing an archaeological narrative.
volumes about the polarization of politics on the island and the broad project of dismissing the recognition of events over the past 50 years. Contemporary conflict archaeology is also part of the history of the island. Hardy insists that

“[...] while the mass grave exhumations are archaeology of the Cyprus Conflict, there is no modern conflict archaeology in Cyprus: there is study of ancient warfare, but not of modern; there is study of medieval village abandonment, but not of modern. Nevertheless, despite the lack of cultural heritage research into the conflict, there are massive (frequently, written by specialists in cultural heritage) political campaigns about the destruction of cultural heritage in the conflict.”126

I believe that the study of the past should not be driven by religious or political affiliation (although it is necessarily influenced by the historian’s own biases); it should only attempt to understand and explain the past and provide evidence for trajectories yet to be explored. Apparently in the context of Famagusta, the political agenda greatly overpowers a scholarly and scientific attempt to study its culture, history, and heritage.

In other literature, Minkoo Kim (2008), 127 commenting on the term ‘nationality’ and its relationship with archaeology, observes: “Nationalist archaeology, therefore, has helped various groups of people construct their own collective identities and, in doing so, has been a form of resistance, particularly in the nations that suffer or have suffered from colonization and exploitation.”128 The formation of nations was accompanied by the incorporation of assets conquered in different parts of the world to deliver an idea of power and strength, which, according to Kohl, is represented with the help of: “Colossal artifacts from ancient civilizations [which] now became peculiarly transformed into national symbols, and the subsequent French and British competition for such loot served the useful national function of filling up both the

128 Ibid, 121.
Louvre and the British Museum.” Needless to say, national governments gave heritage assets the role of reinforcing nationalistic conceptions. Heritage sites, art pieces, musical productions, and other intangible cultural assets became imperative aspects that supported the creation of national myths and cultivated a sense of shared identity. But the process itself pushes aside deeper analyses in relation to ethnicities, beliefs and cultural expressions in a quest to define the political structure of diverse communities. These hidden realities, un-analysed, would eventually arise in the form of conflicts.

Nation-states came together in accordance with the UN desire to preserve the geopolitical status quo, and prevent further dismemberment of nations. In the formation of nations and nationalistic ideas of state, governments are inclined to dismiss any form of threat that can question the soundness of the concept of nation. In that transition period, nation-states were compelled to overlook the diversity within the nation itself and focus more on the construction of the idea of national unity – of cultural homogeneity and harmony. In various circumstances, the creation of the nation and the suppression of minority cultures, in defense of the dominant one, emerged through violent and bloody means. The tools used to reinforce the concept of nation, in several places, have not been examples of virtue: ethnic cleansing, religious supremacy, gender exclusivity, class supremacy. It is worth noting that in this same context that forms of Cultural Heritage have been flagged to enhance patriotic and nationalistic arguments, and in the same manner give space to exclusion and marginalization, manipulating cultural content of national assets to deliver grandiosity or supremacy of a chosen class. This is essentially true in The Balkans, and of course

129 Kohl, Nationalism and Archaeology, 227.
130 To understand this approach more fully see: Cyprus. Τμήμα Αρχαιοτήτων, Coordinating Group for Famagusta (Cyprus) Τμήμα Αρχαιοτήτων, Coordinating Group for Famagusta, 36 centuries of civilization, 1600 BC-1974 AD. (Cyprus: Department of Antiquities, 1988). Note that ‘civilization’ is counted until 1974 when the Turkish invasion of Cyprus occurs.
in Cyprus where the non-recognition of the transitional territory in the north has exacerbated nationalistic discourses.

Perhaps because of its insular location, Cyprus never received the same attention and interest compared to other conflict situations in Europe, such as the Balkans during the political re-shaping of that region starting in the 1990s. Furthermore, the unresolved transitional territory in North Cyprus closed the door to partial agreements, such as the control of further deterioration of Cultural Heritage located in the north. The 1974 events redefined the way Cyprus has been studied for decades. The historic and continuing (current) exacerbation of ethnic differences, and its development into an armed conflict, opens new paths in understanding Cyprus beyond the sociological level into a multidimensional one. Furthermore, the unresolved Cyprus issue gives a clear perspective on the current framework of nations and its limited capacity to help stop the decay accompanying nationalistic discourses, from either side, both inside and outside Cyprus’ boundaries.

To give Cyprus’ Cultural Heritage a context, it is necessary to stand back and look at the island through an alternative lens, one that helps us recognize additional components to heritage, and redefine aspects such as nationalism and identity. As the Cultural Heritage Technical Specialist of the Study on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus tasked to deal with the Bi-communal Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus, I have seen the overall political umbrella that drives the two communities, down to the technical level. Those who argue for the superiority of the Greek-Cypriot community as the inheritor of Cypriot origins do not accept a discussion on how to recognize the heritage of the ‘Other’ as its own. Most importantly, the discussion on how to dismantle the ‘cultural ban’ on cultural heritage scholars working in the northern part of Cyprus was never an option.\textsuperscript{131} The assumption of national identity is imbricated

\textsuperscript{131} To understand better the politics involved in Cyprus see Hardy: “After the war of 1974, the Republic of Cyprus Department of Antiquities ‘appeal[led]’ to UNESCO to protect cultural heritage in northern
with an ethno-national heritage, and both Cultural Heritage and ethnicity are part of the inherited asset belonging to the citizens. 

When revising the current Law of Antiquities of the Republic of Cyprus, which was designed during British rule, it is clear that the former vision of heritage management is oriented to the formalities of listings, procedures and legal framework, for dealing with heritage sites. Nevertheless, a discussion of the principles that rule the recognition of tangible and intangible heritage has yet to be held. This, in principle, obliges a new definition of identity, nationality and ethnicity that is inclusive and participatory in order to replace the polarised vision that separates something that is indivisible. To conclude, the notion of identity, as discussed here, is a concept widely used to manipulate and reinforce political views that often exclude minorities and stifle the sense of plurality of cultures. This, in the context of Cultural Heritage especially in Cyprus, does not help in finding resolutions to its limbo. In the case of Famagusta, the identity of the site is yet to be defined and needs to be carefully assessed within the context of the unresolved political issues that have caused an acute fracture between Famagusta and the people living in it. The present study takes a step closer to that.

Having explained the connections between the current situation in Famagusta and the conceptualization of Cultural Heritage, and at the same time, UNESCO’s role

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132 On national identity see Scott: “State strategies involving the projection onto a world stage of narratives of ‘national destiny’, strategies which have often been developed in response to the experience of colonialism, are closely linked to concepts of ethno-national heritage and patrimony which are derived from notions of private family inheritance and the unbroken ‘genealogical chain.” Scott, World Heritage as a Model for Citizenship, 103.

133 Also Scott comments: “The success of the movement for Greek national self-determination, which had mobilised the support of western Europe’s phil-hellenic elite in its struggle against the Ottoman ‘Other’, sparked off Greek irredentist movements throughout Asia Minor and in Cyprus. In Cyprus, the same historic resources underpinning the British destiny to rule were also claimed by a vociferous and self-confident indigenous movement as authority for their right to enosis of the union of Cyprus with Greece.” Scott, World Heritage as a Model for Citizenship, 103.
in the design of the term, I reiterate the need for a fresh, dynamic and updated approach to Cultural Heritage, in the case of Famagusta and by extension to the entire sector. Famagusta proves the difficulties of securing a site that is unable to respond to a number of webs, attachments, and conditions that come with the internationalized politics of culture. Famagusta does not need another cry for justice. It requires a serious discussion on how to design the concept of Cultural Heritage to recognize fluidity in Cultural Heritage formation. Only a discussion of this sort is able to pave a road for the future, rather than wallowing in the cacophony surrounding its preservation.

To conclude, the proposed new definition of Cultural Heritage in Famagusta necessarily needs to recognize memory. Cultural Heritage, as a dynamic social construction suits the idiosyncrasies of Famagusta. The definition is based on core aspects widely discussed in its theoretical elaboration throughout this study. Those aspects are: Conflict and Recognition, Social Construction, Diaspora and Globalization, Value and Significance. Moreover, the recognition of Famagusta outside the realm of (legitimate UN-mediated) identity, and in permanent conflict, might help in moving the discussion of heritage away from the rhetorics of conservation and towards alternative explorations. This will challenge the relationship between the city and the citizens, and suggest ways that Famagusta can facilitate a peaceful integration of heritage sites within developing narratives of citizenship in conflict. If Famagusta is capable of showing itself to be a site of diasporas that for centuries shaped the landscape of the city, instead of merely the ethnicities and religions of the present, the opportunities for its revitalization grow. Apart from claiming ownership (heritage), an approach that has only emphasized the incapacity of visualizing a future for Famagusta, there will be a chance to settle the arguments that look futile from any perspective, even from a political one. It is time for Famagusta to take advantage of its own reality and project itself as a representation of disaporic heritage, hybridity and
transition, and even present the limbo of its institutions, to the international community and the heritage sector that have dismissed and marginalized the entire site.

Cultural Heritage as a concept has not had the opportunity to be discussed outside the realm of UNESCO and its partner organizations such as ICOMOS and ICCROM, as well as those as I have discussed in depth. The inclusion of Cultural Heritage as a social construction steers the dynamics away from the trajectory that transpired with the usage of the notion of monument. It transforms heritage back into an event of memory. The difficulties memory brings to nations in formation, national environments and national legal structures, challenge the core aspects and assumptions, a challenge that UNESCO’s member states are not comfortable with. When situating Cultural Heritage in the social context, it is guaranteed that a different society other than the present one can eventually recognize a heritage that we cannot in current times. It is not about protecting Cultural Heritage. It is about creating the conditions where Cultural Heritage does not need to be protected.
Chapter II
History: a Tailored Perspective for Transition
1. Prologue

In the practice of Cultural Heritage, history plays a key role, though not always a fundamental one, in establishing the significance of a place. Its function is mostly limited to describing and interpreting the sequence of events that transpired in a certain space and at a certain time. In writing history, historians are inclined to take specific viewpoints on facts and events, using other fields, such as anthropology and archaeology, to present narratives to define the weight of events in the cosmogony of a certain culture or community. Historians vigorously select and organize which facts will eventually be included in what we read and teach as history. Simply put, they play an active role in decision making, in determining what makes up the historical significance of a place or event.

This chapter explores, and argues for, the historical background and significance of Famagusta, a task that is ordinarily expected from historians. However, I take a different approach than the historian, as a purely historical inquiry is an endeavour that exceeds my capacity and interest as a Cultural Heritage practitioner. As such, this chapter will highlight selected aspects, or themes, that exemplify Famagusta’s heritage. These will then be discussed in the context of the history of Famagusta in order to highlight the historical value and significance of its heritage assets.¹³⁴

Needless to say, in the case of Famagusta, history is an imperative lens through which one is able to grasp the context in which the significance, value, and essence of the place is entrenched. The current political and social predicaments that confront Famagusta, as well as Cyprus, obscure the lines through which historical narratives are articulated, thus, placing the site in a state of limbo. This chapter aims to highlight the

link and interconnection between five aspects of the history and heritage of Cyprus where Famagusta plays an important role. These aspects are: i) scholarship, ii) technology, iii) multiculturalism, iv) personas, and v) conflict. I argue that by examining these five aspects, we may be able to understand the dynamic heritage significance of Famagusta and support its development, as an embodied memory of mankind. These aspects represent pillars for the creation of a coherent rationale for the development of its heritage assets. Famagusta, I maintain, is an important portion of the memory of humanity which requires alternative forms of analysis to understand its transformations as a multicultural, multiethnic, and diverse society. It is to be noted at the outset that I do not intend to re-write the history of Famagusta – that is a complex and intricate work that I leave for historians; instead I merely contribute a comprehensive detailed bibliography on Famagusta. What I propose is a broader scholastic analysis of the multifarious layers of history that transpired in Famagusta and that regardless of their complexity – or because of it – contribute to the immense significance of the place. This turbulent history, I maintain, is where Famagusta draws its essence and value – essence and value that lie outside the parameters of definition, recognition and management set by the current universal framework on Cultural Heritage.

In the pages that follow, I present an alternative approach to assess Famagusta’s heritage assets. First, I survey the relevant scholarship to establish the fundamental relationship between the transformations of Famagusta and the production of knowledge on its heritage sites. Historiographical inquiry provides a window to understanding the important political, cultural, social, and technological transformations that occurred in Famagusta. I argue that simultaneous with (and possibly attributable to) the steady production of writings and publications about Famagusta, the definition, meaning, and portrayal of city has also changed. Second, I elaborate on the evolution of the technological aspects of Famagusta’s fortification
system. I maintain that its importance is not limited to Cyprus, in fact, highly relevant to the rest of the Mediterranean region. Third, I discuss multiculturalism in Famagusta and Cyprus. Multiculturalism, I assert, is an alternative framework through which to view and understand the history of Famagusta as a single cord made of multiple threads, all contributing to its shaping as an integrated whole. Understanding multiculturalism in Famagusta’s history highlights the role of diverse cultural backgrounds, languages, and ethnicities in the evolution of such a site.

Fourth, I explore key personalities who played a prominent part in the heritage formation, development, and recognition of Famagusta. Investigating specific persons in the context of Famagusta, I surmise, will help in understanding vital conjunctions in the metamorphosis of Famagusta.

Lastly, I probe into the nature and history of conflict in Famagusta, and by extension, Cyprus. The lens of conflict, I believe, provides an opportunity not only to analyze the persistence of political impediments in Cyprus but also to understand a critical factor that shaped the physicality and meanings of its heritage expressions – its building, the walls, and streetscape, among others. Conflict, in the context of history, in this case both constructs and deconstructs Famagusta and sets the tone for what it is today.

2. Formative Scholarship: Constructing Famagusta

The production of literature about Famagusta is in itself a heritage asset, with a weight of its own. If one admits scholarship production as heritage activity, the late 19th century onwards must be considered a vibrant period, yielding numerous works and analysis on Famagusta’s history, culture, economics, and society.

By far, the most important is the publication of Camille Enlart’s *L’art Gothique et la Renaissance en Chypre* in 1899, which emphasizes Famagusta and its
connections to European trends in art, architecture, and construction.\textsuperscript{135} This, and his other works, reveal a glimpse of the multiplicity of historical narratives that transpired in Famagusta and the plurality of perspectives that are preserved and manifested in the physicality of the city. Enlart produced important scholarship on Famagusta in the context of his own time and place (by the time of his first publication - \textit{Gothic art and Renaissance in Cyprus} - Cyprus was under British rule), discussing aspects and features of the city that are now lost. These observations were inevitably influenced by their background, context and biases (as a French scholar with Christian upbringing) but in any case they represent a snapshot of Famagusta at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century which is fundamental in assessing the transformation of the site. Enlart gives the first modern assessment of Cypriot expressions of art and architecture in Famagusta, and delights the reader with various attributions of European origin. According to Enlart, “They show influence of Provence and Champagne and thus corroborate the documentary evidence for close connections.”\textsuperscript{136} As such, he gives a clear picture of the how architecture, art and craftsmanship are embedded into heritage expressions in Famagusta. Enlart’s approach to Famagusta is through the eye of an architect who describes the outline, accents of around thirty churches, rhythms of the city’s walls and bastions, and pauses of the ruins. Enlart shows perspectives that connect everyday life in Famagusta and the condition and characteristics of its buildings, which until the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century was a missing aspect of Cypriot history. According to his observations, Famagusta’s structures and physical features were closely intertwined with the social history and realities of that period. His account offers the reader, and future researchers, the tools with, and foundations on, which to understand future scholarship on Cyprus, which is now contested by Nicola Coldstream and Arne


\textsuperscript{136} Enlart, Gothic art and Renaissance, 211.
Franke, and vigorously defended by Soulard. Enlart also provided detailed descriptions of religious buildings such as the Cathedral of St. Nicholas, Saint Peter and Paul, St. George of the Greeks, St George of the Latins, Church and Monastery of the Franciscans, St Mary of Carmel, St. Anne and its attachment, the Nestorian Church, Armenian Church, St. Anthony, the twin Churches - Templars and Hospitallers, St. Clare, as well as six unidentified buildings. Enlart’s approach served two purposes initially: first, the descriptions of the religious edifices established their connections with historic events, even as the churches themselves were witnesses


of history and second, these observations are relevant in understanding that a small place like Famagusta was able to cater to various peoples from multiple cultural backgrounds and each of these groups left distinctive traces in the physicality of the city.

Another valuable work was compiled by a government official in the Consul of the English Levant Company in Old Larnaca named Claude Delaval Cobham.\textsuperscript{146} His written compendium is entitled \textit{Excerpta Cypria}.\textsuperscript{147} Beginning with Wilbrandi de Oldemborg (circa 1211) on the walls of Famagusta, Cobham draws together a continuous picture of Famagusta through the eyes of travellers and offers not an official or scholarly view, but a set of lay descriptions of the condition of the city throughout the years.\textsuperscript{148} This compendium offers an insight into the social, cultural, and political milieu of Cyprus, including astute narratives from other sources such as military, government and diplomatic officials from various backgrounds including refugees, merchants, and pilgrims. As such, \textit{Exerpta Cypria} must be regarded as a fundamental starting point from which to look at the events which shaped Famagusta (and Cyprus) from the 13\textsuperscript{th} to the 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, as it reveals a central theme in the history of the place, i.e. the inherent complexity of the narratives that transpired in Famagusta. These narratives often contained detailed accounts of buildings, markets, customs, and personas of relevance in the everyday life of Famagusta, and its importance in the context of Cyprus itself. As a key hub for travellers and merchants crossing between Europe and Asia and within the Mediterranean, Famagusta was influenced and shaped by a diversity of cultural and social flows that

\textsuperscript{147} Cobham was a former H.M. Commissioner in Cyprus between 1880 and 1898.
\textsuperscript{148} There are three different stages in the construction of what are the existing fortified system of Famagusta, this reference corresponds to an early Lusignan period. On reference to Famagusta Cobham says: “Hence we reached Famagusta, a city built close to the sea, with a good harbour, slightly fortified. Here is the third suffragan see of the lord bishop of Nicosia. Near it is the site of some city now destroyed, from which, they say, came that famous and blessed Epiphanius, who is commemorated in the Canon” Cobham, \textit{Excerpta Cypria}, 14.
came in and went out of the city, on a regular basis. This vibrant flow of goods, people, and ideas inevitably enhance the significance of the place. The works of Louis de Mas Latrie in the 19th and Sir George Hill in the 20th centuries with regard to the influence of the Crusades in Cyprus and Famagusta completes the fundamental bedrock of Famagusta scholarship. Similar to the scholarship of Enlart and Jeffrey, Rupert Gunnis paid special attention to the urban settlements island wide. His understanding of the functioning of the Orthodox rituals helps in interpreting the iconography found on the island. Gunnis’ explanation of the history of Cyprus is brief and useful but not sufficient to understand what we appreciate in Famagusta to date.

A different type of written record, no less important, comes in the form of basic technical assessments, together with reports from excavations and research on ancient sites, recommendations for conservation and security of archaeological sites, as well as the creation and functioning of museums. The extent of reports even addressed the difficult political situation (in the last report from 1972) that had not been resolved, and still has not. The Reports (RDAC) are in essence the detailed records of the Department of Antiquities, its interventions, construction works, even cost of labour and materials. Those details help in drawing a map of interventions, timing, legal

152 For example a report states: “Famagusta, Jambulat Bastion and adjoining curtain wall.* - The counterscarp wall was repaired and two staircases one on the east and another one on the west by the
aspects and difficulties in the implementation of the Law on Famagusta Stones (1891), drafted during the British administration (1878 - 1960). A record like this, I maintain, is in itself a record of change, modification, transformation and permanent evolution in Famagusta’s heritage assets - interventions that are now regarded as heritage.

In more recent work, Catherine Otten-Froux and David Metcalf show evidence of the production of money and the establishment of a ‘mint’ in Famagusta, which opens an alternative perspective from which to study the role of Cyprus in the economic network of the Mediterranean and the strength of its policies on commerce, endorsed by the Banco di San Giorgio in Genoa. Through this literature, Cyprus (and Famagusta) is projected as a vital place for trade, commerce, and the 15th century financial system in the Mediterranean. The importance of this site is based on the fact that Cypriot money was a trading asset (based on a strong economy) and also was endorsed by a bank in Italy, confirming the linkage between the two territories. In Michalis Olympios’ recent study, the main objective is to establish a regional relationship regarding the production of architecture from the gothic period, especially between Rhodes and Cyprus. This approach helps to explain the context in which Famagusta emerges as a paradigm for sites in the region, rather than only in Cyprus. His work further links Cyprus, now in the realm of gothic production, to Rhodes. This established the significance of Famagusta from multiple perspectives and in wider

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scope. In the field of cultural aesthetics, Nicola Coldstream addresses Cyprus’ expressions of gothic architecture in terms of its own uniqueness, instead of comparing it with similar representations from other parts of the world. She reassures the reader that the Lusignan pattern is distinctive and therefore highly important for its unique design.

More recently there have been scholars exploring the links between Venice and Famagusta. One of these is Alan Langdale who produced an assessment of Famagusta’s fortification system based on the comparison in protection policies between mainland Venice and its islands throughout the Mediterranean Sea. Besides the fortification system, which happened to be the most impressive of the eastern possessions of Venice, the author’s main argument is that urban architecture and the architecture of buildings was designed by Venetians to have a deeper impact on its inhabitants through the recognition of patterns similar to those encountered in


158 Regarding the architecture features of Famagusta, Langdale argues: “The Palazzo Ducale, free of the defensive architectural vocabulary that marked its terra firma counterparts, was boldly placed at the waterfront, with the high domes of St. Mark’s hovering beyond. Venice’s confidence was thus expressed in the architectural facades that also made up the facade of her self-image” Langdale, At the Edge of the Empire, 155.
Venice. In the specific analysis of the main square, Langdale addresses the hybridity present in the physiognomy of the square. It is rare to find a contemporary vision that links history, design and urbanism in descriptions that utilize contemporary concepts such as hybridity and liminality, (sociological and anthropological concepts) to explain the connections with other parts of the world, but in this Langdale has been successful. This approach speaks of a need to take a broader, contextual perspective when looking at Famagusta, one that incorporates disparate, additional elements from fields of thought not generally held to belong to the discipline of historical inquiry.

Famagusta’s history and the convolutions of historic events which took place there paved the way for some scholars to expand research subjects and offer new perspectives on life in Famagusta. In one of these works, Michael Walsh explores more than two decades of the history of Famagusta, when the British Empire administered Cyprus, moving it from being a part of imperial policy, to being a colonial administration. During this period, Walsh explains a number of policies, such as the Famagusta Stones Law, which secularized the management of heritage goods, and introduced changes to the port and therefore to the fortification system. It is important to note that the legislation designed by the British is still enforced in both parts of the island. In the politically sensitive scenario of Cyprus, I assert that a foreign perspective

159 On features of Famagusta’s public spaces Langdale describes: “I suggest that one of the primary objectives of the modifications of the built environment of Famagusta’s main square was to serve public rituals. Given the centrality of processions and public ritual in Venetian culture, it is not surprising that such practices would have been exported and modified in various colonial contexts” Ibid., 158.

160 Also on architecture Langdale opinion is: “A hybridized Venetian renovation in Famagusta’s main cathedral square [...] In terms of articulating the architectural setting of the square, the building represented yet another institutional presence—probably ecclesiastical, originally—which defined and organized the space of the square, thus, establishing its spatial precedence in the city by more emphatically segregating it from the busy street which ran along the square to the south. Ibid.,176.

might yet bring clarity on what to protect and why, and how to implement the upgrading of contemporary conceptualizations on Cultural Heritage. Some of Walsh’s works reveal the multilayered aspects of art where overlapping artistic expressions can become equally significant in heritage terms. The acknowledgment of local artistic expressions or decorative motives gives relevance and centrality to Cyprus in relation to other heritage sites and suggests its potential to become a center for study away from the periphery linked to ruling empires.

In Carmelina Gugliuzzo’s work\textsuperscript{162} we see the study of two different cities that decided on expansion towards ports and maritime facilities: Messina and Valetta. This study offers the potential for comparative analysis with Famagusta and helps assess the transformation of a former walled system. Since the region felt the permanent threat of the Ottoman Empire, this work can also help in understanding the changes and alterations that occurred in Famagusta’s fortification system. Other scholars have studied different aspects of Famagusta, such as architecture, that are relevant to understanding the different connections established by history between the Mediterranean and continental Europe geographical areas.\textsuperscript{163} This has involved an examination of ‘styles’, architectural languages, decorative features, construction techniques, materials, masonries and local production of craftsmen, and transfer of technology between east and west. Moreover, art\textsuperscript{164} (in its various expressions

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Carmelina Gugliuzzo, “The opening of the harbor, the closing of the walls: urban history of two Mediterranean port cities,” \textit{Humanities} Anno 1 no. 2 (2012).
\end{thebibliography}
including archaeological remains like heraldic decorations, wall paintings, artifacts, sculptures, ceramics, murals, frescoes, jewellery, ornaments, ecclesiastical art, plateries), archaeology, ethnicity, and religion were also explored by various scholars in detail, especially during the past decade.

The insular character of Cyprus and its geographical location determine its future. During the Crusades, Cyprus and Famagusta played a fundamental role as a support territory for Crusaders and their intention to recover control of the Holy Land, while later during the Ottoman period the interest was focused on the conquest of Europe. In the Balkans, public works and highly elaborated buildings supported the advance of Islam throughout Eastern Europe: Ottomans modified and ‘Islamised’ buildings and public spaces, blending symbolism, decorations, and characteristics; The Ottoman period in Famagusta brought many other changes as well beyond this (i.e. infrastructure, water works, among others). Needless to say, it is difficult to measure the impact of the Ottoman period in Famagusta based solely on visible changes in the urban structure, yet the Ottoman impact on Famagusta is still apparent. Ottoman rule came at the hands of Selimin [Suleiman] the Magnificent, when in May 1570 a systematic takeover in Cyprus began. Between May and September the main town of Limassol fell to Ottoman hands. In September the attempt to take over Famagusta


began and led to one of the most important episodes in Famagusta’s history: a ten month siege. Paolo Paruta explores the narratives of the 1570-71 Ottoman Siege of Famagusta:

“But the Chiefs and people of Famagosta were staunch in their resolve to defend themselves to the end. They lent no ear to these arguments, and instead of begging the Senate to surrender the city, they resolved urgently to demand aid for its defence; and that the state of things, and their immediate wants.”

Later, Cobham relates the closing stages of the siege:

“[...] But when Marcantonio Bragadino and Astorre Baglione the generals, with a following of many captains and nobles went forth from the city to his camp to present the keys of the gates and to ask (as had been agreed) for leave to depart, he caused them at first to be brought to his tent, received them kindly, and praised their courage and their zeal in defending for their Prince so noble a city. Then a sudden fit of rage seized the cruel savage, and in violation of his pledged word and of the common law of nations he not only ordered Astorre Baglione, a man of noble birth and a distinguished soldier, and other leaders to be beheaded, while their followers were attacked and massacred by the arms of his guards and the spears of the janissaries, but caused Marcantonio Bragadino, the general in command of the city, a man illustrious among the nobles of Venice for his passion for arms and singular courage, after his ears were cut off, to be brutally flayed alive by a Jewish hangman—a spectacle of hideous and unparalleled barbarity.”167

These accounts demonstrate that Famagusta is difficult to portray as purely Ottoman (or inherently Ottoman), though it is difficult to deny Ottoman influences in the features of buildings and public spaces. A consolidated settlement was already there when Ottomans arrived in the island. It withstood the ravages of an asymmetrical battle and, if one looks closely enough, can yet be seen in the urban streetscape of the city. Besides Islamic symbols such as minarets and traditional vernacular houses, the Ottomans left numerous nearly invisible traces of their almost three hundred years of rule in Famagusta. A deeper historical analysis of their imprint is only now being attempted.168

167 Cobham, Exerpta Cypria, 198.
A close examination of archives and documents reveal a reality that is not frequently discussed. The architecture of management, rule of law, public administration and religious acceptance among communities in Cyprus during the Ottoman rule give evidence of a tolerant setting where -at least- Orthodox Christians and Jews were recognized and respected as communities from monotheistic backgrounds. The status of *zimmis*, which was given to Jews, Armenians, and Maronites and others, guaranteed the acknowledgement, recognition, and to some extent, the protection of those communities. The rules of law that applied to all communities have been documented by Ronald C. Jennings in his work *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571-1640*, in which he demonstrates that the *kadis* (a sort of a court house) were distributed by *kazas* (regions) and Famagusta (Magosa) was one of them, subject to a main court house (*sharia*) located in Lefkoşa (Nicosia).

Another facet that can be traced through archives is the taxation system *cizye*, applied to non-Muslim communities (which by 1572 was estimated to be around 70,000 to 80,000 people in the whole island). The reduced population of Cyprus after the Ottoman invasion had a simple consequence in the functioning of the state in that there was now a limited demand for medical assistance, and infrastructure and other aspects of daily life that motivated investment in public works. A parallel system to the official was charity enterprises -*Evcaf* or *Vafk*- with particular objectives in education, religion, health, etc. The majority of relevant buildings in Cyprus (at least the ones corresponding to the Ottoman tradition) can be traced through research in the *Evcaf’s* archives. The relationship of *kadis* with *Evcafs* is that *kadis* were entitled to give

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169 On multicultural population Bambrilla says: “majority of the population, joined by a few other tiny confessional groups (Jews, Armenians, Maronites) gained the status of zimmis (Arab dhimmi), that is, of tolerated, if inferior, religious minorities, which were allowed to live peacefully alongside the growing Muslim population” Elena Brambrilla, (2007) “Convivencia under Muslim rule: the Island of Cyprus after the Ottoman Conquest (1571-1640),” in *Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective*, ed. Joaquim Carvalho (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2007): 122.

170 Ibid., 123.
Evkafs the supervision of tax collection. Evcafs by definition were institutions financed and managed by Muslims to maintain public works in urban settlements, for the good of the Muslim community.  

As mentioned above, the decreased population in the island and limited increase throughout the years was probably one of the reasons the Ottoman impact on Famagusta was mild, even if the establishment of evcaf initiatives made possible activities such as the construction of aqueducts, public baths, inns, bazaars, shops, mills and schools. The elements that accompanied the Ottoman impact on Cypriot population, ethnic groups and religious diversity, are reflected in Famagusta’s streetscape of the historic core. Nevertheless, to understand the full impact of the Ottoman rule is a complex endeavour that requires further analysis. I have only mentioned two aspects that, from the perspective of a Cultural Heritage practitioner, are interrelated: policies and management.

Based on the selected works I presented here, it is evident that scholarship itself has a significant role to play in understanding Famagusta and in the evolution of its society. These authors describe, assess and study the changes and transformations, some of which are no longer visible, or that lie hidden as archaeological remains, or ruins. These observations and insights in turn form a significant part of how we understand Famagusta. In other words, our understanding of the society, complexity, and nature of Famagusta’s heritage is highly contingent on the works of various scholars who have attempted and still attempt, to unravel pieces of the Famagusta

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171 Regarding the functioning of Evkafs, Yıldız argues: “It is naturally expected that vakfs are usually established by devout Muslims proud of their cities, who wanted to beautify them as well as wishing to serve God or to be generous with their fellow Muslims. According to Jennings, during the early Ottoman era Cyprus had no wealthy merchants from the old families nor native ulemas, and all except some local converts whose ties of home and family initially were outside the island, many of the early founders of evkaf were from the military class. Netice Yıldız, (2009) "The Vakf Institution in Ottoman Cyprus," In Ottoman Cyprus : A Collection of Studies on history and Culture, ed. Michalis Michael, Mathias Kappler and Efthiios Gavriel (Berlin : Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009): 129.

172 Ibid., 128.
puzzle. Through this approach, I foster a strong dialogue between heritage site and the epistemology as a witness of historical transformation.

3. Technology

I now offer an overview of the relevance of the fortification system of Famagusta from the technological point of view and within the context of military advances. There are a growing number of historians who explore the history of scientific and technological processes in various societies, yet Famagusta is a case that is not well explored. This gap in research does not do justice to the significance of the technological innovations that occurred in Famagusta and the subsequent impact on social behaviour, culture, heritage and other facets of life. To instigate an inquiry into the history of technology in Famagusta is also to embark upon a study of its social and heritage transformations. Broadly speaking, the development of weaponry in Europe forced the improvement of effective defence measures for urban settlements and the protection of trading routes between Europe, the Americas, Africa and Southeast Asia. The Mediterranean played an important role in the development of different types of walls for various ports. The original fortification of Famagusta was Lusignan, which was then modified by the Genoese, added to by the Venetians, remodelled by the Ottomans, and finally adapted by the British. The wall represents not only a footprint of many of the cultures present in Cyprus, but the rivalry, and thus the protection of the city, was a concern throughout the centuries.

To understand the relevance of the walled system of Famagusta, it is important to give it a historic context and turn to various scholars who have attempted to do so. War forces innovative thinking in terms of defense and security of urban settlements, as can be seen in Pietro Cataneo’s (1553) attempt to structure a treatise on how to build fortresses as an answer to weaponry development.\(^\text{173}\) Famagusta’s defence system

reflects some of the features shown in his work *I Quattro primi libri di architettura* such as the star shaped bastions further developed by Venetians along the Mediterranean Sea, along a line from Bergamo and Verona in Italy, Modoni and Patras in Greece, Candia and Canea in Crete, Kotor in Montenegro, Pirano in Slovenia, and Zara in Croatia, to Famagusta. The development of walls to prevent the occupation of entire regions in Europe (and later in the Americas, Africa and South East Asia), came with a humanistic and contemporary vision for the design of urban settlements based on considerations such as security, hygiene, food supply, and water provision. Connection to sea ports, specialization in trade activities and the beginning of an urban way of life with governance, rule of law and general regulations, replaced the feudal tradition inherited from the Middle Ages, which previously characterized such settlements. By exploring the technological developments in Famagusta and then observing how Famagusta influenced further technological advancements, we appreciate that we are engaging in a study of a greater memory of the past. What these developments in defense triggered requires a deeper understanding of the architecture of urban settlements focused on the idea of new forms of fortification as the technological response to more destructive forms of weaponry. Engineering defined the materials, forms and physics of city constructions around Europe, Africa, South East Asia and the Americas. Experiences of war reverberated among the regions of the world with European influences, and determined the technological development that we can now see in surviving fortresses. To explore the relevance of the walls as one of the components that conditioned the existence of Famagusta throughout the centuries, it is necessary to see how different scholars from many disciplines have detailed aspects of the walls at various moments in time. Enlart took up this idea in his study of the fortification system of Famagusta\(^\text{174}\), beginning with an account of Henry II (the

construction of the Arsenal bastion before 1310), then Armaric (Henry’s brother) and the building of the wall between today’s Othello’s tower and the Arsenal. After giving a brief description of the walls, he then described the invasion in 1373 by Genoese forces and observed the consequences for Famagusta’s decay. Enlart quotes the words of Jacques La Siege\textsuperscript{175} in 1492 to highlight the good condition of the fortification system. Similar repairs can be found in Cobham, and physical replications of the fortification – at least one- can be found in Venice. Enlart’s emphasis on the fortification system and the variations in its design leave the reader with the impression that there is more to know of the medieval walls of Famagusta. Famagusta’s citadel (also referred to as Othello’s castle) is located in the northern part of the fortifications. The citadel in Famagusta is the result of Genoese and Lusignan interventions, while the rest of the fortifications were finalized under Venetian rule, and later modified by Ottomans. The citadel also has a role in the protection and defense of Famagusta, one of the most important ports in the eastern Mediterranean and strongly linked to the Holy Land, Jerusalem, and the Crusades during at least four centuries of its history.

