INTERESTS, IDENTITY AND NORDICITY
EXPLAINING NORWEGIAN MEDIATION EFFORTS

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SUMMARY

This study seeks to unpack the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts by undertaking a multi-level analysis within the framework of the foreign policy analysis literature. A greater understanding of the motivations behind third party mediation efforts has the potential to pave the way for a deeper understanding of other aspects of such mediation efforts, most notably whether the motivations behind peace engagement have an impact on the success or failure of an intervention. Norway, as one of the world’s most prominent third party mediators is an excellent candidate for such an analysis.

The arguments in this thesis are built around three inter-related hypotheses. It will be argued that the determining factors behind Norwegian mediation efforts are threefold. This study contends that Norway becomes involved in the domestic affairs of other countries in order to further its own interests, both in the material sense and in terms of influence. It will however be argued that Norway’s national identity and its domestic politics are the reasons behind its choice of peace diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy. Moreover, it will be argued that Norway’s broader Nordic identity or ‘Nordicity’ is responsible for the manner in which it pursues its mediation efforts. In this context, emphasis will be placed on Scandinavian ‘norm entrepreneurship.’

In terms of methodology, this study will involve an in-depth quantititative and qualitative analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts. The case studies considered in this study will be the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), the conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the New People’s Army (NPA) and the conflict in southern Sudan between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The conflicts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka are of particular interest as they rank among the ten conflicts to have received the least UN attention in the period 1996-2005. These conflicts did not
result in a single UN Security Council resolution in this period. Sudan is of interest as, despite ongoing tensions, it constitutes a successful intervention, South Sudan having gained independence in July 2011.
ACRONYMS

ABB – Alex Boncayao Brigade
AFP – Armed Forces Philippines
AHLC - Ad-hoc Liaison Committee
AMRSB - Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines
ANC – African National Congress
ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group
CARHRIHL – Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
CFA – Ceasefire Agreement
CHD – Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
CLPA – Cordillera Liberation People’s Army
CoW – Correlates of War
CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
CSO – Civil Society Organisation
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo
ECF – Ecumenical Bishop’s Forum
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
EIC – Economist Intelligence Unit
FARC – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GOP/GRP – Government of the Philippines
GOS – Government of Sudan
GoSL – Government of Sri Lanka
ICG – International Contact Group
IGAD – Intergovernmental Agency for Development
IGADD – Intergovernmental Agency for Drought and Development
INGO – International Non-governmental Organisation
IPA – International Peace Academy
IR – International Relations
JASIG – Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees
JVP - Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
LTTE – Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam
MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MILC – Managing Low-Intensity Intra-state Conflict
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA – Norwegian Church Aid
NCCP - National Council of Churches in the Philippines
NDA – National Democratic Army
NDFP – National Democratic Front of the Philippines
NEPP – Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
NORAD – Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NOK – Norwegian Krone
NPA – New People’s Army
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS – Ordinary Least Squares
PCEC - Philippine Conference of Evangelical Churches
PEPP – Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform
PHP – Philippine Peso
PKK – Kurdish Worker’s Party
PKP – Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas
PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PLOTE - People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam
PNOC – Philippine National Oil Company
PRIO – Peace Research Institute Oslo
PSD – Private Sector Development
RAM – Rational Actor Model
RPA – Revolutionary Proletarian Army
RPMP - Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas
SLMM – Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
TIPH - Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron
TULF – Tamil United Liberation Front
UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN – United Nations
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Despite its great distance from those parts of the world in which the deadliest conflicts are played out, Norway is frequently hailed as one of the key players in non-military conflict resolution in the world. This study seeks to establish why Norway frequently fulfils the role of third party mediator, given that many of the country’s peace efforts have been unsuccessful. The Norwegian led peace process in Sri Lanka was ultimately abandoned in favour of a military solution and while the Oslo Accords were groundbreaking at the time of signing, we are still very far from seeing a peaceful resolution to the Israel/Palestine conflict. Norway’s efforts to foster peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea caused much resentment and as yet there are no signs of a permanent resolution to the conflict between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC). Norway has of course had some successes - its reputation is not based upon conjecture alone. Norwegian representatives succeeded in bringing peace to Guatemala in 1996 and to Mali in the same year. Moreover, they played an active role in the South Sudan peace process, which culminated in the recent referendum on South Sudan’s independence. Following the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka, there have been a growing number of assessments of Norwegian peace efforts, although the majority have focused on the Sri Lanka case alone. The end of the Sri Lanka conflict has also seen a shift away from analyses, which are limited to lauding the country for its humanitarian efforts, without ever really addressing the question of what motivates those living in one of the most peaceful regions of the world to become so deeply involved in the troubles of other nations. This study seeks to contribute to this growing literature. However, much of the writing on Norwegian peace engagements remains uncritical. The praise heaped on Norway is undoubtedly warranted in those cases where the country’s representatives have facilitated lasting peace. As highlighted above, however, the number of successes is relatively small. Therefore, the perception that Norway can solve all the world’s conflicts, whether promulgated by Norway itself or whether the product of enthusiastic commentators seeking to offer quick solutions to complex problems, is clearly inaccurate. It is therefore important to go beyond superficial assessments of
Norway’s activities in order to fully understand what drives its peace diplomacy. There is a need for a comprehensive analysis of Norway’s “peace diplomacy” in order to further understanding of the motivations behind the country’s choice of foreign policy strategy. There is also a broader need to understand the motivations behind third party mediation efforts. In recent years academics and practitioners alike have called for a move away from the heavy reliance on quantitative methods in the field, advocating a greater use the multi-method approach in order to further understanding of mediation efforts.¹ Norway, as one of the world’s most prominent third parties, is an excellent candidate for such an analysis.

This thesis argues that the determining factors behind Norwegian mediation efforts are threefold. This study contends that Norway intervenes in the domestic affairs of other countries in order to further its own interests, both in the material sense and in terms of influence. It is however argued that Norway’s national identity and its domestic politics are the reasons behind its choice of peace diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy. Moreover, it is argued that Norway’s broader Nordic identity or ‘Nordicity’ is responsible for the manner in which it pursues its mediation efforts.

In enabling an understanding of the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts worldwide, while taking into account both the Norwegian perspective and the perspectives of the warring parties, this study serves as a significant contribution to the literature on third party interventions in intra-state conflicts. This study provides an in-depth quantitative and qualitative analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts, taking a multi-level approach which takes into account interests, national identity and domestic politics and Nordic identity and norms. This is done within the framework of the foreign policy analysis literature. This chapter will consider the existing literature on Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts, followed by a discussion of where this study stands in the context of the existing International Relations (IR) debates. An outline of the methodological approaches to be used in this study will then be provided. First, however, the existing literature on third party mediation will be reviewed in an attempt to set the scene for this study. While

the literature on third party intervention is extensive, the amount of writing devoted to Norwegian foreign policy and more specifically Norwegian peace diplomacy is limited. There are multiple reasons for this, not least the fact that very few people have questioned the official discourse on Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts. The aim of this section will be to provide a more comprehensive critique of the existing literature.

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

There is a vast swathe of literature addressing the subject of third party intervention in conflicts. In order to enable a focused analysis it is therefore important to clarify the parameters of this thesis. This study does not seek to address the issue of effectiveness other than in the context of the decision-making processes behind third party intervention. Literature on effectiveness will not therefore be reviewed in this section, unless it falls into the aforementioned category. Emphasis will instead be placed on the choice of mediator and the decision to mediate. These issues have been addressed from many angles. However, it is worth noting the lacunae within those writings. In addition to the unbalanced nature of much of the literature on Norwegian interventions, existing discussions fail to consider the possibility of economic motivations as a factor in the decision-making processes behind the country’s peace diplomacy. The majority of existing studies also fail to provide an assessment of the reasons behind the insurgents’ choice of Norway as a third-party facilitator or mediator.

Key contributions include Maoz and Terris’ analysis of the impact of third party credibility on mediation. Maoz and Terris argue that a high level of credibility does not necessarily make an actor a desirable third party. Rather, they argue that warring parties sometimes seek a third party who is not considered to be credible. The authors use a rational model of mediation to arrive at their conclusions. While providing an interesting insight into how third parties are chosen, this model suffers

from the problems inherent to the rational choice approach. Bercovitch suggests a number of motives behind the decision to engage in mediation. These are presented in Table 1.1 below. While relatively comprehensive, Bercovitch fails to acknowledge the possibility that in addition to the quest for influence, direct economic motivations may also play a part in driving states to serve as third party mediators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>MOTIVES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official mediator</td>
<td>• Clear mandate to intervene in disputes.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Desire to resolve a dispute whose continuance could adversely affect their own political interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Approached by one or both of the warring parties and asked to mediate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Desire to preserve intact a structure of which they are a part.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Seeing mediation as a means of extending and enhancing their influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in the dispute, or by gaining the gratitude of one or more of the protagonists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warring parties</td>
<td>• Hopeful that this low-risk and flexible form of conflict resolution will actually help them understand their conflict, reduce some of the risks and get them closer toward settling it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expectation that the mediator might nudge or influence the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Seeing mediation as a public expression of their commitment to genuine conflict management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Desire for an outsider to take much of the blame for failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A mediator can be used to monitor, verify and guarantee any eventual agreement.</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1.1: Summary of Bercovitch’s discussion of mediator motivations.

In addition to the motives behind third party intervention promulgated by Bercovitch and presented above, other important studies include Bercovitch and Gartner’s discussion of the different types of mediators, which considers the roles

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3 The rational choice approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.
played by international institutions, regional organisations and states. They argue that in intense conflicts, major powers and international organisations tend to act as mediators, while in low-intensity conflicts, regional and local actors tend to mediate. Criticising the state as a third party, Cunningham looks at the effect of external state mediation on the duration of civil wars. He argues that states sometimes intervene to promote their own agendas, which may differ significantly from those of the warring parties and that in such cases civil war can be prolonged by the external state’s intervention. Frazier focuses on territorial conflicts, arguing that third parties with political and economic interests are more likely to mediate in conflicts over territory than in conflicts over other issues. Other third parties, on the other hand, are actually less likely to mediate in conflicts over territory. Browne and Dickson look at the impact of ‘prenegotiation rhetoric’ on the outcome of a mediation effort, focusing on third parties who claim that they do not negotiate with terrorists but then proceed to do so anyway. Touval and Zartman argue that all states, whether they be great powers or small states, mediate out of self-interest and that institutions also mediate for the same reason. This argument is in keeping with the hypothesis of this study, however it is too simplistic, in that it fails to take into account the other factors influencing a state’s decision to fulfil the role of third party mediator such as cultural influences and behavioural norms.

Bercovitch and Gartner’s claim that little attention has been paid to economic issues and the influence of resources on conflict management, and more specifically the choice of mediator, highlights a significant gap in the literature on third party mediation. This study seeks to address this gap. It will also use a multi-method approach to establishing the motivations behind Norway’s peace diplomacy. This differs from much of the existing literature on third party interventions in intra-state

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4 Ibid.
conflicts, which is predominantly the result of quantitative studies.\textsuperscript{12} Many of the arguments presented above are the result of such studies. The problem with using a purely quantitative approach is that studies incorporate vast quantities of data but fail to take into account the considerable differences between third parties, treating the USA, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Nelson Mandela as exactly the same. This issue will be discussed at greater length in the methodology section of this chapter. First, however, the literature on Norway’s peace diplomacy will be reviewed.

**NORWAY’S PEACE DIPLOMACY**

A parliamentary democracy in the far North of Europe, Norway receives relatively little attention in the IR literature. English language assessments of Norwegian foreign policy are relatively few. There is a larger body of Scandinavian language literature addressing this subject, however, it must be noted that most Scandinavian authors write in both the Scandinavian languages and in English.\textsuperscript{13} The relative lack of English language assessments is surprising given Norway’s considerable foreign aid commitments and its extensive peace diplomacy. Existing works on Norwegian mediation efforts tend to focus on specific interventions, glossing over the bigger picture, rather than looking at Norwegian peace diplomacy as whole. Moreover, although critical works have been on the rise in recent years, much of the literature available tends to reflect highly idealistic interpretations of Norwegian interventions. Kelleher and Taulbee describe Norway’s peace engagement as Track 1½ diplomacy, which they define as “the effective blending of the advantages offered by the two traditional tracks to effect favourable outcomes.”\textsuperscript{14} They list five factors as being behind Norway’s frequent interventions in intra-state conflicts worldwide. The first factor cited is Norway’s development of “a domestic consensus that has pragmatically synthesized Social Democratic and Lutheran global concerns for the oppressed and less fortunate.”\textsuperscript{15} They also cite Norway’s

\textsuperscript{12} Notable scholars relying largely on quantitative methods include J. Bercovitch, P. Wallensteen and Z. Maoz, whose works are discussed above.  
\textsuperscript{13} Examples include Kristine Höglund, Iver B. Neumann, Øyvind Østerud, Isak Svensson and Terje Tvend.  
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.482.
lack of colonial history as the reason behind Norway’s ability to present itself as a “credible neutral third party.” In addition, Kelleher and Taulbee describe the Norwegian government’s desire to chart an independent path, even during the Cold War, as a factor behind its role as an active third party mediator. The relationship between state and non-state actors is also considered to be important, as is Norway’s oil wealth, which they cite as enabling Norway “to pursue its selectively focused and long-term peace initiatives.” As with many assessments of Norway’s peace engagement, this borders on the idealistic, citing factors that can be applied to a number of small European states and to all of the Scandinavian countries. There is therefore a need to go beyond these generalisations and to address the specifics of Norway’s peace diplomacy in a more objective manner.

Kelleher and Taulbee also list the preconditions for Norwegian intervention in any given peace process. The willingness of the warring parties to engage in face-to-face negotiations ‘in good faith’ is one such prerequisite. The extent to which the Norwegian government commissions background research to establish the degree of commitment on the part of both parties is an important factor as it would serve as an indicator of the degree of importance assigned to this particular prerequisite. According to Crocker et al. “mediators…typically are not driven solely or even chiefly by altruistic motives.” However when discussing Norway’s peace efforts, they state that Norway does not publicise its motives for intervening in conflicts. Thus they present their own assessment of these motives, which they claim “include its desire to continue its self-conscious and highly popular international role as a good citizen and practitioner of humanitarian solidarity.”

De Coning et al. cite Norway’s “funding footprint” as a factor behind the country’s “scope and influence.” While not the subject of this paper, it is worth noting that there is almost certainly an overlap between the motivations behind Norway’s significant contributions to multilateral organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the factors behind its extensive peace diplomacy. In sharp contrast to its image as a neutral third party, Norway has been a key player in various international organisations and peace processes. This dual role highlights the complexity of Norway’s international engagement and the challenges faced in maintaining its reputation as a neutral and credible mediator.

References:
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. p.483.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid. p.38.
peace nation, Norway is one of the world’s top exporters of arms and military equipment. If Norway’s image is the motivating factor behind its peace diplomacy then this dichotomy between the discourse on peacemaking and military objectives must be explained. As a member of NATO Norway has troops in Afghanistan. Moreover, in addition to its military activities as a member of NATO, Norway also played an active military role in the enforcement of the UN sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya. While, ostensibly motivated by humanitarian factors, this nevertheless raises the question of how Norway reconciles its military activities with its much-publicised emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution and negotiation.

While Norway is considered a middle power by many scholars, it is, with a population of less than 5 million, undoubtedly small in size. The inherent one-sidedness in much of the literature on Norway’s peace diplomacy can perhaps therefore, be explained by Knudsen’s argument that academics from small countries often write about their own countries. He describes this as “an Achilles heel for more systematic, generalising small-state studies since it leaves the field dominated by researchers more liable to take a particularist view.”²³ Written from an outsider’s perspective it is hoped that this study may be able to provide a unique insight into the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions.