Famagusta’s citadel is the setting for one of the most important pieces of English literature – Shakespeare’s \textit{Othello}. As a critical component in Othello, the citadel figures in collective literary memory crossing generations, social classes and ethnic backgrounds.

Throughout its various eras of rule by different groups, Famagusta’s rulers paid significant attention to the walls and so the ownership cannot be claimed exclusively by one community or the other. It is a neutral, hybrid, feature that emphasizes the complex character of the city. The fortification system serves as an important heritage

\textsuperscript{175} On the fortification system Enlart suggests: “We were greatly astounded to see such a strong city [...] The walls of the aforementioned Famagusta are all repaired and there is a very fine rampart. To speak briefly, the city is impregnable, so long as the garrison is adequate [...]” Enlart, Gothic art and Renaissance in Cyprus, 448.
asset that epitomizes technological and historical development of Famagusta. A closer analysis of this segment of fortification shows not only the transformation that the building went through since before the walls were constructed, but also offers evidence of a fortress (the first of a number of defense measures taken in Famagusta) as a predecessor of the model developed during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries as a response to advancements in weaponry. The transformation of a building speaks not only of political decisions, religious changes, but also of technological advances. A building is an open document of decisions at different levels of society, traceable through its features and components.

Although the construction of Othello’s tower corresponds to an early period, its continuous changes and transformations are deeply linked to the Venetians and their efficiency in developing fortifications throughout the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. One particular way in which Othello’s tower has a role is in the early formation of enclosed fortress/buildings (what, in Italian, is called piazza forte [strong fortressed square]), which signifies an enclosed building that by itself was designed to survive a military assault. The citadel contains the characteristics of a piazza forte and the features needed to protect artillery and weaponry as well as living space for troops. The concept of piazza forte was also used in the Caribbean and widely developed into impressive ensembles such as El Morro in Havana and San Felipe in Cartagena de Indias. Othello’s castle remains a building structured around a central courtyard with passages at the perimeters around the open space to connect all dependencies. Throughout the 16th to 18th centuries, European defense was strongly linked to the Spanish Empire and its territories abroad (the Americas and the Philippines), as evidenced by the transfer of technological advances to the Americas as part of the Spanish empire. Given that Spain was among the most powerful kingdoms in Europe,

176 The building appears in its original configuration prior 1310. For more information on this building in its early stage see: Camile Enlart’s works, also Sir. George Jeffrey and Rupert Gunnis.
it had already acquired substantial experience in building defense systems for their own
city-states and securing trade routes along the Mediterranean. The connection between
the experience acquired by the Venetians and the power displayed by the Spaniards
formed a productive alliance for defense of the Americas with impressive examples
throughout the Caribbean (Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia): these
sites include Castillo San Lorenzo el Real de Chagre in Portobelo, Panama, Castillo de
la Fuerza real, Los Tres Reyes del Morro, San Salvador de la Punta in Havana, Santa
Catalina and San Felipe del Morro in Puerto Rico, Palacio de Sans Souci in Domican
Republic, and San Felipe de Barajas in Colombia. Famagusta’s fortress and walls
represent pieces of a greater puzzle that links it to other continents and cultures, though
those connections have yet to be fully established. The work of engineers such as
Giacometto da Novello, Ercole Martinengo, Michele Sanmicheli, Giangirolamo
Sanmicheli, Luigi Brugnoli, Agostino Chisone, Gian Battista Zanchi, Ascanio
Savorgnano, Giulio Savorgnano and Giovanni Magagnati in Famagusta are
connected to treatises such as: *I Quattro Primi Libri D'Architettura*, (Venice 1554).
*Dell’Idea Dell’architettura Universale*, (Venice 1615), *Due Libre del Modo di Fare le
Fortificazioni*, (Venice 1559), *Della Fortificazioni Delle Cittá*, (Venice 1564),
*Dell’arte Militar*, (Brescia 1571). This suggested three main changes to the traditional
fortification: the replacement of towers for pentagonal shaped bastions, defensive walls
becoming oblique, replacing verticality, and the use of a moat adjacent to walls.


178 Harris in his work “Bastion” gives the following description: A bastion is lower than a tower, to reduce damage from increasingly powerful artillery; it is much larger in plan area, to allow the mounting and deployment of artillery. Perhaps most distinctively, the bastion is straight-sided and polygonal in plan, the walls facing the enemy, the faces come to a point; guns mounted there can attack besiegers in the field. The two other sides, the flanks, allow fire not only along the ramparts (the curtain walls between the bastions,) but also along the faces of the adjacent bastions, leaving none of the blind spots that square and even round towers were perceived to leave. The bastion is often described as pentagonal: two faces, two flanks and the open face on the line of the ramparts, the gorge. John Harris, “Bastion.” 2012, accessed May 15, 2014, <http://www.google.com.sg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCcQFjAC&url=http
Eventually, one additional feature included the creation of the circular shape of the settlement to give better access to all flanks in case of attack. Famagusta presents an interesting evolution in the structure of the walls and other elements that are still unstudied (e.g. internal spaces and underground areas). The scholarship/treatises produced during this period is vast and shows the interest new weaponry brought to defense, and the impact of defense in the configuration of enclosed, specialized and autonomous urban settlement. This makes Famagusta and its fortification system a significant example of new applied technologies. The connections between Europe and the Americas have traditionally been studied as transference of technology from other parts of Europe to Spain and from there to the New World. Subsequent accounts such as Jacques la Saige in 1518, John Locke in 1553, and Elias of Pesaro in 1563, give further accounts of the condition of Famagusta’s walls.

“We were greatly astounded to see such a strong city [...] The walls of the aforementioned Famagusta are all repaired and there is a very fine rampart. To speak briefly, the city is impregnable, so long as the garrison is adequate...”

Giacomo Diedo, a Venetian citizen, in his work entitled the *History of the Republic of Venice*, includes a detailed account of Famagusta under Genoese rule. Diedo’s account gives a broad perspective of the importance of the port of Famagusta.

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179 De la Croix is cited by Funizio in her Doctoral Thesis: “Most of these traffic and supply problems found their solution in the military radial plan, which provided the fortress with an efficient system of interior communications by connecting each of its bastions with the town’s center. The central piazza became at once the mustering point and the dispersal center for the city’s military strength which could be channeled to the key points of its defensive system along straight and unimpeded access roads. The radial plan had an additional advantage; each bastion could be seen from the central piazza and a commander stationed on a tower or raised platform in its center was incomplete control of the city’s defenses, able to shift his forces at will and according to need.” Funizio, Fortificazione e Citta: La Marca Italiana, 261-262.

180 In his work, Defensas a la antigua y a la moderna en el Reino de Valencia durante el siglo XVI- Arciniega García addresses this specific topic and remembers how Phillip II of Spain would create (in the Academy of Mathematics) the chair on Fortification and Geometry reinforcing the importance of securing the kingdom in Europe and overseas. Luis Arciniega García, “Defensas a la antigua y la moderna en el Reino de Valencia,” Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, Serie VII tomo XII (1999): 62.

181 I believe there are more layers, and that sometimes the feedback from the Americas to Europe and South East Asia – especially in terms of defence - made a difference, if only mainly in securing routes from British and Dutch piracy.

182 Enlart, Gothic art and Renaissance in Cyprus, 448.
from a unique perspective – of looking into Famagusta from the viewpoint of Venice. This is relevant because Famagusta is, in reality, a sum of connections between other places in the Mediterranean. The fortification system, I maintain, is probably the most interesting aspect of the configuration of a city with more potential for the study of military engineering, architecture that transcends the frontiers of Cyprus, and the world memory than is currently recognized.

Maps are representations of one’s reality, or plans to transform a particular territory. In terms of Cultural Heritage intervention, maps and plans are traditionally endorsed by other sources of research such as written material, from which a close interpretation of the past can be discussed. A relevant discussion at this point includes an analysis of the relationship between spatial humanities and the interpretation of maps. This provides a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of Famagusta’s societal context, however, this falls outside the scope of this study. The difference between what has been drawn and what is effectively built is mediated by technological assessments, resources, raw materials and expertise. Frequently maps and drawings are given historical value, and as such, they can be treasured. Their heritage value is quite different. One often hears arguments that the historic value of a graphic does not lie in what it actually depicts. Cartographical analysis of urban settlements, I would argue, is probably one of the most interesting and challenging aspects of heritage work, because it allows one to build an image of transformations and evolutions that are analyzed against events from everyday life. Such artifacts as weights and measures, currency, taxation structures, class and gender, trade, and newspapers, among others, can help in offering alternative visions of the past. A serious analysis of the plans of the fortification system of Famagusta will necessarily require a separate study itself. Here, I present only four maps designed at different

183 Maps reflect the vision and knowledge of geography and its components, including the built environment. Cartographic research helps us see transformation not only in the physical features of a given place but also how it is represented. Historic drawings give light on features that can be interpreted in the context of politics, religion, war and defense, among others.
moments during the 17th and 18th that show different emphasis of the fortification system. Figure 1 shows the Sea Gate and the Land Gate in relation to the fortification system. Figure 2 shows the control over the port and Figure 3 is particularly focused on the location and shapes of bastions and other features. The last figure portrays the system and its relationship to the geographic features of the bay. I have specially chosen these four examples to highlight various informative aspects of maps: first, the relevance that walls had in relation to defense (disregarding the settlement within the walls); second, the understanding of how geography determines the defense system to make it unique in its repertoire and development; third, that the walls required additional support components taking advantage of the morphology of the site and the characteristics of the ocean to complement the system, from the military architecture perspective (the ‘site’ was one with the topography); and fourth, the geometry and mathematics employed in the design and functioning of the defense system which portrays the urban settlement as a machine carefully tailored to effectively function with the defense system’s only purpose being to prevent access in times of conflict. The best evidence of this is the siege of Famagusta in 1571.

Figure 1. Famagusta Johann L. Gottfried, 1649
Figure 2. Plan de Famagouste Gravier d’Otiers, 1685

Figure 3. Famagusta Vincenzo Maria Coronelli, 1688
4. Multiculturalism

When analyzing Famagusta through a lens of multiculturalism we may ask ourselves: how is it possible to frame the permanent flow of peoples, languages and ethnicities as diverse as we have seen in Cyprus? Certainly the current definition of Cultural Heritage – as I have discussed – has not been able to link the past and the present in a conciliatory manner. This section highlights the presence of diverse groups of peoples that have shaped Famagusta and Cyprus permanently.

One of the defining characteristics of the history of Cyprus in relation to its heritage is multiculturalism. Throughout the centuries, hybridity, transition, and transnationality have highlighted the narratives of this area and shaped the contours of its heritage. Multiculturalism as an aspect of history is often diluted within discussions of historic events and the particularities of ethnicity, race and gender, and as such it is frequently included in social science scholarship. However, in the area of heritage...
studies, multiculturalism has yet to be integrated into mainstream conversations and analysis. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the notion of multiculturalism often represents clashing interests. Narratives of the various sites differ; they may include the voices of perpetrators, victims, or those in between, and various discourses of supremacy and nation building. I shall offer a few examples to illustrate the important link between history and Cultural Heritage.

Cyprus has, throughout history, served as an arena for the meeting of different cultures from East and West. Several prominent scholars, such as Camille Enlart, have explored this and devised a clear picture of the relationship between the art and architecture created in Famagusta as the product of a rich society composed of a variety of backgrounds such as Greeks, Syrians, Jews, Italians (Genoese), Provençals and Armenians. ¹⁸⁴ From his perspective, it was clear that Famagusta, from the very outset in the 12th century, was a nexus for cultural and social diversity. ¹⁸⁵ Regarding the composition of Famagusta’s population, Enlart used the coronation of King Peter I as King of Jerusalem in 1360 to give a broad account of its ethnicities. He remarked that Famagusta was a space where the Latins, Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians,


Jacobites, Indians, Ethiopians, Saracens and Jews co-existed. Gunnis further notes the presence of Copts, Abyssinians and the Georgians in Famagusta.

In a more recent work, Benjamin Arbel186 demonstrates that slavery187 was part of the social structure in the Mediterranean islands and has been documented continuously from the 13th century. Traces of slavery speak, on one hand, of the wealth of the city, and on the other hand of the presence of diverse ethnicities coming from other parts of Europe and the Middle East. One of the sources used by Arbel is testaments, whereby the property of human labour is evident. Arbel’s sources indicate that nationalities of slaves would include a variety of countries from the Mediterranean, but especially Greeks whom, Arbel argues, it is necessary to differentiate from Greek-Cypriot as an independent ethnic group. Arbel188 gives an explanation for the presence of Jews in Famagusta, explaining that they entered a more tolerant society which allowed them to practice money lending and trade, medicine and scholarship. His account further reveals Famagusta’s history of accommodating peoples from different cultures and backgrounds (often against their will).

Another aspect of multiculturalism in Cyprus can be seen in its link with the Crusades. Richard the Lionheart led a campaign to recover Jerusalem for the Catholic Church, known as the third Crusade. Richard I took Cyprus – on his way to Jerusalem – and sold it to Guy de Lusignan. Cyprus has ever since been linked to the Crusades and the possession of the Holy Land. The Cathedral of Famagusta is the coronation place of the king of Jerusalem. This important period in the history of Cyprus is

explored in a number of studies and is crucial in understanding the multicultural feature of the area.¹⁸⁹

One of the leading scholars of Famagusta’s multiculturalism is David Jacoby.¹⁹⁰ He argues that Famagusta’s commercial rise was as a consequence of papal prohibitions against dealing with Muslim countries. This fact, together with fiscal policies to encourage foreign traders to establish their headquarters in Famagusta and the presence of refugees from the Levant after the fall of Acre in 1291, explains the formation of various quarters which have characterized Famagusta for centuries. This work is pertinent as it unveils another layer in the historical significance of Famagusta, in this case, associated specifically with economics. The influx of merchants who hailed from different cultural backgrounds made Famagusta even more diverse and culturally rich. These aspects can be understood in the light of a greater narrative (e.g. trade and/or slavery) of that part of the world which reinforces the principle that sees heritage formation as a dynamic process, living outside our conceptualization of culture, by which I mean cultures. This emphasizes that heritage has connections that go beyond our sense and knowledge of the past and our own sense of belonging, ownership and sentiments in the present.

Multiculturalism is reflected in the symbiotic relationships between peoples and places in heritage sites. Othello’s castle or citadel is the product of Lusignan time and Venetian transformations of the spatial structure; La Porta di Mare (Sea Gate) has

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¹⁸⁹ In 1994, during the conference on Cyprus and the Crusades, Jaroslav Folda explored the idea that the Crusades, as a movement, produced its own artistic expressions or influenced the current production at the time. For additional information on expressions of multiculturalism in Famagusta see “A Spectacle to the World, Both to Angels and to Men”: Multiculturalism in Medieval Famagusta, Cyprus as seen through The Forty Martyrs of Sebaste Mural in the Church of Saints Peter and Paul by Michael Walsh. Journal of Cultural Heritage. 8, (2007): 81-86.

influences from Venice and yet an Ottoman, timber gate. In other words, the more we examine the physicality and symbolisms in heritage and architecture in Famagusta, the more it becomes clear that there were and still are various traces and influences of cultures and traditions that have shaped the place and its heritage. However, when heritage is attached to culture we take the risk of segmentations and divisions which dismiss the role of time in constructing those expressions and focus the perspective on particular moments that we assume are representative, when in reality they are part of the same dynamics of heritage and culture formation.\textsuperscript{191}

5. Personas

Personas play a role in the formation, definition, regulation, preservation and promotion of heritage formation. Political and religious decisions are influenced by particular characters in history who, in one way or another, modify the way heritage is perceived in the present day. We usually study fragments of what history has left behind and collect memories that structure us as society. Looking at heritage as a dynamic activity, it is imperative to recognize the personalities that took part in what is now known as Cultural Heritage, particularly in Famagusta.

In terms of heritage assessment, it is useful to identify key characters in the life of Famagusta to help understand the current condition of the site and to draw a plan to control, prevent and develop an alternative path guiding towards the enhancement of the city as Cultural Heritage site. I will focus on three personalities who are key to understanding the transformations, modifications and, to some extent, the heritage of

\textsuperscript{191} On descriptions of Famagusta Walsh notes: “Famagusta, located on the eastern coast of Cyprus, rose to prominence after the fall of Acre in 1291. As a major port city with a natural harbor, the city was famous for its cosmopolitan and multi-lingual population. Economically it benefitted from a negotiated balance of trade between east and west to become unimaginably wealthy. But it was infamous too for corruption, political intrigue and treachery. During the century-long government of the Genoese (1373–1464 CE) the decline began which not even the maritime and enterprising might of the Venetians could arrest when they took over the island (1489–1571 CE). Yet they invested heavily in Famagusta, with all the artistry and engineering of the Renaissance, blending what Marie-Luise von Wartburg described as ‘monumental elegance with the expressions of power and defiance’”. Walsh, A Spectacle to the World, Both to Angels and to Men: Multiculturalism in Medieval Famagusta, Cyprus as seen through the The Forty Martyrs of Sebaste Mural in the Church of Saints Peter and Paul, Journal of eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 1 no. 3 (2013): 194.
Famagusta: Sir George Jeffrey, Mr. Theophilus Mogabgab and Kofi Annan. The first two names reflect at one level the work of the Department of Antiquities in Cyprus. Jeffrey also however was the most influential author of the Antiquities Law drafted by the British in 1905, which dissected and divided the island into the two separate cultural entities that we perceive it now to be. Mogabgab (sometimes as an Antiquities Officer and at other times as the Director of Antiquities for Famagusta District) produced a photographic record that survives from the mid 20th century and represents an important archive for future scholarship. Jeffrey and Mogabgab, I argue, are important as an essential piece of the puzzle of interventions in Famagusta’s heritage sites.

George Jeffrey192 in his role as the Director of Antiquities had the opportunity to write, describe and analyze Famagusta in detail. His writing helps assess transformations, modifications and alterations to buildings, walls, public spaces and other components of urban life in Famagusta. It also offers fundamental data for future decisions pertaining to most heritage sites in Famagusta’s historic core. His descriptions and analysis of the fortification system from the historic as well as the building perspective, helped to establish the connection between the historiography of the fortifications and the conservation works carried out. Jeffrey played an important role as Curator of Ancient Monuments, and this, I believe, is where the value of this account lies – in attempting (though perhaps subconsciously) to bridge historiography

and Cultural Heritage and providing a snapshot of his time, not only on how
Famagusta was managed in terms of its heritage content, but also regarding the
relevant interventions. A wider, all encompassing, discussion about Jeffrey has been
made by Despina Pilides in a two volume book with a complete description of
Jeffrey’s work in Cyprus. Jeffrey’s first mention of Famagusta and the use of its
heritage was from April 1900 when he commented on the use of stones from
Famagusta walls for the purpose of building a railway. By 1901 the issue of the harbor,
one of the main projects the British implemented in Cyprus, which had an impact on
the city’s heritage, became the focus of his efforts. Of the existing churches, Jeffrey’s
reports are detailed and they give accounts of the changes in the conditions of the sites,
alterations and measures to follow, even for the those churches that were already in
private hands. Jeffrey’s experience of Anglican buildings in different parts of Europe
and the Middle East proved to be of great value in appreciating the significance of the
buildings still left standing in Famagusta. With the Famagusta Stone Law and the Law
of Antiquities from 1905, the medieval buildings were left aside without protection,
even if the legislation was intended to prevent illicit trade. Jeffrey created a
management policy and developed ideas of town planning to help in the protection of
monuments, for the case of Nicosia and Famagusta. Through Jeffrey’s work, the
British government realised the negative impact that the issue of monuments’ neglect
had on the image of the colonial powers, which could be one of the reasons for the
publication of The Better Preservation of the Ancient Buildings in Cyprus in 1907 by
the Society for Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB). At this stage, it is important to
point out that Jeffrey’s objectives and endeavours as a government official in Cyprus
reveal his conviction of the importance of Famagusta. As such, to argue that
Famagusta has been, and continues to be, essential in the memory of humanity is not

entirely original – it is my objective, rather not to, let this relevance fade, and not to let Famagusta be trapped in continuing political turmoil. In his diaries, Jeffrey expresses the difficulties of working with the Evkaf194 and their attitude towards non-Islamic sites (although the Ottomans had their own heritage regulation code). The British attention to major buildings in Famagusta is also noticeable, like churches, civil buildings and especially the fortification system, while other aspects such as wall paintings and sculptures are not included in these documents. Perhaps, this reflects the vision of Jeffrey’s duties, from conservation plans to maintenance and caretaking of sites, (the last two evidently with a greater weight in time and efforts during Jeffrey’s various appointments in Cyprus). Whatever its shortcomings, Jeffrey’s work stands as one of the most important windows into the past of Famagusta. It is through his work that we see a man able to appreciate and comprehend a past that was both complex and intricate – a vision of history not limited to one narrative, but a plurality of perspectives.

Another important individual persona was Theophilus Mogabgab, an officer from the Department of Antiquities in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Mogabgab is a character who has not yet been explored in-depth. Nevertheless his archive speaks for itself, and for the purpose of this analysis I will only refer to these archival material, not his work as Antiquities Officer. His photographic archive records findings and interventions performed in Famagusta over two decades under his supervision. From aspects of everyday life to public works in Cyprus, one can make the following conclusions: 1) stone buildings and vestiges under British rule were particularly relevant and documented to great detail, above domestic and vernacular architecture; 2)

194 On this respect, accessed April, 14, 2014. http://www.evkafl.org/?a=tarihce: “Established in Cyprus in 1571 upon the arrival of Ottomans to the island and passed under the control of British Empire with lease lend of the island in 1878; Cyprus Evkaf Administration has taken over by the righteous owner - Cyprus Turkish society on April 15th, 1956, as a result of the struggle put forward by the Cyprus Turkish society. In this regard, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, who led Cyprus Turkish society, made unforgettable contributions. Today, Cyprus Evkaf Administration has operations in areas of agriculture, tourism, real estate, education, culture, religious services and finance; and uses its sources for the good of Cyprus Turkish society.”
the British presence in Cyprus was highly ceremonial in nature, as evidenced by the active use of ruins for religious and civil ceremonies; 3) there was much relevant work on consolidation of ruined parts of buildings or public spaces; and 4) regarding intervention on the fortification system, it is possible to compare the records from the Mogabgab archive with an archaeological assessment of the site as it is now and reconstruct the sequence of restitutions, additions, modifications and works that the walls had at precise moments in time. The value of the Mogabgab photographic archive is documentary. Furthermore, it is a tool to assess both present and future interventions of the city’s heritage, and it reinforces the fact that the walls contain more data than has been researched to date. What lies buried underground and hidden is yet to be assessed. Simply put, the photographic accounts of Famagusta carried out by Mogabgab are windows into a Famagusta from the 1930s to the 1950s, at the architectural, archaeological, social and urban levels, and supports his technical work.

In many ways, the photographic records of Mogabgab reflects the legacy of the British rule in Cyprus, the rebuilding of the site together with important efforts made to improve its physical infrastructure, and simultaneously the legal and educational system. The concern of my work is to argue for the relevance of Mogabgab as the author of a graphic snapshot of Famagusta which more support discussion of the evolution of the place.

In 2002, Cyprus’ candidature to become a member of the European Union was still being thwarted by the events and the aftermath of 1974. At the same time, the UN agreed to contribute to a solution by drafting a political settlement that would reunite the island. From 2002 to 2004 the UN produced a draft settlement agreement that reflected negotiations between the leaders of both communities: Glafkos Clerides (Greek Cypriot) and Rauf Denktash (Turkish Cypriot). In April 2004 a plan to create

195 For additional information on education during British rule see: *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus* by Rebecca Bryan.
the United Republic of Cyprus was fully endorsed by the leaders and went for public vote. 65% of the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan while 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against it, therefore the Annan Plan failed endorsement by the citizens of the island. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus was accepted as an EU member state on April 16, 2005, while North Cyprus was not (Acquis communautaire\textsuperscript{196}).

Although the Annan Plan for Cyprus on heritage matters does exist, its supporting data and inventory are no longer available for consultation. I had the chance to scan through a printed copy in 2010 of the heritage section which thousands of sites were documented and inventoried throughout Cyprus, Famagusta included. The selection I did for the 2010 Study on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus (240 approx. buildings apart from ruins and archaeological sites) was short compared to the selection the Plan had in 2004, which suggests possible demolition of sites, buildings and archaeological sites. In any case, the criteria for selection of heritage assets in the Annan Plan are of crucial importance only because they reflect the condition of Famagusta in 2004. When establishing a parallel between the recognition in the Annan Plan of the relevance of Cultural Heritage in conflict zones and the role of various UN agencies in The Balkans during the 1990s, we can visualize a potential scenario for Cyprus, if it had been the case that the Annan Plan was endorsed by both communities.

If we understand the limitations of the international system, developed as a platform for understanding among member states, the Annan Plan represents a significant effort to negotiate a deal among divided communities and in a contested territory. It is likely that this failure prevented the system from pursuing similar endeavours in other regions of the world such as the Balkans after the 1990s.

6. Conflict

The oldest long-term peacekeeping mission in the world was established in Cyprus in 1964. Until now, approximately seventy resolutions addressing a number of issues from missing persons, human rights and others, have been approved by the UN assembly that reveal the volatility of the island and the polarized positions over the ethnic composition of its inhabitants. Fifty years of UN presence in Cyprus reflect the significant challenges to the stabilization needed to prevent further violence in Cyprus. In fact the history of Cyprus is plagued with conflicts, and the most relevant changes happening in the island until now are reflected in its heritage formation.

In chapter one, I established a parallel between international legislation on Cultural Heritage and the evolution of the Cyprus issue. This illustrated that in the international arena, as UNESCO launched legislation on how and what to preserve, new events emerged in Cyprus to worsen the conditions of heritage sites across the entire island. But Famagusta is a case study not only on the failure of heritage preservation, but also a case study on human rights, internally displaced people, and all aspects of a contemporary conception of the ‘sovereign’ state. Needless to say, conflict is not new in the history of Cyprus, which has faced changes before 1974 when the last conflict divided the island into two separate portions. The political players involved in the conflict have neither been able to enforce a division, nor to justify a unified state (at least in contemporary terms). Should such a place, with the history of Cyprus, be called a failed state? Have we failed in understanding the dynamics of Cyprus? To address the

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topic of conflict in Cyprus one would need more than one chapter in a PhD dissertation, and I sincerely believe that the causes and solutions of the Cyprus issue lie outside Cyprus. The strong investment Turkey has made in North Cyprus throughout the years and the heavy presence of Turkish citizens owning property in the region, means that Turkey is a main player in the future of the entire island. On the other hand the use of the Republic of Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands for offshore Russian investments, or the so called round-trip investments, has been widely documented.200

In framing conflict as a main aspect of Cyprus’ history, and having established that the current issue in the island is exacerbated by external actors, it is important to mention, albeit succinctly, the British occupation of Cyprus from 1878 - 1960. This period, I argue, is crucial in understanding how Famagusta reached its current situation. Politics in post-colonial Cyprus have been particularly intense, not only because of the intricacies of its domestic politics but also because of the events that took place in the island which have global consequences.

In her book, Tabitha Morgan explores the complex history of the British colonization in Cyprus focusing primarily on the perspective of the colonizers.201 Starting with the transfer of the administration of Cyprus to the British by the Ottomans in 1878, she presents a detailed record of the narratives, policies, and impediments experienced by the British on the island. She maintains that the British had an ambivalent attitude towards Cyprus: on the one hand, they felt a certain degree of uncertainty about the place and the people, and on the other, there was a sense of familiarity with the island’s linguistic and archaeological connections with Greece. Morgan further asserts that, “the tension generated by these conflicting impulses, by the urge simultaneously to find and recognise an idealized, Utopian ‘Britishness’ in

Cyprus, while exoticising and Orientalising the island, came to define much of the character of British rule in Cyprus. In the 1900s, as the colonial administration was starting to embed itself in the island (though it was not yet formally a colony), the complexity of Cyprus became more apparent. According to Morgan this can be seen, specifically, in terms of education which “was a policy born out of a failure to agree on a policy.” The obscurity / uncertainty of who the Cypriots really were became a hurdle in implementing a constructive and effective educational policy, especially one that was common to all. Was a Cypriot an ‘Oriental hybrid’ (perhaps, pertaining to the Turkish Cypriots) who should be governed with a firm hand and be assimilated into British society, or was he/she akin to the mainland Greeks (Greek Cypriots) and therefore be ruled with leniency proper to a cultural inheritor of an ancient civilization? This confusion regarding identity and ethnicity is still prevalent today and is very much a part of the plethora of conflict and issues that divide the island.

In the realm of political administration, the division and fragmentation, indeed the conflict within the society, of Cyprus was also perceptible. Although the British implemented a constitution that had all the external appearances of democracy and equal participation between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, the reality was less convincing. In fact, Ana-Maria Olteanu argues strongly that the British favored the Turkish Cypriots and, in fact, aimed to maintain, if not intensify, the division and racial enmity within Cypriot society. This strategy of ‘divide and rule’ was not unique at all in terms of colonial administration. As a result, the Greek Cypriots felt increasing repugnance against the British and their vision to unite with Greece (enosis) became more fervent. The conflict escalated in 1955 when the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) launched massive campaigns

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202 Ibid., 1.
203 Ibid., 43.
204 Bernal, The Image of Ancient Greece, 127.
205 Ana-Maria Olteanu, The European Union and the Local Freeze: The Cyprus Conflict, 3.

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against British authorities. Great Britain was compelled to declare a state of
emergency. In August 1960 an independent Republic of Cyprus was created (by the
Zurich\textsuperscript{206} and London\textsuperscript{207} Agreements), even if EOKA had wanted to unite Cyprus with
Greece. In any case, it brought to an end colonial rule in Cyprus. It did not however
bring peace to the island.

As a new state, the Republic of Cyprus laid down the roots of its formation
through the promulgation of a constitution based on consociational democracy.
Disagreements, lack of trust, and divergence in interests however eventually meant that
\textit{enosis} was countered by the concept of \textit{taksim}, the partition of the island and the union
of the north with Turkey. In 1963, the Turkish Cypriot members of the Republic
abdicated their parliamentary positions and the intercommunal conflict began. After a
year of intermittent skirmishes, the United Nations sent a peacekeeping force to
Cyprus, a contingent that remains until today and is regarded as the oldest, long-
standing peacekeeping force in history. By 1974, the clash reached its peak when

\textsuperscript{206} “On ‘Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus’ Initialed by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in
Zurich on 11 February 1959. Established, together with the London Agreement, the bi-communal 1960
Republic of Cyprus.
According to the Zurich Agreement, Cyprus was to be an independent Republic with Greek and Turkish as
official languages. There was to be a presidential regime with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish
Cypriot vice-president elected separately by their respective communities. The executive authority was
vested jointly in the president and the vice-president who had separately veto powers on laws and
decisions concerning foreign affairs, defence and security. They had also the right to return for
consideration all other laws and decisions of the Government.
The main clauses of the Basic Structure together with the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance
laid down and confirmed the principle of political equality of both communities in a partnership State
based on functional federalism. The legislative authority was vested in the House of Representatives, composed of 70 per cent Greek and
30 per cent Turkish Cypriot members elected separately by their respective communities.” Accessed Dec
6ce7006600b1?OpenDocument.

\textsuperscript{207} “19 February 1959. Established, together with the Zurich Agreement, the bi-communal 1960 Republic
of Cyprus.
Agreement to the Zurich Agreement which had been signed by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey
a few days earlier. The London Agreement was signed by the British, Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers,
as well as by the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Agreements were
to be the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus and set forth the foundation of an independent republic
in Cyprus, including an outline of the essential provisions of the Constitution.
The Cyprus Constitution was prepared based on the Zurich and London agreements and the Guarantee and
Alliance treaties, as a result of which Cyprus became an independent republic.” Accessed Dec 3, 2014,
http://unterm.un.org/DGAACS/unterm.nsf/8fa942046df7601c88526983007ca4d8/14b15a6dc4def1518525
6ce70067d4f7?OpenDocument

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Turkey occupied parts of Cyprus, thus, creating the divide between what now regarded
as North and South Cyprus. In 1983 the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus was declared and the United Nations in resolution numbers 541 (Nov. 18,
1983), and 550 (May 11, 1984), declared the illegality of this act. No UN member state
could recognise the existence of the ‘new Republic’, and so international isolation
began. Famagusta, and its heritage assets, lies several miles inside the border of the
TRNC, hence its exclusion from UNESCO, and meaningful discussions led by
ICOMOS, ICCROM, just to name a few.

There is an increasing body of literature that deals with other facets of
Famagusta, but for the purpose of this research, I am compelled to be selective. The
works that I have chosen to incorporate in this study have helped to unveil
Famagusta’s different facets, from the tangible components such as buildings, art,
walls, streets or castles, to its role in aspects of politics, religion and power throughout
the Mediterranean. Simply put, the works presented provide pieces of the puzzle of
Famagusta’s complex past and dynamic culture. The journey from the intangibles of
history to the construction of a city that holds footprints of major periods of the
evolution of knowledge of humanity is a crucial thread that establishes the significance
of Famagusta. The interaction between the streams of history and the evolution of
heritage is evident in these works – and without a doubt evident in Famagusta itself.
This is where I ground my own premise on the significance of Famagusta at the global
level.