NORWEGIAN PEACEMAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IR PARADIGM DEBATES

Prior to embarking on a discussion of the methodology that was employed when conducting the research for this study it is necessary to locate Norwegian peace diplomacy in the context of the IR debates. Norway’s peace diplomacy can be viewed through a number of distinct lenses. Realist, liberal, constructivist and post-structuralist approaches will all be considered and their benefits and shortcomings discussed. Sil and Katzenstein’s ‘analytic eclecticism,’²⁴ the stance selected for this study, will also be assessed. While this study places emphasis on the decision-

making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts, rather than focusing on the efforts themselves, it is important to consider theoretical approaches to peace and conflict studies, as this study draws, in part, on the literature on mediation. This is largely because there is a disciplinary overlap between the various subfields of IR, including peace and conflict studies, Foreign Policy Analysis, and mainstream IR. Literature addressing the question of mediator motivations can therefore be found across all of these disciplines. Following a brief overview of peace and conflict studies in the context of the IR debates, the subfield of conflict resolution will be considered. Norwegian mediation efforts will subsequently be discussed in the context of the IR paradigm debates. Kriesberg states that there has been increasing convergence between mainstream IR and peace and conflict studies. Richmond, however, argues that those working in the field of peace and conflict studies have often turned away from IR theory or have refused to engage with it at all. Despite this assertion, he outlines “four generations of theory” within the subfield of peace and conflict studies. They can be summarised as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SCHOOL OF THOUGHT</th>
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<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td>Realist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>Combination of idealism, structuralism and liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third generation</td>
<td>Liberal-realism and structuralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth generation</td>
<td>Post-structuralism</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

conflict that would not result in its replication in various forms, leading to a consensual, legitimate and discursive form of emancipation.

Table 1.2. Richmond’s four generations of peace and conflict theory.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Realist and neo-liberal viewpoints}

Richmond argues that in contrast to peace studies, conflict resolution is largely rooted in the pluralist tradition.\textsuperscript{28} Looking, more specifically at conflict resolution, Miall \textit{et al.} state that the sub-field of peace and conflict resolution has faced much criticism in the years since its inception.\textsuperscript{29} Realists, they argue, perceived conflict resolution to be “soft-headed and unrealistic” while neo-Marxists and radical thinkers “saw the whole conflict resolution enterprise as misconceived, since it attempted to reconcile interests that should not be reconciled, failed to take sides in unequal and unjust struggles, and lacked an analysis within a properly global perspective of the forces of exploitation and oppression.”\textsuperscript{30} William’s discussion of liberal approaches to conflict resolution suggests that others have sought to locate conflict resolution within the IR paradigms. He argues that liberals might argue that since the end of the Cold War “we now have a new paradigm of resolution where conflicts are seen as transformable, and where the parties’ behaviour and even attitudes can be changed to make conflict a thing of the past, at least in theory.”\textsuperscript{31} He does however, state that “liberals and realists alike have alternatively turned hot and cold on mechanisms like truth commissions and the use of techniques of conflict resolution as they either seemed to be working or were not.”\textsuperscript{32} Burton states that “power political realists tend to react to conflict resolution as merely another

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid. p.99.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. p.156.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p.197.
form of idealism.” He goes on to refute this notion arguing that “far from idealism, the attempt is made to bring together two apparently conflicting realisms: the realism of power politics leading to structural violence and the realism of the costs of the consequences of structural violence.” Jackson outlines neorealist and neoliberal approaches to conflict resolution, stating that neo-realists “argue that the anarchical structure of the state system precludes the possibility of genuine conflict resolution or transformation; in a world of self-maximizing states, effective conflict management, often through the use of power mediation or peace enforcement, is the optimal achievable condition.” Neo-liberals on the other hand emphasise, among others, the importance of cooperation, the establishment of international law, regimes and norms, the creation of security communities, the use of cosmopolitan peacekeeping and the extension of the democratic peace.

Constructivism

Avruch argues for a constructivist approach to conflict resolution. He argues that in view of the realist preoccupation with “amoral, maximizing, interest- and power-seeking states” conflict transformation or even the resolution of conflicts as policy are difficult to imagine within this paradigm. Avruch assigns great importance to the ways in which we define culture, arguing that culture is “contingent, emergent, contestable and contested.” He claims that by “locating culture with historically (and thus politically, religiously, and economically) situated individuals it is possible to conceive a more realistic sense of dialogue – or any other conflict resolution technique, such as problem solving workshops – in the search for commonalities.” Avruch describes the discourse on the roles of third parties in conflict resolution as having been relatively open to cultural concerns. He cites the fact that third parties in international conflicts “often come from some European or North American country to work in a non-Western, or Third World, setting” as one

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37 Ibid. p.252.
of the principal factors behind this, claiming that this scenario means that “cultural differences are more naturally highlighted.”

Jackson also favours the constructivist approach, highlighting the fact that it “[offers] the possibility of a more holistic, multi-dimensional understanding of approaches such as war, conflict and conflict resolution.” He argues that constructivism is the best suited of all the main IR approaches to understanding conflict and conflict resolution because

“[…] just like conflict resolution, constructivism is concerned with the beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of parties in conflict, the normative structures that regulate conflict behaviour, the formation of regimes, the communicative-discursive strategies adopted by intermediaries in conflict, the role of language, memory and narratives in reconciliation and the actions that individuals and groups can take to shape their lives and resolve their conflicts.”

Jackson states that there is no direct constructivist theory of conflict resolution and that to date there have been very few studies focusing on conflict-resolution, which locate themselves directly within a constructivist framework. He argues that one of the key implications of a constructivist approach to conflict resolution is that such efforts “must be characterized by holism.” Thus a constructivist approach would serve to confirm the assertion that conflict resolution “must focus upon dealing with both overt violence and ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ violence.” Such a holistic approach would also recognise the fact that in order to build a ‘positive peace’ “the reconstruction of peaceful discourses and non-hostile identities must occur at the level of civil society, as well as local and national leadership.”

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39 Ibid. p.83.
41 Ibid. pp.172-173.
42 Ibid. p.182.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
In terms of Norway’s peace diplomacy, the constructivist approach is prevalent in both the literature on Norway and its foreign policy but also within the literature addressing broader Scandinavian issues. Höglund and Svensson claim that there is a lack of debate about Norway’s peace diplomacy, which may stem from a sense of unity around the country’s national image. Höglund, K. and Svensson, I. 2009. “Mediating between tigers and lions: Norwegian peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka's civil war.” Contemporary South Asia. Vol.17(2). p.179.

Skånland takes this further, adopting a discourse analysis approach to Norway’s peace engagement in a bid to understand how it was made possible. Skånland, Ø.H. 2010. “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement.” Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 45(1). p.35.

He also addresses the question of how peace diplomacy has been constructed as a “natural and necessary” part of Norway’s foreign policy. Skånland argues that three discursive constructions ensued in the aftermath of Norway’s success in the Middle East. The first of these was that Norway’s efforts in the Middle East were portrayed, by the Norwegian government, as essential to the positive outcome of the peace process. As such, peace diplomacy was a viable foreign policy option, not just in the Middle East, but also in other settings. Secondly, peace engagement was portrayed as an important part of Norway’s foreign policy. The third discursive construction related to Norway’s unique approach to peace promotion. This led to the portrayal of Norway as a state with particular qualifications in peace promotion and ultimately resulted in the concept of the “Norwegian model.” This model will be discussed at length, later on in this study. While Skånland provides an interesting insight into Norway’s peace diplomacy and the notion of a Norwegian identity, further investigation into this view of Norway’s role as a third-party mediator is required.

As highlighted by the above discussion there are helpful elements in each of the schools of thought discussed and in their approaches to the different aspects of this study. This study seeks to understand the motivations behind third party mediation efforts through a detailed analysis of the Norwegian case. It will consist of a multi-level approach, which transcends the IR paradigms. The arguments for this

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. p.38.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. p.39.
approach will be discussed following a brief discussion of the international ethics literature.