My study reinforces and complements the work of other scholars who have
dedicated their lives to discovering the bridges that link Famagusta to the
Mediterranean, to Europe, and from Europe to all parts of the world. In my own study,
I explore Famagusta’s historicity in order to assert its global value, even if it is not
fully acknowledged by the present international framework. I maintain that Famagusta
possesses a network of connected histories that are complex, dynamic, and interrelated
and are unquestionably relevant for the preservation of the memory of humanity. I maintain, furthermore, that now is an opportune time to recognise Famagusta as a crucial witness to all those events embedded in history, as part of a dynamic process that looks towards the future – transmitting meanings from the past and accepting additional connections with the current generations. It is an opportunity as well to re-examine the provisions of the current framework in Cultural Heritage, evaluate its applicability and suggest recommendations, if necessary, and I believe it is based on the context of Famagusta. To put it plainly, this work recognizes the role of history in understanding the heritage component of Famagusta and its multifaceted identities as a pillar that supports the design of contemporary approaches in dealing with the past in the context of the present. In the next chapter, I probe a potential legal framework that can set the context for a comprehensive intervention on Famagusta, regardless of its political crisis. The framework of Transitional Justice offers a platform for a transition period where non-state actors can spearhead the development and sustainability of Cultural Heritage in Famagusta.
Chapter III
Famagusta, Transition between Memory and Justice: a Framework
1. An Introduction

Having addressed the limitations of History in dealing with the recent past, and the need to include memories in the complementation of a comprehensive timeline in territories that have suffered the impact of armed conflicts, this chapter draws attention to two issues that are often dismissed when assessing cultural expressions during conflict and its aftermath (a stage of transition between conflict and a stable form of society and governance): the memories of victims and perpetrators (as a resource for Cultural Heritage identification), and the limitations of institutions (in Cyprus, i.e. the governments from both sides of the island) in incorporating culture in a process that is mainly political. This dichotomy is also reflected in the UNESCO doctrine, that on one hand honors political agreements where actors are unquestionable and uncontested, and on the other dismisses the memories arising from conflicts, which remain unrecognized unless those memories are included in national narratives.

Up to this point in this work, my focus has been the recognition and discussion of the gaps arising from the implementation of current doctrine in Cultural Heritage practice, and the scholarship that helps explain this phenomenon. Also, I have pointed out the limitations of trying to frame components of Cultural Heritage that openly contest the unity and solidity of the principles that build nations and its constituents. I have argued against the core principle that gave birth to Cultural Heritage, property, and how the consistent reaffirmation of this vision has built a system that shows its unfairness towards those silenced contested voices and memories that by all means have a right to justice and to recognition as part of significant cultural expressions. I will now explore an alternative lens with which to view and discuss those gaps and caveats that are present when working on Cultural Heritage in sites that, for various reasons, give evidence of the flaws in mainstream scholarship/doctrine. This lens and framework is known as Transitional Justice.
The two concepts are deeply rooted in Cypriot society involving religion, language, and education. The purpose of taking a step back is to recognise the British rule as an important period in the formation of the difficulties between the northern and southern parts of the island. As such, this only intends to frame Transitional Justice process including the need to address those concepts (enosis and taksim). Moreover, that recognition necessitates an additional actor, the United Kingdom.

Transitional Justice is a legal model that allows peoples to transiting from troubled pasts to improved stages of social life. This is done in reference to past events by adopting transitional judicial and civil measures in order to re-frame the legacies of human rights violations, injustice, exclusion, and dilemmas at the moral, legal and political levels caused by such events. This framework differentiates five major topics that need to be addressed: 1) criminal prosecutions, 2) truth commissions, 3) reparations programmes, 4) security system reform and 5) memorialization. The utilization of Transitional Justice in rebuilding communities, trust and peace, has become a laboratory for emerging communities to come to terms with violent pasts. This framework suits the idea of fairness that leads to justice, and justice being impartial to all, therefore universal. Also, this framework emphasizes the need to enforce memories of troubled times as a way to prevent similar events from emerging again. This is a clear link in approach to our understanding of Cultural Heritage: within that same rationale I argue that Cultural Heritage, being an asset that transcends generations, recognizes peoples from all periods and backgrounds (including the ones arising from any recent times, conflict-laden or not), speaks of fairness in relation to the past (because it allows for interpretation of multiplicity of narratives without

208 “The field [Transitional Justice] has been described as an international web of ‘individuals and institutions whose internal coherence is held together by common concepts, practical aims, and distinctive claims for legitimacy’. Indeed, the study of how societies emerging from periods of dictatorship and armed conflict that left a legacy of gross human rights violations is not only confined to academic research, but also of international NGOs” “Voices from the Shadows: The Role of Cultural Contexts in Transitional Justice Processes. Maya Q’eqchi’ Perspectives from Post-Conflict Guatemala” Lieselotte Viaene (PhD diss., Ghent University, 2010): 4-5.
preference), and at the same time presents a scenario for memorialization of the memories that have impacted culture and society. Cultural Heritage at a deep level reflects facts that are beyond identity, boundaries and political frameworks. Its existence is as part of a set of Human Rights (since everyone is entitled to their own culture) and represent a legal argument for communities that lie outside boundaries (e.g. diasporas, refugees or internally displaced people), yet who somehow can be categorized as cosmopolitan communities or world citizens (by force or by choice).

Cosmopolitan communities (or at least the ones outside national boundaries), like the ones that recognize the Cultural Heritage present in Famagusta as their own, cannot expect acknowledgement of their primary rights (including cultural rights) to be based on the legitimacy of governments, because, as I have discussed, in Cyprus the governments from both parts of the island have chosen coercion over the heritage assets of Famagusta as a political argument. Work in Cultural Heritage in the north is subversive to both forms of sovereignty in Cyprus. This is the case unless Cultural Heritage work is seen as a sign of recognition of the accountability of the North over those assets, or the work is triangulated through international organizations with a regional mandates such as the EU. As I have discussed previously, Cultural Heritage has been assumed to be a moral issue. When understood as such, it does not require the argument of universality. It simply exists for everyone, without need for characterization, segmentation, and classification – as Barnett and Finnemore\(^\text{209}\) put it. This view liberates the Cultural Heritage in Famagusta from the need to be included on a world list, or a world classification, because being seen as a moral endeavour it does not need further assessment or comparison. However, when framed among Human Rights it becomes a legal issue, which gives Cultural Heritage a different weight and relevance above local legislations, which is exactly one of the core difficulties – the

accountability of local governments over the future of heritage assets. The legal aspects of Cultural Heritage detached from value, and beyond national boundaries and local legitimacy, can begin to reveal the fluidity of its conceptualization. As I have stated, this conceptualization speaks of the need for preservation of such assets (though not necessarily as a flag for nationality or identity) without additional sets of values and categorization attached to its conservation. Cultural Heritage simply exists, and needs no further argument.

This chapter addresses a need and also an opportunity for cultural expressions to recover their role in building communities under contemporary and realistic values, identities and sense of time and space. Such approaches are necessary in societies transitioning from conflict-laden times to a next stage that has yet to be shaped. This chapter discusses the linkages between Cultural Heritage and Transitional Justice as juxtaposed with human rights and memorialization.

2. Cultural and Human Rights: Understanding its Context

I will use two different and complementary approaches to Human Rights to identify the scope of this discussion. As Cyprus is a location between the East and West, it becomes necessary to see Human Rights in light of that difference. Charles Taylor\textsuperscript{210} has pointed out this issue in the following manner:

“What would it mean to come to a genuine, unforced international consensus on human rights? I supposed it would be something like what John Rawls describes in his Political Liberalism as an ‘overlapping consensus.’ That is, different groups, countries, religious communities, civilizations, while holding incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, human nature, and so on, would come to agreement on certain norms that ought to govern human behavior. Each would have its own way of justifying this form out of this profound background conception. We would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms. And we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief.”\textsuperscript{211}

\textsuperscript{210} Charles Taylor is a Canadian philosopher whose works include: \textit{a Catholic Modernity}, \textit{Multiculturalism; The Ethics of Recognition} and \textit{The Ethics of Authenticity}, among others.

This reflection highlights important aspects of the applicability of categories, classification, and compartmentalization of norms and rules (even Human Rights) that are employed globally. If cultural rights are part of the group of human rights and are framed by the same inquiries about the applicability of their protection, defense and promotion of existence, then it is relevant to explore scenarios where the difference in principles between East and West do not represent an impediment to the understanding of aspects of culture and Cultural Heritage.

The tendency to reach international understandings on core aspects of life (e.g. towards the environment) is a growing concern among communities and governments. However, differences on how the vision, perspective and values that each community has on those aspects of life is a difficult issue to discuss. Those difficulties, together with the fact that governments often control the legislature and its implementation demonstrate need for super structures to balance the impact of state power. In this manner the recognition of worldwide agreements, not necessarily of principles, shields aspects such as changing governments or political views and forms of governance, avoiding internal discussion on how to convey those agreements or justify them, i.e. in defining democratic scenarios for its interpretations.

The second approach to Human Rights that I consider useful for this study is one from Jürgen Habermas:

“My working hypothesis is that [human rights] standards stem less from the particular cultural background of Western civilization than from the attempt

212 On this respect Tomas McCarthy reflects the following: “Habermas’s conception of civil union amidst cultural diversity takes ‘constitutional patriotism’ to be the political-cultural glue holding multicultural polities together. This obviously raises feasibility questions as to whether allegiance to legal-political institutions, practices, ideas, values, traditions, and the like can function as the core of social integration in modern societies, whether it can provide sufficient ‘glue’ to keep together the socially differentiated, culturally heterogeneous, and ideologically fragmented populations that characterize them.” De Greiff and Croning, Global Justice and Transnational Politics, 259.

213 Ibid., 262. What this quote highlights is the form in which standards are perceived. Standards tend to set a common goal, i.e. in the case of Human Rights: the respect for life. However life is an individual asset, therefore the goal is individual wellbeing. In many cases especially in Asia and Africa, societies prioritize the wellbeing of the collectivity over the individual. That does not mean life can be dismissed by collective will. The difficulty is in setting universal standards, and how those affect structural relationships among members of a community that does not share same ethics. When considering the cultural rights of a society (and Cultural Heritage among those) the understanding of tradition can be different, therefore standards over the intervention of those assets can also have a negative impact.
to answer specific challenges posed by a social modernity that has in the meantime covered the globe. Whether we evaluate this modern starting point one way or another, it confronts us today with the fact that leaves us no choice and thus neither requires, nor is capable of, a retrospective justification. The context over the adequate interpretation of human rights has to do not with the desirability of the ‘modern condition’ but with an interpretation of human rights that does justice to the modern world from the viewpoints of other cultures as well as our own.”

Both approaches, one that acknowledges cultural tradition as a condition to potentially embrace global standards, and the other which refers to Human Rights as a modern principle not sustained on traditional cultural principles, coincide in identifying cultural differences as important aspects in the implementation of any regulatory system over the rights of all humans. However, acknowledging a set of rights as a litmus test of modern societies that recognize basic standards of respect among humans, does not necessarily correspond to communities that share the same tradition of understanding respect, or freedom or life. A few questions might arise from this discussion. One, assuming that the recognition of Cultural Heritage is by nature an expression of modern forms of government (deeply linked to nation-states following the Second World War), can Cultural Heritage (being a modern/contemporary concept) be recognized by societies that have not reached modern forms of governance? Two, if so, what kind of enforcement can be expected? One that prioritizes the rights of individuals or communities, within or outside the national territory? And three, can some human rights be enforced while others can be dismissed?

The recognition of this statement as a consequence of the analysis of the Cultural Heritage concept throughout time, conventions, expert meetings, declarations and doctrinal documents, represents a step forward the acknowledgment of the political component of heritage, at the global, regional and local levels. The political component is by far the most relevant consideration to understand the current heritage condition of Famagusta. Although this is an academic work, it is unrealistic to leave to the academic production the responsibility of preventing additional decay of the site. The reality speaks for itself. International NGOs and independent practitioners can, and have produced an important amount of literature on Famagusta. However, as it stands now, not only because the discussion of this work, but for the politics of Cyprus and North Cyprus, Cultural Heritage works remain a highly political endeavor. The direct linkage UNESCO – Nation State – policy design, is one that I argue extensively in this work, has an important impact on the current condition of Famagusta.
What these questions highlight is that the universality in concepts that societies are required to agree on, such as justice, fairness, equity, respect, freedom or democracy, might require the good will of governments to enforce them. The discrepancy in the understanding of priorities and cultural traditions where individuals favoured the collective nature of a community and vice versa, however represents a major difficulty in globalizing ideas, concepts and terminologies. In addition, the forms of government that are not necessarily aligned with democracy, but based on castes, tribes, ethnicity, and religion, among others, represent further difficulties in the implementation of global ideas, their monitoring and the setting of enforcement measures. In short, concepts that are difficult to agree on are therefore difficult to implement, much less design a form of judicial framework to guarantee their enforcement. When the above rationale is applied to aspects that go beyond borders and national identities such as Cultural Heritage, governments as we understand them face limitations that weaken their sovereignty in guaranteeing the well-being of their inhabitants, or the ones that even outside those boundaries are entitled to well-being. For example, air pollution, technology and security, are aspects of contemporary concerns that together with organized crime (including illegal smuggling of Cultural Heritage), questions the autonomy or democratic legitimacy of states. Such concerns are simply difficult to tackle.

The fact that Famagusta has not been discussed as a cultural right for those outside its boundaries, together with the local limitations in maintenance and development, positions this debate in a difficult place, one in which it is necessary to go back to the original question: how can cultural expressions in North Cyprus be assessed, enforced and monitored outside its institutional framework on Cultural Heritage? The current discussion on Cultural Heritage as a Human Right, therefore as a
legal right,\textsuperscript{215} leads to two different perspectives. The first responds to the enforcement of a judicial system that can effectively guarantee Human Rights to all citizens, without consideration of political affiliation, race, religion, and gender, beyond political scenarios and forms of government. This perspective corresponds to supranational systems of legal enforcement, and is based on a primary rationale: a territory which lacks legitimacy might not recognize Cultural Heritage (as part of the set of Human Rights) to its full extent because a) it is a stateless nation (i.e. North Cyprus), b) its sovereignty is subjugated to another nation’s will (i.e. Turkey), and c) because a discussion on Human Rights most probably questions the legitimacy of the status quo (i.e. the division of the island). Under that rationale the implementation of laws on Cultural Heritage results in subversive activity, and is therefore unfeasible. The second perspective raises additional complexities regarding the following topic: if a supranational system of laws succeeds in recognizing, promoting and developing methods and techniques to implement them, who can be accountable for the implementation of measures to comply with a supranational law? This interrogation takes us back to the core of this dissertation: Cultural Heritage is not controlled by its constituents but by elective and exclusive sets of stakeholders, therefore its preservation has proven ineffective. Cultural Heritage intervention in Famagusta is exactly that, an activity that in its technical aspects challenge the political aspects of its recognition, control, accountability and/or abandonment.

A new approach comes into place under the principle of a ‘Third Way’ which in principle comes from a political background that explores an alternative approach

\textsuperscript{215} On this regard the UN states: “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Universal human rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law. International human rights law lays down obligations of Governments to act in certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.” United Nations Human Rights, “What are Human Rights?” OHCHR, accessed Nov 19, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx.
between liberalization of the economy and conservative measures: “In the age of
globalization, it is impossible to remove restrictions on state power; [globalization] …
demands above all that we reinforce the autonomous, liberal forces in civil society […] people’s individual initiative and sense of personal responsibility”\textsuperscript{216} Although this is linked to a change in ethical conceptions of neoliberalism that differentiated Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair’s political discourses, I believe that in principle this approach gives a voice to a third force that can ideally speak on behalf of organized communities without political representation and outside of either public practice or private enterprises.\textsuperscript{217} This, apart from the political implications of the term third way, invokes the presence of a neutral party. Interpreted in the context of our discussion, I view the third way as a voice coming out of civil society that can stand as an alternative between Cultural Heritage (of public and private nature) and markets in a way that is detached from governmental decisions but allows its participation. This approach provides a bridge to markets (although Cultural Heritage does not have a market, while assets such as land and buildings with heritage value do) so that commercial dynamics can be accommodated and implemented under supranational movements without participation (in reference to legitimacy and sovereignty) of the ruling government.

Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights) points out that since the establishment of her mandate in 2009, she has received testimonies stressing the importance of historical and memorial narratives as shapers of collective identities and cultural heritage. She added, “[…] I also noted that, all too often, a cultural rights-based approach to transitional justice and reconciliation strategies is not

\textsuperscript{216} De Greiff and Croning, Global Justice and Transnational Politics, 229.

\textsuperscript{217} “In normative terms, advocates of this Third Way fall in with the line of a liberalism that regards social equity solely from the standpoint [sustainable development], making it a mere matter of equal opportunity. This borrowed moral element aside, however, public perception of the difference between Thatcher and Blair is blurred above all because the ‘Newest Left’ has accommodated the ethical conceptions of neoliberalism.” Ibid., 226.
rendered the attention it deserves.”218 This responds to this need, by recognizing the unsettled political situation in North Cyprus as a transitional stage, examining additional characteristics of Cultural Heritage as part of the set of Human Rights, and acknowledging of an alternative framework called Transitional Justice to fill the gaps left by the international system governed by UNESCO and its member states. The shift in perspective from a monolithic doctrine based on the cultural aspects of heritage towards its recognition as a Human Right in a transitional context opens the discussion to redress and reassess the concern of the first chapter of this study which was the transformation of ‘memory’ into a concept that entitles property.

3. Cultural Heritage and its Capacity to Hold Memory(ies) and Memorialization at the Same Time

On April 15, 1985, members of the M-19 guerilla group took over the Palace of Justice, a building facing the Bolivar square that is regarded as the most symbolic public space for Colombia, in Bogota. For two days, members of the Supreme Court, employees, visitors, attorneys and civil servants were held hostage, and later killed in the cross-fire between the rebels and the army. Two days later, the Palace was recaptured, and this signalled the beginning of one of the most difficult moments of the country’s history.

On many levels, the episode of the siege of the Palace of Justice represents the multidimensional forces that have had a share in Colombia’s life over the past fifty years. At the political level, the siege of the Palace triggered a short military coup that forced the president to give up power and allow the military force to take control and maneuver the political machineries of the state. This episode was further marked by the number of missing persons whose bodies have not yet been found, incidents of torture, censorship and an unfinished discussion on what was legal, and what was legitimate, between right wing supporters, human rights defenders, and the polarization of the

civil society. At the social level, the press and media fed extremism to the social psyche and took sides in favor of institutions. Needless to say, the Palace of Justice episode was a turning point for Colombia and set further developments in motion which were to play out over the next five years. When the M-19 guerilla group surrendered their weapons, a reintegration process started, leading to a partial peace process, with the formation of a new political party, and finally a referendum for a new constitution in 1990. However, many of the events are still unclear for most of my generation. It is a memory that we all hold, as is the news which originated from unofficial sources. The episode is also very personal for many people in Bogota. A former colleague of mine was caught in the middle of the siege but he managed to escape before the incident went public so he did not go through interrogation, a fact which probably saved his life. As such, the events of that unfortunate day remain real and yet very unclear.

The Palace of Justice was a building designed in the 1960s (after the 1948 fire destroyed most of the city center) which embodied the modernist parameters of the time. It faced the northern side of the Bolivar square and together with the Cathedral, the Lievano Palace (which currently houses Bogota’s city hall), and the congress building represented the coexistence and division of the three official and legal powers: justice, legislation and government (and the unofficial fourth, religion, is also present). The building was damaged by the fire during the 1985 events and was subsequently ear-marked for demolition a few years later. It was a building with its own sobriety, nevertheless a good example of its own time and therefore a good infilling piece of other memories: a fire in 1948, the society and attitudes of 1960s, and all within a 1539 square. A new Palace of Justice now occupies the northern façade of the Bolivar square yet my generation still struggles to understand what that building should, would, or might represent in the reconstruction of our recent memory. The decision to demolish the Palace of Justice was by all means a political one, an episode that all institutions
were keen to erase or at least give a different interpretation to. Slowly a term was coined: ‘The holocaust of the Palace of Justice’ and its ghost still haunts us until now. A truth commission on the armed conflict was established during the beginning of this century and the events which took place in the Palace of Justice are indeed a relevant chapter. The building, a place that was part of a monumental setting / episode was replaced, and the replacement erased the tragic events that the city, the country and all of its communities still need to remember, not for the sake of remembrance but because it is still part of the ongoing open discussion regarding who we would like to become. And that, I believe, is a right that we all are entitled to.

The role of politics, religion and institutions are frequently moving at different paces, in different directions and pursuing different objectives from one’s community, society and generation. That is exactly the relevance of giving heritage a multilayered, multidimensional and multiform setting where valuable sites can speak of things, particularly of memories, even the ones we are not able to face in our present, but which others can analyze in the future. Buildings and sites hold some of those memories that, sometimes, are difficult to process in our own time, but should be kept to offer clues to future generations to recognize, then formulate, those memories. Cultural Heritage, I would add, offers information that is fundamental in the construction of social life. This is information that is frequently represented by the memories that can be read in Cultural Heritage expressions.

Moving away from the definition of Cultural Heritage, it is crucial to discuss the role of memory and forgetting. In the previous discussion, I traced the transformation in the definition of ‘monument’ (as what eventually evolved into Cultural Heritage) and its connection to memory. Moreover, I have defined Cultural Heritage as a set of collected memories that help us understand our evolution. Here, I proceed to contextualize memory within the frame of heritage and explain further the cord linking heritage and memory. To put it plainly, the relationship between heritage
and memory consists of two fundamental facets. Memory shapes, influences, creates, and justifies heritage while heritage organizes, frames, and in extreme cases, disregards memory.

During my post in Kosovo, I received an informal proposal from the director of the YMCA Kosovo to convert the Christ the Savior Church in Pristina into a YMCA gymnasium. The building was an incomplete, unfinished Orthodox Church which was constructed during Slobodan Milošević’s presidency which lasted from 1997 to 2000. I mention it here because the proposal had different facets that were relevant to this discussion. First, it opened the possibility of unlocking the economic viability of using an unfinished building that, by far, would enhance further activities at the very center of a place that was in dire need of sports and leisure activities. From the Cultural Heritage point of view, the proposal is basically, and commonly known, as adaptive re-use. Second, from the memory aspect, it would secure a site that reminded people of the close relationship between religion and the control of territories during a period of extreme turmoil in the Balkans. Since Milošević was indicted for crimes against humanity on account of his involvement in the Kosovo War from 1998 to 1999, the building has certainly earned its place in the local history. Third, the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in securing sites with the support of the Serbian government and its position as a UNESCO member state will be discussed in this study. Although the site was a rich location from the heritage point of view (not the building), our office in the Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports of Kosovo decided that the proposal was highly sensitive and political, and so it was not considered further given that it was also a delicate time for the status talks for Kosovo.

During the negotiations for Kosovo’s recognition, the Serbian Orthodox Church played, and still plays, a key role in utilizing buildings as instruments to secure territories and control, to a certain extent, parts of Kosovo. In my view, the Christ the Savior Church would merit a heritage assessment in terms of singularity, integrity, or
interest. Nevertheless, it holds within it the memory of destruction. Wars do not need memorials; on the contrary, the recognition of sites and their relevance during war time offers more information and data of real events, not the events that a society is willing to remember but the ones that really happened. The controversy still exists to this day. The government of Kosovo plans to demolish the building, though luckily the Serbian Orthodox Church has reacted against it, arguing that the Church was always against Slobodan Milošević and that the buildings cannot be judged by the ruler at the time of its construction.

In the case of Famagusta, it is clear that there are undeniable Muslim influences on Christian buildings. However, during my tenure with the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus in 2010, I often heard the argument that ‘Christian’ represents the ‘earliest stage’ of buildings that exhibit elements that require complex forms of assessment above age, beauty, integrity or uniqueness. In this respect, the 1974 conflict has not ended, still exists and Famagusta is living proof of it. The argument of what was first, and the dismissal of other stages in Cultural Heritage formation, illustrates the urgent need to erase memories that could eventually unite the two communities despite ethnicity and religion. At this juncture, it is imperative to clarify what I mean by memory.

In principle, memory is a human feature. As Paul Connerton argues:

“This thought was famously expressed in 403BC. In that year, the Athenian democrats, after having suffered defeat at the hands of the dictatorship, re-entered the city of Athens and proclaimed a general reconciliation. Their decree contained an explicit interdiction: it was forbidden to remember all the crimes and wrongdoing perpetrated during the immediately preceding period of civil strife. This interdict was to apply to all Athenians, to democrats, to oligarchs and to all those who had remained in the city as non-combatants during the period of the dictatorship. Perhaps more remarkable still is the fact that the Athenians erected on the acropolis, in their most important temple, an altar dedicated to Lethe, that is, to forgetting. The installation of this altar meant that the injunction to forget, and the eradication of civil conflict…”

Furthermore, from the perspective of Anita Kasabova: “The words memory, memorial, and commemoration are Latinisms derived from the Greek nouns mnemon and Mnemosyne. The latter is the mother of the Muses and counterpoint to Lethe, the personification of forgetfulness (oblivio) or loss of memory.”\textsuperscript{220} These aspects help drive my point that not all memories can be kept, not all expressions of Cultural Heritage can be preserved. However, the existing memories evident in Cultural Heritage allow us to choose what narrative is more appropriate for our time and circumstances without preventing others from holding different narratives and memories.

As Macdonald puts it in the Cyprus case:

“…distinct affective sensibilities embedded in different socio-political situations that may co-exist – in this case, between the different populations of the island. […] after the 1974 division of the island, ‘nostalgia…became a patriotic duty’ for Greek Cypriots who had been displaced […] Turkish Cypriots , however faced ‘an official rhetoric that the past was all negative and that the north was now their true “homeland”’, which meant that they were not supposed to ‘feel nostalgic towards the homes they left behind in 1974, as that could imply that they wished to return or that life there was not always bleak’ […] in what is perhaps an over-stated opposition, to characterize the Greek Cypriot position as nostomania and that of Turkish Cypriots as nostophobia…”\textsuperscript{221}

The construction, definition, and development of the concept of memory has taken different paths and adapted to contemporary questions on human, therefore social, behavior. It is important to note at this juncture though that the notion of memory itself remains a subject of debates and discussions among various scholars working in different fields. I will present a number of meanings that will help the reader in understanding the diversity of approaches to memory, and especially when trying to see the fundamental difference with history. I will start with the definition from a scientific perspective. According to Charles Golden:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
“Memory is a biomechanical process; memory provides a framework that
dividuals use to locate themselves in place and time; memory provides a
marketing tool; memory can be used for political purposes […] memories
are selective reconstructions of past events that serve a present collective
need […]. Our collective memory is always multiple, and it incorporates
different levels of collectivity that entail different social memories.” 222

Others like Anita Kasabova argue that: “Unlike the notion of commemoration,
the notion of memory (at least as regards conscious and personal memory) implies that
we consider ourselves as agents: when we retrieve an event from our past experience
we construct the past by positioning it and taking it as true.” 223 As I gave an account of
how Cultural Heritage took the side of property and history leaving behind the idea of
memory, something becomes clear: Cultural Heritage is conceived as a truth, while
memory is an interpretation of the past. That is one of the difficulties in framing
Cultural Heritage. It does not stand for ‘truth’, it can always be interpreted, often in
contradictory ways.

The main objective of this chapter is to reiterate that Cultural Heritage is about
memory. There are different aspects of personal memory that are pertinent to mention
to give an overview of the number of facets this discipline can include, and that to
some extent are reflected at the social level as well. Flashbulb Memory has been
studied by Elizabeth Kensinger and Daniel Schacter. 224 They write, “As the term
implies, individuals sometimes believe they have maintained an almost photographic-
quality memory of a highly emotional and consequential event.” 225 Suffice it to say,
memories are complex expressions of one’s reality. A heritage site can offer more
possibilities if linked to memory than can history, or at least it can complement the
rigid framework of history in its search for the truth. It can express more than one
narrative, and at the same time it can speak of the layering of time, albeit without a

223 Kasabova, Memory, Memorials and Commemoration, 335.
225 Kensinger & Schacter, Memory and Emotions, 605.
concrete discourse but as a present witness from the past. As I have mentioned before, Cultural Heritage does not search for the truth, it only gives evidence of a past, which may, and should, have a variety of interpretations. In the case of Famagusta for example, the study of the fortification system is perceived as Genovese when in fact the role the walls played during the Ottoman siege, which shaped sections and altered features of it, is highly relevant as well.

A face of personal memory that helps explain why memory is fragmented is one called Episodic Memory, studied by Endel Tulving:

“[…]it] is a neurocognitive (brain/mind) system, uniquely different from other memory systems that enable human beings to remember past experiences. The notion of episodic memory was first proposed around 30 years ago. At that time it was defined in terms of materials and tasks. It was subsequently refined and elaborated in terms of ideas such as self, subjective time, and autonoetic consciousness.”

Another relevant aspect are memories that never existed, yet they still take part in our recollection of events as False Memory. This kind of memory is explained by Marcia Johnson:

“A false memory is a mental experience that is mistakenly taken to be a veridical representation of an event from one’s personal past. Memories can be false in relatively minor ways (e.g., believing one last saw the keys in the kitchen when they were in the living room) and in major ways that have profound implications for oneself and others (e.g., mistakenly believing one is the originator of an idea or that one was sexually abused as a child). False memories arise from the same processes as do true memories and hence their study reveals basic mechanisms of memory.”

False memory together with involuntary memory can complement each other, shaping a reality with its own characteristics. Involuntary Memory is a field studied by Gilles Deleuze, who states that “the sign of an involuntary memory is necessarily an ambiguous sign of life, it has one foot in the pure past and one foot in the future, a future that can only be created through the death-instinct and the destruction of

When speaking about memories of war, episodes can be deceptive and sometimes inaccurate, such as—for the Cyprus region— the role of the island after Second World War and the transportation and detention of Jews after concentration camps were closed in the continent. On the control of memories, which is a form of memory that can be read in relation to Cultural Heritage sites, Metamemory is an aspect studied by John Dunlosky and Robert Bjork. According to them,

“Metamemory refers to people’s knowledge of, monitoring of, and control of their own learning and memory processes. […] we use the term metamemory or metamemorial processes to refer to any of these components of metamemory. The history of metamemory as a topic of experimental inquiry is very brief, relative to the history of memory research and theorizing.”

Ken McRae and Michael Jones explore a different variant of memory called Semantic Memory, whereby

“Concepts and meaning are fundamental components of nearly all aspects of human cognition. We use this knowledge every day to recognize entities and objects in our environment, anticipate how they will behave and interact with each other, use them to perform functions, to generate expectancies for situations, and to interpret language. This general knowledge of meaning falls within the realm of semantic memory.”

Environmental context-dependent Memory has been studied by Steven M. Smith, and defined as: “[…] a class of phenomena in which cognitive processing is affected in subtle, profound, and sometimes important ways by the coincidental background EC in which experiences are set.” What is important about referencing

230 McRae & Jones synthesize semantic memory as: “For many years, semantic memory was viewed as an amodal, modular memory store for factual information about concepts, distinct from episodic memory (our memory for specific instances of personal experience). However, researchers now interpret semantic memory more broadly to refer to general world knowledge, entangled in experience, and dependent on culture. Furthermore, there is now considerable evidence suggesting that semantic memory is grounded in the sensory modalities, is distributed across brain regions, and depends on episodic memories at least in terms of learning, with the possibility that there is no definite line between episodic and semantic memory.” Ken McRae and Michael Jones, “Semantic Memory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology, ed. Daniel Reisberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 206.
231 The following is an example quoted by the author: “Having lived most of his life in St Louis, Missouri, except for two years at the University of Texas at Austin and four years in the military service during the
some of the different lenses through which memory is analyzed, is to highlight that Cultural Heritage as expressions of memories is able to admit multiple, even contradictory, expressions of memory within it. This is useful to support multiple narratives, contesting the issues on originality and authenticity, and gives a more global context to Cultural Heritage. An interpretation of these views for Northern Cyprus is the 1974 crisis and the humanitarian debacle.

More broadly, Cultural Memory sees into forms of linkages and relationships between human beings, which has a direct relationship with the memory aspect of Cultural Heritage. 232 Jan Assman, a German Egyptologist, has reflected on this aspect of memory. His argument in relation to Cultural Memory is that it serves to save knowledge that directs behavior and experience, as opposed to Communicative Memory that is subject to everyday life and would only last three to four generations. 233 The concept of Social Memory is also important as a perspective on memory aspects and Paul Connerton explains that it “[is] control of a society’s memory [that] largely conditions the hierarchy of power. Seen in this light, social memory is inherently instrumental: individuals and groups recall the past not for its

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232 For additional information on Cyprus and culture see: Rebecca Bryant, Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of nationalism in Cyprus (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

233 For Assmann the argument is as follows: “To put it more simply, Assmann argues that every culture connects every one of its individual subjects on the basis of shared norms (rules) and stories (memories; Erinnerungen) to the experience of a commonly inhabited meaningful world. It is only because of this experience that individuals are able to frame their personal identity through the orientating symbols of identity of their social world, symbols which are embodied in the objectified forms of a commonly shared cultural tradition. In the term “connectivity” the two types of memory which are decisive for this theory meet: “kommunikatives Gedächtnis,” active on the level of simultaneity, which connects the present and the most recent past (Verknüpfung); and “kulturelles Gedächtnis,” which, like a large storehouse filled with traditional “memory figures” (Erinnerungsfiguren), offers various possibilities to link the present to an ancient past (Anknüpfung).” Dietrich Hart, “The Invention of Cultural Memory,” in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. Astrid Erll, and Angsar Nünning (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008): 86.
own sake, but as a tool to bolster different aims and agendas.” Pierre Nora then advances the term Sites of Memory. From Nora’s perspective,

“memory is attached to ‘sites’ that are concrete and physical—the burial places, cathedrals, battlefields, prisons that embody tangible notions of the past as well as to ‘sites’ that are non-material—the celebrations, spectacles and rituals that provide an aura of the past. Sites of memory therefore encompass geographical places (the site of New York's World Trade Center, the city of Hiroshima), monuments and buildings (San Antonio's Alamo, the Auschwitz death camp), […]”

The list goes on. Suffice it to say that memory itself is a distinct field of study that embraced by numerous scholars from different disciplines. Indeed, memory is an evolving concept which can be defined from various vantage points. The purpose of my enumeration above is to establish that there are many considerations when one is using the concept of memory. In this study I use the concept of memory as an argument for valuing Cultural Heritage in a dynamic and evolving manner, in part because Cultural Heritage has been used to erase, transform and manipulate the memories that contain inherent conflict for governmental structures, state-countries and dictatorships around the world. (Argentina and Spain) Furthermore, in my experience, memory helps post-conflict recovery and Cultural Heritage can substantiate and demonstrate some of those memories that even when difficult to deal with, are necessary for the reconstruction of societal structures and healing. The fact that Famagusta has witnessed, throughout its existence, such a variety of cultures means that a variety of tools are needed to assess events (including the 1974 events) in terms of heritage formation / destruction.

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235 Also see: Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, sites of Mourning: the Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
237 These two countries are relevant case studies from different parts of the world and different moments in time. Spain still struggles to address issues as far back as the civil war in the 1930s, then after Franco’s rule in 1970’s. Argentina has been a leader in truth telling and memorialization after the last of several dictatorships, from the 1970s in Latin America.
For the case of Famagusta, the link between remembering and forgetting has been triggered by the 1974 conflict, among other things. The change of street and village names, for example, gives an idea of how much the current community wants to drive away a past that is full of turbulent times and thus those things that could remind them of it. As I mentioned before, the farther away in time events happened, the less impact they have in our lives (or so it seems). A legal framework can help incorporate of recent memories in Famagusta. For the moment however I will concentrate on the permanent neglect of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage, which reflects two factors: 1) a great number of the current community living in this part of town (center) have been ‘settled’ coming from mainland Turkey, and so have limited connections with the site 2) the question of a practical settlement creates uncertainty for the future and the risk of a loss of ‘autonomy’. The re-framing of Cultural Heritage could, I suggest, help build up a real civil society and create a sense of belonging and ownership of those buildings and structures that currently communicate very little to their inhabitants. The dynamism and evolution of the Cultural Heritage model proposed here can remedy the loss of identity which has emerged from four decades in limbo, making it accessible to residents as well as visitors.