**International ethics**

The international ethics literature is also relevant to the question of Norway’s mediation efforts. According to Amstutz, international ethics in the context of IR deals with the issue of moral values in foreign policy decision-making. In the context of foreign policy decision-makers must “select the most desirable action from a number of available alternatives, each involving moral limitations.” Amstutz goes on to argue that moral values provide the means by which to “illuminate and define” a country’s interests. He states that moral norms influence IR via the conscience of the decision-makers, the influence of domestic public opinion and the influence of international reputation. Amstutz goes on to say that critics of international ethics state that morality has been “used to clothe and justify national interests resulting in rigid, moralistic foreign policies.” This is an interesting assertion and is worth considering in the context of Norway’s peace diplomacy because it suggests that it is often difficult to determine where the boundary between morality and interests lies. Coicaud and Warner, argue that during the 1990s “the spirit of the times advocated greater respect and better implementation of certain norms in the name of a more “ethical” politics.” This could arguably explain Norway’s extensive peace efforts during this period in time. However, Coicaud and Warner go on to state that decision-makers still tend to revert to notions of national interest rather than incorporating ethics in their decision-making, thereby suggesting that political decision-making in most cases, continues to based on more than just ethical considerations.

54 Ibid. p.16.
55 Ibid. p.17.
56 Ibid. p.18.
58 Ibid.
If the purpose of IR theory is to aid our understanding of the major events and problems facing us today, then it is imperative that events are not simplified purely for the sake of theory. All potentially relevant resources must be considered, regardless of the theoretical tradition in which they are rooted. It is entirely possible that there are problems, which can be viewed and understood, through the lens of one school of thought alone, yet the reality of more complex problems, which do not fit into a particular box, must be acknowledged.

Sil and Katzenstein, exponents of ‘analytic eclecticism,’ acknowledge the limitations of viewing problems through a single theoretical lens. They describe analytic eclecticism as “a means for social scientists to guard against the risks of excessive reliance on a single analytic framework and the simplifying assumptions that come with it.”

Sil and Katzenstein argue that “analytic eclecticism increases the chance that scholars and other actors will hit upon hidden connections and new insights that elude us when we simplify the world for the sole purpose of analyzing it through a single theoretical lens.” Fearon and Wendt reinforce this argument stating that the most interesting research is likely to be that, which cuts across the rationalist/constructivist boundary. They argue that structuring IR as a “battle of analytical paradigms” can lead to scholars being method-driven rather than problem-driven in their approach which can in turn result in important questions or answers being ignored if they do not fit in with the “preferred paradigmatic fashion.” This is particularly pertinent in the case of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts, as attempts to view this through one or other theoretical framework have failed to provide convincing explanations. The ways in which this approach will be applied in the context of this study are described in detail in the conceptual framework, laid out in Chapter Two.

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60 Ibid. p.414.
61 Ibid. p.426.
63 Ibid.
ARGUMENT

This study argues that ‘middle powerdom,’ which is frequently used as a framework for explaining Norwegian foreign policy, is conceptually flawed. It is argued that ‘middle powers’ are not very different from other states as many of their attributes could be applied to states not falling into this category. This study argues that Norway’s peace diplomacy is driven by interests. However, that is not to say that Norway’s identity does not play a role in defining its foreign policy. Rather, it is argued that Norway’s identity, and its continuing identity-building activities, help to identify those interests, which are deemed appropriate, and more importantly ‘acceptable’ ways in which they can be achieved. This identity has therefore resulted in Norway’s choice of peace diplomacy as a key foreign policy strategy. It is argued that appropriate interests can be identified by the extent to which they comply with international norms. Thus, this thesis contends that ‘Nordicity’ and norms are also key factors in determining why and how Norway engages in peace diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy.

HYPOTHESES

This study was built on three inter-related hypotheses. These are outlined below:

Hypothesis I:

The first hypothesis of this study was that there is a strong correlation between the level of intervention undertaken by Norway in a given conflict and its economic interests. These interests include Norway’s extensive energy interests, which take the form of overseas oil exploration and bilateral trade. Moreover, it was considered likely that Norway’s quest for greater influence on the global stage is also a driving factor behind its mediation efforts. These factors were therefore deemed likely to explain not only the degree of intervention undertaken by Norway but also which

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64 Nordic identity.
conflicts Norway decides to become involved in. Put simply, it was hypothesised that Norway’s interests are the reason for Norway’s interventions in different countries around the world.

**Hypothesis II:**

The second hypothesis of this study was that Norway’s national identity and domestic politics have played an important role in shaping Norway’s foreign policy and its choice of peace diplomacy as an area in which it can excel. Moreover, it was hypothesised that this study would show that low levels of contestation within this identity and high levels of resonance have played a role in leading Norway to pursue peace diplomacy rather than using other means to further its interests in different parts of the world.

**Hypothesis III:**

The third hypothesis of this study was that there are a number of fundamental differences between Norway’s national identity and its Nordic identity. It was hypothesised that ‘Nordicity’ falls into the constitutive norm type rather than constituting a cognitive variant of collective identity. It was considered likely that this Nordic identity, of which ‘norm entrepreneurship’ is an important component, would be found to have played a significant role in driving Norway’s mediation efforts in intra-state conflicts worldwide. More specifically, it was hypothesised that ‘Nordicity’ determines the manner in which Norway engages in its interventions.

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65 While the warring parties may be the ones to request Norway’s assistance, Norway is under no obligation to accede to their requests.
67 According to Abdelal et al., constitutive norms constitute Norms or rules that define group membership, whereas the cognitive variant constitutes worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests, which are shared by an identity group. Abdelal et al’s model for operationalizing identity will be discussed at length in Chapter Two.
METHODOLOGY

Norway has intervened in over 20 conflicts in many different parts of the world. These interventions have taken various forms and have entailed varying degrees of involvement. It must however be noted that not all of the interventions have been carried out solely by the Norwegian government. NGOs and the Church of Norway have also played an important role in Norway’s peace diplomacy. Moreover other international actors have often worked together with Norway in its peace facilitation efforts. At this stage it is important to note Støre’s assertion that “Norway is directly or indirectly involved in a number of silent processes where the aim is to provide channels for parties who do not want any publicity in connection with the talks.” This was one of the key obstacles in providing a comprehensive analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts. However, as highlighted above, there were sufficient publicised interventions to ensure that this was not an insurmountable hindrance. The use of qualitative methods in the form of case studies was the primary means of overcoming this obstacle. Quantitative methods were also used to ensure that this study provides a comprehensive picture of Norwegian peace diplomacy.

Prior to embarking on an in-depth discussion of the methods, which were employed, it is necessary to define the key terms associated with this study. With regard to conflict, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) definition of conflict is used for the purpose of this study. Conflict is therefore defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” The time period covered for the purpose of this study is 1993-2011. The reasons behind the decision to cover this period are twofold. First and foremost, international relations have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The decision to intervene in intra-state conflicts is no longer determined by alliances with one of two great powers.

69 These include Colombia (FARC), Chechyna, Croatia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia (Aceh), Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Mali, Nagorny-Garabagh, Nepal, Philippines (NPA), Philippines (MILF/MNLF), Spain (ETA), Sri Lanka (LTTE), Sudan (South).


71 See Uppsala Conflict Data Program available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/faq/#What_is_a_conflict__
Secondly, 1993 is also the year, in which Norway brokered the Oslo Accords, resulting in a ceasefire in the Israel/Palestine conflict. This arguably put Norway on the map in terms of its role as a third-party in intra-state conflicts. Skånland argues that peace diplomacy became an important aspect of Norway’s foreign policy in the aftermath of its success in brokering the Oslo Accords, having previously consisted of *ad hoc* efforts, which received little public attention. Thus 1993 marked a significant shift in Norwegian foreign policy. In terms of geographical scope, this paper will seek to explain all Norwegian interventions in internal conflicts worldwide. Norway has intervened in conflicts in almost all geographical regions, including Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe. This rendered it necessary to establish what drives Norway to intervene in such a diverse range of locations and conflicts.