Let us begin with memory as a learning process that allows us to retrieve information from the past. As such, it is both individual and public. However, memory is a selective process that is deeply linked to the societal environment in the way it is distributed among the population.\(^{238}\) The interactions between individuals and their environment or contexts give birth to a range of memories difficult to study.\(^{239}\)

\(^{238}\) Halbwachs explains: "It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories" (Halbwachs, 1992, 38). Halbwachs argued that it is impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of their group contexts. His favorite example include the impossibility of certainty regarding particular childhood memories : it is difficult at the limit, to say whether what we remember is somehow individual and independent.” Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” Sociological Theory 7 no.3 (1999), 335.

\(^{239}\) Roediger and Wertsch give us a broad account of typologies: “Tulving’s (2007) list of 236 terms provides a number that seem applicable to memory studies.” Henry L. Roediger and James V. Wertsch, “Creating a new discipline of memory studies,” Memory Studies 1no.1(2008), 19.
Although science has established that memory is a human characteristic, the transformation and re-shaping of memories are the result of external influences that are mediated by the social milieu. That is also to say that personal memory is intricately linked to collective memory.²⁴⁰ But how do personal memories form a part of collective memory? Some scholars argue that aspects like rituals and traditional activities within communities condition their memory formation.²⁴¹ There are forms of memory that do not necessarily come from individual experiences but from the context.²⁴² Those ‘collective’ memories have grown into a strong argument for standardization and unification²⁴³ and, to some extent, to the shape of identities.²⁴⁴ This has permeated the Cultural Heritage sector and its very core principles. Traditionally, the inclusion of memory within heritage, requires a collective recognition and endorsement. This principle states that governments, as publicly elected bodies, have collective endorsement, and what states recognize as Cultural Heritage is therefore in the public’s interest.²⁴⁵ In principle the rationale is valid, however a closer look at how ‘collectiveness’ is positioned is exclusive only to what the majority recognizes,

²⁴⁰ Olick explains it as: “At the same time, however, he does seem to have preserved the notion of an individual memory, however shaped that memory is by social frameworks and identities.” Olick, Collective Memory, 335.

²⁴¹ For Kasabova the argument is: “Unlike the notion of commemoration, the notion of memory (at least as regards conscious and personal memory) implies that we consider ourselves as agents: when we retrieve an event from our past experience we construct the past by positioning it and taking it as true.” Kasabova, Memory, Memorials and Commemoration, 335.

²⁴² Kansteiner expresses it: “Elites produced sites of memory in language, monuments, and archives which had one common referent, the nation-state, and which strove to secure the future of the nation-state through compelling inventions of its traditions.” Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective memory studies,” History and Theory 41 no.2(2002), 183.

²⁴³ In Golden’s perspective: “[...] new political culture theory highlights the discursive dimensions of politics, seeing political language, symbolism, and claim-making as a constitutive of interest and identities.” Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, 337.

²⁴⁴ “[...] new political culture theory highlights the discursive dimensions of politics, seeing political language, symbolism, and claim-making as a constitutive of interest and identities.” Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, 337.

²⁴⁵ The following clarifies the term: “Nancy Wood has delineated such an approach in her account of collective memory, the unconscious, and intentionality: [W]hile the emanation of individual memory is primarily subject to the laws of the unconscious, public memory—whatever its unconscious vicissitudes—testifies to a will or desire on the part of some social group or disposition of power to select and organize representations of the past so that these will be embraced by individuals as their own. If particular representations of the past have permeated the public domain, it is because they embody an intentionality—social, political, institutional and so on—that promotes or authorizes their entry.” (Kansteiner, Finding meaning in memory, 188.)
decides, and chooses to call Cultural Heritage. This suggests that the structure of power embedded in governments reflects the will of the elite, and often the dismissal of any threat to unity and solidity.

The acknowledgment of the relationship between memory and society, in their constantly changing nature, has impacted heritage formation. As a consequence, two important questions require answers: to what extent does the memory produced at the societal level transform, impact, and destroy the character of Cultural Heritage? And vice versa: to what extent can Cultural Heritage be a game changer in the shaping of narratives that identify a community? These are fundamental questions that might produce more than one answer depending on one’s take on Cultural Heritage. What is important is to acknowledge this strong relationship. The intention of this discussion is to highlight that as part of the dynamics of change in memory and identity, Cultural Heritage expressions also change: its physicality, however—which is its unique feature, Cultural Heritage holds traces of the multiplicity of transformations in time (whether in buildings, documents, art, archives or manuscripts). As such, Cultural Heritage represents an open book that can be read according to different narratives, from different perspectives and at different moments in time (as in Hopscotch, the novel by Julio Cortázar246). The exploration of memory and forgetting is present, symbiotic, and entrenched within the very nature of Cultural Heritage, which seems to resent or resist its multiple definitions. On the same level, as a recipient of various memories, Cultural

246 That is precisely what differentiates Cultural Heritage from historic narratives per se: a physicality that allows diverse interpretations (from songs and oral traditions, to entire cities and their archaeology). On Hopscotch, Stavans writes: “To say that Hopscotch has no resolution is to overstate the obvious. It doesn't have a true beginning or end. In the front matter, a Table of Instructions asks the reader to peruse the narrative in multiple ways, two above all: following the plot chronologically from the first page to the last and leaping somewhat erratically from chapter to chapter, pursuing an alternative sequence that starts with Chapter 73 and ends with 131. The reader doesn't have to come back to the instructions, since the end of every chapter gives the number of the next one to go to. Indeed, before the age of the Internet, before story lines with multiple endings, Cortázar endorsed a serendipitous type of literature, one shaped by chance. He wasn't its sole practitioner—he sits comfortably on the shelf next to John Barth, Italo Calvino, Georges Perec, Milorad Pavić, Thomas Pynchon, and Raymond Queneau. But he was the libertador, the one who truly connected with the anti-establishment sensibility.” Ian Stavans, ““Hopscotch’ at 50,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 60 no.11 (2013).
Heritage is called to give evidence in Transitional Justice processes as a witness of conflict and a potential bridge towards a resolution, so long as its voice may be heard.

The division of Cyprus into two different and antagonistic regions polarized any discussion on the memory aspects of culture. Nevertheless, I believe the value of Famagusta involves the representation of its legacy of conflicts that transformed the place throughout time. As I have explained in the second chapter, the series of wars and conflict (as well as commerce and religion, etc.) in Famagusta had a profound effect in buildings, decorations, craftsmanship, etc. that gives Cyprus a singularity and Famagusta a sense of witness of time, eras, styles and also conflict, even the most recent from 1974 and after. The pain that conflict brings into the memories of communities has become a form of denial or has resulted in forms of nationalism that also represent denial. What would be left in Famagusta if its memories of conflict were erased? Probably very little. I believe there are ways of addressing and dealing with contesting memories, or painful memories such as ‘Sites of Conscience’.  

‘Sites of Conscience’ are cultural sites that offer the opportunity to discuss memories that are themselves conflicting and painful for the community(ies). If the entire historic core of Famagusta is addressed as a Site of Conscience, it would facilitate a platform to address the pain and unresolved issues that have kept Famagusta in a protracted transitional stage for over four decades. The development of narratives and events suit the development of activities, amenities and commerce around the same idea.

Irineo Funes, the main character from Funes the Memorious, one of Jorge Luis Borges’ short stories, published in 1942, suffers from a strange ability to record every

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Sevcenko argues: “What would a ‘conscience heritage’ consist of and how could it confront conflict? By preserving sites of atrocity to ensure that the abuses they held in memory would never be repeated? Not only that. Sites such as Terezín Memorial, a holocaust ghetto in the Czech Republic, or the Maison des Esclaves, a slave house on Gore’e Island, Senegal, knew all too well that their stories alone did not prevent racist violence. Moreover, in many contexts of long-standing interethnic conflicts, what is a site of atrocity to one group may not be to another. Finally, the founders believed that conscience could and must be inspired by the full range of human experience and ethical dilemmas. Sites of Conscience include museums exploring social change movements, such as the Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site, or daily experience of social issues such as poverty or immigration, as at the Lower East Side Tenement Museum.” Liz Sevcenko, “Sites of Conscience: new approaches to conflicted memory,” Museum international (2010), 21.
detail of his life, but is incapable of remembering it in perspective. Funes lacks the capacity to forget. A version of this is currently studied as ‘presentism’ which, in short, is the assessment of the past with the tools of the present. To this I would add, the ‘de-characterization’ of the past when seen from the limitations of the present. The limitation of seeing the past with the eyes of the present risks (i.e. anachronism) the imposition of moral and ethical views about the past, inaccuracies, false interpretations and in general a partial view that can diminish aspects of Cultural Heritage that we have not yet fully understood. My interest in addressing this aspect of memory is to reflect on the need to see Cultural Heritage not only as a process of remembering and forgetting but also to highlight the limitations of the present. Not everything from the past can be categorized as heritage. Heritage is formed by a selection process that leaves some of its expressions behind or simply forgotten. With the same rationale, some of the expressions that we receive in the present will probably not pass on to the following generations. It is the exercise of our ‘free will’. It is common to see the Cultural Heritage sector living, and operating, in a continuous ‘presentism’, looking at the past with the political, ethical, and moral weight of the present.

Having clearly stated the difficulties of encompassing Famagusta within the current international framework and having discussed the relevance of memory in the case of Famagusta and the political turmoil of Cyprus, I will now explore an alternative legal and conceptual framework which entitles the acknowledgment of memories of conflict, promotes remembrance and seeks to include human rights in a discussion of how to transit towards the next stage after conflict: Transitional Justice.

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248 Kasabova explain presentism as: “I argue that presentism fails to account for the temporal structures of memory and the changes in perspective as we switch from the present to a past situation.” (Kasabova, Memory, Memorials and Commemoration, 331.)
4. Transitional Justice: An Opportunity for Cultural Heritage to Reinforce its Legal Content as a Human Right

Moving a step away from the discussion of memory, this section explores Transitional Justice as a legal framework for Famagusta to support the process of its coming to terms with the past of dealing with its memories – including what is remembered, neglected, and forgotten. Transitional Justice is useful for a number of reasons. First, Transitional Justice, I propose, is a framework to discuss the memories of destruction, human rights violations, history and past (all of which are substantial components of heritage construction). Second, Transitional Justice offers to set a legal framework with international endorsement for communities to come to terms with events that impede the reconstruction of societies that are linked to troubled pasts, contested memories, and war (as such opening the path for attending to the management and potential development of the heritage that has long been neglected in Famagusta). Third, Transitional Justice provides a platform for dialogue necessary to set the conditions for ‘a’ future. Those aspects that hold the difficulties of a transition are also reflected in Cultural Heritage and with special emphasis in Famagusta: a site with no international recognition, at the heart of divided communities, with severe management difficulties, a recipient of memories that speak of hybridity, disconnection, fragmentality and liminality and most of all, a site with a history that transcends the boundaries of Cyprus, the Mediterranean and Europe.

As a legal concept, Transitional Justice is still a work in progress. Scholars such as Bill Rolston and Harvey M. Wenstein are among the leading pioneers who are engaged with defining the principles behind Transitional Justice: its applicability, the conditions it requires to work, and how the concept is related to broader fields such as history, human rights, political transformation, truths, and even heritage legitimization and management. According to the International Center of Transitional Justice,

“Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the
legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.\textsuperscript{249}

The experience of Europe in dealing with difficult memories in its recent history has indubitably been strenuous. World War II left open wounds through much of the continent that continue to raise discussions on how to address the past, its complexity and its consequences in the present. The defeat of the Nazi regime left a number of questions, at the heart of which was how to deal with the Nazi past which many European societies possess. Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Hungary have explicitly addressed issues of accountability and justice, therefore of memory (outside the national narrative), collective remembering (not the same as collective memory) and embarked upon the permanent search for answers that allow(ed) Europe to heal from the wounds of war. In different moments and for varied reasons, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Poland have also ventured on a journey of memory telling, truth discovery, and justice.\textsuperscript{250}


In these cases, societies face the need for a closure process and the design of a next stage, vacillating between what is true, what is historically accepted or proposed, how communities hold a sense of identity over troubled times and how ‘others’ identify them and their role during conflict. This cornucopia of complexities and unresolved questions are also seen lingering in Famagusta. The Balkans offer a wide range of experiences on how the war went in different parts of former Yugoslavia. Each war has its own monster that cannot be compared to any other: nevertheless I will present some examples that might help in discovering connections and similarities with the Famagusta case, where antagonisms still focus on ethnic and religious issues.

When North Cyprus is seen as a transitional stage rather than a place that has reached a status, it is possible to come to terms with a past that still represents a serious difficulty for the future in the island.

The Balkan War needs to be understood in the context of the legacy from World War II and its difficulties in dealing with the past that led to the composition of a variety of ‘truths’ that were never confronted. Those ‘truths’ were manipulated by elites and ethnic groups to change the meaning of past events and to create myths.

Those ‘truths’ were what fed the Balkan War which, together with the manipulation of information, created a collective victimization that exacerbated the conflict. However, the Balkan War affected communities that shared a common socialist past and had, to some extent, similarities in their religious components from which to draw parallels. The fact that the war affected everyone in the region raised the interest from every corner to learn what had happened to other communities during those difficult years in the 1990s.

Cyprus is a transnational place. The North makes little sense without the South, and vice versa. The way the island shaped its connections to the world, the way it structured cities and ports, agriculture and customs, are distorted by the latest division, and even if there is a settlement, the roots of Cypriots lie in every corner of the island. This approach is not only focused on the past but also on aspects such as economy, inequity, and unemployment that the emergence of a new system (after conflict) might bring with it. In this case, transition can unfold into new ethnic disturbance, religious unrest and a new cycle of conflict. A transitional stage is designed to address the issues that are unresolved and prevent them from emerging in the future. As Craig Calhoun puts it: “a strong public sphere where the past can be addressed depends upon a favorable organization of civil society.”

My personal analysis is that a Transitional Justice process is necessary for healing. Victims and perpetrators require forms of expressions, and institutions to recognize their role in the conflict. Although many would want to forget, healing or coming to terms with the past creates a long lasting ‘wellness’ for the whole of society. Other aspects that are relevant during transitional processes deal with unresolved issues on property (although some would like to believe Famagusta does not have those issues) tenure of nationalized buildings, access to official documents on missing persons, truth, religious property, oral history and

memorialization. But these are aspects of the Cyprus issue that probably no governmental organization (either in North Cyprus or in the Republic of Cyprus) is willing to confront.

An extremely specific component of my fieldwork in Cyprus aimed to address this. Conducting an open survey on heritage issues in the center of Famagusta (to gather data that local institutions cannot offer) showed me how the perception in the public sphere can challenge official figures, narratives and even internationally accepted ‘truths’. That is why I feel it relevant to cite the experience of a Croatian institution called Documenta: Dealing with the Past. In 2006 Documenta carried out a survey which people were asked questions on four main topics: 1) awareness in dealing with the past and the “Homeland War” (1991-1995), 2) perception of victims and survivors, 3) perception of war crimes and 4) attitudes on processing war crimes. I will not discuss the wide-ranging results here, but will focus on only one: 14% of the respondents had a negative impression of the terms “dealing with the past” while 41% of the interviewees were indifferent. When adding other features such as the nationality of victims, the perception of how the population saw particular events of the conflict might give a different result. It would be interesting to see how the Turkish-Cypriot community feels about the Turkish military presence in the island and the overwhelming presence of Turkish citizens in the light of a future status.

At this juncture, what is important is to note that Transitional Justice tackles the need to remember, and to remind, and propose memories and actions to encourage remembrance. I suggest that at the very core of this process, Cultural Heritage assets provide a malleable means to remember, remind and establish clear connections to memory and the past. Briefly, I will discuss the connections between history, memory,

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252 Part of the Human Rights House Networks, an institution with presence in fourteen countries in Europe and Africa.
and Transitional Justice after which I will present my analysis on how these concepts lead back to Cultural Heritage, particularly in the case of Famagusta.

The stage of transition that I use to frame Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage is one generally employed after a conflict, internal conflict or a process of change in political terms, for example from a totalitarian military dictatorship to democracy, or from communism to a different form of government. Changes are frequently ushered in with violence, and violence impinges on human rights. Transition itself is a historical process which facts, events and truth are unclear and therefore misleading. History is necessary in a transitional process to understand the events that lead to violence or conflict, as much as it is necessary in documenting violence itself. It gives clarity to events of the past, its causes and consequences. More than factual, history in relation to transitional stages and justice has a role in preventing forgetting. Transitional Justice is a tool to assist in coming to terms with the past, in conditions where law, human rights, violence and truth are permeated by mixed emotions and subjectivities. Cultural Heritage here becomes a main component in truth telling and remembrance, which facilitates the coexistence of multiple narratives and versions of the past: historical, sociological, psychological and official. It also welcomes a dynamic re-assessment of events that can be interpreted in multiple ways. The relevance of Cultural Heritage is fundamental to Transitional Justice process to help us understand that history is incomplete when memories are missing from its narratives. Memory, from a different perspective, is what history dismisses. Pierre Nora describes it in a better manner:

“What we are now in the habit of calling ‘memory’ is in reality the history of those who have been forgotten by History, those who have been excluded from official history because they live in the margins of society; hence the founding connection between memory and minority groupings.”

Small, local or family histories are not part of significant studies in the history of a place, however they can frequently help in understanding how what we see as historic events evolve. This argument translated to the case of Famagusta offers the opportunity to address the past, its violence and its consequences – despite the general opinion that the past is better left behind. The victims of that recent past deserve a form of recognition that goes beyond any expiration date. Together with the recognition of victims and human rights violations it is possible to open the discussion on the role of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage in establishing a bridge between the victims of the recent conflict and the victims of previous conflictive events that have shaped the city and explore Famagusta as a ‘Site of Conscience’.

A transitional scenario gives the opportunity to incorporate heritage as a main component of life in Cyprus, and as such, opens the possibility to re-frame it, re-define it and re-develop it, in ways that recognize the transnationality of its nature, its role in the memory of Europe and its key role in the rebuilding of a society that has suffered for such a long time. It is clear that places and territories that have suffered a conflict require, in the process of overcoming events form the past, forms of remembrance, mechanisms to make peace with the past and assurance that the places of memory will remain as part of a narrative that is closer to society and more distant from nationalism and politics. I argue that in addition to memories, remembrance, and historic events and their relationship with identity, Cultural Heritage sites remain as assets that can permanently become sources of new interpretations, new discoveries, and new discourses. This also includes difficult memories. It gives heritage assets a more permanent presence in the locus of a community than artificial sites to exploit shame and regret. The separation of Cultural Heritage from memory has permitted the manipulation of the past, framed in the light of history – a problem that can now be addressed through restoration and development of Cultural Heritage as a repository of memories. At the end of the day, I surmise that the tenets of a holistic Transitional
Justice, once commenced and implemented in Famagusta, would unlock a whole process of confronting the prevailing issues that hamper the development of Famagusta, ending the current state of limbo. In this process, Cultural Heritage not only serves as a means to overcome the political barriers and instigate the efforts to deal with the history of wars, conflict, and displacement that have plagued Cyprus, but it will also be subsequently subjected to a proper management model with the help of the international civil society (NGOs), private sector, and the public.

Within this Transitional Justice framework, I have presented the connections between memory, transition, human rights and justice, and suggested how Cultural Heritage helps in bridging these fissures to offer new perspectives and links, for example to remembrance and memorialization. The role of governments in initiatives such as Transitional Justice, however, is not clear. Is it necessary to recognize whether there is political will, and how would the institutions in Cyprus react to a scenario like this? What is clear is that Transitional Justice will eventually need to be addressed in Cyprus, a process that involves the civil society at large beyond political and religious actors, beyond generations and the historic narratives of the past. It is a process that needs to be carried out for Cyprus, in Cyprus, with the participation of Cypriots. Therefore, civil society should be present. At this juncture, it is important to ask, how will Transitional Justice be implemented in Cyprus? What are the necessary settings or institutions that must be present in order for it to work? In the succeeding section, I will present my personal insights on these crucial points.

Acknowledging the attempts to resolve the Cyprus issue in 2004, as seen in the Annan Plan, the slow process of re-establishing connections between both parts of the island and taking into account the radicalization of governments over the years, the possibilities of a Transitional Justice initiating another round of violence, rather than a process where all communities have the opportunity to participate, is a real fear. There are a number of features where the participation of governmental institutions threatens
the Transitional Justice process, among which are: 1) The recognition of transition. For North Cyprus the aim is international recognition, for the Republic of Cyprus it is submission to, or absorption within, the current institutions – these goals make any scenario unfeasible, and the transitional stage is likely to devolve into conflict. 2) Division. Forty years of division have permeated all levels of government: education, economy, religion and family – these divisions are not likely to change easily or soon. 3) Involvement of a sovereign nation. Turkey and its presence in North Cyprus turns the Cyprus issue into an international matter that the region has allowed – should Turkey also become involved in the Transitional Justice process, the matter could easily devolve. I have already addressed the convenience of including the UK.

I envisage a Transitional Justice process in Cyprus motivated by the civil society at the local and global levels. Transitional Justice is a growing sector around the world with many experiences in different regions and enough scholarship to build a network of endorsements from academics, legal practices, non-governmental institutions and the international community.
Chapter IV
Economics in Transition: a Cost-Benefit Analysis for Cultural Heritage Development
1. An introduction

In July 2009, while I was working as the Cultural Heritage Expert for the Kabul Urban Reconstruction Project (KURP), World Bank (WB) officials called a follow-up meeting on the project’s implementation process. One of the aspects discussed was the existing heritage buildings that survived the bombings and attacks in Andarbi, Deh Ghouchack, Murad Khane and Darwazae Lahori - the four historic neighborhoods impacted by KURP. In the course of the discussions, the World Bank officials asked a challenging question: how much would the cost of restoring the Cultural Heritage of those neighborhoods be?

This inquiry raised a number of issues. First, the World Bank policy on Cultural Heritage in the region (Middle East and North African countries)\(^\text{256}\) gives a clear account of what it considers Cultural Heritage to be, its policy on it, and an acknowledgment that Cultural Heritage has an economic component and value.\(^\text{257}\) Second, Cultural Heritage can be a sensitive issue for WB projects and so they have developed standardized procedures for involvement. Third, an inquiry on costs for Cultural Heritage preservation shows that the topic is still part of a mitigation approach, not a development one. Lastly, if well understood, Cultural Heritage includes vernacular expressions, public spaces, bazaars, the Kabul River, and many other realizations that require detailed analysis.

The answer to the question on the cost of restoring Cultural Heritage in the four neighborhoods impacted by KURP would therefore necessarily include additional


\(^{257}\) A quote on this aspect is as follows: “The Bank’s policy toward CH rests on two cornerstones: the patrimony’s economic value and its educational value. By definition, the patrimony represents a vast collection of cultural assets, but these assets also have a huge economic value. Markets only imperfectly recognize this economic value because of insufficient information and inadequate pricing mechanisms. Historically, the economic value of the patrimony’s endowments has been given much less attention than its cultural significance. Largely because of this limited recognition, policymakers and planners in developing countries have been little concerned, and little able, to activate and harvest the economic value of their countries’ patrimony. Bank policy has come to unambiguously recognize this economic value. It holds that the patrimony can become an auxiliary engine for generating economic growth and development.” World Bank, *Cultural Heritage and Development*, 33.
features, such as policy making, economic environments and financial issues, of expressions as diverse as bodies of water and public spaces, all of which are difficult to quantify. Estimating costs is usually a ‘solution’ that rarely comes from sound analysis. However an answer to the question on rehabilitation and other aspects of Cultural Heritage in the above mentioned neighborhoods of Kabul could be triggered if the following elements were considered: 1) Although crude, in my experience, war is an opportunity from which Cultural Heritage can benefit, 2) If Cultural Heritage is perceived as a development potential instead of a mitigation process, the possibilities for drawing attention and resources grow, 3) If considered an asset instead of a cost, the answer can be focused on the impact of including heritage as part of the spillovers of a reconstruction process. I prepared a pre-feasibility study that identified bombarded areas of the neighbourhoods in question, then applied a development ratio per square meter, and included mixed land uses with social housing against the market during those months. The results were as follows: for Andrabi a development potential of 43.53% of its area could produce 34,489 m² of low income housing, 22,990 m² of commercial space and resources to rehabilitate 54% of its heritage buildings. For Deh Ghouchack the results indicated that 47.87% of its area had development potential that could generate 35,370 m² of low income housing, 17,685 of commercial space and contribute to 55% of the area to be regenerated. Murad Khane showed 42.88% of development area, 26,527 m² for low income housing, 17,685 m² for commercial space and 55% of the regeneration area covered by this intervention. In Darwazae Lahori, an area of 43.37% of the neighborhood had development potential; this area would produce 86,655 m² of low income housing, 57,770 m² of commercial areas and the capacity to regenerate 54.68% of its heritage buildings. This analysis was well received - however, such an idea would require political will, the formation of an institutional architecture to carry out a programme like this and other aspects of governance that were not, and are not generally, present in Afghanistan. My experience in Kabul
reinforced my perception that multilateral banking and international bureaucracy are in place to perform tasks with limited capacity to improvise or improve, create and resolve issues. On the other hand, civil society (Turquoise Mountain and Aga Khan Trust for Culture, or INTERSOS and Cultural Heritage without Borders in the Balkans) were and still are filling the gaps left by war. A proposal like the one described will most likely be banned by institutions in the South and in the North. This, limits the feasibility of the civil society acting on behalf of heritage.

The economic benefit and spill-over of preserving and maintaining heritage assets and Cultural Heritage expressions have traditionally been difficult to measure. The closest we have come and the most common valuation scheme is to connect heritage expressions to tourist activities. Through this approach, commercial activities and the heritage industry are able to give an economic value to heritage assets. Nonetheless, putting an economic value on heritage assets remains difficult and highly controversial. The intervention and development of heritage sites tend to favor the restoration of historic values over the possibility of a sustainable economic framework. The former entails an investment only in conservation and management while the latter incorporates heritage with commercial and entrepreneurial activities. For this reason, it has been challenging to formulate any regulating framework that intersperses economic principles with heritage.

The assessment of economic value in heritage has been oriented to non-use or non-exploitation (e.g. preservation of natural heritage, national parks and marine

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258 Cultural Heritage has been referred to as a good that is close to the environment –in market terms, given the qualities of its existence and the impact in the general public. Referring to Cost Benefit Analysis –CBA, Boardman et al., (2011) state: "As CBA is increasingly applied to environmental policies, concern about existence value among analysts will almost certainly grow. Unless methods of measurement improve substantially, however, deciding when and how to include existence values in CBA will continue to be difficult. By being aware of the limitations of these methods, analysts can be better producers and consumers of CBA.” Anthony Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2011), 231.

259 Regarding the non-exploitation aspect of heritage Throsby analyses the following: “In a neoclassical world peopled by rational fully informed utility maximizing consumers, value arises through processes of exchange in perfectly functioning markets. Even when markets fail, as in the case, for example, of public goods, it is the willingness-to-pay of individual consumers that expresses the value of the goods in
reserves), rather than the analysis of how heritage impacts the economy as a whole and economic activities in specific sectors. The non-use or non-exploitation of heritage has an important economic impact that goes beyond the heritage site to determine land policies, market dynamics of properties and development potential. However, the recognition of an area as significant in terms of heritage brings additional elements to any assessment – economic, social, technological, political, and, of course, cultural. Nevertheless, of these, it is the economics embedded in heritage that is perhaps the least explored aspect. What then does this reflect? In principle, it corresponds to a vision of heritage and culture as part of a state’s welfare, therefore a monopoly driven by governmental policy. 260 From this viewpoint, heritage is seen as a special kind of commodity that needs to be conserved, and preserved, more than being utilized as part of a long-term economic development plan. The diversity of heritage assets present further difficulties in finding a single approach suitable in assessing sites that include a wide range of possibilities and a combination of expressions (nature, archaeology, buildings and landscapes, among others). 261


260 Different approaches to welfare can be discussed: “We see evidence of this all around us. For example, areas thought of in earlier times as being part of a social welfare system are now more often seen as aspects of economic policy. Health policy provides a good illustration; this is an area that nowadays is increasingly constructed in terms of contractual arrangements between the state and the people, where the worth of alternative strategies for providing medical and hospital care is assessed in terms of their financial benefits and costs.” Throsby, Economics of Cultural Policy, 33. From the same publication: “[…] Analyses of the tourist industry usually make a distinction between mass tourism, characterised in business terms as being a high-volume low-yield operation, and niche tourism, referring to tourism products that cater to small numbers of discriminating tourists with high revenue yield per person. The arts and culture are deeply involved in, and affected by, both types of tourist market. The term cultural tourism is used to relate to both aspects of tourist activity, […] Cultural tourism in its more specific sense, on the other hand, involves smaller numbers of people seeking a more specialized experience. Used in this context, the term ‘cultural tourism’ refers to the niche market of the well-informed and culturally-sensitive tourist, whose trip, whether part of an organised package or undertaken independently, is primarily or solely for cultural purposes.” Ibid., 146.

261 Just to mention a few, UNESCO classifies heritage assets into a number of categories such as: cultural landscapes, historic towns, heritage canals, heritage routes, among others. For additional info see UNESCO’s website, accessed Nov 7, 2014, http://en.unesco.org/.
The economic impact of developing an urban area with heritage assets in it is different from developing a natural site (for instance, national parks) where heritage significance is appreciated for its intactness, or an archaeological site with limited potential to modify its landscape. Cultural Heritage is composed of assets that are not standardized in their relationship with the environment around them, environments which form part of their significance; hence, Cultural Heritage is usually seen in isolation – as separate, due to its historical significance, from the rest of its surroundings that do not have the same level of historic impact. This indubitably hampers the potential of incorporating heritage into the broader economic base. As such, the singularity of each heritage site adds to the difficulty of framing heritage as part of an economic dynamic. Certainly, it is difficult to compare the economic value of a natural park with a heritage building or an archaeological site. What is needed, therefore, is to have a set of criteria which give economic value to heritage.

This chapter explores a single economic component of Cultural Heritage using Famagusta as a case study for evaluating the economic potentials of heritage sites. In particular, I probe the possibilities of assessing the economic feasibility of the walled city of Famagusta and the prospective implications of formulating a sustainable scheme that could eventually facilitate the management of the site in order to prevent further decay. In evaluation, I employ the methodology of Cost-Benefit Analysis\textsuperscript{262} premised on the following principles:

i) Acknowledgement of tourists as an additional stakeholder group in the design of alternative policies in Cultural Heritage preservation and development.

\textsuperscript{262} On CBA I will take Boardman’s approach: “In CBA we try to consider all of the costs and benefits to society as a whole, that is the social costs and the social benefits.” Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 2.
ii) The economic value of the heritage asset can be derived from what the tourists are willing to give to Famagusta, and this can be measured through a survey in-situ.

iii) The economic impact of a potential World Heritage listing for the case of Famagusta can also be measured using the change in the tourists’ willingness to pay once the brand has been applied to Famagusta.

The normal methods and procedures for establishing economic value of assets and goods including a complete statistical account of the role those assets have in different sectors. The location of Famagusta in the northern part of Cyprus denies us a reliable source of such statistics and also offers a reason to tailor information to first hand data. The Total Economic Value of a commodity is usually obtained through the examination of preferences (Preference or Stated Preference Methods\(^{263}\)). In the case of Famagusta, to arrive at its total economic value, I used a questionnaire to measure the willingness of tourists to pay for an activity that could initiate a positive economic impact to the locality - a walking tour.\(^{264}\) It is crucial to note at this point that heritage does not have a real market, unlike other commodities that are consumed and

\(^{263}\) On this regard: “What are stated preference methods? Without trying to give a rigorous definition, we can say the term ‘stated reference methods’ refers to a family of techniques which use individual respondents’ statements in a set of…options to estimate utility functions... By their nature, stated preference methods require purpose-designed surveys for their collection of data.” Eric P. Kroe and Robert J. “Stated Preference Methods. An Introduction,” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 11 no.1 (1988): p.11.

\(^{264}\) A different approach is the Travel Cost Method commonly used for assessing recreational venues. The Travel Cost Method can be used in understanding consumer’s preference to visit a heritage site assuming the listing as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO which traditionally has been used for assessing Cultural Heritage sites it is important to understand the development of different methods and how their limitations impact the valuation of Cultural Heritage: “The most predominant valuation methodology applied to cultural heritage goods has been the stated preference method known as contingent valuation (Ready and Navrud, 2002). Travel cost models involve a revealed preference method, which infer value from individual travel expenditures to access and utilize the public-type good. Revealed preference models have significant limitations and as such, have not been used to value cultural heritage sites (Ready and Navrud, 2002).” P. Joanne Poor and Jamie M. Smith, “Travel Cost Analysis of a Cultural Heritage Site: The Case of Historic St. Mary’s City of Maryland,” Journal of Cultural Economics 28 (2004): 217. Together with Travel Cost methods, we can find the Hedonic Price Method, which is used to measure the value of a property with singular environmental features (views, clean air, sun, etc), or benefited by legislations that would guarantee a forest, a lake or any other natural resource. The hedonic price method also intends to give economic value to heritage sites: “The hedonic price method examines market prices for a good such as housing as a function of its component characteristics, including both housing characteristics (number of bedrooms and bathrooms, etc.) and other characteristics, including attributes such as air quality and proximity to amenities, recreation sites or heritage assets.” Rhona C. Free, 21st Century Economics: A Reference Handbook (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2010): 827.
patronized by a specific market. Heritage is a public good, as it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. In a sense, it is comparable to clean air in that it cannot be purchased per se and therefore cannot be exclusively owned, but its management and preservation benefit the public. In order to determine its economic value, heritage actually needs to be related to its impact over other sectors (spillover) of the economy.