**Methodological debates**

Prior to outlining the methods to be applied in the course of this study, it is necessary to briefly consider existing methodological debates. As mentioned above there has been a tendency to favour quantitative studies when looking at third party mediation, eschewing in-depth case studies for large n-studies. This approach has both advantages and shortcomings. The same can be said for reliance on case studies alone. With this in mind, Druckman advocates the multi-method approach arguing that it “trades the weaknesses of one approach for the strengths of another” and going on to state that “when the different approaches are used together in sequence a more complete picture of the conflict or resolution process is achieved.” With regard to qualitative methods Druckman states that while enhanced case studies highlight the relevance of theory “for capturing the essential processes of complex cases” they do not “provide sound explanations for relationships among variables in the conflict setting, process, or outcome.” Case studies also fail to explain the bigger picture and as such, supplementing them with a quantitative analysis enables a more holistic approach to answering the research question. It is however important to bear in mind the fact that the quantitative

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74 Ibid. p.126.
approach also has its shortcomings. These will be discussed below with the aim of
highlighting the methodological pitfalls that this study must seek to avoid.

Prior to presenting the quantitative methods applied in this study, it is necessary to
evaluate the quantitative approach in the context of third party mediation, and more
specifically to determining third party motivations for intervention. A serious
problem with existing quantitative analysis in the field of conflict resolution efforts
stems from the fact that many of the datasets in use today appear to provide a
wealth of information regarding third party interventions but actually contain
flawed data. This is largely due to the fact that those gathering the data in question
often have differing interpretations of the criteria to be met for inclusion. The
UCDP’s Managing Low-Intensity Intra-State Conflict (MILC) dataset is a prime
example of this, with incompatibilities being included before they actually reached
the status of an intra-state conflict or after a cessation of hostilities occurred.
Moreover multi-state interventions are often included as several separate single
state interventions, even when they took place on the same day, in the same location
and involved the same warring parties. In view of the heavy reliance on such
datasets in the field, it is imperative that steps are taken to avoid such inaccuracies.
Moreover, the question of whether to take an events-based approach or whether to
consider the entire duration of the conflict is important. Using an events-based
approach is necessary for quantitative analysis but it can lead to misrepresentation
of the facts, especially in terms of establishing which third parties were involved in
a conflict. There are often instances of a state holding talks with the warring parties
on one day and an institution holding talks with the same warring parties on the
next day. Using an events-based approach, such a situation would constitute two
separate interventions, one of which was a single state intervention and the other a
case of an institution acting as third party. If one considers the conflict as a whole,
then such an effort would be a multi-party intervention, comprising both states and
institutions as mediator. As demonstrated by this example, the two approaches can
lead to very different results. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to this
problem. The best way to counteract these shortcomings is therefore to undertake a
multi-method approach as suggested by Druckman.
Quantitative methods

The quantitative element of this study involved the creation of an events-based dataset covering all Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts in the stated time period. The intervention data used was collected from Norwegian government reports, news articles and interviews. In addition to the variables discussed below, a series of control variables were also included. These were Norway’s political orientation at the time of the intervention, religious ties (CIA Factbook), Norway’s humanitarian aid to the conflict-affected country in the five years prior to the intervention (NORAD), whether Norway had diplomatic relations with the conflict-affected country prior to the intervention (COW diplomatic relations dataset) and the size of the diaspora from the conflict-affected country living in Norway in the year prior to the intervention (Statistics Norway). Other control variables often used in analyses of third party mediators were not included, as they were not relevant in the case of Norway. Principal among these was the question of colonial ties, as Norway has no colonial history. These could however be included in similar studies looking at other third-party mediators.

An ordinal logit analysis was used to establish the extent to which the independent variables influence the level of intervention undertaken by Norway in intra-state conflicts. However, the statistical analysis for this study was impeded by problems using the SPSS software package to carry out an ordinal logit regression analysis on a dataset containing a large number of continuous independent variables. The models, which ran successfully, did however provide important results. Moreover, the extensive qualitative analysis carried out in this thesis meant that this did not serve as major impediment to attempts to find answers to the research questions outlined earlier in this chapter.

Qualitative methods

For the purposes of the qualitative element of this study, when looking at the case studies emphasis was placed on Norway’s decisions, with the decision-making processes of the other parties playing a more secondary role. There are several reasons for this. While Norway may not offer to mediate directly, an important
aspect of Norway’s peace diplomacy, which has received very little attention, is the country’s active self-promotion as a mediator. Norway states that it only intervenes when it has been invited to do so by the warring parties. While this may be true, it has been suggested that there have been a number of instances where Norway has in fact offered to intervene ‘should it be requested to do so.’ This suggests that Norway is actively seeking to influence the warring parties. Moreover, there are marked differences between the effort that Norway puts into interventions in intra-state conflicts, with their commitment ranging from good offices to full-scale mediation. While all parties have a say in the degree of intervention undertaken, Norway has, on a number of occasions, made it clear from the outset, that it will only provide limited assistance. Nepal is a good example of this. There is also evidence to suggest that Norway may have turned down a request to mediate between rebel groups and the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Such claims were verified and where reasonable evidence existed other cases where Norway had declined to mediate were documented. The aim was to establish why Norway chooses to intervene in some conflicts, when it decides not to become involved in others. It is important to establish what accounts for these differences. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it was hypothesised that Norway intervenes in the domestic affairs of other countries in order to further its own interests. It was furthermore argued that these interventions frequently take the form of third party mediation because of the influence of Norway’s identity and domestic politics. It was also hypothesised that the way in which Norway’s peace diplomacy is carried out, is largely determined by ‘Nordicity’ and norms. Due to the lack of existing literature on this subject, the qualitative element of this study relied heavily on primary sources.

Interviews constituted one of the key sources of information for this thesis. This was particularly important in the Philippines case, as almost no information was available. One of the more surprising aspects of the research conducted for the purposes of this thesis was the range of different stories and views on how Norway came to be involved in its various peace engagements. Dates, key characters and the nature of events differed wildly, depending on who was recounting the story. This was not only the case for those from opposing sides but even those representing the same organisation or government. This made it almost impossible to decipher the
true course of events leading up to each Norwegian intervention. By picking out the points of consensus in all the different stories and by using a range of other facts it has been possible to come up with a version of events, which hopefully bears some resemblance to the truth.

While it was possible to speak to a significant number of senior policy-makers, access to Erik Solheim would arguably have improved the quality of the final outcome. Moreover, it would have been useful to speak to senior Sri Lankan figures involved in the GoSL – LTTE peace process. It must however be noted that the publication of NORAD’s Sri Lanka evaluation entitled “Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009” in 2011 provided invaluable background information about Norway’s involvement in peace process between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). Other Norwegian government documents dealing with Norway’s involvement in the aforementioned conflicts were also consulted. Many of these documents were available on the Government of Norway’s and NORAD’s websites and were therefore easily accessible. This was useful in that it made it possible to gain an insight into processes, which took place over twenty years ago. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) has played a supporting role with regard to Norway’s mediation efforts in the conflict between the Government of the Philippines and the New People’s Army (NPA). Their reports were therefore also consulted.