The following not only applies to Famagusta as a post-conflict, unrecognized, politically and socially sensitive territory. It is a way to include the most important fact (from my experience) in heritage work, which is the economic involvement, impact and spillover of Cultural Heritage. There have been over sixty years of a limited relationship between heritage with the rest of the economic factors that affect the intense and growing connections between each one of the actors in the economic arena. What I propose here are immediate actions that can avoid rhetorical discussions on politics, ethnicity, religion, ethics (nine hundred years and a number of occupations of Cyprus) and legal aspects of Cultural Heritage. Instead, I design a pilot project drawn from an idea of how to develop and implement an economic model that generates the necessary economic means to invest in Famagusta’s historic core. This model is based on a walking tour and proves its feasibility under the current circumstances in North Cyprus. It sends a strong message to all stakeholders of Cultural Heritage in Cyprus that it is unnecessary to look to international players for answers. Solutions are perfectly viable from within. The core component of this idea is a survey tailored to the current conditions in Famagusta. This was a person to person interview carried out by junior local architect (Turkish/English speakers) capable of offering information of what World Heritage site means and the concept of a walking tour. The interviewees were shown the logo of World Heritage site and were given examples of other World Heritage Sites. The full extent of the interview appears in Figure 5.
2. Heritage and Economics

In recent years, we have observed the emergence of specialized forms of tourism targeting sites with profound significance for society and which trace the evolution of human civilizations. A new term has been coined to describe flows of people in pursuit of places with high cultural content, and that is Cultural Tourism.\(^{265}\) This formalizes the consumption of Cultural Heritage and opens discussion of the connections between heritage and the private sector of the economy, specifically services linked to tourism: e.g. real estate, hospitality, and banking, among others. Furthermore, it stimulates the design of policies in the public sector that address the preservation of heritage assets that are mostly dual in character, by which I mean both public and private.\(^{266}\)

Cultural Heritage is characterized by a fundamental and dual character. On the one hand public in its recognition, and on the other hand private in its ownership. This has placed it in a peculiar position, especially when trying to establish accountability for its preservation. Traditionally, Cultural Heritage has fallen under a cultural umbrella in terms of which it is common for stakeholders to concentrate only on the negative condition of sites, such as deterioration, loss of significance and alterations that diminish their heritage content. The positive impact on Cultural Heritage to the local and national economies, on the other hand, is measured and assessed by other

\(^{265}\) “Cultural Tourism is that form of tourism whose object is, among other aims, the discovery of monuments and sites. It exerts on these last a very positive effect insofar as it contributes - to satisfy its own ends - to their maintenance and protection. This form of tourism justifies in fact the efforts which said maintenance and protection demand of the human community because of the socio-cultural and economic benefits which they bestow on all the populations concerned.” ICOMOS, “Charter on Cultural Tourism.” ICOMOS, 1999, accessed Nov 7, 2014, http://www.univeur.org/cuebc/downloads/PDF%20carte/51.%20Cultural%20tourism.PDF.

\(^{266}\) When addressing goods I will take into account the following description: “Valuing cultural goods and services in economic terms requires a recognition of the fact that such goods fall into the category of mixed goods, i.e., goods that have both private-good and public-good characteristics. Private goods and services are those whose benefits accrue entirely to private agents (individuals or firms); in other words such agents can appropriate the benefits for themselves by acquiring property rights over the good or service involved […] Public goods, on the other hand, are those whose benefits accrue to everyone in a given community; economists describe them as non-excludable (once they are produced they are available to everyone and no one can be excluded from consuming them) and non-rival (one person’s consumption does not diminish the amount available to others).” Throsby, Economics of Cultural Policy, 19.
disciplines such as economics and planning. Scholars of Cultural Heritage have generally set aside the valuation of heritage, assuming that heritage is a priceless asset that needs to be conserved at all costs. The general restriction applied to Cultural Heritage as only framed by the cultural sector further debilitates any comprehensive attempt to assess the impacts of heritage to the wider economic spectrum.

As a consequence of this I approach the connections, difficulties and opportunities by including an economic perspective on Cultural Heritage. By presenting an analysis of the four decades of abandonment of Famagusta, as well as the consequences to its management (which will be further elaborated in the subsequent chapter), I anticipate the required investment in the preservation and development of its heritage assets even within the context of its political embargo, its lack of representation in the international arena, its limited capacity, and its economic limitations. When analyzing heritage in a context such as this, the relationship between stakeholders is a crucial point from where to begin. Since a stakeholder analysis is as difficult as it is heavily entrenched with public policies in the northern part of the island, which in my experience is highly political rather than technical, current (traditional) stakeholders (such as the local residents of Famagusta), have been put aside in favor of tourists in the historic core of Famagusta. This will permit an alternative outlook on the relationship between the visitors and the heritage of Famagusta.

To achieve this, one would normally assess the stakeholders and acknowledge their share in decision making, on policies and actions to preserve these fragile assets. In the case of Famagusta, at least three sets of stakeholders would have emerged: the local residents in the vicinity (some of whom even own parts of the historic core of Famagusta); the government of North Cyprus; and the government of the Republic of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{267}}\] In this regard: “Governments, like markets, sometimes fail to promote social good. We often cannot accurately predict the exact consequences of government failures (indeterminacy itself is sometimes a predictable consequence)” David Weimer and Aidan Vining (1999) Policy Analysis: Concepts and Cases (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999): 142.
Cyprus (and to some extent the government of Turkey, since parts of the fortification system are still occupied by Turkish army). In one way or another, all of them are supposed to be accountable and responsible for the development of Famagusta, but due to current political ambiguity they confront, considering them as central to any sound heritage management plan would be problematic and limited.\(^{268}\) In order to formulate a development scheme for Famagusta that is impervious to political issues, an alternative, practical strategy has been designed which concentrates on tourists who visit Famagusta and have no political agenda, but are willing to spend money for tourist activities in the area.

To understand the role heritage plays in attracting visitors to Famagusta, its historic core and the facilities on offer, it is necessary to have a vision of the economy as a whole. This, however, is problematic in the northern part of Cyprus, given its political status and the unreliability of its institutional architecture. For instance, the usual economic indicators available in other states are either inaccurate or non-existent. Therefore, let us view heritage in economic terms, as a commodity. A change in the perspective of heritage from a cultural asset to a commodity helps in analyzing its role in the economy and facilitates forms of measurement to help draw out the economic value heritage has, or might have, for society. Moreover it offers an alternative for Famagusta to the current political scenario that has isolated its \textit{de facto} institutions and prevented them from accessing any expertise and funding, and at the same time has prevented the outside world from taking part in any discussion that could eventually pave the way for a feasible means of dealing with Famagusta’s heritage.

As discussed in previous chapters, the international framework only further complicates the issues, since North Cyprus is an unrecognized territory. Since the

\(^{268}\) Since 2012 the EU pledged four million Euros in support to the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, which in my personal and professional experience is a political front from the two sides of the island, not reliable technically, and reluctant to engage in contemporary discussions on economics, management or any form of alternative governance for Cultural Heritage that could represent a risk for sovereignty (in cultural, territorial and recognitional aspects) as both sides understand Cyprus. Its role will be expanded in chapter five.
political scenario continually eclipses heritage concerns, economics then becomes an alternative lens through which to address key aspects of contemporary approaches to sustainable management of Cultural Heritage. An economic analysis of the relationship between heritage and economics within a site needs to be carried out with the support of detailed assessments of data, for example in the hospitality sector concerning number of beds, new jobs created, as well as complementary activities or restaurants, bars and other leisure activities, transportation and travel agents, and so on. Cultural industries also play a major role in economics, in parts of the world where institutions follow the standards designed for the community of nations. The singularity of North Cyprus, and the case of Famagusta, challenges any possible approach to public policies for the preservation of heritage assets, especially in this particular case where the economy is deeply dependant on Turkey. Activities such as tourism, transportation and commerce (among others) rely on Turkish facilities and commercial structures to sustain the economy of the northern part of the island, which then forces North Cyprus into a subsidiary relationship with Turkish policies and priorities.

Pointing out how a different set of stakeholders (one that is not formally a part of the state) might offer an alternative perspective to any development and preservation potential offers a way of circumventing much of this. It is imperative to note that: a) Famagusta is not a World Heritage Site because UNESCO has not received a nomination (the underpinnings of this will not be discussed in this chapter), b) to apply for World Heritage status, a nomination dossier is needed, c) a nomination dossier highlights the procedures, measures and actions needed to preserve the Outstanding Universal Value of the heritage site (it is a management plan), d) a management structure to implement what the nomination dossier indicates needs to consider the economics of the managerial aspects, the course of maintenance, rehabilitation, development and a global vision (description of significance or identity) of what the heritage site is intended to communicate, e) forty years of decay of Famagusta’s
heritage site proves the limited capacity of the current management organizations, expertise and feasibility of its policies, it also suggests strongly the economic value local citizens give to this heritage site (i.e. limited, with the exception of profitable shops, investment in housing improvements is scarce and inadequate. A heritage site cannot be regenerated based only on commercial space), f) despite the local political, economic and social situation in Famagusta, there is international concern that would like to have Famagusta regenerated, or at least to halt its decay.

3. Valuation of Culture and the Principle of Policies Design

Since Cultural Heritage has no market, it is hard to accurately determine its total economic value. Cultural Heritage is usually seen as an added value to other sectors (such as goods and services) where its impact is more or less evident. The relationship between heritage and its economic spillover has been asymmetrical, given the scarce investment in heritage coming from the industries that benefit from heritage sites (i.e. tourism, hospitality, etc.). Instead, what is commonly seen is the cultural sector (ministries, agencies and local governments), designed to provide the welfare of the population – not its economic development – providing resources to secure heritage sites to benefit sectors of the economy with better provisions.

One of the reasons for this is the double (public/private) character of most heritage goods, combined with the private logic of business, which when taken together are not easy to integrate. The acquisition of quantitative terms for

269 The classification made by Throsby is accurate in terms of Cultural Heritage and the difficulties of framing it: “Values that can be given to heritage are: • existence value: individuals may value cultural heritage simply because it exists, even if they themselves have not directly experienced particular heritage items; • option value: individuals may wish to preserve heritage items in order to leave open the option that they or somebody else may visit them or consume their services in some way in the future; and • bequest value: individuals may wish to pass on heritage assets to future generations. All of these sources of value give rise to non-market demand for the conservation of heritage, expressible as individual willingness to pay.” Throsby, Economics of Cultural Policy, 110).

270 The double character of Cultural Heritage is explained as follows: “Heritage assets may be held in public or private ownership but their common characteristic is that they engender significant public-good benefits. This being so, the policy task is to manage the publicly owned cultural capital, and to oversee the management of privately owned heritage, in such a way that the public interest is best served.” Ibid., 113.
economics in Cultural Heritage is still under debate, while the qualitative aspects are represented by quality of life, social cohesion and investment, among others. Since Cultural Heritage has such a volatile framework (in terms of policies), policies often refer to regulation and mitigation measures over heritage assets, leaving aside other crucial factors such as inter sectorial planning, sustainability, and environmental impact, giving policy design a focus on what to avoid instead of how to develop links to the sectors involved. For instance, there are scholars (such as David Throsby one of them) that sees the experience of appreciating urban heritage as a use-value. When compared with activities such as bird watching, the setting (i.e. a forest) is given the character of non-use value to preserve the conditions so that birds can be appreciated and their role as part of the environmental system. For urban heritage the considerations are different. Urban settings were developed for people to inhabit, therefore, walking is inherent to its nature, however that is framed as use-value.

271 Throsby explains it as: “Heritage: The cultural value of heritage is inherently bound up with the sense that the existing stock of tangible and intangible cultural capital represents both a link with the past – an inheritance that tells us a great deal about ourselves and where we have come from – and a link with the future – surveys of public attitudes to heritage reveal a widespread acceptance of a responsibility to pass on our valued cultural resources to our children, our grandchildren, and beyond. This ‘bequest value’ does have an observable economic component, measurable as a willingness to pay for heritage conservation, but there is likely to be a significant non-financial component as well – an ethical belief in the importance of continuity.” Ibid., 44.

272 On principles of economic valuation see Pagiola (1996): “When we ask what the value of a cultural heritage site is, we are generally asking one of two related but different questions. First, we might be asking what the value of the entire site is, as an asset. Implicitly, we are asking how much worse off we would be if the site vanished tomorrow. This is the question we would ask if we were primarily interested in estimating our wealth, of which cultural heritage is one component. Second, we might be asking what the benefits or costs of actions that change the cultural heritage site in specified ways are. This is the question we would ask if we were considering undertaking a project which would improve (or which might damage) the site. In this context, the key issue is not the overall value of the site but the change in that value resulting from the project. Stefano Pagiola, (1996) “Economic Analysis of Investments in Cultural Heritage: Insights from Environmental economics.” World Bank, 1996, accessed Feb 17, 2014, http://www.elaw.org/system/files/Economic.Analysis.Investments.Cultural.Heritage.pdf.1. Also see Bogaards (2007): “Cost-benefit analysis can play a useful role in historic heritage conservation. Even when it is difficult to estimate some heritage conservation costs and benefits with precision, applying the cost-benefit analysis framework is important and useful in itself. The challenge for departments undertaking cost-benefit analysis is to consider intangible impacts adequately but not overplay them. By using cost-benefit analysis, scarce conservation resources are more likely to be directed towards those historic heritage places the community values most highly.” Rod Bogaards, (2008) “Cost Benefit Analysis and Historic Heritage Regulation.” Office of Best Practice Regulation, Government of Australia, accessed Feb 18, 2014, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/deregulation/obpr/docs/wp3-rbogaards-historic-heritage.pdf.1.

273 As referenced in Throsby: “Cultural policy is understood as the promotion or prohibition of cultural practices and values by governments, corporations, other institutions and individuals. Such policies may be explicit in that their objectives are openly described as cultural, or implicit, in that their cultural objectives are concealed or described in other terms.” Throsby, The Economics of Cultural Policy, 8. This openly includes non-governmental institutions, private sector, among others.
Cultural Heritage still offers a number of opportunities for economics to develop. This section of study only points out the gaps that arise from a deeper discussion when trying to define the public and private character of heritage assets and urban heritage.

The approach most legislations have is that Cultural Heritage is part of commercial dynamics, for which it needs to be regulated, when the reality is that important heritage areas in the world become part of degradation processes because of obsolescence, urban growth, or simply due to internal migration of activities in cities, towns and rural areas. Famagusta, although situated in a difficult location and under vulnerable conditions, also responds to similar processes whereby markets and commerce impacts values, even heritage values. That is precisely one of the main functions of this exercise, within the limitations of Famagusta. To transform it into a feasible environment in which to establish an alternative discussion for the benefit of the heritage located in problematic sites.

It is commonly understood that policies are governmental duty, but when talking about Cultural Heritage, private policies, such as the ones implemented by civil society organizations and businesses, have a direct impact on securing and developing heritage sites. For the purpose of this work, when referring to ‘policies’ I simply refer to the public sector. Before considering the value of Cultural Heritage, it needs, in my opinion, to be recognized first as a kind of capital – cultural capital. This perspective allows us to better frame Cultural Heritage linked to investment, social discount rate, rates of returns, which are the basic components of a cost and benefit analysis.

274 The shift in recognizing culture as part of the capital opens the possibility for a better understanding of the economics embedded in culture, in addition the deterioration of Cultural Heritage diminishes cultural capital: “Cultural capital, like any capital item, exists both as a stock of assets and as a flow of capital services over time. The value of the capital may be assessed in terms of its asset value at a given point in time or as the value of the flow of services to which it gives rise. Either way, the particular characteristic of cultural capital is that it embodies or gives rise to the two types of value, economic and cultural, that are a guiding theme throughout this volume” Ibid., 108.

275 In the same manner Cultural Heritage has an role in the performance of the economy but limited ways of measuring it: “Treating heritage as cultural capital has some attractions to the economist and policy analyst. Defining heritage as capital enables concepts such as investment, depreciation, rates of return, and so on, to be applied to its evaluation and management. In particular, the way is opened to applying
Recent scholarship on policy design to preserve Cultural Heritage differentiates between the intrinsic value (that Cultural Heritage holds given its characteristics of unrepeatability and representativeness of the past) and the instrumental value as a way of computing the economic implications of heritage. O’Brien assures us that intrinsic value refers to the “value that is unique to the cultural sector and isn’t found anywhere else. Intrinsic value is therefore highly subjective and is hard to fit into the language of outputs.” Instrumental value “is generated by the social and economic policy uses of culture, for example to raise exam results or tackle social exclusion.” Intrinsic value has formed a central part of the initial chapters of this dissertation where I argued that Famagusta is important worldwide not only because of its capacity to demonstrate Outstanding Universal Value but in its connections to the memory of different parts of the world, at different moments in time including the ones arising from the 1974 conflict events. Additionally the intrinsic value of Famagusta challenges core definitions of Cultural Heritage as stated by international organizations and demands a redefinition of the term. For the economic value of Cultural Heritage in Famagusta, I refer instead to the instrumental value, aiming to highlight the impact this assessment might have in policy design.

Investment appraisal techniques such as cost benefit analysis to the assessment of public and private expenditure on heritage conservation, as we shall see further below.” Ibid., 108.


Ibid., 18.

The difference and relationships between different forms of value is better explained as follows: “cultural value can be understood as instrumental value, institutional value and intrinsic value. The three forms of value are interdependent and rely on each other to form an overall picture of cultural value. Instrumental value is generated by the social and economic policy uses of culture, for example to raise exam results or tackle social exclusion. Institutional value refers to the kind of value discussed by Mark Moore’s work (1995) on public value, where organizations generate trust or esteem by the way they engage their users. Intrinsic value is that form of value that is unique to the cultural sector and isn’t found anywhere else.” Ibid., 18.

A position on this is: “The cultural heritage may be defined as the entire corpus of material signs - either artistic or symbolic - handed on by the past to each culture and, therefore, to the whole of humankind. As a constituent part of the affirmation and enrichment of cultural identities, as a legacy belonging to all humankind, the cultural heritage gives each particular place its recognizable features and is the storehouse of human experience. The preservation and the presentation of the cultural heritage are therefore a corner-stone of any cultural policy.” (Jokilehto, Definition of Cultural Heritage, 4-5.)
Culture, Cultural Heritage and other forms of cultural expressions seriously impact the economy of many countries around the world. For example in Spain, 91% of the total investment in tangible Cultural Heritage comes from public sources, and expenditure per capita is €16.65, while in Italy it is €12.84, and France, where there were 180,000 jobs related to heritage in 2009, the expenditure per capita is €16.03.\textsuperscript{281} In other places like the UK, the impact of heritage preservation is 180,000 direct FTE\textsuperscript{282} (fulltime employment), while the impact of Cultural Heritage reached 500,000 indirect jobs\textsuperscript{283} and its contribution to the GDP is £11 billion in 2011 (in England alone). These figures are indicative of the role that heritage has on the broader international economy.

Instead of being viewed as cultural assets only that need further investments (in the form of management and conservation), the above data suggests the productive potential of cultural assets. Cultural Heritage represents an important quality, which in different regions of the world is measured though the impact to GDP, job creation and expenditure per capita, to name but a few. In the case of North Cyprus, data is scarce and problematic to assess, making it difficult, if not impossible, to precisely calculate Famagusta’s economic potential. Given this predicament, I use instead Cost and Benefit Analysis – a type of valuation method to determine the economic feasibility of Famagusta (considering a walking tour and the application of the World Heritage Site brand). The discussion which follows elaborates on the facets of Cost and Benefit Analysis followed by an explanation of how I implemented it in the context of Famagusta.

\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., 38.
4. Costs and Benefits Analysis (CBA)

Broadly, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is defined as: of, relating to, or being economic analysis that assigns a numerical value to the cost-effectiveness of an operation.\(^{284}\) CBA brings together two groups of valorization components, costs and benefits, which require a common economic base to allow the measurement of risks involving the project.\(^{285}\) CBA is commonly implemented to determine the monetary value of the risk of implementing a certain project vs. the benefits of implementing that same project. This analysis includes aspects on which the market does not provide appropriate economic measure. In order to evaluate the feasibility of Famagusta as a self-sufficient management scheme, I conducted a Cost-Benefit Analysis to measure the viability of incorporating a walking tour and implementing the World Heritage Site brand in planning for Famagusta.\(^{286}\)

CBA is usually conducted to determine the effectiveness of policies that concern the public in general. For instance, since CBA is based on efficiency, infrastructure projects can be assessed using this method, though not so accurately for environmental policies. In Cultural Heritage, however, CBA has only been used sporadically. I believe one of the reasons for this is because the benefits are always greater than costs for society at large (i.e. pride or self-respect are benefits for which


\(^{285}\) According to Boardman et al: “CBA is a method for determining if proposed policies could potentially be Pareto [which means that an action cannot make anyone better off without making someone worse off] improving: positive net benefits make it possible in the sense of making available resources to compensate those who bear costs so that some people are made better off without making anyone else worse off.” (Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 47.

\(^{286}\) The idea of a walking tour comes from the analysis of a previous economic study (“Using contingent valuation and cost-benefit analysis to design a policy for restoring cultural heritage”) by Andrea Báez and Luís César Herrero, published in 2011 in the Journal of Cultural Heritage. A walking tour as well as a bike tour, or any other form of non-invasive action in a historic area of any historic town in the world proves the potential of an action that can draw important resources for urban rehabilitation. The walking tour for the case of Famagusta is intended to prove that there is no need for a political status resolution to engage in the rehabilitation of heritage assets, or any important public policy. This idea could have been implemented by any international agency such as UNESCO, or UNDP-PFF or international non-governmental. This also proves that there has not been any will to secure Famagusta at the local, regional or international levels.
value is not simple to measure). Additionally, the impact of heritage in a number of sectors of the economy is still difficult to measure and so economic benefits are also difficult to establish.

Given the highly sensitive, not to mention politically charged, conceptualization of Cultural Heritage, the forms to measure a policy that effectively values the impact of preservation remains difficult. In fact in North Cyprus, heritage takes a backseat to achieving recognition as an independent country, which is the primary political concern that drives interests and policies. Furthermore, the political and economic affairs in North Cyprus are dependent on external actors, namely, Turkey. That fact alone is problematic in terms of the indicators that realistically measure economic activities, living conditions, and societal discussions of North Cyprus independently. For Famagusta, a relatively small urban settlement (its heritage area), the development of hotels and casinos in the vicinity represent an important destination for tourists, but not necessarily a source of income. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the impact of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage on the casino and hospitality sectors. This is not only because of the lack of credible data but also because the relationships that accompany most activities in North Cyprus are too ambiguous to identify. Acknowledging all the factors that play a role in northern Cyprus and in Famagusta, I use an alternative approach to define a form of sustainability to the preservation and development of its Cultural Heritage assets through CBA. I have done this with data gathered in-situ and by using only two sets of figures from the local institutions in order to attain as high a degree of accuracy as possible.

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287 “Though some heritage conservation benefits will remain intangible, cost-benefit analysis can still assist the decision maker to make a judgment about whether the intangible heritage benefits are likely to be greater than the quantified costs – an easier judgment than one about the possible magnitude of the intangible heritage benefits.” Bogaards, Cost Benefit Analysis and Historic Heritage Regulation, 12.

288 Planning, Statistics and Research Department of the Tourism Planning Office of North Cyprus. Copies of this data were provided by Prof. Dr. Osman M. Karatepe, faculty from the Faculty of Tourism, Eastern Mediterranean University.
The analysis of the economic impact that comes with the nomination of a heritage asset as WHS, and the efforts and resources needed to complete a nomination dossier, are two different issues though connected. The first requires the assessment of the different sectors that are interconnected with Cultural Heritage, for example: transportation, tourism, the real estate market, space planning (in the case of urban and rural settlements), agriculture, hospitality, services and so on. The second includes the preparation of a dossier that establishes the actions and measures that the management institution will implement to guarantee the preservation of the heritage site. Nevertheless, development and economic activity can happen with or without the WHS nomination. At this point I am only reflecting on the facts that arise from the decision to undertake the preparation of a nomination dossier. [An important caveat is that the social benefits of Cultural Heritage preservation are always greater than the cost of regenerating it. For instance, among the social benefits of conserving Famagusta would be the increase of the well-being of the population in Famagusta, or the improvement of pride and self esteem, of being part of the city].

Both circumstances (nomination dossier and management after acceptance in the World Heritage list) require a Cost-Benefit Analysis that identifies different objectives, different sets of costs and therefore totally different benefits (even at the financial level). Once included in the World Heritage list, the site requires a CBA for the management process and to create indicators and a monitoring system of the site. In the case of the dossier preparation, the role of CBA is established by UNESCO to formulate a planning strategy that could guarantee the preservation of the significance embedded in the heritage site. Moreover, a CBA is employed to predict the economic impact of any policy to the wider community. What UNESCO or the heritage site have not accounted for is the CBA of the preparation of the nomination dossier, which can easily reach more than one million US dollars for financial costs and four years (on average) of intense lobbying and foreign relations from national and local
governments. A sample case is instructive: “The National Historic Site of Grand Pré, located in the Annapolis Valley of Nova Scotia, Canada has applied for a UNESCO World Heritage Site designation. The nomination process began in 2008, will take three years, will cost $1.3 million in cash and kind contributions” (Tourism Strategy & Interpretation Framework Final Report, 2010) and culminate in the official proposal submission in 2011. (Grand Pré was accepted in the World Heritage list in 2012). Other assessments established a range of around £890,000 for the preparation of a nomination dossier for future sites in the United Kingdom. The main issue arising from this potential nomination is the limited capacity to access the World Heritage Site brand, turning the World Heritage list into a high-risk bet and making it one of the most exclusive clubs in the world under the umbrella of UNESCO. The application of CBA in heritage sites that have been selected as WHS (as in the Porto case) is framed by two aspects: first is the economic spillover once a heritage site is included in the

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289 In this regard: “In 2010, at the request of the World Heritage Committee, an external auditor was tasked with assessing their priority initiative, the ‘Global Strategy for a Credible, Representative and Balanced World Heritage List’ (UNESCO 2011). The audit revealed that the Committee’s decisions were increasingly diverging from the scientific opinions of the Advisory Bodies, resulting in a more ‘political’ rather than a ‘heritage’ approach to the Convention. Sufficient representation is not being given to heritage experts within the national delegations, and these are now largely political appointments, contrary to Article 9-3 of the Convention. Members of the World Heritage Committee are representatives of States Parties and thus free to pursue their own national interests, maximize power, push their economic self-interest, and minimize their transaction costs [...]” Lynn Meskell, “States of Conservation: Protection, Politics, and Pacting within UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee,” Anthropological Quarterly 87 no.1 (2014): 226-227.


292 “Our research suggests that the larger and more complex the ownership of the site the larger the partnership that would be required to develop the bid. The average number of partners involved is 13 but for large sites or sites with multiple ownership or jurisdiction the number of partners involved can be as many as 70. The participation in the bid can be expected to cost on average £40k in staff time during the bidding process. Smaller sites with just one or a few owners are likely to incur less cost in the bidding process. There may be further cost if additional conservation, tourism or other studies are required and these can be for between £20-£80k per study. New nominations are required to develop a management plan for the cost. This will provide a more comprehensive assessment of the site for conservation and management purposes which is a significant benefit in itself regardless of the outcome of bidding, however it can be expected to cost between £200-£250k in staff time and resources. The overall cost- From our research the overall cost of producing a bid which reaches the UNESCO committee for approval is estimated at between £420 and £570k.” PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Costs and Benefits of World Heritage, 11.
World Heritage list and second, the management and efficiency of policies oriented to preserve the characteristics for which the site was included in the list.293

There have been other scenarios where the assessment of a particular site that has already been accepted onto the World Heritage list formulated regression models to understand how (after a period of time) a World Heritage Site has impacted various sectors of the economy. The regression method is also used to assess the negative impact of the brand to the heritage site including decay, degradation, carrying capacity, looting, etc. The use of the above mentioned models is considered when assessing the impact of a UNESCO nomination in relation to features and physical changes of the site. One example of regression models includes changes in the qualitative and quantitative supply of tourist services (number of beds, jobs increase, etc.). This is measured by the level of satisfaction expressed by the visitor. Simply put, the regression method is conducted to ascertain the effect of a status change in the heritage site from an unrecognized area to one with an Outstanding Universal Value, as framed by UNESCO.

293 At this juncture, it is important to state that there are multiple techniques that can be utilized to understand the role of Cultural Heritage in the economy, and to explicate different perspectives in the definition of economic value. These methods have particular ways of assessing a value of heritage and its economic benefits. For example, one of the techniques mostly frequently used to address the tourist activity in heritage sites is the Input-Output Analysis. This method measures the changes in demand in diverse activities related to consumption of tourism, for example, services and products. The collection of data is commonly linked to the flow of visitors and expenditure per capita. The data-gathering technique is required to be direct via surveys and questionnaires. Since visits to heritage sites are often free of charge (urban walks, sightseeing, etc), buildings and historic archaeology have a lower return rate compared to other venues that have a management strategy: i.e. those that require fees, provide space rental, merchandising, patrons, goods and services. In the Input-Output Analysis, the definition of the territorial scope of the policy is difficult, as often it is not circumscribed to the heritage site but includes additional areas where commercial activities with a connection to heritage actually take place. In this case, the outcomes of an assessment require a broader perspective and data. This method tends to assess the economy in regional terms to find connections with the rest of the world and is often used to forecast the performance of the economy on a large scale.

Another procedure that has been used is the tourism satellite account, a technique that facilitates the recognition of tourism at the local, regional and national level. In short as stated by the World Tourism Organization (WTO): The purpose of a tourism satellite account is to analyze in detail all the aspects of demand for goods and services associated with the activity of visitors; to observe the operational interface with the supply of such goods and services within the economy; and to describe how this supply interacts with other economic activities. Although both have been used more frequently to highlight the heritage–tourism relationship, in the case of northern Cyprus the data required is simply not developed. In the case of Famagusta the data of economic performance is, as we have established earlier, still unclear. The concomitant relationship with Turkey prevents us from separating what corresponds to North Cyprus alone and what is subsidized, favored and financed by Turkey. In that context it is impossible to establish the linkage and relationships between different sectors of the economy and its connections with the rest of the world, in particular when North Cyprus is not a recognized territory.
Heritage, in this sense, is actually connected to the broader economic field. The indicators used to draw a picture of development projects linked to heritage assets are described in two ways: one is the direct impact in job creation (construction costs and labor of developing the site), and the other is composed by indicators with more complex relations such as funding (public & private) and the impact in sectors such as transportation, infrastructure, employment policies and the hospitality industry. Regression models produce data that can be used in a number of ways, since the technique assesses changes it also allows us to see the relationship between policy implementation and the effect in the industries involved in heritage development at the local, regional and national level. For North Cyprus this method would require reliable indicators and data, which are not available.

With a comprehensive CBA we can anticipate the viability of a policy or compare different policies and identify which has the highest benefit. In the case of heritage, a tailored CBA offers additional advantages such as the possibility to produce partial data to feed the analysis of singular ideas (projects, policies, actions) in realistic terms, without relying on institutional assessments that, for the condition of Famagusta, can increase the risk. In principle a CBA assesses costs and benefits, bringing the future (costs and benefits) to the present. Costs and benefits are measured using the “Willingness to Pay - WTP”294 model for the benefits and for the possibility of using an asset, i.e. a trade-off. Another way to determine the value is to identify the Willingness to Pay for NOT using a particular asset (for example development potential in a national park). In the case of urban areas, the nostalgia for abandoned plots of land only complicates heritage assessments and prevents the dynamics of change to occur. Such decisions have a cost that eventually one party or all need to subsidize, and urban regeneration becomes difficult to implement.

294 “In CBA, the value of an output is typically measured in terms of “willingness to pay.” Boardman et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 11.
The WTP needs to be assessed in the present as represented in the following formula:

\[ PV = \frac{P}{(1 + r)^t} \]

Present Value – PV.

P is the amount of money in the future.

r is an interest rate in a given time (months, years, etc.), also replaced by Social Discount Rate.

\( t \) is the number of periods of time (months, years, etc.).

In CBA, the viability of Famagusta is calculated by means of a straightforward financial ratio – the Net Present Value as represented by:

\[ NPV = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left( \frac{Benefit_t - Cost_t}{(1 + r)^t} \right) \]

Traditionally, CBA for World Heritage Sites is carried out to assess management strategies of the site, together with development initiatives that would eventually improve the economic performance of the site/locality. This activity requires detailed project planning. Since this is an activity that measures benefits in monetary terms, using Net Present Value is a useful tool for showing the benefits of

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295 This formula has been used for decades; its principle is to bring past or future monetary to the present in order to have a realistic assessment on costs of a particular project. An important caveat has to be noted here. The NPV only provides an estimate of a possible outcome.

296 For Boardman the rationale is as follows: “For a project that has impacts that occur over years, we need a way to aggregate the benefits and costs that arise in different years. In CBA, future benefits and costs are discounted relative to present benefits and costs in order to obtain their present values (PV).” Ibid., 12.

297 In Harrison the explanation is as follows: “The case for discounting future costs and benefits arises from opportunity costs. The cost of investing a dollar in a project is what it would have produced in its alternative use. Because invested capital is productive, an extra dollar invested today in the private sector will (on average) grow to more than a dollar tomorrow, a fact reflected in positive market interest rates. Tying up a dollar today in any project requires a return of more than a dollar tomorrow to ensure the project covers its costs and produces benefits greater than from leaving the money in the private sector.” (Mark Harrison, 2010) “Valuing the Future: the social discount rate in cost-benefit analysis.” Australian Government, Productivity Commission. 2010, accessed Feb 18, 2014.

298 Net Present Value is known as: the present value of future cash flows minus the present value of the cost of the investment.
individual projects, while the Internal Rate of Return\textsuperscript{299} can measure the accountability and sustainability of the project. As a benchmark in my calculation, I used the cost of preparation of a nomination dossier for UNESCO’s World Heritage list as the initial cost for a ten-year feasibility computation. The programme, as it is projected to ten years, will bear the cost of a managerial structure (including four professionals, tourist guides, administration staff, and infrastructure). On top of this, further costs involve a yearly investment in conservation/regeneration of heritage assets and consequently the maintenance of those conservation works. The benefits, broadly, are calculated from the WTP of the tourists multiplied by the percentage of the total number of tourists as determined by the Planning, Statistics and Research Department of the Tourism Planning Office.

5. Famagusta, Cyprus: a Tailored Survey of 1000 tourists

My argument is rooted in the necessity to demonstrate the feasibility of a management model designed for the site which can be implemented with or without the WHS listing, and which will have positive economic effects. The objective of this exercise is on one hand to provide a realistic scenario to assess the cost of the preparation of a nomination dossier as the valid pretext to enhance the discussion of the epistemology, framework and conceptualization of Cultural Heritage that impedes the rehabilitation of Famagusta at the global level. On the other hand, it draws attention to the feasibility of small initiatives which have an even greater economic impact than the World Heritage Site brand, designed under a more appropriate set of ethics than the politics and power involved in heritage, which have been so detrimental to Famagusta.

A nomination dossier for UNESCO consideration necessarily includes a management model and strategy to demonstrate the preservation of the so called Outstanding Universal Value of the site. If the dossier fails to gain acceptance into the World Heritage list, it can still be used as a programme or a policy, given the fact that

\textsuperscript{299} Internal rate of return is the rate at which the Net Present Value is = 0.
the implementation leads to the regeneration of the site (with or without UNESCO nomination). Assessing the costs and benefits of a nomination process for a site is linked to a number of factors. In economic terms a WHS has a deep relationship with the assessment of its non-use together with development restrictions (carrying capacity to accept tourist activities, etc.). Benefits most probably impact the tourist sector together with the businesses and services that support the sector (accommodation, restaurants, bars, and leisure activities). None of these activities can be possible unless there is a government/management structure that oversees that the characteristics for which the site was included in the World Heritage list remain present for future generations. Therefore, larger policy concerns need to be raised: infrastructure (airports, transportation systems, bus facilities, as well as water supply, sewer systems, garbage disposal, electricity, internet access and general sanitation standards).