An unexpected development during the course of carrying out the research for this thesis was the release of over 200,000 US diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. A significant number of the cables released dealt with Norway and Norwegian peace diplomacy. As a result, information about previously ‘silent’ processes became available. This had a significant impact on the scope of the dataset used for the quantitative element of this study. Moreover, the cables also provided an interesting insight into the way that Norway’s peace efforts are perceived by external actors, and especially the US. Details of conversations held with senior Norwegian policy-makers were also revealed, providing an unprecedented insight into the decision-making processes behind some of Norway’s interventions in conflict-afflicted countries.
The Variables

For the purposes of this study, the dependent variable, “intervention,” refers to non-military third party involvement in intra-state conflicts, specifically, financial support, good offices, membership of monitoring groups, group facilitation and mediated talks. For the quantitative element of this study the dependent variable was assigned ordinal values according to the amount of effort required for the intervention whereby financial support = 1, good offices = 2, support to the peace process = 3, mediation/facilitation as part of a group = 4 mediation/facilitation = 5. The logic behind this is that in the Norwegian case, money is arguably less valuable than time. The amount of money devoted to peace and reconciliation, while large by international standards, does not constitute a disproportionately large sum by Norwegian standards. While good offices merely require the provision of a place to hold talks or other similar forms of low-key facilitation, this was nevertheless considered to require more effort than the provision of financial assistance. Examples of Norway providing support to a peace process include, leadership of the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH) in Hebron or membership of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao. Instances where Norway participates in a peace process as a member of a facilitation team, which actively participates in talks with the warring parties or in official negotiations, such as its role as part of the Troika in the Sudan peace process, are deemed to require more effort than mere membership of such a group. Mediation or facilitation by Norway, when it is acting as the sole third party to a peace process, was deemed to require the most effort and therefore this level of intervention ranks the most highly on the ordinal scale. The shortcomings of this approach have been discussed above and were rectified by the presence of a thorough qualitative analysis in this study. The independent variables for the purposes of this study were Norway’s bilateral trade with the countries in which it has been involved in peace processes and the presence of oil reserves. The data for these variables was gathered from the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) petroleum dataset and the CoW

75 The other members were the US and the UK.
Bilateral Trade dataset. A more detailed description of these variables and the ways in which they were measured is provided in Chapter Three.

For the qualitative element of this study, economic factors constituted Norway’s energy and trade interests in the conflict-affected countries in which it mediates. Influence was Norway’s position on the international stage and its aspirations in this respect. The aim was to establish the degree of influence that Norway has been able to garner from its interventions in the conflicts, which constitute the case studies for this thesis. ‘National identity’ pertains to the significance of the concept of a Norwegian identity and the relevance of the country’s domestic political scene in shaping the country’s foreign policy. The ways in which identity was operationalised for the purposes of this study will be discussed in Chapter Two. ‘Nordicity’ refers to the notion of a collective Nordic identity and the ‘norm entrepreneurship that these states engage in. Other domestic factors such as public opinion, NGOs and the role of the Norwegian church also fulfilled the role of unquantifiable independent variables for the purposes of this study.

Case Studies

The case studies considered in this study were the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), the conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and the New People’s Army (NPA) and the conflict in southern Sudan between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). These case studies were chosen on the basis that they constituted examples of Norwegian engagement in conflicts, which had received little attention from the international community at large. The conflicts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka were among the ten conflicts to have received the least UN attention in the period 1996-2005. These conflicts did not result in a single UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution in this period. Norway, however, has played the role of principal third-

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80 Ibid.
party in both of these conflicts. Moreover, a preliminary investigation showed that Norway appears to have been the only third-party to have been involved at a high-level in the conflict between the Government of the Philippines and the NPA and that its intervention in Sri Lanka was only preceded by Indian peacekeeping efforts in the late 1980s. In addition, Norwegian Foreign Minister Støre has claimed that Norway played its greatest role in these two conflicts. Speaking in Oslo in 2010 he stated:

“In Sri Lanka and the Philippines, Norway has had or still has a formal facilitator role in a peace process on behalf of the parties. These have been extensive engagements where we have spent a great deal of time with each of the parties to help them develop their positions and thus take important steps towards resolution of the conflict.”

The Sri Lanka case study is also of interest, as it has arguably constituted Norway’s most controversial peace engagement. Much of the Scandinavian literature on Norway’s role in the Sri Lanka peace process has shied away from addressing its shortcomings in depth. Examples include the earlier works by Höglund and Svensson. The key arguments promulgated in these works will be addressed here in order to highlight the areas that are focused on in the Sri Lanka chapter of this thesis. Work produced by Asian scholars such as Bandarage has been more critical of Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka but it has failed to provide credible arguments for Norway’s involvement in the country’s peace process. This work will also be considered here in order to highlight some of the areas, which require further attention.

Höglund and Svensson argue that the reasons behind Norway’s intervention in Sri Lanka are threefold. They claim that the first of these is that Norway is “particularly suited for undertaking mediation activities.” Their justification for this statement is, however, somewhat woolly. They cite an uncompromising history, wealth and a

commitment to humanitarian issues and human rights. Yet, these attributes can be applied to a significant number of smaller European states. As such they cannot be considered to be adequate explanation for Norway’s involvement in the Sri Lanka peace process. More convincingly, Höglund and Svensson argue that peace diplomacy is important for Norway’s “national image as a great, moral power.” Their final argument is the fairly standard explanation for small state and middle power interventions, claiming that it provides Norway with a role on the international stage, opening doors to forums, which would otherwise be closed to a state of its size. Höglund and Svensson address Sri Lankan criticisms of Norway’s intervention, however their analysis is selective, failing to consider some very credible critiques and focusing only on issues raised by Sinhalese nationalists, known for their hard-line views.

Beardsley focuses on the reasons behind the GoSL’s choice of Norway as a mediator. He argues that the GoSL was not truly committed to the peace process, merely using it as a stalling tactic. He states that there are two reasons behind the GoSL’s approach. The first of these is that the GoSL was facing rising losses and the second is that domestic public opinion was increasingly against the conflict. Beardsley also addresses the LTTE’s motives for accepting Norway as a mediator. He argues that the LTTE had no incentive to reach a lasting peace, as this would have undermined the justifications for its existence. He also claims that the peace process enabled the LTTE to pursue an aggressive recruitment campaign and to consolidate its control over large swathes of territory in northern Sri Lanka. Interestingly, Beardsley also highlights the significance of international events in the LTTE’s decision to participate in the peace process. He states that in the aftermath of 9/11, the crackdown on terrorist groups worldwide made it difficult for the LTTE to escape international scrutiny. By actively engaging in the peace process they were, to a large degree, able to divert attention away from their terrorist label.

83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
86 Ibid. pp.283-284.
87 Ibid. p.284
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid. p.285.
Bandarage, writing prior to the conclusion of the conflict, states that Norway was criticised not only by Sinhalese nationalists but also by Muslim nationalists, Tamil dissidents and a number of international human rights groups. She argues that Norway fulfilled a number of conflicting roles in Sri Lanka. These took the form of peace facilitator, leader of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and principal provider of both aid and loans. Expanding on the criticism faced by the Norwegian government, she cites examples of human rights abuses and ceasefire violations by the LTTE being ignored by the Norwegian leadership. She also cites instances of military equipment being donated to the LTTE by the Norwegian armed forces, and repeated calls by the Norwegians for the LTTE to be afforded the same status as the GoSL in negotiations. Bandarage’s sources appear credible, leading one to assume that there is at least an element of truth in these claims. However, she fails to address the question of why the Norwegian government should have chosen to act in this manner, supporting a group whose activities often flew in the face of everything the Norwegians purport to stand for. This is an important issue, which must be addressed when looking at the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts.

As demonstrated above, the existing literature on Norway’s peace engagements fails to address a number of key points. This thesis seeks to provide a detailed account of the run-up to Norway’s peace engagement as well as of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s continuing engagement until the early stages of the GoSL’s military offensive against the LTTE.

Norway’s involvement in the GPH versus NPA conflict was ongoing at the time of writing, with peace talks between the parties having recommenced in Oslo on 16th February 2011. Conflict between communist insurgents and the GPH broke out in the 1960s. While this conflict has resulted in more casualties than the conflicts between Muslim separatists and Government forces in Mindanao, the former has arguably been overshadowed by the latter. Post 9/11, the world’s attention has

91 Ibid.
focused on Islamic terrorism and the GPH has been under significant pressure from its American allies to resolve the Islamic insurgency in the South, thereby drawing attention away from the NPA. The conflict, however, continues to pose a significant threat to the country’s stability. There is very little literature on the subject of Norway’s peace efforts in this conflict. The CHD in Geneva provides basic information regarding the intervention on its website.\textsuperscript{93} There do not however appear to be any significant academic assessments of this intervention, despite the fact that it dates back to 2001. As discussed in the methodology section of this chapter, primary sources constituted the principal source of information for this aspect of the study. This made this a particularly interesting case study as it contributes significantly to the literature on peacemaking by providing a detailed description of a single-state intervention in a peace process, which has remained largely undокументed.

The Sudan case is particularly interesting as it not only spanned almost two decades and involved varying levels of Norwegian engagement, but also because Norway was involved in several peace processes involving different actors in the country. In addition to its involvement in efforts to broker peace between the North and the South, Norway also played a role in the Darfur peace process and in Eritrean attempts to reach a peace agreement between the GOS and the Eastern Front, operating in Sudan’s eastern provinces. Moreover, the literature addressing Norway’s engagement specifically is very limited and is dominated by works by Norwegian scholars. These works often fail to look at Norway’s engagement in a critical manner and as such they leave a number of key questions relating to Norway’s peace engagements in Sudan unanswered.

Kelleher paints an idealistic picture of Norway’s peace diplomacy citing its involvement in Sudan’s peace process as an example of “the time, focused commitment and financing it takes to be an effective external mediator.”\textsuperscript{94} She claims that many involved in the peace process credited Norway with “skilfully continuing behind-the-scenes conversations to keep the arduous process going.”\textsuperscript{95}


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. p.287.
Kelleher goes on to claim that Norway was perceived as a “non-threatening mediator” without vested interests in Sudan, backing up this claim by stating that “Norway had not invested in Sudan’s oil industry.” Evidence has since emerged to refute this claim. While Kelleher provides a comprehensive overview of Norway’s involvement in Sudan, she fails to mention a single criticism of their role. This suggests a lack of objectivity, in the sense that no third party or state is infallible. Mistakes are always made and there are always areas which can be improved on. Kelleher portrays Norway as the voice of reason, the one independent and unbiased party guiding other states and institutions along the road to peace. At present few alternative assessments of Norway’s involvement in Sudan exist, so it is difficult to verify the extent to which Kelleher’s portrayal is accurate. Grawert, however, presents a less idealistic picture of Norway’s involvement in the Sudanese peace process, citing ‘the scramble for oil’ as one of the reasons why Norway, along with the UK and the US, sped up the peace negotiations post 2003. Norway’s current activities in the Sudanese petroleum industry suggest that there may be an element of truth in these claims.

**Substantive evidence**

With regard to substantive evidence, evidence of Norwegian companies engaging in oil exploration and Norwegian hydroelectric and geothermal energy companies operating in Sri Lanka, the Philippines or Sudan was considered to be important. The more specific such data was, the more useful it was considered to be. Evidence that Norway declined to intervene in countries where it has no such interests also served to substantiate the hypotheses. A statistical correlation between Norway’s economic interests and their interventions was also considered to be a substantiating factor.

Evidence of Norway seeking to increase its prominence on the global stage was also deemed to have substantiated the hypotheses. Such evidence included statements by Norwegian government officials, aimed for domestic consumption, to the effect that Norway will play a decisive role in international affairs in the coming years.

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96 Ibid. p.288

Evidence of Norway being afforded a role in international affairs, disproportionate to its size, has also been deemed to have substantiated the hypotheses.

Evidence of Norway’s national identity being largely uncontested was considered to substantiate the hypotheses, as was evidence that Norway’s identity has high levels of resonance. Evidence to suggest that there is a clear difference between the Norwegian and Nordic identities was also deemed to substantiate the hypotheses, as was evidence to show that Norway seeks to fulfil the role of ‘norm entrepreneur.’

Falsifying criteria

The hypotheses were considered to have been falsified if there is no evidence of Norwegian economic interests in the countries in which it intervened. Evidence that Norway had never declined to intervene in an intra-state conflict was also considered to have served this purpose. Furthermore, evidence that Norway does not seek a prominent role in international affairs and no visible increase in the country’s involvement in international forums would also have falsified the hypothesis. Finally, while more difficult to assess, the absence of a Norwegian identity, built around Norway’s peace diplomacy, would also have served to falsify the hypothesis as would evidence to suggest that there is no dichotomy between Norway’s national identity and its ‘Nordicity.’

LAYOUT OF THIS STUDY

Having outlined the methodologies to be used in this study, it is now necessary to consider the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework for this thesis consists of a multi-level analysis within the framework of the foreign policy analysis literature. The three levels of analysis, which are used in this study, are interests and influence, national identity and domestic politics and ‘Nordicity’ and norms. A full explanation of this model will be provided in the next chapter, as will a discussion of the levels of analysis, which were not used for the purposes of this study. Chapter Three will consist of a general overview of Norway’s peace diplomacy, looking briefly at Norway’s history and its foreign policy as well as at
some of its earlier interventions. The quantitative analysis of Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts will also constitute a part of this chapter. Chapter Four will provide an assessment of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s role in the peace process between the GoSL and the LTTE. Chapter Five will provide an in-depth analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s involvement in the peace process between the GPH and the NPA. Chapter Six will evaluate the reasons behind Norway’s decision to play an active role in the peace process between the GOS and the SPLA/M, while also looking at the role played by Norway in the Darfur peace process and the peace process between the GOS and the Eastern Front operating in Eastern Sudan. Conclusions will be provided in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This study considers the literature on middle powers as the quest for greater influence, and the use of niche diplomacy are often cited as factors leading countries to engage in peace diplomacy. However, the limitations of this explanation are highlighted and the case is made for an integrated analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts located within the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Recent writing in the field of foreign policy highlights the inadequacy of research focusing on just one level of analysis. While the difficulties of employing theoretical integration as an analytical tool are many, there is a consensus among many scholars that this must be the ultimate goal for those working in the field. This study sought to devise an integrated model of analysis tailored to the case of Norway, in its quest to understand the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts. The reasoning behind adopting such a complex and ambitious approach to the analysis of decision-making processes is that by using a model, which addresses only one level of analysis one grossly over-simplifies a multifarious issue. It is worth noting that Norway is an ideal case for such an analysis as its relatively small size makes this approach much more feasible than a similar study looking at larger states like the USA or Great Britain.

The literature within this subfield is extensive. Thus, for the purposes of clarity, the conceptual framework will be presented by first considering Norway’s ‘middle powerdom’ and the implications that this status could have for Norway’s foreign policy decision-making. However, due to the fact that the middle power concept has some inherent flaws, alternative levels of analysis will then be considered. In addition to discussing the levels of analysis, which will constitute components of the conceptual framework, it is also necessary to take a brief look at those levels of analysis, which will not be applied in this study. The first of these to be considered.

will be the rational actor model (RAM), due to its predominance in much of the
decision-making literature. The reasons for dismissing this approach will be
highlighted. The reasons for dismissing bureaucratic politics and beliefs and the role
of individuals will then be discussed. In terms of the levels of analysis that will
form a part of this study, an assessment of the significance of interests and a desire
for influence in determining Norway’s foreign policy strategy will be provided. The
case will then be made for the importance of identity in deciding Norway’s foreign
policy trajectory. Finally, the potential impact of ‘Nordicity’ and ‘norm
entrepreneurship’ on the decision-making processes behind Norwegian
interventions in intra-state conflicts will be assessed. The purpose of this exercise is
to explain the suitability and relevance of each level of analysis within the
framework of Norwegian interventions. This is particularly important, as some of
the factors, which play an important role in determining foreign policy in other
states, have no relevance in the Norwegian context, while others will play a much
more significant role in Norway’s decision-making, than they play in other states.