The purpose of this study is to provide a funding strategy to rehabilitate Famagusta’s heritage site, and as such I will assume the opportunities for nomination are still valid. Some figures, especially relating to the cost, come from my previous experience as the Cultural Heritage Technical Specialist for the Study on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus 2010 (UNDP-PFF), and the survey conducted in-situ from May to August 2013. These figures are assumed to be based on informed assessment and evaluation of the current state of the heritage expressions in Famagusta. Two main tenets drive this assessment:

1. The Nomination Dossier will consider the design of a form of governance outside the current de facto institutions and will take the shape of a Private – Public – Partnership (PPP) to implement the walking tour as a 10-year programme. The objective of this is to produce an economic dynamic which rehabilitation, development and maintenance of heritage assets is achieved for at least at 40% of the sites that are considered as having heritage value in the historic core of Famagusta (including vernacular architecture, monumental structures, archaeological sites).
2. The data used in this exercise comes from the 2013 survey in-situ and will follow the logic used in the 2011 study carried out in the city of Valdivia in Chile by Andea Báez and Luis César Herrero, which I consider to have the least invasive and most feasible possibility to begin a regeneration process that requires limited investment, and goods and services only in historic data. This study is entitled: “Using contingent valuation and cost-benefit analysis to design a policy for restoring cultural heritage”.

To further understand the priorities I decided to divide Famagusta’s heritage items into three separate parts: 1) 240 vernacular buildings that are located within the fortification system, 2) the monumental structures of Famagusta that are dispersed within the historic core and need to be assessed independently, and 3) the fortification system. The policy in proposal is the establishment of a Walking Tour in Famagusta’s historic core.

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300 Báez and Herrero, Using contingent valuation and cost-benefit analysis to design a policy for restoring cultural heritage, 235.
301 The selection of the 240 buildings was carried out with my participation. This does not represent the outcome of a sound study of every building in the old core, its role in the urban context and in the evolution of the city, it had rather a different rationale: how negative can the impact of losing one particular example of architecture be in terms of scale, relationship between the public and the private spaces, color, texture, among others. When such selection is compared against land occupation (cadastral maps), it is possible to find patterns, repetition of volumes, shapes, spatial organizations, that yields relevance.
Figure No. 5

The walking tour around the old city is meant to provide additional on the characteristics that may shape Famagusta. One walking tour would not be sufficient to provide a full picture of the relevance of Famagusta, however a thematic approach can facilitate information on various aspects, for example: military architecture, dark history (death and conflict), Ottoman influences, the Crusades, Renaissance period, British period, World war II, among others. In addition, the interrelation between time and cultures with physical evidence in the same site offers the possibility of multiple narratives. See Annex A

Figure No. 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire No.</th>
<th>Gender: Age:</th>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>email:</th>
<th>Nation:</th>
<th>Before visit</th>
<th>After visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location sample:</td>
<td>Grupal: Names</td>
<td>e-mails</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Famagusta, Cyprus  Carlos Jaramillo  - PhD  - Nanyang Technological University - Singapore

How much money are you willing to spend in Famagusta’s historic core? What do you think is needed to attract a second visit to Famagusta?

WHS - How much are you willing to pay for a walking tour through the walled city, to tell you the historic tales of Famagusta?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Above 20 €</th>
<th>From 19 to 16 €</th>
<th>From 15 to 12 €</th>
<th>From 11 to 8 €</th>
<th>From 7 to 5 €</th>
<th>Under 5 €</th>
<th>Nothing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

WHS - How much more would you be willing to pay for the walking tour if Famagusta is listed as a World Heritage Site?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Above 20 €</th>
<th>From 19 to 16 €</th>
<th>From 15 to 12 €</th>
<th>From 11 to 8 €</th>
<th>From 7 to 5 €</th>
<th>Under 5 €</th>
<th>Nothing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Knowing that the fortification system (walls), is highly representative of European history, do you think your visit experience could be improved by:

Improving accessibility to the different parts of the walls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cannot be improved</th>
<th>Can be improved</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Int. Academic Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If there was accommodation available in Famagusta’s old town would you choose to stay in the historic core?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Notes:

Carlos Jaramillo  PhD  Nanyang Technological University  Supervised by:

Map downloaded from www.PlanetWare.com
In order to gather valid and up to date data for a credible CBA on Famagusta, I conducted a survey from May to August 2013. A total of 1025 questionnaires were distributed and a total of 1000 responses were valid. The questionnaire was divided into five different questions:

1) Respondent details including gender, age, name (optional), nationality, location of interview and whether it was done prior or after their visit Famagusta.

2) Tourist willingness to spend in Famagusta (in general); willingness to pay for a walking tour that will enhance their knowledge about Famagusta; and the increase (change) in the willingness to pay when/if Famagusta is listed as a World Heritage Site.

3) What Famagusta needs to attract a second visit.

4) Visiting experience at the fortifications of Famagusta and possible improvements.

5) Accommodation (within Famagusta’s historic core) preferences.

Identification, nationality and gender can eventually help in assessing data from the local institutions and the reliability in number of visitors established by North Cyprus. The intention of the value given to a walking tour is part of the CBA on the implementation of a policy for the preservation/development of the heritage site. The next section of the survey is dedicated to the fortification system, for a number of reasons. One, because it is a public good, as a public space that reflects the global impact of the site. two, it has high development potential, and therefore better prospects for financial sustainability. It is an independent system that has limited impact from other systems in the city (traffic, development, sanitation, electricity) and can be seen as a component of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage which can attract donors

303 Although the purpose of this study has very limited relation with gender, and tourist nationality, the account of these two aspects can be used to compare data from previous years and studies that utilize these aspects in the development of arguments in other disciplines, like tourism, hospitality, trade, etc.

304 In economic terms public goods are referred to goods that are non-rivalrous (air for example) and non-excludable (sunlight for example).
and investments and eventually test the argument of this thesis. The next section addresses the managerial condition of Famagusta and lays out different scenarios for the respondent to choose an option that could improve the heritage condition of the site. The last section asks for accommodation preference, in the event that the historic core of Famagusta would offer accommodation with international standards. Converting the walking tour to a permanent policy, I project the results of a survey in a ten year period and analyze the feasibility of this initiative as a permanent source of cash flow for heritage preservation, development, and maintenance.

Results are summarized in the following tables:

### Table No. 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price (In Euros)</th>
<th>Number of Respondents*</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 20</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>15.50%</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>432 – 513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 to 15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>540 – 675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 to 11</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>15.30%</td>
<td>1,224 – 1,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 7</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7.20%</td>
<td>360 – 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing/Indifferent</td>
<td>446/11</td>
<td>44.6%/1.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Willingness to Pay: Range**

6,020 – 6,839

**Willingness to Pay Mean:** 11.84

*Based on a survey with 1000 respondents

### Table No. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents Based on Gender (Total: 1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents Based on Age (Total: 1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table No. 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents Based on Nationality (Total: 1000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table No. 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned expenditure in Famagusta Historic Core (1000) during the visit</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 150 €</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-100 €</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-50 €</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 €</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 €</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness to Pay for WHS brand (1000)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 20</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-15</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. 1 reflects the Willingness to Pay for the walking tour. Approximately half of the respondents (55.4%) would give within a range of under €5 to above €20. The rest of the respondents claimed that either they were not willing to pay anything or they were simply indifferent to the question. Among those who were willing to pay, 155 said that they would pay above €20 for the walking tour.

Using the data of the survey, the total willingness of the tourists to pay, calculating by means of a straightforward assessment of the mean, is €11.84. Having defined the WTP of one thousand respondents on the cost (ticket) to access a walking tour in Famagusta’s heritage site, the next process was to estimate the costs of implementing such a project. A detailed account of the managerial structure will be discussed in the next chapter. What is important at this stage is to establish the cost of creating and maintaining such a management structure.
Table No. 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conservation</th>
<th>Maintenance</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Legal Fees</th>
<th>Publications</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,262,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,812,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,887,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,960,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,037,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,112,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>435,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,187,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,262,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>585,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,337,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,412,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Costs:** 31,272,750

The management costs relating to the project would be distributed in the following items: rehabilitation, maintenance, management, infrastructure, legal fees, and publications. The initial cost of the project in year zero (i.e. prior to the implementation of the policy) is €1,000,000, corresponding to the cost of the nomination dossier. Upon the implementation of the walking tour programme, the conservation costs would be increased to €2,000,000 and then to €2,500,000 in the subsequent years. Maintenance would start in the second year and account for 3% of the accumulated rehabilitation and development investment. The management structure is composed of professional staff, directorate, and administrative staff, legal costs, infrastructure and guides, and would have a yearly cost of €225,000. Infrastructure costs are fixed to €25,000 per year while the legal fees for setting up the programme, payable only once, is capped at €10,000. Finally, publication cost per year is set at €2,500. Summing up, the total costs for the programme in a ten-year assessment amounts to €31,272,750. As seen in the table, the sum of costs involved in the programme increases every year, particularly the maintenance aspect – which logically increases as more investment is directed towards conservation. At this point, it is important to note that for the purposes of establishing the feasibility of the project, I set
the cost side as constant while, in the subsequent segment, I provide three difference scenarios for the benefits calculation.

6. Framework

Going back to the key features of the survey results: i) 54.3% of the total respondents agreed on giving an economic value to Cultural Heritage as represented by the choice to take a walking tour that could enhance their knowledge of Famagusta, ii) the ‘willingness to pay’ mean amount offered for the walking tour was approximately €6. For the empirical application of this valuation, I then used the data from the Planning, Statistics and Research Department of the Tourism Planning Office\textsuperscript{305} which published the number of foreign visitors to the northern part of Cyprus in 2012, as registered at Erçan airport in North Cyprus: This total was 1,166,186 persons. The same agency gives a growth rate of visitors in comparison to 2011 of 14.4%. Using 50% of the total number of tourists in 2012 as a base for my computations, I now present three different scenarios of cost-benefit analysis. Visitors coming from the south of Cyprus by land represent less than 1% of the respondents of the \textit{in-situ} survey carried out in 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tourists Taken into Account</th>
<th>Total No. of Tourists (50%)</th>
<th>WTP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>583,093</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,498,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>641,402</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,848,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>705,542</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,233,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>776,096</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,656,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>853,706</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,122,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>939,077</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,634,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,032,985</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,197,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,136,284</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,817,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,249,912</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7,499,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,374,903</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,249,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Amount of Benefits:** 55,758,000

\*Scenario 1 takes into account 50% of tourists willing to pay 12 Euros for the walking tour

\textsuperscript{305} Copies of this data were provided by Prof. Dr. Osman M. Karatepe, faculty from the Faculty of Tourism, Eastern Mediterranean University.
Only 50% of the total number of tourists are assessed with an increase of 10% per year

The impact of an initiative such as the walking tour in the total of a project that oversees the integral rehabilitation of Famagusta’s Cultural heritage are as follows. The Willingness to Pay selected for the three scenarios (€12) had the intention to compare the impact of the change in visitors. Scenario 1, a conservative one is also the “best estimate”. The three scenarios are arbitrary selected, given the lack of realistic figures.

7. Scenario 1

The initial scenario takes into account the defined Willingness to Pay at €12 [increased from €6 stated in the preliminaries of this exercise] for the walking tour. I will use 50% of the total number of tourists given by the local agency\(^{306}\) (583,093) assuming that only half of the visitors to North Cyprus visit Famagusta’s historic core. I will apply 50% to the number of tourist. The tourists will grow at a rate of 10% per year (a conservative estimate since the recorded increase by the institution is at 14.1% from 2012 to 2013).\(^{307}\) As Table 8 indicates, at the end of the ten-year programme, the total benefit is valued at €55,758,000. The assessment of cost (using the summation from Table No. 7) and benefits is as follows:

The Cost-Benefit Analysis, using a Social Discount rate of 10% shows the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>SDR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,498,558</td>
<td>2,262,500</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1,123,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,848,412</td>
<td>2,812,500</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>856,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4,233,252</td>
<td>2,887,500</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1,011,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,656,576</td>
<td>2,960,250</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1,161,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,122,236</td>
<td>3,037,500</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1,294,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,634,462</td>
<td>3,112,500</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>1,424,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6,197,910</td>
<td>3,187,500</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1,543,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{306}\) Planning, Statistics and Research Department of the Tourism Planning Office of North Cyprus. Provided by Dr. Osman M. Karatepe, faculty at Eastern Mediterranean University.

\(^{307}\) The local agency established the growth rate of tourists as 14.1% from 2011 to 2012.
As mentioned, the Social Discount rate is employed to estimate the NPV\textsuperscript{308} of the programme. Using a rate of 10\%, within the range used by economists for developing nations and based on the calculation, Scenario No. 1 shows a positive Net Present Value (€24,485,250) at the end of the ten year period. The Cost-Benefit Coefficient is 2.27. Being a positive number it shows that the policy is feasible. The figures give feasibility to a potential policy that considers this scenario that is not conservative. In this scenario it is possible to increase costs adding more conservation/development area to be implemented yearly. The surplus of the NPV gives a margin to draw a more conservative scenario.

### 8. Scenario 2

To allow further testing, in this scenario I will maintain the total number of visitors (as in scenario 1) according to the statistics from the local agency as a starting point in year 1. I then take into account 25\% of the tourists, growing 10\% per year, willing to pay at least €12 for the walking tour. This time, it is a highly conservative approach in the populations subject to the assessment. The total benefits will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tourists taken into Account</th>
<th>Total No. of Tourists</th>
<th>WTP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>583,093</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,749,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>641,402</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,924,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>705,542</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,116,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>776,096</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,328,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>853,706</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,561,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>939,077</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,817,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1,032,985</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,098,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{308}NPV result shows a positive value and therefore a feasible policy.

*NPV result shows a positive value and therefore a feasible policy.*
As indicated, at the end of the ten-year implementation, the total benefits will reach €27,879,000. Assessing the viability, the Cost-Benefit Analysis using a Social Discount rate of 10% shows the following results:

### Table No. 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>SDR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,749,279</td>
<td>2,262,500</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-466,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,924,206</td>
<td>2,812,500</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>-734,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,116,626</td>
<td>2,887,500</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>-579,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,328,288</td>
<td>2,960,250</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>-432,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,561,118</td>
<td>3,037,500</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>-295,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,817,231</td>
<td>3,112,500</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>-166,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,098,955</td>
<td>3,187,500</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>-45,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,408,852</td>
<td>3,262,500</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>68,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,749,736</td>
<td>3,337,500</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>174,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4,124,709</td>
<td>3,412,500</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>273,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NPV:** -3,204,271

*NPV result shows a negative value and therefore a feasible policy.*

Scenario No. 2 shows a negative Net Present Value (-3,204,271.2), which indicates that benefits do not match costs and the policy is flawed. One simple reflection regarding this scenario is as follows: if the 2013 survey managed to interview 1000 people in one month (summer time), in one location in Famagusta (the main square), it is more likely that the total of tourists for 2013 was over the used figure (145,773). This corresponds to a portion (25% of the tourists, growing 10% per year, as stated in the scenario design). When drawing a potential scenario for economic analysis it is necessary to minimize risks. In the case of economics in North Cyprus, economic indicatives are unreliable and one of the key figures deals with tourist
services, revenues and of course visitors. Assuming a low rate of visitors reinforces the feasibility of a project such as the implementation of a walking tour. This scenario represents the floor of a potential policy that would include an action such as the walking tour as the main source of income therefore investment in regeneration, rehabilitation, and development of Famagusta’s heritage site. It does not prove the failure of the initiative; it merely sets the limits either for costs or benefits. A slight change on investment expectations during the ten year period of the project would increase the feasibility of this scenario, converting it into a positive NPV. Another reflection is that the expectations for the policy are higher than the costs; reassessments of investment capital on rehabilitation and development can change the figures into a positive outcome.

9. Scenario 3

In the next scenario, I will still maintain a conservative forecast. I will use only a percentage of the growth rate of tourists to be taken into account. Although according to the local agency the growth rate of 2012 was 14.1%, I will maintain the number of tourists as a starting point in year 1, and the same percentage for the following years. With the same willingness to pay €12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tourists taken into Account</th>
<th>Total No. of Tourists</th>
<th>WTP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>583,093</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,247,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>641,402</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,772,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>705,542</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,349,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>776,096</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6,984,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>853,706</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7,683,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>939,077</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8,451,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1,032,985</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9,296,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1,136,284</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10,226,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1,249,912</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11,249,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1,374,903</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12,374,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Amount of Benefits:** 83,637,000

*Scenario 3 takes into account 75% of the tourists per year who are willing to pay €12 Euros for the walking tour*
Results show that the total benefits after the ten-year policy will be €37,172,003. Applying this to the Cost-Benefit Analysis, using a Social Discount rate of 10% shows the following figures:

Table No. 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>SDR</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,247,837</td>
<td>2,262,500</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2,713,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5,247,837</td>
<td>2,812,500</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>2,446,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,349,878</td>
<td>2,887,500</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>2,603,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6,984,864</td>
<td>2,960,250</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>2,756,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7,683,354</td>
<td>3,037,500</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2,885,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8,451,693</td>
<td>3,112,500</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>3,016,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9,296,865</td>
<td>3,187,500</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>3,133,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10,226,556</td>
<td>3,262,500</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>3,254,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11,249,208</td>
<td>3,337,500</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>3,352,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12,374,127</td>
<td>3,412,500</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3,446,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NPV: 286,008,752

*NPV result shows a positive value and therefore a feasible policy.

Table No. 13 clearly shows that the forecast for all scenarios, which demonstrates the viability of the policy. At this point, it is important to note that beyond the figures stated here, the benefits of the project are beyond financial and can be represented by the rehabilitation of buildings, development of projects and partnerships whose objective includes the preservation of the heritage content of Famagusta’s assets. Furthermore, the impact on the economic dynamic, change in demands and transformation of markets is impossible to assess at this point given the conditions of Famagusta’s political and diplomatic scenario. Other aspects that might be considered as benefits correspond to the financing system as a start up action in co-funding rehabilitation costs as a partnership owner-PPP. The managerial format to drive this project will be explained in the following chapters, as well as the principles of financing and return of investments.
For the rehabilitation, maintenance, and development of those monumental structures that are iconic for Famagusta’s urbanscape, the proposal is to dedicate a percentage of the maintenance budget to permanently invest in those buildings and ruins that at this stage are difficult to assess, or to dedicate one month’s budget of investment annually for the purpose of preserving large-scale structures. A small and appropriate action towards prevention of further decay of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage supports a number of arguments. A Walking Tour to enhance tourism in Famagusta’s historic core has three points of potential:

1. A Walking Tour designed to offer instruction on Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage can finance between 40 and 100% of the cost of rehabilitation and development of the entire heritage site in a 10 year period, depending on the scenario designed for the implementation of this policy.

2. The Walking Tour, a politically correct action, non-invasive, not a burden and sustainable, opens the discussion of why UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, UNFICYP, UNDP-ACT or UNDP-PFF are incapable of or unwilling to carry out an effective and sustainable action outside the political domain.

3. The Walking Tour raises a management question that will have potential answers in the next chapter. The question is still valid: how can resources be channeled from public assets to private buildings, and how can the return from those investments improve the feasibility of Cultural Heritage development?

It is important to clarify that the proposed policy (walking tour) does not fail under any of the scenarios. It only sets the conditions under which the goals can be achieved. As stated before, benefits arising from Cultural Heritage rehabilitation are always greater than numbers. Scenario No. 1, best estimate, shows a positive NPV of €24,485,250, meaning that given a high number of tourists willing to pay a high price
for the walking tour, the possibility of regenerating the 46.72% of Famagusta’s heritage site (as the floor established from the beginning of the policy design process).

Scenario No. 2 shows a negative NPV (\(\text{€}-3,204,271.20\)) – this, the most conservative scenario which takes the lower number of tourists can only regenerate 40% approx.

Scenario No. 3, upper bound shows a capacity to increase the basic area coverage (46.72%) and increase to 99% of the total area of Famagusta’s heritage site). In summary Scenario 1 reached 46.72% of the total area, Scenario 2 the equivalent of 40%, and Scenario 3 99.00% of the area of study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>3,498,558</td>
<td>1,749,279</td>
<td>5,247,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>3,848,412</td>
<td>1,924,206</td>
<td>5,772,618</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>4,233,252</td>
<td>2,116,626</td>
<td>6,349,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4</td>
<td>4,656,576</td>
<td>2,328,288</td>
<td>6,984,864</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 5</td>
<td>5,122,236</td>
<td>2,561,118</td>
<td>7,683,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6</td>
<td>5,634,462</td>
<td>2,817,231</td>
<td>8,451,693</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 7</td>
<td>6,197,910</td>
<td>3,098,955</td>
<td>9,296,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 8</td>
<td>6,817,704</td>
<td>3,408,852</td>
<td>10,226,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 9</td>
<td>7,499,472</td>
<td>3,749,736</td>
<td>11,249,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 10</td>
<td>8,249,903</td>
<td>4,124,709</td>
<td>12,374,127</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Benefits:</strong></td>
<td>55,758,000</td>
<td>27,879,000</td>
<td>83,637,000</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>25,500,000</td>
<td>25,500,000</td>
<td>25,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>3,240,000</td>
<td>3,240,000</td>
<td>3,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Fees</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>22,750</td>
<td>22,750</td>
<td>22,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Costs:</strong></td>
<td>31,272,750</td>
<td>31,272,750</td>
<td>31,272,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NPV                        | 24,485,250 | -3,204,271.2 | 52,364,250 |

10. **World Heritage Site: a brand with economic value, Famagusta’s case**

As part of the survey, respondents that agreed on giving a price to the walking tour were asked how much more they would be willing to pay in the event Famagusta is listed as a World Heritage Site as it is (given examples of other sites that have been
listed such as Istanbul, Venice or Paris) showing them the logo that appears in the questionnaire sheet (see Figure 6) for the same walking tour. 32.05% of the tourists were willing to pay over €20. The second highest category was 25.09% with a price between €8 and €11. The remaining 42.89% were divided between the remaining options. The mean price given to the WHS brand was €12.74. The rehabilitation process was not included in the questionnaire in order to maintain the tourist experience as it is. The fact that the question is attached to the Willingness To Pay (saying how much more are you willing to pay in the case that Famagusta is listed as a World Heritage Site) reflects that the World Heritage Site status (attached to the logo) is known as a positive characteristic of a heritage site. Although this cannot be taken as an economic analysis in itself it shows a tendency that is evident in the change in the price for an activity connected to Cultural Heritage watching.

A practical way of measuring the impact of the World Heritage Site label is to add the mean price to the calculation of Net Present Value in each scenario. The impact of the WHS label to this particular activity (walking tour) adds positive results in all three scenarios with an interesting characteristic: the WHS label shows better impact in conservative scenarios where account of tourists and Willingness to Pay are low. This conclusion reinforces the pertinence of policies framed by full control of costs, benefits and implementation. The behavior of these proposed scenarios for other activities where the control in the flow of money (e.g. taxation) are planned to take a route through bureaucratic structures and limited spillovers on a particular activity, is more difficult to establish.309

309 As it will be mentioned in the Porto case study and the references to Havana (in chapter V), control over different components of the urban life improves the feasibility of regeneration processes.
The main strength of this project is the value given to the Social Discount Rate,\textsuperscript{310} which has been agreed in economics (as expressed by Mark E. Moore, Anthony E. Boardman, Aidan R. Vining, David L. Weimer and David H. Greenberg) to be in the range of 3.5%. In a decision to give a more conservative view to the argument I modify the conditions by raising it to 10%. In total the benefit arising from this operation is 46.72% of the cost of rehabilitating Famagusta’s heritage site.

Regarding the impact the figures arising from the previous analysis I will now present an estimate based on my personal experience in the field of conservation and my time in Cyprus. The estimate intends to quantify average costs of construction for reparation of old structures, materials and labour. Subsequently I will the use the figures from the three scenarios to draw a general perspective of the financial impact the walking tour can have in rehabilitating 240 buildings that correspond to vernacular buildings privately owned.

A general review of the site and its structures that have heritage relevance shows 240 heritage buildings approximately, at an average area of 700 m\textsuperscript{2} each, and rehabilitation costs of €300 per 1m\textsuperscript{2}, shows gross cost of a rehabilitation project for Famagusta of €50,400,000. From a different perspective, for the fortification system a regeneration action can be conceived with a gross cost of €2,000,000. The total cost of taking up a regeneration project in Famagusta can therefore be established at around €52,400,000. The monumental structures of Famagusta such as ruins, churches, mosques, shrines and other buildings/ruins from institutional, civil and religious backgrounds are more complex to assess given the singularity of each one of them. For those, a percentage of yearly investment needs to be established. For scenario 1, the performance which restoration activity will regenerate is 46.72% of Famagusta’s

\textsuperscript{310} On a more theoretical view: “The key issue in determining the real social discount rate is deciding the weights society should apply to costs and benefits that occur in future time periods relative to the current period” Mark A. Moore, (2004) “Just Give Me a Number!” Practical Values for the Social Discount rate,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 23 no.4 (2004): 791. From the same authors: “For most projects, those whose main impact occur within 50 years and whose financing does not crowd out investment, we recommend a discount rate of 3.5 percent.” Ibid., 809.
heritage assets. For scenario 2, the total area that can be regenerated is: 53.20%. For scenario 3, the area that can be regenerated is 99%.

The previous analysis gives an account of a number of aspects that for various reasons have become a serious impediment in Famagusta’s rehabilitation of its heritage area. It has set an idea outside the political context, as a non-invasive initiative to trigger a sustainable process where sites of all nature (public, private, religious buildings, archaeological sites, public space, and walls, among others) have the possibility to improve their feasibility as cultural heritage through participation in a regeneration programme. This programme takes into account the current visitors to Famagusta as the main source for funding, and their Willingness to Pay as the main source of data in the preparation of the Cost-Benefit Analysis of the programme. This idea also links together the memories that are present in Famagusta and its urban setting, to open the possibility of multiple narratives, including those from victims and perpetrators, throughout Famagusta’s history.

The next and last chapter reflects on the management model that can effectively carry out such a programme not only from the perspective of the heritage component of Famagusta, but also the implementation of a Transitional Justice process where ideas of justice and fairness apply not only to the physicality of the assets heritage, but also the memories of the victims of Human Rights violations.
Chapter V
Famagusta: a Pilot Project for Cyprus’ Transitional Justice Process
1. An introduction

In 1990, the Municipality of Bogota in Colombia, a country that has been plagued with over 50 years of internal conflict, initiated the process of preparing a Master Plan called the Acuerdo 6. The document was a set of strategic urban development plans intended to be discussed and deliberated by the City Council. I was actively engaged in preparing data on heritage areas and heritage items located in Bogota. The underlying principle of the approach was that heritage should be formulated in terms of a regulation system meant to frame any intervention, conservation, and development plan linked to heritage sites within the city. The approach to heritage implemented the principles established by the conservation sector (suggesting that the principles were mainly coming from the central governmental level) and the international organizations (UNESCO – ICOMOS) on preservation of Cultural Heritage. The process of determining how international scholarship and policy should be implemented in a city of around five million people (based on the 1993 census) relied on a predominantly legalistic vision. This reflected how decision making on urban Cultural Heritage had to be aligned with the planning system and instruments that the city had created. The conclusion of four months of inspecting urban and natural areas, buildings, public spaces, structures, emblematic sites, urban archaeology and compounds from different backgrounds that represent the history in Bogota, was overwhelmingly complex. The peculiarity of each and every heritage site made it very difficult to frame all of them into a singular tailored and standard model for intervention that suited the legal framework of the “Acuerdo 6”. It was clear, at least to me, that the preservation of heritage assets needed an alternative outlook to accommodate the dynamics of the city – the kind of dynamics, ironically, that traditionally lead to destruction of heritage.

Twenty two years later, I was asked to adapt a new planning instrument – again – formulated at the central government level, to assess, plan, and preserve
heritage items, called Bienes de Interés Cultural\textsuperscript{311} (BIC), located in Bogota. The instrument was called Planes Especiales de Manejo y Protección\textsuperscript{312} (PEMP), and was designed to recognize the unique features of each heritage site and to facilitate integration into its surroundings, not only physically but within its legal framework, such as the planning system, traffic, and infrastructure, among others. By 2012, Bogota had listed approximately 4900 BICs located in conservation areas, parks, and rural areas. Most of them are privately owned and exhibit signs of deterioration. The city and its governmental institutions, it is clear, have been ineffective in executing a clear political, economic and conceptual setting to carry out the mandate given to them by The Constitution (that is, to preserve the Cultural Heritage of the city of Bogota). This is primarily, though not exclusively, because of the conflict between the concept of merely conserving heritage and the imperative to integrate spaces for urban development. Moreover, the city itself is diverse and to a certain extent problematic having suffered dire consequences of war (e.g. Internal Displaced People, rootlessness, or abandonment). Moreover, the disconnection that has traditionally placed the conservationists at one end of the spectrum and developers on the opposite end has limited the feasibility of actions to integrate Cultural Heritage as a component capable of interacting with an urban settlement, alongside social inclusion, economy, human rights, development and culture. The gap between these two efforts is huge and yet both tell us one thing: that most communities must respond to the rigidity under which Cultural Heritage has been framed and the limited capacity of the Cultural Heritage sector to interact in an effectively manner with its counterparts in production and administration. Cultural Heritage has been difficult to measure, assess, and frame in every sense, be it in financial, social and / or historic terms. These constraints have led this sector toward an uncertain and unclear future.

\textsuperscript{311} Goods of Cultural Interest –translation by the author.
\textsuperscript{312} Special Management Protection Plans –translation by the author.
Broadly, the current chapter responds to these difficulties by presenting an alternative framework for Cultural Heritage, focusing once again on Cyprus: a formula that can facilitate the implementation of Famagusta as a pilot project for Transitional Justice, and yet has potential applications in other conflict-heavy settings, such as Colombia. The connection established between Cultural Heritage and Transitional Justice is one that I have discussed throughout this work. Transitional Justice offers a framework for Cultural Heritage under a set of ethics that are not feasible, in territories that are contested, since nationality, identity and ownership is changing. Transitional Justice sets the conditions for heritage practitioners to address the aspects relevant to the recent history in an ongoing process that still has not agreed on its narratives, therefore difficult to frame under the current definitions of heritage.

This chapter will analyze the participation of representatives in Cyprus from both communities (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) in what is known as the Bi-communal Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus. The Committee resembles the Reconstruction Implementation Commission (RIC) established by the Council of Europe in 2005 in Kosovo. The examples drawn from these two experiences (RIC and the Bi-communal Committee) show the limitations arising from this analysis, and suggests how Transitional Justice can offer a potential solution to it, not only in dealing with the heritage elements in question but also in providing a sustainable approach. I will elaborate on the concept of Public-Private Partnership as a ‘Third Way’ out of Famagusta’s complicated setting. I argue that the formation of PPP for Cultural Heritage in Famagusta is a valuable and feasible means of putting the political issues to one side and concentrating on the possibilities of incorporating Famagusta’s heritage within the wider society in terms of development.
2. The Reconstruction Implementation Commission – RIC in Kosovo and the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus

As mentioned in the introduction to this study, my responsibilities as the Cultural Heritage Technical Expert for UNDP-PFF in 2010 exposed me to similar conditions as I had experience in 2005 in Kosovo: the political weight that Cultural Heritage had during status talks in Kosovo, together with the events in 2004 when a number of houses and churches from the Serbian community living in Kosovo were burned and looted, people were killed and disappeared. The events framed a political initiative. The formation of a multilateral group to facilitate an expression of good will from the de facto government in Kosovo in recognizing, respecting and protecting the heritage linked to the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Kosovo Serb population living in Kosovo, was an important sign for status definition (a process that began in 2007, which up to date has gained the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by 108 UN member states).

The experience in Kosovo was preceded by the Balkan War in the 1990s and the formation of a number of new countries throughout the region with the presence of a wider a number of ethnicities such as Romas, Egyptians, Bosniaks, Croats, Albanians, and Serbs, among others, that reshaped the political scenario of Eastern Europe. The events from 2004 in Kosovo (also known as the 2004 Kosovo riots) lead to the formation of a technical committee to assess the damages. This body was formed by the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), and the Serbian Orthodox Church. The provisional government of Kosovo then pledged seven million Euros for a programme to secure a number of sites linked to the Serbian community in Kosovo. An Implementation Committee followed by a Memorandum of Understanding was set with the participation of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). The Committee failed due to the withdrawal
of the Serbian Orthodox Church and a Reconstruction Implementation Commission. RIC was then proposed in 2005, followed by a second Memorandum of Understanding to seek a compromise between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Kosovo institutions in the reconstruction of selected religious sites. Together with the RIC an international expert board was designed to endorse the technical aspects of the programme.

The RIC is a political commission headed by the Council of Europe, with the participation of main partners such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Institute for the Protection of Monuments (Serbia), the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (Kosovo) and the Institute for the Protection of Monuments (Kosovo). The RIC Technical Unit is financed and controlled by the Council of Europe and the European Commission, and has responsibility over the financial and technical aspects of the reconstruction of the buildings. Additional aspects such as capacity building, and training are provided by additional partners in the region.

A similar structure has been created in Cyprus in the form of a Bi-communal Committee on Cultural Heritage created in 2008. Resources from the European Commission have been pledged to support the work on a number of buildings mainly located in North Cyprus.

The situation in Cyprus, in common with the experience in Kosovo, reflects the political implications of Cultural Heritage its recognition of North Cyprus as an independent state, and the recognition of a religious community as an important stakeholder (in Cyprus this is the Cypriot Orthodox Church, in Kosovo it is the Serbian Orthodox Church). Further, a scenario of divided communities (Christians and Muslims) shapes the context of work in Cultural Heritage in Cyprus as well as in the Balkans. The deductions from my experience in both regions let me recognize the similarities as well as the differences that link both experiences. There are five main differences: 1) The institutions in Kosovo committed important resources to the work on Cultural Heritage from all backgrounds but especially Orthodox buildings. In
Cyprus, in contrast, the governmental institutions (from both sides of the island) have failed to engage with resources, this has instead been carried out by the Bi-communal Committee on Cultural Heritage, with resources from the European Commission. 2) In the Cyprus case the presence of Turkish nationals, Turkish military forces, and the continued occupation of areas of North Cyprus turns Turkey into an important stakeholder that has not been included in the work on Cultural Heritage; 3) Unlike Kosovo, the technical aspects of the work have not been detached from the political implications of Cultural Heritage; rather, Cyprus emphasizes Cultural Heritage by prioritizing sites that are either neutral in terms of ethnic and religious connections or have strong ethnic backgrounds rather than technical aspects (such as significance and features); 4) The technical aspects of the work is not assessed or endorsed by an independent expert outside the conflict. A final difference between the scenarios is that the Council of Europe and the Technical Co-operation and Consultancy Programme, together with the Regional Programme in Southeast Europe and its Local Development Pilot Projects, intend to link heritage development among regions and countries that share features, landscapes and customs. The characteristics shared by neighbouring countries have been addressed through transnational projects to boost the economy of developing areas; this represents an approach to the issues arising from conflict and through post-conflict that guarantees the accuracy of mechanisms, involvement and results, while in Cyprus the approach is still embryonic.

The most important aspect that both experiences share is the commitment of to public buildings, which are either owned by the Orthodox Church (Cypriot or Serbian) or by institutions, or are public. This is crucial to what I have argued throughout this study: public resources, either coming from European institutions, donors, NGOs, or any other form of funding, are pledged not to favor individuals. Internal or external resources can ONLY be invested in public assets, detached from profitability, commercial ownership or individual benefit. So, one question remains. How are the
approximately 240 privately owned buildings that constitute the majority of heritage assets in Famagusta to be rehabilitated? These buildings represent over 90% of Famagusta?

The exercise in Kosovo, as well as the one currently happening in Cyprus, has as many values as it has limitations. However, further reflection is needed to align with the principle that Cultural Heritage is concerned, not only with great visual structures and buildings as representatives of a society, but with places like kitchens, dormitories, courtyards, shops, and butcheries, where people have spent most of their time throughout history. Great structures are the consequence of wealth, vision, or simply the need not to be forgotten; this is less an expression of society than of its leaders. Kosovo, as well as Cyprus, will eventually need to face the fact that a community that is unable to stand on its own principles concerning memories embedded in Cultural Heritage, and commit to rehabilitation and development in relation to those principles, is a community that is not clear on what, if any type of society it wants to be. Principles are crafted by politicians or politics, they are crafted by regular people, and these principles work their way up to society’s representatives, not vice versa. One of the features that differentiates this study from the work of international organizations is precisely the way in which it fills the gap caused by the dead ends left throughout time by the top-down doctrine on Cultural Heritage. This work targets that greater segment of the Cultural Heritage sector, represented by vernacular architecture, urban and rural landscapes, and any other expression that lies in private hands, and from which it is possible to recover the memories that characterize a particular community. These expressions often lie outside the scope of multilateral banking support, institutional representation, financial conditions or even basic public services such as running water, sewerage or electricity, which constitute the heritage area of Famagusta.

We must understand that laudable endeavours of institutions like RIC in Kosovo or the Bi-communal Committee in Cultural Heritage in Cyprus are by their
nature limited, and by no means represent an answer to the problem of Cultural Heritage management, in either country. To understand this dead end it is necessary to go back and examine once again core documents and their relationship to the events of 1974.

3. The controversy in Cultural Heritage Management

In 1945, UNESCO was established to provide a platform for various stakeholders to discuss pertinent issues and promote peace, grounded on the notion of a shared humanity and morality. UNESCO works on the premise of a four-pronged strategy to guarantee education, protect heritage sites, promote international scientific collaboration, and secure freedom of expression. Moreover, UNESCO functions on the premise of global values as well as the principles of human rights. Within these parameters, the preservation and management of Cultural Heritage and historical monuments were elevated to debates on universal values, national ownership, and global management. The establishment of UNESCO and its commitment to intercultural discussions and Cultural Heritage preservation was, I surmise, a defining moment in that it acted as the leading global agency responsible for, identifying Cultural Heritage expressions, with the support of the structure of the UN. The framework established a way for countries to openly dismiss expressions aimed at the construction of nationhood by non-state entities; it also recognized by creating this framework, the expressions that are collectively agreed on. The framework therefore dismisses (for example) Cultural Heritage of minorities, and benefits the heritage sites with Outstanding Universal Value which belong to member-states. UNESCO also

313 From this moment on, the scholarship related to Cultural Heritage and its expressions of relevance to the world is intrinsic to the newly formed system of nations. Since UNESCO is an organization composed by state-members, the political character of the organization as well as its involvement in Cultural Heritage is highly politicized. See: Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization accessed March 29, 2014, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002161/216192e.pdf#page=7.

began the process of clearly stating or defining the matrix of universal values, all of which seems very positive. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the present study interrogates the framework formulated by UNESCO, and argues that while UNESCO has been successful in promoting the preservation of many World Heritage Sites, the current framework does not sufficiently take into consideration areas that are under or have undergone a series of political conflicts, and does not provide tools for Sustainable Development in such delicate settings where some Cultural Heritage stands. To such contested territories, or as I argue, the communities in transition, Famagusta belongs. Even at this stage, UNESCO’s framework on Cultural Heritage pays no heed to disputed cases like Famagusta, which continues to be laden with confounding identities and a plethora of political concerns. And yet despite the impasse in definition, recognition, and identification Famagusta’s quintessence, amidst the spectre of its political and social decay, is undeniable.

As UNESCO prompted the institutionalization of World Heritage Sites, the political, economic, and socio-cultural impacts of Cultural Heritage management became evident. For instance, tourism followed and commercial endeavours escalated. This serious economic effect and the complexity of assessing heritage sites arising from the World Heritage Convention (1972) forced UNESCO and its main consultant organization, ICOMOS, to articulate a set of criteria or guidelines for the nomination process of World Heritage Sites. What is now called Outstanding Universal Value is, in fact, an effort to regulate the diversity of heritage sites that still remain around the world (though this only applies to include nations which are a part of the current UN system). In due course, additional components of heritage sites were acknowledged

315 Blake explains an additional connection to universal heritage: “This reference to ‘universal heritage’ brings into the equation a further characterisation of cultural heritage as the “common heritage of mankind” (CHM), placing it alongside a broader category of non-renewable resources.” Blake, On Defining Cultural Heritage, 68.

– drawn by the publicity and highly specialised types of tourism which were a direct
effect of World Heritage Site inscription. This trend eventually produced the first
scientific document on cultural tourism in 1999.\textsuperscript{317}

Since Cyprus is in the immediate region of Europe (and accepted into the
European Union in 2004), let me now focus on the regional efforts within Europe that
are concerned with heritage management. In 1954, the European Cultural
Convention\textsuperscript{318} was initiated to encourage intercultural dialogue and the appreciation of
cultural diversity among the people of Europe. The convention served as one of the
foremost undertakings within Europe to ensure that European culture, juxtaposed with
national cultural production, was protected. This, I maintain, is significant, as it
established the structure within which issues that concern Cultural Heritage could be
negotiated, discussed, and, if possible, resolved. The case of Famagusta in the context
of the European\textsuperscript{319} dialogue on Cultural Heritage then becomes highly problematic, for
although the immediate milieu of the island remains European, any effort coming from
regional organizations or conventions on the dilemma in Famagusta is dependent on
political and bureaucratic agreements between the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of
Turkey, and other European states (and indeed in the Council of Europe, where Turkey
has a seat). These countries have their own polarised political positions regarding
potential contested territories throughout Europe, not least on Cyprus itself. Given this
political complexity, a solution on the Cyprus issue on Cultural Heritage located in the
northern part of the island needs to be examined in the light of 40 years of its ‘illegal

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{317} The ICOMOS International Cultural Tourism Charter was adopted by the ICOMOS 12th General
\item \textsuperscript{319} An attempt to draft a Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property was open for signature in
1985, since then only three member-states have signed and it is currently open for non-member-states. For
more information on the Balkan issue see: John E. Tunbridge and Gregory John Ashworth, (1996)
\end{itemize}
status’ and the future projected into a transitional scheme where the international community has more ability to interact. More than one generation has lived with no recognition, and this has resulted in an erosion or disorientation of identity, nationality, belonging, ownership, and even the sense of community. So too, the general relationship between inhabitants and their physical environment is not framed under any of the analysed conventions, charters or agreements existing at the regional level, or the international system of nations.

From my experience and also from a perspective that recognises heritage as a summation of intricate layers of times and peoples that shaped what we see and acknowledge as heritage, it is difficult to accept the urge to prevent the natural evolution of cultural sites and diminish the development character that is inherent to any particular site (with or without cultural content). I maintain that even Cultural Heritage has an evolving and transforming spirit – as it changes with time, history, and society. This does take away the genuine essence of the place, but rather acknowledges that the process by which Cultural Heritage is defined is always grounded on a complex web of subjectivity, constructions, and abstractions.

Famagusta has also radically changed over time. Its collective essence – its historical value as a living witness to the past – endures, but the walls themselves are subjected to developments as each layer of people and as the vestige of time do their part in transferring their respective cultures. My point is, Famagusta has developed, is developing, and I see no reason why it cannot be further developed, preserved, and managed in order to save a fragment of the memory of humanity.

In 2006, a Revitalization Plan endorsed and financed by the EU was prepared for the Walled City of Famagusta. Although its limitations, assessment and inapplicability are beyond the scope of this study, it reflected the vision of Cultural

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320 Ertan Öztek et al., Famagusta Walled City Revitalization Plan – Executive Summary (Nicosia: UNDP-PFF, 2006).
Heritage as a conservation process, which I have argued, is a small portion of a regeneration process. Contemporary approaches to Cultural Heritage adapted to Famagusta would necessarily require the design of a vision that recognises the difficulties which historically have accompanied Famagusta. The formulation would need to be realistic in presenting a sound strategy to prevent further decay, acknowledging the limited technical capacity of its local organizations coping with its political situation and finally, over-riding the lack of will of the local stakeholders to act in favour of Famagusta. When analyzing the Master Plan (2006) with The Walled City of Famagusta: A Framework for Urban Conservation and Regeneration (2012)\(^{321}\) the similarities are striking. Two assessments, one from 2006 and the other from 2012, with similar spirit, intention and set of presumptions, speak of the need for heritage sites to accommodate their conditions to the current doctrine, as if doctrine is what matters above heritage.

I have chosen to highlight the interwoven nature of Cultural Heritage as the result of political will that facilitates urban regeneration through the recognition of heritage as part of wider systems that rules the urban context, by which I mean a government. It can be argued that North Cyprus is a democracy, with free and fair elections; Famagusta has a mayor, a city council, and can exercise its mandate. But does the regeneration of Famagusta follow a vision? The decisions over the heritage, urban space, and communities require long-term commitments, and that is precisely what Famagusta lacks. Is Famagusta a city which will be dependent on tourism? Is Famagusta anticipated to become a university city? Is it a city that envisages an open relationship with the neighbouring port (currently industrial/high security zone)? Or, what would Famagusta be like if it became a casino town? Those are the kinds of considerations that have a direct impact on its revitalization, its investment, its policy

design, and taxation, among others. Those are the aspects that the above-mentioned report misses. Vagueness such as: “A city with increased livelihood fed by suitable functions”,\(^{322}\) or “A city, which has managed to utilize these features and turn them into profits in the fields of tourism, culture and economy”,\(^{323}\) or “An orderly city; living area, life style and life conditions of which have been defined and determined”,\(^{324}\) or “A city; where there is sensitivity towards how its hinterland is being shaped and the shape it will take in the future”, can feed the rhetoric of international publications; however, institutions that heavily invest in urban regeneration (such as the World Bank) would have difficulties recognising them as technical proposals, unless supported by figures.\(^{325}\)

### 4. Sustainable Development and Transitional Justice for Heritage

The limitations of current doctrine on Cultural Heritage, as I have discussed in Chapter 1, creates a real risk of losing important pieces of memories, that are vital in Cultural Heritage definition. For the purpose of this analysis, I shall point out two crucial observations that, I maintain, have an impact in our evolving notion of heritage. These two principles, I argue, are imperative in formulating an effective management strategy for Famagusta.

I propose a management structure for Famagusta as a Pilot Project for Transitional Justice in Cyprus that rests on Sustainable Development. On the one hand, the idea of sustainability shifts culture and Cultural Heritage to become part of development processes where it becomes an indicator of wellbeing, instead of a material culture that needs to be protected from the impact of urban development. On the other hand, a Transitional Justice legal framework allows us to address Cultural

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\(^{322}\) Ertan Öztekin et al., Famagusta Walled City Revitalization Plan, 8.
\(^{323}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{324}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{325}\) To understand how these positions have been supported by international scholars see the publications by Naciye Doratli and Randall Mason on Famagusta.
Heritage as a component of fluid memories. In the case of post-conflict territories it is necessarily connected to historical dialogue, past violence, conflict resolution, society’s effort to preserve memory, and cultural rights as a human right that need to be secured in post-conflict territories. Once viewed through the lens of Sustainable Development and the framework of Transitional Justice, Cultural Heritage can be more adaptable, regenerative, and relevant to the rapidly changing nature of urban development.

Following the 1992 *UN Conference on Environment and Development* held in Rio de Janeiro, a non-binding document on Sustainable Development called Agenda 21 was launched.\(^{326}\) In this document, culture was identified as the fourth pillar for sustainable development.\(^{327}\) This gives the heritage sector a major responsibility in connection with aspects previously absent from cultural discourse: human rights, governance, sustainability and territory, social inclusion and economics. This shift in perspective on Cultural Heritage from one that is disconnected from the rest of practical social dimensions to one that is inevitably connected to human rights and cultural rights indubitably opened a new path of discussions about the relationship between heritage and society, and therefore to statehood, governance and accountability. These discussions form the main thrust of this chapter.\(^{328}\)

Re-framing Famagusta to re-examine it through lens distinct from the one that for forty years has rendered vision impossible (the indivisible relationship between politics, the international system of nations and Cultural Heritage), requires a fundamental modification in the way issues are addressed, indicators are measured, and implementation is designed. The sustainability of this approach lay on the fact that it

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does not rely in the functioning of a form of government (North Cyprus form of government has proven to be ineffective towards Cultural Heritage). Also it does not rely on potential recognition by the international community of nations, as it does not consider any emblematic national discourse, sense of identity, and recognises transitional forms of law to address ownership. And above all, this approach targets the preservation of vernacular expressions of Cultural Heritage that are not public assets, which are the least feasible assets of the heritage sector, a responsibility of private owners. In short, this approach tackles the dead ends of Cultural Heritage seen as a feature that reflects the past, and not one that transforms itself during our time as well.

5. From Cultural Heritage Protection to Cultural Heritage Development

In 2011, ICOMOS released a Declaration of the Symposium in which the member states reinforced a vision of Cultural Heritage in harmony with development.\(^{329}\) In this vision, the role of ‘heritage site’ was reformulated from the aesthetic perspective to a more dynamic approach that allowed for the harmonization of heritage sites together with urban management/development designs. This pragmatic approach recognized the significance of heritage-based economics attached to heritage for the first time. Performance indicators of heritage in relation to Sustainable Development and investment were identified, expressing a more realistic estimate of the costs and benefits of heritage regeneration specifically located within urban settlements, where economic developments grow rapidly each year.

As I have stated before, Cultural Heritage has changed from a preservation discourse to one that is considered as a planning and development component of cities. From this perspective, heritage is not detached anymore from its surroundings. It is seen as linked to, and having a capacity to interact with, infrastructures, traffic systems,

and sanitation networks, to name but a few. When shifting from a mere ‘preservation’
approach to one that is focused on using heritage as a part of planning and
development, it is necessary to also understand that planning and management
activities not only require a vision, but a permanent assessment and monitoring of the
different dynamics within an urban settlement. When thinking about Cultural Heritage
as an integral part of a planning vision of a city, the importance of Cultural Heritage
needs to be fine tuned and subjected to the general wellbeing of the population and
each community in it. Those connections are generally established through heritage
management frameworks.

At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that despite the complexity and the
volatility of formulating a management framework for Famagusta, there are a few
considerations that can, in point of fact, be appropriate for its context. What is crucial
to understand is that Famagusta’s heritage can be managed well when heritage itself is
linked to the other components of the society such as economics. Since the connection
between Transitional Justice, Cultural Heritage, and Sustainable Development has not
been established or implemented, and there are very limited experiences of Cultural
Heritage being sustainably developed, I suggest that Famagusta be approached using
the planning management methods implemented in Porto, Portugal (legislative
instruments and taxation) and Havana, Cuba (financial sustainability). These two
models are important as they provide a paradigm in which heritage is incorporated into
the wider economic and societal instruments, giving heritage a boost and a means to
regenerate in a sustainable manner. The effect of the application of Transitional Justice
is the acknowledgement of the memories that have been traditionally dismissed and the
creation of means for its memorialisation. To summarize: Transitional Justice offers
the platform for addressing Cultural Heritage (the official and the contested) and
Sustainable Development gives the tools for eventually guaranteeing its permanence
throughout time.
5.1 Bridging the Gap between Heritage and Development: the Porto and Havana Management Frameworks

The formulation and innovations in global heritage management frameworks have all been influenced by, and predicated on, the rapid development of cities and urban settlements. The force of migration, both internal and external, juxtaposed with efforts to create commercial and industrial zones as a part of national development plans, has altered the landscape within which heritage is located. Although urban degradation is an inevitable result of massive migration, as is urban growth and change in land uses and activities, Cultural Heritage has traditionally maintained a static approach which simply restores value to what it was before the degradation began. In short, the aim is merely to preserve what it is, as it was. The case of Porto and Havana are different as they targeted the dynamics of urban life for the benefit of heritage assets. Using a legal framework that allowed a managerial structure to participate in the public and private components of heritage, the two models were able to achieve what I deem as a strange, yet necessary, balance between the social aspect of regeneration and the economic and development capacity of heritage.

Porto is a city by the Douro River located in Portugal. In 1996, UNESCO added Porto to the World Heritage list and in 2004, a management body called Porto Vivo, SRU, was officially created to develop a model for the rehabilitation of Porto’s UNESCO listed historic centre. What is unique about this framework is the establishment of the bridge between heritage and urban development implemented by hybrid organizations accountable to the public. “The agency played a critical role in the redevelopment of the city because its responsibility covers the collection of urban taxes, the definition of incentives and compensation, and the sale, demolition, renting and rehabilitation of the historic building stock. These activities are always carried out
in co-operation and in formal partnerships with the private sector.” Porto’s Master Plan comprises five pillars that encapsulate all areas and fields involved in the historic core: Heritage, Community, Tourism, Creative Industries and the Douro River. Each pillar has specific objectives (such as heritage preservation), programmes (e.g. heritage rehabilitation and heritage safeguarding), indicators and impacts. As such, heritage has been integrated into the wider society – and thus secured not only its conservation but also its development.

Through the innovative approach used by Porto Vivo, they were able to complete the construction of a Tourist Accommodation Unit, a Students Residence, and the extension of Assisted Living Residence for Elderly. And the successful excavation of a fortified wall from the Celtic period. They also put more investment into the conservation of various parts and building within the historic core, relocating the families affected. In sum, Porto’s attempt to integrate its heritage center with the broader economic and social structure in the city enabled its management body, Porto Vivo, to acquire the necessary funds and authority to successfully preserve, manage, and develop the site. This supports me to my point that if we shifted our perspective on heritage to one that is more dynamic and fluid, we would be able to widen the path for possible management programs that can revive and regenerate our heritage assets. This, translated to the case of Famagusta, would work significantly to increase the feasibility of preservation by developing business plans and a solid taxation initiative to promote investment in Famagusta’s heritage site.

Havana is another interesting case. Despite the political and economic limitations in Cuba, a robust socialist system embargoed by the United States, the country has found a way to revive the feasibility of its significant heritage assets. In

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October 1993, the Law-Decree No. 143 was promulgated and gave the Office of the Historian of Havana full power to convert Havana into a sustainable and profitable commercial enterprise (Habanaguex), to restore, fund, implement, and acquire the necessary means to develop the historic core. Later in 1997, institutionalized the original objective for Havana and applied it to the entire nation. The main thrusts of this law are: a) heritage buildings are seen as accompanied by a context (architecture and urban spaces) that give meaning to great structures which are both (relevant buildings and its context) concomitant, b) it opens the possibility of re-assessing the heritage content of listed buildings, c) urban infrastructure is considered as an important component to heritage content, d) recreation and sports are considered a fundamental activity that takes place in the heritage area, and e) urban signage and public advertisement are covered under the law. From the social aspect where heritage plays a role in the balance of activities as well as in the provision of resources, the site aimed for: 1) infant care (the building on the corner of Llamparilla and Mercedes), and elderly care (a portion of Belén Convent), 2) social housing and

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331 On the management format of Havana Scarpaci & Coyula states: “The Office of the City Historian designs and implements the Master Plan for Old Havana's Revitalization that manages land use and investment priorities for the 214- hectare and 242 blocks of Habana Vieja, which extends beyond the limits of the old wall and up to the Prado and border with Centro Habana. Its jurisdiction entails about 4000 buildings, of which 900 possess heritage value. Development projects concentrate heavily in the northeast corner of Habana Vieja, around the Plaza de Armas, Plaza de la Catedral, Plaza de San Francisco, the cruise ship terminal, and Plaza Vieja. Habaguanex is a special public entity because it is one of the few Cuban companies that manage dollar-operated facilities without having to remit profits to the main legislative body, the Ministry of the Economy and Planning. It actually sends part of its profits to the national government, but keeps most of it to finance their own programs. Such decentralization means that Habaguanex can arrange joint venture deals for historic preservation without much of the lengthier review that the Ministry of Foreign Investments (MINVEC) conducts for other Cuban companies. Habaguanex negotiates historic preservation and new construction projects directly with foreign capitalists and by occasionally consulting related ministries on a case-by-case basis. From a design and planning vantage point, its principal duties allow the firm to use profits to refurbish Old Havana. […] Habaguanex generates hard currency so that it can repair the torn fabric of the old walled precinct UNESCO site. In 1995, it generated $5 million USD in gross revenues. Its 1997 figures were estimated to be greater than $10 million. In early 1999, the figure stood close to $40 million and by the year 2002, Habaguanex revenues should approach $200 million. Habaguanex CEO Eusebio Leal stated in 1999 that investment in Habana Vieja exceeded the previous four years combined. If ‘sustainability’ is a term that is perhaps best defined based on local geographical and political contexts, then in Habana Vieja it has come to mean self-financing” Joseph L. Scarpaci, and Mario Coyula-Cowley, “Urban Sustainability, Built Heritage, and Globalization in the Cuban Capital,” in Human Settlement, Vol. 1, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, edited by Saskia Sassen (UNESCO-EOLS)

temporary accommodation for inhabitants of the heritage area, 3) re-use of heritage sites for cultural purposes (courtyard of Belén Cloister to host a conservatory), 4) new housing developments (San Isidro complex), 5) revitalization of public space (Obispo street), 6) special buildings with museographical design (Johnston historic pharmacy), institutions housed in iconic neighborhoods (Angela Landa school at Plaza Vieja).

What then can we gather from these two heritage management models? I would argue that Porto and Havana have designed long term Master Plans for the preservation and development of significant heritage assets and have established effective managerial bodies with additional powers and responsibilities to mediate, implement and organize the physical and social environment of historic areas. These special managerial structures were able to engage, as a third partner, private investors and the owners of heritage assets (which in large measure they served as a representative of the city), in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of buildings and public spaces within a determined area in the city.

In Porto and Havana, local and national government have given the managerial body the authority and capacity to facilitate the flows of capital (both public and private) so that the regeneration of heritage is given the same weight as urban growth. Both utilized an effective expropriation of land and buildings as a mechanism to guarantee the management plan. Taking these approaches a notch higher, I argue that a management framework that incorporates heritage and the broader principles of development should be supplemented by inputs from different areas of society such as the planning office, infrastructure, traffic networks, and parking systems, among others. It should also be necessarily backed by a structured series of legal frameworks such as heritage acts, legislations on land titles, specialized court processes, consultation and civil society involvement. An urban rehabilitation process that takes heritage into account is a dynamic action that requires monitoring measures. For

example, it must be capable of identifying how the buildings that have undergone interventions can impact the change in price/m² by area, by street and by building ‘style’; how the price increase in built areas leads towards internal migration of traditional inhabitants, the so the so called ‘gentrification’; and the change in use to supply new needs in services and goods that a higher occupancy rate requires.

In the case of Famagusta, where construction activities (including conservation) are not widely applicable to the historic core, but are dynamic in the outlying areas and new suburbs, a more detailed approach is required, including additional elements to assess how much of the new developments in the city impact the historic core and vice versa. Famagusta requires a businesslike approach to identify potential resources aside from local institutions, a governance structure with some international representation, monitored by an international scientific board to endorse the vision, mission and values of each and every activity, programme and intervention where the management model needs to engage. Intervention from the local actors in the north and the south that historically have used Cultural Heritage as a political flag, including actors from the newer areas of Famagusta and nearby resorts, should be minimized. The idea of implementing one activity (a walking tour) sets the tone for the implementation structure, and the composition of the participant stakeholders.

In light of the multilayered actors, resources, facets and timing that a revitalization process requires, the scope of organizations such as the Bi-communal Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus or the Reconstruction Implementation Commission in Kosovo, and of primary importance and reflect the political weight Cultural Heritage has. This political element has placed Famagusta in a limbo for many decades. I argue strongly against this outdated and destructive mind-set, as it generates instability in the process of recognition, development and sustainability of heritage assets, to the point of dismissing memories with challenge the political status quo.
In order to balance political concerns (represented by a public partner), the need for resources (a private partner), and the need for a third party capable of objectively assessing Cultural Heritage expressions geared towards the revitalization of Famagusta, I intend to shape a form of management which builds on the knowledge gained over the past four decades in Famagusta. This will emerge from a Transitional Justice process that can (and eventually will) take place among the communities in Cyprus, and allow its memorialization process to thrive. This process together with the heritage content already existing in Famagusta before 1974 can, I argue, give a full perspective of a site with the potential to host memories, narratives and experiences that represent an important step towards any form of political solution in Cyprus.


Cultural Heritage and urban settlements are constantly evolving and what we see now is the consequence of past actions, decisions or abandonment. The unrealistic idea of conserving heritage only, has led the Cultural Heritage sector to isolation from its potential as a key urban actor. The nostalgia of our time prevents us from seeing heritage as a changing organism capable of adapting and evolving over time. The analysis of only ‘one’ component of a regeneration process in a conservation area of a site shows the interconnections that need to be identified, assessed and controlled in order to arrive at sound and credible indicators of performance. The conservation approach limits the risks that come when trying to act on a bigger scale in a multi layered structure such as the city, seriously compromising the feasibility of a

334 Although scholars insist in observing particular commercial venues as ‘good’ examples of heritage intervention (see World Monument Fund, 2014 p.57-69), I believe Cultural Heritage needs to correspond to the type of society a particular community would like to be (or in fact is). Is it one of the private investors? If so, then what would be the future of non-profitable heritage? Cultural Heritage that does not recognize the dynamics of society will probably become another failure ‘plan’. An example of Cultural Heritage revitalization would be considered positive when the success of one or many commercial venues can guarantee the sustainability of sites that have fewer possibilities of engagement in commercial activities, or the inhabitants that reside in it. The difficulties do not lie in the application of conservation methodology, or the preservation of the spirit of the place (the spirit of which century? The spirit of conflict then?), the challenge comes in converting it into an asset for all.
regeneration initiative. This proposal for Famagusta is focused on a change in urban
dynamics that regards Cultural Heritage as a burden for the city and its communities.
As I explained in the previous chapter, the preparation of a nomination dossier for
Famagusta to be considered a World Heritage Site was the motivation for running a
CBA to test its feasibility and financing means, and then extend that project as a
permanent programme to provide resources for the regeneration of Famagusta’s
historic core. The task at this point is to design a management structure tailored to
implement that programme. This, I propose, can be in the form of a Public-Private
Partnership.

A Public – Private Partnership (PPP) is an engagement between public and
private sectors for the provision of a shared public service or public goods. PPPs were
initially designed to deliver goods or services that, in principle, state governments were
incapable (whether in terms of technical capacity, expertise, or resources) of
delivering. Immense investments in knowledge, research and monetary resources are
commonly seen as the main drivers for establishing PPPs, often in the sectors of
infrastructure and the exploitation of natural resources, since these sectors require huge
investments and capital that the state alone cannot provide. When talking about PPP, it
is necessary to understand that this type of association has an economic background
which in this case follows the X-Efficiency theory developed by Harvey Leibenstein in
the 1960s. The theory states:

“That public institutions or enterprises cannot fail as long as official financial
and monetary policies are expansionary enough to bail them out or to limit
their probability of failure. Inefficiencies in public institutions or enterprises
result from both distorted government interventions as well as states’
organizational structures, which are typically highly bureaucratic. Hence,
according to this theory, Public-Private Partnerships are necessary to reduce
the sources of x-efficiency in public organizations and to allow them to
respond to market forces and become more competitive.”

335 Mona Hammami, Jean-Francois Ruhashyankiko and , Etienne F. Yehoue, (2006) “Determinants of
Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure,” International Monetary Fund, 2006, accessed Jan 8, 2014,
This is relevant to Cultural Heritage in two ways: one, because, traditionally, Cultural Heritage has been conceived of as part of a welfare apparatus instead of being a participant in market dynamics (even if it is clear that Cultural Heritage impacts the market’s dynamics in the form of tourism, infrastructure and job creation); and secondly, because the majority of the activities included in an urban heritage’s regeneration processes are subject to market fluctuations in terms of labour, raw materials, infrastructure, services, and commerce. It must be reiterated that this proposal is a response to the limited interest from local institutions to engage in responsible management of heritage assets. I believe PPP is an approach that provides not only 1) a possible way out of the political quandary that prevents any attempt to systematically manage Famagusta but also 2) a contemporary perception of the relationship between the state and the market when placed in the realm of heritage, and 3) a facilitator of a transitional process where an important amount of the future Cultural Heritage exists. The call for new stakeholders and economic actors to make up for the deficiencies and failures in de-facto governmental institutions, and a more open sense of regulation from Civil Society, completes a scenario where Famagusta can benefit in almost every conceivable way. The search for a Sustainable Development process where social, economic and cultural rights are preserved through an open dialogue between the public, the private and Civil Society is what drives this proposal. It may also offer a pragmatic ‘third way’ to break the stalemate which has been so detrimental to Famagusta.

Although PPP is widely appropriated to heritage, I maintain that in the case of Famagusta, it serves a highly promising means of managing and reviving the significant heritage located in the city and connecting it to the broader economy by means of a paradigm formed through collaboration between the public and the private sectors, without the complication of the highly sensitive political issue of Cyprus. When implemented in Famagusta, PPP (for instance, just on the walking tour) will be
able to stimulate innovative ideas, foster entrepreneurial activities, and form mutual
trust and responsibility among the various stakeholders while at the same time
initiating a long protracted restoration and development scheme for the city’s heritage
assets. A tailored rationale to implement a PPP for Cultural Heritage development in
Famagusta would consist of a core driving committee, a Trust, composed by at least
five areas of expertise: economics, urban management, policy design, urban
development and environment. Their goals would be, first, to establish a feasible
balance between the carrying capacity of the heritage site in relation to environmental
aspects such as water supply, climate change and food security; second, to maintain the
economic drive that can take the site to a stage of development where the heritage
aspects can be enhanced and they can contribute to establishing a form of identity
between the current inhabitants and the site, not only because of its past but, most
importantly, because of its present (this is intended to fund the base of an engaged civil
society); third, the Trust would gather proposals to accomplish the one main core
objective which is the sustainability of Famagusta’s heritage site; fourth, it would
establish the planning instruments and needs, and formulate the linkages between
Famagusta’s heritage site and its region in the light of a 10 year plan to manage,
develop and project Famagusta’s heritage site in a sustainable manner; and fifth, the
Trust would correspond to the international representative of Famagusta and
directorate board for Famagusta’s Public – Private – Partnership. The Trust has the
objective of bringing the technical aspects of heritage and its relationship to the
broader context in order to foster discussion on the present and future of Famagusta’s
heritage site, endorsing the decisions taken by the PPP.

One important component of the dynamics of urban rehabilitation is
investment, and private investment is based on the possibility of drawing an attractive
scenario in a safe environment, where international banking is granted security,
property and titling are honored and stable in terms of public policy, taxation, etc. The
growing number of tourists speaks of the dynamic of economic activities in Famagusta. However it is still a market that has critical risks given the conditions of North Cyprus. What this approach does is minimize the risk of investing in a sector that tends to grow. It offers a partnership for the development of activities that are sympathetic to the relevance of the heritage site. The design of a Public-Private-Partnership tailored to develop one activity such as a walking tour and deliver in return the rehabilitation of parts of the city, requires the participation of the private sector to invest in profitable activities that can contribute to the rehabilitation of the site beyond a walking tour. The examples of Havana and Porto give the reader references to urban operations that are flexible and creative, as they limit the market in benefit of Cultural Heritage and apply formats such as concessions, development of new buildings, requalification, housing, among others, that are present in an urban settlement and impact the live of heritage structures, social environment and life.

A global effort to design a new organization is precisely an effort to grant an alternative platform that is accompanied by the international community which can endorse a transitional stage and the decisions taken throughout this process. A PPP for the specific case of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage requires an active ‘Public’ partner which is willing to facilitate information, data, archives and the infrastructure needed (water, electricity, sewage) to complement any policy design, and who agrees to be a partner outside the political realm of northern Cyprus. A ‘private’ sector has to be found in the region (including Cyprus itself) that is interested in participating and proposing forms of investment on infrastructure, real estate projects and programmes which can help to form a scenario where a regeneration process can begin in a sustainable manner. A PPP possesses one main characteristic that differentiates it from a regular commercial enterprise: its reversible (the possibility to revise conditions and participation) option of heritage assets of public ownership or public control. This guarantees, on one hand the re-assessment of the conditions (economic, management
and heritage) and on the other, the change in market conditions in the future, both for
the benefit of the regeneration process at large.

A heritage PPP is based on re-development, drawing a scenario where the
missing parts of a regeneration process can be achieved under one main premise: a can
PPP bridge a market demand with a heritage asset. The Havana and Proto cases
highlight the need for an independent scheme with a ‘profitable’ managerial drive that
can generate resources for heritage investment, in a sustainable way; this means the
recognition of the recent past as a fundamental period in Famagusta’s life and its status
as heritage site. As such a PPP can offer the grounds for the multiple narratives of
conflict, human rights violations and the memorialization of all those events. The
relationship between markets and heritage assets frequently show different economic
hazards: development, operating, financial, political and environmental risks, which
constitute evidence for the need for a deep engagement from all actors of the Public –
Private Partnership. The PPP for the case of Famagusta will implement the Trust’s
vision and road map, developing a bank of projects to meet short, mid and long term
objectives associated with the rehabilitation of the entire historic core of Famagusta. It
is designed to adapt to different forms of operational (relationship) engagement from
the private partner, in which the main variables are lease term and transfer of heritage
assets.336

336 The following are excerpted from UNECE: “Buy-Build-Operate (BBO): Transfer of a public asset to a
private or quasi-public entity usually under contract that the assets are to be upgraded and operated for a
specific period of time. Public control is exercised through the contract at the time of transfer. Build-Own-
Operate (BOO): The private sector finances, builds, owns and operates a facility or service in perpetuity.
The public constraints are stated in the original agreement and through ongoing regulatory authority.
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT): A private entity receives a franchise to finance, design, build and
operate a facility (and to charge user fees) for a specified period, after which ownership is transfer back to
the public sector. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): The private sector designs, finances and constructs a
new facility under a long-term agreement (often called concession contract) and operates the facility
during the term of the Concession after which ownership is transferred back to the public sector if not
already transferred upon completion of the facility. In fact, such a form covers BOOT and BLOT with the
sole difference being the ownership of the facility. Build-Lease-Operate-Transfer (BLOT): A private entry
receives a franchise to finance, design, build and operate a leased facility (and to charge user fees) for the
lease period, against payment of a rent. Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): The private sector
designs, finances and constructs a new facility under a long term lease and operates the facility during the
term of the lease. The private partner transfers the new facility to the public sector at the end of the lease
term. Finance Only: A private entity, usually a financial services company, funds a project directly or uses
The main responsibilities that Famagusta’s PPP can be given is therefore summarized in three core themes: 1) To curtail the impact of forty years of decay in Cultural Heritage assets located in the historic core of Famagusta, 2) To establish a management structure to implement and develop the walking tour as a permanent programme and develop others arising from the transitional process in Cyprus, 3) To control the political influence of the forms of government and institutional apparatus in northern Cyprus that traditionally have been so negligent in preserving and developing Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage assets, and its counterpart in the south that is so reluctant to recognize alternative narratives for Cyprus.

Having given a detailed form of governance, liaison, and representation to PPP, it is important to establish roles for each of the partners. The public partner is accountable for: a) overseeing and participating in capacity-building for local institutions and civil servants, b) facilitating interaction and liaising among local institutions, c) guaranteeing urban infrastructure for the heritage site, d) liaising with international actors (such as the Turkish army), d) providing information and data from local archives that can help elucidate ownership issues, occupancy and tenure of heritage assets, and e) assessing risk. On the private side, the inputs are focused on finance, capital financing, management, marketing, technology and real estate expertise.

This form of PPP also includes civil society, with its complex role, combining management of programmes for urban intervention, the legal framework, transparency in investments and managerial processes, facilitating private investments in heritage

various mechanisms such as long-term lease or bond issue. Operation & Maintenance Contract (O & M): A private operator, under contract, operates a publicly owned asset for a specified term. Ownership of the asset remains with the public entity. (Many do not consider O&Ms to be within the spectrum of PPPs and consider such contracts as service contracts.) Design-Build (DB): The private sector designs and builds infrastructure to meet public sector performance specifications, often or a fixed price, on a turnkey basis, so the risk of cost overruns is transferred to the private sector. (Mainly do not consider DBs to be within the spectrum of PPPs and consider such contracts as public works contracts) Operation License: A private operator receives a license or rights to operate a public service, usually for a specified term. This is often used in Information Technology projects” Donovan, Rypkema and Caroline Cheong, Public-Private Partnerships and Heritage: A Practitioner’s Guide. (Washington: Heritage Strategies International, 2012): 12-13.
rehabilitation, establishing priority interventions, and developing Cultural Heritage expertise. A road map composed of a bank of projects needs to include the following: a thematic walking tours; a journey through the heritage of humanity, heritage in the form of social housing, urban archaeology and educational institutions, a university for the preservation of memory (lease of sites for educational purposes), the walls, the fortification of memory (adaptive reuse), natural heritage, Famagusta label.

Going back to the original motive for carrying out this study, which was the preparation of a nomination dossier (despite being infeasible), let us define the main functions of Famagusta’s PPP. 1) Design of a nomination dossier following UNESCO’s framework. 2) Preservation of Famagusta’s historic core, including financing, developing and participating in profitable activities to support the intervention of built heritage and all additional components of urban life in Famagusta’s historic core. 3) Design of projects, programmes, policies and technical studies its implement actions on Famagusta’s heritage site. 4) Provision of a financing structure to engage with private owners in heritage projects in Famagusta’s heritage sites. 5) Operation of businesses, institutions, projects and assets to improve Famagusta’s economic feasibility. 6) Resource Contribution: The PPP will produce a nomination dossier that will be used as a road map for Famagusta’s management, policy and strategy to preserve and develop its Cultural Heritage assets in the light of a Sustainable Development framework. The PPP will provide the human resources and technical expertise as well as international representation among commissions, monitoring bodies and international legal systems that will be overseen in this programme. Since the public component of the PPP is still contested, this proposal will necessarily need consent from all parties involved as proof of goodwill and recognition if this third way in Cultural Heritage management is to act during this stage and throughout the adjustment after status talks have finalized.
It is crucial to note at this point that there is no fixed template for the implementation of PPP in managing historical urban precincts. The application of PPP can be achieved through a wide range of options and this requires specific (i.e. local) knowledge as it depends on the practice of legal entities, financial expertise and project management. With the exception of the *stadsherstel* organizations, this kind of knowledge is rarely found in the cultural sector, but arises from cooperation with experts from the urban planning sector or private stakeholders. The application of heritage management in the preparation of PPP, however, is a core task of heritage experts and could be achieved in different ways.

The setting of the PPP is a method to unlock the most relevant aspects of the current situation in Famagusta that have prevented stakeholders from securing its heritage sites. At the international legal level, Transitional Justice perspective presents a platform for the discussion of memory, cultural rights and accountability (alternative conceptualization of heritage, memories, identity and nationality), and produces transitional laws while endorsing a regeneration process of the site. In terms of a technical framework, by the principles of Sustainable Development enable us to avoid core aspects of UNESCO’s assumptions that only recognize what its member states allow, dismissing contested heritage.

Experiences like those in The Netherlands are important to reference: “The *stadsherstel approach*, which mainly emerged in the 1970s, has been and is very successful in safeguarding Dutch built heritage in historic inner cities. This is especially true in the case of ‘stock corporations’, which own, purchase, restore and lease heritage buildings. PPP and heritage conservation in urban redevelopment areas is more a concept of the urban planning and development sector. It is usually accomplished by installing a redevelopment agency or ‘private limited liability company’ and adaptive re-use and preservation of built heritage is established by an *integrated approach* which is called ‘integrated conservation’. Recently, due to the economic crisis and in areas facing population decline, alternative PPP projects emerge. In those cases PPP is an important tool to improve the living environment and manage historical precincts by a *community-based approach*.” Indonesian Heritage Trust (BPPI), Directorate General of Spatial Planning, Cultural Heritage Agency (RCE), Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, The Netherlands. (2013) “Workshop Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Managing Historical Urban Precincts.” BPPI, 2013, accessed Feb 22, 2014, http://www.cultureelerfgoed.nl/sites/default/files/uf6/WORKSHOP%20PPP%20Heritage%0Indonesia%20May%206-8%202013.pdf. 38.
Conclusion

In my previous work in the northern state of Chihuahua in Mexico between 2003 and 2005, I was in charge of preserving some of the approximately 158 mission buildings established by the Spanish Empire to secure frontier areas of the ‘New World’. Border areas in the Americas, like the ones in Mexico, Venezuela, Paraguay and Argentina had the same principles during the Age of Exploration and Discovery: colonization and Christianization. To understand the relevance of these compounds (missions) it is important to note that there are some included in the World Heritage list, including the Franciscan Missions in the Sierra Gorda of Querétaro (five buildings in Mexico), and the Jesuit Missions of the Guaranis (five ruins shared by Argentina and Brazil). Missions operated under a different colonial model from those used in the rest of the continent as they were territories given to Catholic orders to control, exploit, and Christianize, in the name of the King of Spain. The state of Chihuahua was, and still is, a frontier as it is a border state between Mexico and the United States of America. The exercise of power and domination of the Mexican territory during the 17th and 18th centuries transformed the border into a series of ghost towns inhabited by migrant people for whom the conditions on ‘the other side’ are usually more rewarding than in Mexico.

In other parts of the border, for example Tijuana in Baja California, a traditional crossing ‘spot’, the phenomenon is different. The transition between Mexico and the USA has produced unique cultural expressions, recognizable in the type of music and language in the area. There are communities there that have modified their identities to embrace their own expressions that do not correspond uniquely to either Mexico or the U.S. and are permanently enriched by people in-transit. Simply put, in these border areas or frontiers, the culture that can be seen is quite unique – a mixture or a synthesis of different influences. Additionally, the migrants coming from Central
and South America have enhanced Tijuana and converted the place into a liminal, transitional and hybrid area, not exclusively Mexican or entirely American.

Spread throughout the territory of Chihuahua, there are 158 mission buildings that speak of that symbiosis throughout the centuries. There are mud buildings, oversized and abandoned by communities seeking better living conditions. There are buildings that witnessed forms of colonization that remind us of a time in history, forms of government, slavery and the relations between Europeans and indigenous people, to name but a few. The transition between two worlds has characterized and shaped borders as places in permanent change. Borders created by political systems do not necessarily represent division, but somehow represent an amalgamation of expressions that integrate the differences between both sides of the border line.

While conducting my practice in that area, I frequently asked myself what set of ethics I would need to construct and support the idea of restoring those buildings. For what purpose or objective should I intervene? For whom? For which generation? These questions, ironically, were the same questions that I asked when I saw the deplorable state of Famagusta. It has been, historically, a venue and crossroad for various cultures – European and Ottoman, for instance. It possesses unique heritage assets that are unparalleled in the world, and yet, any attempt to manage its Cultural Heritage is outside the current framework.

Preservation of heritage and its conservation, like the Instituto Nacional de Historia y Antropología – INHA (National Institute of History and Anthropology) in Mexico would argue that it is Mexico’s Cultural Heritage and Chihuahua’s valuable assets. But heritage that was formed in the past may not necessarily be able to survive in the present, at least not under the current framework. Many of the missions in Chihuahua have no communities, interest, sense of identity, or stakeholders willing to invest in preserving those buildings. The doctrinal package that UNESCO pursues on Cultural Heritage prevents any discussion of the contextualization of Cultural Heritage
with the realities of migration, extinct communities, lack of governance, economic
difficulties, infertile soil, etc. Moreover, the Catholic Church would surely raise the
flag of religion to further complicate the discourse. Even in Cultural Heritage, we see
that lethal mixture of politics, religion and power. Once again, the very same
phenomenon is apparent in Famagusta. The complexity of power and politics, the
instability of it, and the lack of any political will from the international system of
nations permeates the realm of Cultural Heritage, only causing further destruction.

In fact, in my exposure to various heritage sites around the world, politics seem
to be omnipresent as it tries to limit the narratives that heritage can contain, despite the
versatility that heritage assets actually hold. If I establish a dialogue among my
experiences in Mexico (a border between two cultures), in the Balkans (border zone for
ethnicities and religion), and Afghanistan (with its struggle to overcome a limbo status
exacerbated by foreign forces) it is evident to me that we live in an environment that is
not fixed and is constantly reconfiguring. This dissertation has identified gaps and
caveats in the conceptualization of heritage and proposed a subsequent alternative path
to cater for that reality. Behind the discussions and analyses I presented here, I further
interrogated a crucial principle: why should heritage be defined and overlooked by
monolithic institutions incapable of accommodating a plurality of narratives?

As in Chihuahua, Famagusta requires sensitive adaptations to the singularities
of the place, and that, when framed under a political umbrella, becomes a tough
endeavor. To preserve its heritage assets, develop its potentialities, or simply discuss it,
is often politically impossible, or undesirable due to the short-term nature of politics
and long-term needs of heritage. Many other places, borders and territories have
evolved into transitional places, for different reasons but with comparable effects or
aspects such as the rule of law, traditions, culture, ethnicity and others. These have
their own meanings, probably an alternative one, which are definitely difficult to
acknowledge or plan for, if adhering to UNESCO’s doctrinal package and politics.
In reality, the Cultural Heritage sector is permeated by a sense of nostalgia and melancholy that we tend to immortalize in snapshots of different presents. Concepts like hüzün [sadness], saudade [melancholy], soul of the city, patina and others, are often used to describe what heritage brings to our memory, and what should be kept under subjective criteria. That is a discussion that has taken decades and so far, the definitions of what it is that we preserve varies throughout a wide range of possibilities. That is why I believe the answer to the question of how we should approach Cultural Heritage in the contemporary period does not lie in the palliative measures embedded in its conceptualization but in the logic of its dynamics. It is not the design of the procedures, policies and actions that guarantees palliative measures, it is a change in the dynamics of decay.

The same questions arise in the case of Famagusta, a site that for a variety of reasons faces the dilemma of falling outside of UNESCO’s doctrine when – as the main global stakeholder of Cultural Heritage – its ethical duty would have been to act in favor of Famagusta. It has chosen not to. As I have discussed in this study, the concept of heritage that UNESCO maintains is rigid and is limited to the scope of the politics of the state and this is where the conundrum of heritage in transitional areas emerge. It is my belief that the Cultural Heritage sector needs to openly discuss the moral rightness of UNESCO’s doctrine, its role in the events that led Famagusta to the current state of limbo (in heritage aspects), and the role of a site that is relevant for humanity’s memories, yet is forgotten or ignored. This issue then compels us to consider and confront the quandary of whether to continue insisting on using the international system and its moral ‘rightness’, which dismisses Famagusta, or acknowledge that UNESCO is a mere political actor that has short-comings for which solutions need to be found. I maintain that what has happened to Famagusta might be legal in political terms but is ethically far from satisfactory.
This dissertation takes the reader to the roots of Famagusta’s current situation with reflections ranging from the Cultural Heritage concept itself, heritage formation, accountability and interconnections to a broad setting that we call social context. This work lays out core questions on Cultural Heritage, walks the reader through the history of the concept to discover the gaps in the international system on Cultural Heritage, and proposes potential answers to the current situation of Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage (and by extension to other places around the world). It also takes the economics of Famagusta and develops it into a feasible idea that challenges policy design on Cultural Heritage, management structures, and heritage intervention that serve as the core aspects of UNESCO doctrine. This work identifies the difficulties of Famagusta under the current international system, and proposes an alternative framework within which to discuss core characteristics of Cultural Heritage such as identity, memory, history, diaspora, human rights and accountability. That framework is Transitional Justice, a platform where Cultural Heritage has the potential to address and support ‘transition’, a facet of Cultural Heritage, unexplored and challenging.

From my discussion on conceptualization in the first chapter, one conclusion is clear: Cultural Heritage is a concept that emerged within a political setting. It serves political aims and facilitates political changes, when needed. As such, we can assume that Cultural Heritage in that context is a political tool. Working on this assumed truth, my study arrived at four substantial findings: 1) Since the current international system does not include all settings where heritage is present or formed, there is a need for additional or alternative platforms to prevent additional loss of Cultural Heritage expressions all over the world, and to open possibilities for civil society, non-governmental organizations, tourists and diasporic communities to have a voice on Cultural Heritage definition, recognition, management and intervention. 2) The economics of Cultural Heritage can be assessed outside official policies, political turmoil and technical capacity, which contradict the international system (that only
acknowledges selected stakeholders and counterparts i.e. governments), and opens alternative possibilities for Cultural Heritage assets to improve their sustainability. 3) Cultural Heritage is a sector deeply connected to conservation and preservation. However, it has additional roles in society’s development, outside UNESCO’s doctrine. In transitional territories such as the ones afflicted by war, borders and contested territories, it complements concepts such as memory, history and remembrance. 4) UNESCO’s doctrine has given a sense of moral rightness to Cultural Heritage and its preservation, and this characteristic places the Cultural Heritage sector as a dominant aspect of society above many other aspects necessary to every day’s life. The delisting of Dresden’s Elbe Valley in Germany is a powerful indicator of the consequences of straying from the fold.338

I recognize that there is a gap between academic scholarship and the practices of Cultural Heritage development and management. From the beginning of this dissertation, the major challenge was to go beyond the academic limits of current scholarship and construct an argument to assess Famagusta under a different framework from the current one where standards, doctrine and theory play against it. A conservative approach to understanding Cultural Heritage in transitional areas would give attention to the paradigm shifts in the notion of Cultural Heritage supported by a comprehensive historic assessment of Famagusta, as discussed in the second chapter. It would include an acknowledgement of a problem, analysis of current scholarship and

338 “The World Heritage Committee decided to remove Germany's Dresden Elbe Valley from UNESCO's World Heritage List due to the building of a four-lane bridge in the heart of the cultural landscape which meant that the property failed to keep its "outstanding universal value as inscribed." Dresden was inscribed as a cultural landscape in 2004. The Committee said that Germany could present a new nomination relating to Dresden in the future. In doing so, the Committee recognized that parts of the site might be considered to be of outstanding universal value, but that it would have to be presented under different criteria and boundaries. The 18th- and 19th-century cultural landscape of Dresden Elbe Valley stretches some 18 km along the river from Übigau Palace and Ostragehege fields in the north-west to the Pillnitz Palace and the Elbe River Island in the south-east. The property, which features low meadows, and is crowned by the Pillnitz Palace as well as numerous monuments and parks from the 16th to 20th centuries in the city of Dresden, was inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2006 because of the planned Waldschlösschen Bridge. Dresden is only the second property ever to have been removed from the World Heritage List. The Oman’s Arabian Oryx Sanctuary was delisted in 2007.” See complete text from: http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/522/ [Accessed 7 November 2014].
formulate an academic proposal to prevent further deterioration in Famagusta’s heritage sites. What is *nouvelle* in this work is that it proposes a way around the limitations found in UNESCO’s doctrine.\(^{339}\) Instead of identifying what can be done given the current structure of heritage, which has proved ineffective in Famagusta anyway, I lay out a different trajectory outside of it. I have set out alternative connections to a Transitional Justice framework in-formation.

Moreover, this work finds the connections between Cultural Heritage and Transitional Justice in ways where both concepts benefit from each other. Transitional Justice tackles the impediments found in the role international organizations have (or the lack of role) in Famagusta’s heritage assets, and formulates a proposal for Famagusta with a focus on its Cultural Heritage that could be implemented as a pilot project for a Transitional Justice process in Cyprus. From the Transitional Justice perspective, Cultural Heritage contributes as a witness of the past, with the potential to speak of multiple narratives, simultaneity of times and neutrality, required for remembrance and justice. For Cultural Heritage, Transitional Justice offers a platform on which to discuss, assess and incorporate memory, multiple memories and conflictive memories and the repercussion in politics and power. Also from Transitional Justice an interim form of governance is a potential need in territories where Cultural Heritage is used as a tool for conflict not for peace.

In many ways this work highlights the faulty, or at least incomplete, nature of the epistemology associated with Cultural Heritage. We may observe a connatural link with property, territoriality and inheritance, therefore politics and power which are exclusionary and that, by definition, isolate places like Famagusta. The effort of

\(^{339}\) Some might argue that the academic would necessarily mean different from doctrine and even different from UNESCO standards. However, when analyzing where doctrine is generally drafted: ICOMOS, a UNESCO endorsing organization composed by experts, those experts generally have an important degree of influence in the academic world, being themselves academicians and also practitioners. In my experience dealing with UNESCO experts it is frequent to find common names which ICOMOS consultants. This cycle gives the three terms a strong relationship. What aggravates this situation is the fact that ICOMOS, although is framed as an NGO, is composed by national chapters, therefore restraining the possibilities of general participation, including contesting communities and unrecognized territories.
addressing Famagusta’s Cultural Heritage (and by extension all those places that are forgotten) has been an effort to sidestep and reassess from the beginning until now some dead ends that in my experience are evident but in scholarship are invisible. A record of the contributions of this PhD to the field of Cultural Heritage studies is as follows:

- This work proposes a shift in Cultural Heritage conceptualization (paradigm) proposing an alternative definition tailored to include issues arising in contexts in which heritage and identity are contested.

- In the field of Cultural Heritage studies and practice, this work contributes by identifying the gaps (e.g. the political component of UNESCO and ICOMOS) and caveats (the public and private nature of Cultural Heritage), that have permeated the international system that controls and determines what Cultural Heritage is, who is accountable for it and how it should be dealt with.

- This framing of Cultural Heritage yields an alternative framework in which to address those caveats and gaps. This platform is known as Transitional Justice. Transitional Justice, commonly used in post-conflict territories to deal with human rights violations (e.g. cultural rights), sets the conditions for truth telling and encourages communities to remember the past. Thus the political nature of the Cyprus issue and the central role Cultural Heritage has played in it, affirm the need to prevent politics from having a destructive impact on the heritage assets that are important for understanding civil society at large. This work casts lights on Transitional Justice and opens various possibilities of study and applicability, including the heritage of displaced communities, the heritage of extinct communities and heritage produced during war. However active and vibrant, Transitional Justice is still a new field that is bound to create categories and geographies which correspond to different elements in conflicts and post-conflicts. The incorporation of Cultural Heritage into Transitional Justice enables discussion of the risk of dead ends arising from political motivations.
In the field of economics and its relationship with heritage, this work develops one economic aspect of a small and concise action (a walking tour) and on this basis discusses a number of aspects of heritage: a) the value of a non invasive, non political and non bureaucratic measure to finance an important part of the revitalization of Famagusta, b) the freedom from international endorsement or recognition if the right stakeholders are called to contribute to its revitalization, c) the potential for any international or local organization to undertake this initiative. Instead, highly bureaucratic institutions (UNDP-PFF, UNDP-ACT, UNFICYP, European Commission, etc.) have minimal involvement in Famagusta’s heritage assets.

This study also proposes an alternative management approach to Cultural Heritage giving shared accountability to the public and private sectors and also to civil society. This is a means of recognizing that Cultural Heritage, is public and of social interest, even when its ownership can be private. This is where many policies fail, giving state governments the responsibility to rule over private assets without the legal instruments to endorse policies on Cultural Heritage preservation.

It is also crucial to highlight that although this work is centered on Famagusta, it is not just about Famagusta. This study is also about those heritage assets that are threatened by the instability of power, conflict, and politics and the inflexibility of the international system of nations. Regardless of the fact that every conflict has its own dynamics, contexts and motives, there are a number of facets that can be recognized as common denominators, including chaos, international diplomacy, international politics, transition, and change. The findings of this work, or at least its basic principles, may apply in cases other than Famagusta, in their unrecognized territories such as the Republic of Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Republic of Abkhazia, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, and Republic of South Ossetia where the political aspect of ‘recognition’ is also prohibitive. To focus on the more substantial component (memory) of heritage assets, to my mind is more workable. The third aspect
corresponds to the governability of Cultural Heritage and gives special attention to the role of civil society (at the local and global levels) and the general public, which are recognized as accountable stakeholders in bridging the gaps created by the current international system. Cultural Heritage, when framed as part of a transitional stage, offers possibilities for places in the middle of an armed conflict and during post-conflict times.

Like all studies, I concede that this work has several shortcomings. The major limitations stemmed from the lack of access I had to reliable data on North Cyprus. This would have helped in comparing, for example, tourism in both sides of the island, income from tourist activities (e.g. casinos in North Cyprus), population and permanent residents, diaspora and other minorities living in Famagusta. Another important limitation was the lack of access to the full Annan Plan (including annexes), in particular, in its projections for Cultural Heritage. The Annan Plan was an important effort (from the United Nations) to establish the conditions for both communities present in Cyprus to determine the set of ethics of interaction. Since the Plan was rejected by the Greek Cypriot community, its technical aspects became irrelevant. This document would have helped in comparing and establishing parameters for how heritage sites have been transformed, deteriorated, disappeared or ignored by institutions of North Cyprus.

I believe that this work and the proposal discussed at length here can in fact be implemented in Famagusta. Having looked into the theoretical details that link management and policy implementation, I utilize empirical knowledge to connect the findings of scholars or Think Tanks on heritage to pragmatic and applicable policy design, international relations or economics. It is important to note that economics in heritage and economics of unrecognized territories are two different issues of the sector which in the case of Famagusta, are necessarily linked. The first aspect (economics and heritage) addresses the feasibility of investment in heritage rehabilitation. The second
(economics of the unrecognized territory) searches for a feasible financial platform to deal with international isolation, and the implementation of policies including Cultural Heritage. But before trying to implement the ideas I would first advocate the broadening of consultation among different groups in Famagusta’s society to improve the accuracy of data gathered from a number of areas. Thses include data on the public perception of Famagusta’s heritage assets, to help orient potential policies, civil society’s organizations, to weigh capacity building on heritage work; and the engagement of the general public. Needless to say, the education system and its role vis-a-vis the heritage of different communities, public discourse, and the creation of identity, can contribute to comparative analysis between both parts of the island. North Cyprus benefits from tourism, it is an element of its economy. Recognized or not, the flow of resources obliges practitioners of Cultural Heritage to also think in economic terms. The economics of heritage assets are usually connected to macro-economics (policies, taxation, etc). However, this study proposes the economic valuation of one action (a walking tour) and its impact within a broader assessment. It demonstrates how to provide economic resources for heritage regeneration without the difficulties of governmental policies, taxation systems, etc., and transforms it into a game changer for heritage.

From a different perspective, the economic impact of Cultural Heritage policy implementation impacts decision making at the urban and regional levels, and demonstrates the difficulty of integrating Cultural Heritage into urban life. Generally the whole sector has been framed as part of preservation, which in principle is a condition that resists development. That is probably why it has been given a prominence above other considerations of regional (rural), and local (urban) economies, and has established a disconnection between both. The economics of culture and Cultural Heritage requires a different perspective, which includes discussions of economic value, establishes systems to economic performance, and
mitigates the measures which needs to be translated into policies. The focus traditionally has been placed on the cultural and artistic aspects of heritage, neglecting the fact that heritage, its recognition, management and development require investment, and that cannot be measured in anything other than economic terms.

The case of Famagusta demonstrates the possibility of combining heritage with monetary value in order to facilitate sustainability. This would eventually require economic analysis on how an added value can impact on the urban economy vis-a-vis development potential transfers, or investment on heritage as a form of tax deduction. These are interesting lines of research that might usefully be undertaken in the future.

This study necessarily opens new trajectories in the study and understanding of Cultural Heritage. There are more facets of Cultural Heritage than one can understand. The term and its broad conceptualization have grown into a complex semantic fiels which involves nature, intangibility and beauty, the politics of territoriality and ethics. Cultural Heritage has become a powerful tool for social manipulation, and the greater its authority the more interesting it becomes for the international community. However, the exclusivity of the long run for power and the institutional architecture behind Cultural Heritage leaves some loose ends that show the relevance of the exercise of power in a sector that has nothing but altruistic goals. Who would not want to secure all those things that Cultural Heritage embraces?

Famagusta represents the sum of all the aspects that have formed heritage and that are dismissed by the internally endorsed pursued over the past six decades. Paradoxically, Famagusta having a voice among the international community is, in my opinion, a path for another cycle of destruction, as recognition of Famagusta necessarily involves the dismissal of what can’t be recognized. This might typically include lack of identity, representation, nationality, accountability, and lead to contestation in government, society and culture from those ignored or unrecognized. The voice Famagusta ‘must’ have, requires, an alternative message that speaks of
singularities. Why would anyone plan for its future under the framework that has impacted so badly on its heritage content?

My work sets a different tone for heritage as it recognizes the harm politics and power have had in heritage in general and in Famagusta in particular. It acknowledges that heritage is also about economics, either for its regeneration, restoration, rehabilitation, development, or for its role in the whole of the market’s reality. It cannot be isolated from it. My proposal recognizes the dual nature of Cultural Heritage, public and private, and responds to it in its managerial setting. It also recognizes that in order to improve its feasibility Famagusta requires its own definition of Cultural Heritage, which will enable a new platform of discussion, assessment and intervention. Famagusta speaks of the wrongness, or at least the imperfections, of the international system; it also speaks of the liability that four decades of limbo have conferred upon all actors in the Cultural Heritage sector that, using legal arguments, have led Famagusta to its deep decay. There is a moral rightness in the international legal system that has prevented UNESCO from acting in favor of Famagusta, a situation that needs to be recognized and then redressed.
Annex A
Annex A

Walking Tour samples in Prague, London and Berlin

PRAGUE CASTLE
AFTER DARK
A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ATMOSPHERE!
EXCLUSIVE NIGHTTIME TOUR!
MYSTERIES AND LEGENDS, ACADEMY AND MAGIC, AND THE BACKGROUND OF HISTORICAL FACTS

Tour Availability:
- Summer: June 1 - Aug 31 (6pm)
- Winter: Nov 1 - Mar 31 (6pm)

Duration: 2h 00m
Price: One price: 345 CZK

This tour gives you a unique view of this famous site, where the tour parties and couples have gone, and will introduce you to the darker parts of the Castle's history. Your guide will lead you from the days of pagan tribes, the Slavic and Hussite Empire through the Empire, to the present, to the Nazi occupation and the days of the Communist control police.

As well as some stunning views of Prague by night, you'll also have the chance to see the Golden Lane, once the home of Franz Kafka. This tour is a mixture of fact, mysteries and legends, to entertain and inform.

GHOSTS & LEGENDS
OF OLD TOWN
BURNED ALIVE, A WALKING EXHIBITION
THE INFAMOUS EXECUTION

This tour takes you away from the bustle of the Old Town Square and away from the skull and bones of the Old Town. The tour for couples and families or for the ones who want to experience another side of Prague, with the visit to the most popular haunted house in Prague.

EXTEND YOUR WALK TO THE CHAMBERS BELOW THE OLD TOWN HALL...
Call us on 011 420 1000 to book the 30 Minute Underground walk for only 450 CZK.

Duration: 2h 30m
Price: One price: 450 CZK

CHARLES BRIDGE: HAUNTED HISTORY
This tour explores the iconic Charles Bridge and its surrounding area, with the interactive guide to visit the Old Town Bridge Tower night by night. A lot of the best known Haunted History that happened in Prague. You will find in the Old Town the house of execution, where the first fire burned, a real source of hundreds of strange and terrible stories. This tour has everything you need to know about the history of Prague and its ghosts.

Duration: 2h 00m
Price: One price: 450 CZK

UNDERGROUND WALK
CATACOMBS WHERE CONDEMNED PRISONERS WERE HELD
MEDIEVAL PASSAGES ONCE USED AS DUNGEONS
GRUESOME HISTORIC FACTS
INTRODUCTION TO THE PARANORMAL

This is a tour of Prague that has a little bit of something for everyone, from people interested in the history of the city to those who enjoy the eerie. The tour is led by a guide who will explain the history and provide insights into the haunted past of Prague.

Duration: 2h 30m
Price: One price: 500 CZK

Join us for good old-fashioned entertainment, we will take you out and make you laugh so you can experience the Prague Chilling Ride that is our Ghost Tours.

Please visit our website at www.annexatours.com

Tickets
- Prague Castle: Adult: 450 CZK, Child: 225 CZK
- Ghost Tours: Adult: 450 CZK, Child: 225 CZK
- Charles Bridge: Adult: 450 CZK, Child: 225 CZK
- Underground Walk: Adult: 500 CZK, Child: 250 CZK

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On Dark Tourism

“Dark tourism (also known as thanatourism) is the act of travel and visitation to sites, attractions and exhibitions that have real or recreated death, suffering or the seemingly macabre as a main theme. Tourist visits to former battlefields, slavery-heritage attractions, prisons, cemeteries, particular museum exhibitions, Holocaust sites, or to disaster locations all constitute the broad realm of ‘dark tourism’. Examples of dark tourism include, but are not limited to, visits to World War One battlefield sites in France or Belgium, Elimina slavery fort in Ghana, Melbourne Gaol in Australia, Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris, a Body Worlds exhibition in London or Berlin, Auschwitz-Birkenau in Poland, or Ground Zero in New York. […]

[…] Nevertheless, to date, the academic literature remains eclectic and theoretically fragile. Thus, our understanding of both production and consumption of dark tourism remains limited – especially considering the relationships between dark tourism and the cultural condition and social institutions of contemporary societies.  

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100 BERLIN MADE EASY

Charlottenburg Walking Tour

Highlights: Sammlung Berggruen, Schloss Charlottenburg and Schlossgarten Charlottenburg.
Distance: Less than one mile (excluding the gardens).

Note that most of the sights on this walk are closed on Mondays.

Take the U-Bahn to Sophie-Charlotte Platz where we will begin our walk. Head up (north) from the square on Schloßstrasse. You're heading straight for Schloß Charlottenburg.

To your right after Schloßstrasse and Welfenstrasse are the Schloßstrasse Villas. These restored villas (especially at numbers 63, 65 and 67) give you an idea of what this area was like at the end of the 19th century when it was home to Berlin's wealthiest residents.

Also to your right at number 69 is Abguss-Sammlung Antiker Plastik Berlin. Classical-sculpture fans can view works spanning 3,500 years (open 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. Tuesday through Saturday, and noon to 5 p.m. on Sunday). At number 69 is Heimatmuseum Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf (open 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. Tuesday through Sunday). This local-history museum features changing exhibits.

Across the street at number 1a is our next museum.

The Belkin Museum contains a huge collection of Art Nouveau and Art Deco objects, paintings and furnishings. (German Art Nouveau is called "Jugendstil"). It's closed on Mondays.

Next door (also on your left) at number 1 is Sammlung Berggruen: Picasso und Seine Zeit (The Berggruen Collection: Picasso and His Era). This museum contains the private collection of Heinz Berggruen, an art dealer. The vast majority of the works here are by Picasso, such as his famous 1939 painting, Women in a Hat. The collection also contains works by such notables as van Gogh, Matisse, Klee and Cezanne. It's closed on Mondays.
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Straight ahead at the end of Schönbrunn is our next sight.

The Schloss Charlottenburg was built by King Friedrich I in the late 1600s for his wife Sophie Charlotte as a summer residence. Over the years, additions by subsequent kings increased its size. Like so many other historic buildings in Berlin, it was severely damaged in World War II, but has been reconstructed. Notice the statue of King Friedrich on his horse as you enter. The apartments of the king and his wife in the Altes Schloss (Old Palace) include the over-the-top Reception Chamber lined with mirrored walls and tapestries dating back to the early 1700s, and the incredible collection of porcelain from China in the Porcelain Chamber. The Neue Flügel (New Wing), also known as the Knobelsdorff Flügel, contains the apartments of Friedrich the Great (Friedrich II) and the Hohenzollern-Museum, featuring a selection of items from the royal collection. The Neue Pavillon (New Pavilion) was constructed in 1825 as an Italianate villa. It houses an art museum.

To the left of Schloss Charlottenburg is another museum.

The Museum für Vor- und Frühgeschichte (Museum of Prehistoric and Early History) follows the evolution of man from 1,000,000 B.C. to the Bronze Age. You’ll find everything from Stone Age tools to finds from the ancient city of Troy. It’s closed on Mondays.

Need a break? To the right of Schloss Charlottenburg as you face the palace is a traditional Berlin currywurst.

Biergarten LSUpt at 1 Lustenplatz isn’t the place to go if you’re looking for fine dining. But try this beer hall for its buffet table filled with hearty (some might say overly heavy) traditional German dishes, where there’s indoor and outdoor dining at picnic tables, and the featured beverage is constantly flowing. It’s inexpensive and a good place for a break, even if just for a beer.

Behind the Schloss Charlottenburg is our final stop.

You can wander the formal, huge gardens Schlossgarten Charlottenburg. They’ve been here since 1697. You’ll see swans swimming in small lakes, the Mausoleum containing the remains of
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