MIDDLE POWERS

Norway is frequently described as a middle power. Yet defining middle powdrom
is no simple task. Cooper et al. avoid what they term “traditional definitions,”
which look at size, power and geographic location as criteria for middle powdrom,
focusing instead on “the technical and entrepreneurial capacities of states […] to
provide complementary or alternative initiative-oriented sources of leadership and
enhanced coalition-building in issue specific contexts.”100 Emphasising the
importance of behaviour, Neack claims that middle powdrom is “a self-declared
role that contains both status-seeking, self-interested behaviour and
moralistic/idealistic elements.”101 She places Norway in the middle power category,
arguing that one line of thinking is that middle power diplomacy “derives from a
moral imperative found in the political cultures of the middle powers.”102 She goes
on to state that this involves spreading their own social policies with regard to the

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102 Ibid. p.161.
redistribution of wealth and conflict resolution to other countries.\textsuperscript{103} Cooper \textit{et al.} are sceptical of this “emotionally centred” stance, arguing that countries like Canada, which have been lauded for their moral actions, are often revealed to be less than ideal when subjected to closer scrutiny.\textsuperscript{104} This raises an important question. If morality is not what sets middle powers apart, do middle powers warrant their own category at all? Behringer also places Norway in the middle power category. Although he argues that there are limits to which middle power leadership can be successful, he concurs with Neack in challenging the realist view that middle powers are merely followers of great power leadership.\textsuperscript{105} Instead, he supports the view that middle powers practice niche diplomacy, serving as catalysts, facilitators and managers in order to achieve their objectives.\textsuperscript{106} Jordaan critiques Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s assertion that “middle powers are recognisable by their foreign policy behaviour,”\textsuperscript{107} stating that “middle-power foreign policy is not determined by the constitutive features of middle-power states, or by their positions in the world system, although these features do shape their internationalism.”\textsuperscript{108} He argues that “it is instead, a product of contextually located deliberate action,”\textsuperscript{109} stating that “attempts at identifying middle powers focus on at least one, but more usually a combination, of the following characteristics: considerations of state capacity, position in the world order, the normative composition of the middle-power state–societal complex, domestic class interests, and the role and influence of foreign policy-makers.”\textsuperscript{110}

Cooper and Jordaan both address the issue of broadening the middle power category. They emphasise the need for including “emerging” middle powers in the category noting the distinctions between the different types of middle power. As demonstrated by the characteristics presented in \textit{Table 2.1} Norway clearly falls into the traditional middle power category and as such discussions of middle powerdom

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. p.161.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
within this thesis will very much focus on the traditional characteristics of such states.

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<td>Purpose of international identity construction</td>
<td>Distance from powerful in region</td>
<td>Distance from weak in the region</td>
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Table 2.1. The differences between traditional and emerging middle powers.

Cooper discusses functionalism in the context of niche diplomacy and middle power decision-making. He cites two benefits of adopting functionalism. The first, which he refers to as a symbolic benefit, is that countries were provided with “enhanced status in the international system.” The second is described as an instrumental benefit and pertains to the fact that middle powers were provided with the opportunity to build up a “constructive role” which distinguished them from the great powers. Cooper sees Norway’s middle power diplomacy as routine in form and discrete in scope. By this he means that in contrast to countries like Sweden, Norway has chosen to limit itself in terms of its foreign policy strategy, choosing to

111 Ibid. p.168.
113 Ibid.
focus on peace diplomacy rather than adopting a range of different strategies.\textsuperscript{114}

Despite the fact that Norway is categorised as a middle power by many scholars, Norway is also frequently discussed in the literature on small states.\textsuperscript{115} Bailes, for example, argues that all of the Nordic states can be categorised as small states.\textsuperscript{116} Knudsen, acknowledging its weaknesses, defines a small state as “a unit with a relatively modest territory and population,” stating also that a small state “can be any state in a relationship of marked inferiority of power \textit{vis-à-vis} another state.”\textsuperscript{117}

Writing in the early 1990s, Slim addresses the issue of small state mediation, using the Algerian mediation of the Iranian hostage crisis as a case study.\textsuperscript{118} She suggests that “an interesting phenomenon” may emerge in the field of IR “in which small neutral states, rather than international organizations, carry out the work of intervenors.”\textsuperscript{119} With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to be critical of this assertion, not least because international organisations continue to play a hugely significant role in resolving conflicts. Slim goes on to state that while countries like Lebanon (pre-1975) and Sweden, whose neutrality and status as a small state are both questionable, have long engaged in such activities, the fact that such activities are becoming institutionalised is new.\textsuperscript{120} Touching on the issue of small state mediation efforts, Rubin states that “one can almost conceive of the mediating small state as a private individual empowered through the existence of a national, sovereign identity.”\textsuperscript{121} It is difficult to conceive of a country like Norway, with its enormous economic resources, in this role.

The question thus arises as to whether Norway is a small state aspiring to middle powdrom, whether Norway is a middle power behaving exactly as middle powers are expected to act, or whether the concept of ‘middle powdrom’ itself is an inappropriate level of analysis for this study. The problem with the small state

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid. p.10.
\textsuperscript{119}Ibid. p.229.
\textsuperscript{120}Ibid.
classification is that it is far too broad and in that sense offers little in terms of furthering understanding of a country’s foreign policy. Many of the characteristics of small states overlap with the attributes of middle powers, yet middle powers form a much smaller category. Small states constitute two thirds of UN members today. Baldacchino is also sceptical of the term small state, preferring ‘smaller’ state. He reasons that “the so-called ‘small state’ is the typical state size” while “it is the large state which is the quirk and the anomaly.” He adds that there is “no sharp dichotomy between ‘small’ and ‘large’ states.” Middle powers could also be included in this argument. Cooper and Shaw argue that “in functional terms, the more successful small states adopt international practices that run on parallel lines to the classic middle power diplomacy associated with much bigger states.” In the context of mediation, Bercovitch highlights the importance of “the power distinction between small states and great powers.” While claiming that these terms do not refer to ‘size’ but rather to ‘weight’ in the international system, he chooses not to include a middle power category. Instead, he defines small states as “those whose ‘weight’ and resources are significantly below those of other actors in the international system.” Zartman does not distinguish between small and medium-sized powers. Discussing third party mediation, he suggests a number of possible motivations for states’ mediation activities. These are largely related to fears and concerns experienced by states neighbouring a country experiencing internal conflict and as such are not relevant to Norway. More relevant, though no more compelling, is his and Touval’s argument that medium sized and small states have no option but to mediate as they have no alternative foreign policy option. This viewpoint is difficult to justify, when faced with the diverse range of small state and middle power foreign policy strategies being implemented around

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123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
the world today. Venezuela, for example, practices ‘resource diplomacy’ and Rwanda is styling itself as the Singapore of Africa, suggesting that peace diplomacy is a strategy among many. The difficulty scholars seem to face in differentiating between small and middle powers suggests that these categories may not be as useful as proponents of the concept suggest. If one looks at the number of small and medium sized states, in area, population or in terms of power the category becomes extremely large indeed. Arguably the number of states not falling into such a category would be no more than six. Suggestions that small states or middle powers are in some way unique are thus difficult to justify as many of their alleged attributes can be applied to almost all states within the international system today.

Moving away from the small state category and focusing once again on middle powerdom, it seems clear that while Norway arguably fulfils the criteria laid out by Neack with regard to this category, there are indications that Norway’s foreign policy is more complex than this framework allows. Thus to view Norway’s ‘peace diplomacy’ through the middle power lens alone is at best too simplistic and at worst fundamentally flawed. Many of Norway’s actions are not in keeping with its self-proclaimed role as global player concerned only with matters related to the increased well-being of mankind. With a competitive defence industry, NATO membership and extensive interests in the energy sector, there is clearly more to peace diplomacy than a quest for greater global prominence. While the literature discussed above suggests that ‘middle powers’ employ “niche” strategies in order to increase their standing on the global stage, this cannot be and is not their only concern. Alongside their aspirations with regard to recognition and prominence they too have economic interests all too often ascribed to great powers alone. Moreover, middle powers are still subject to domestic pressures in much the same way that the great powers of this world are answerable, to a greater or lesser extent, to their people. The middle power lens tries to distinguish between states on the basis of their behaviour, yet the behaviour of so-called middle powers is not so different from the behaviour of other states. Therefore, it seems clear that Norway’s peace

diplomacy cannot be understood in terms of its ‘middle powerdom.’ The application of an artificial category is thus not helpful in determining why states behave the way they do. Moreover, the vagaries surrounding the definition of ‘middle powerdom’ further contribute to the problems with applying this concept. With this in mind, it is now necessary to consider additional levels of analysis, which could serve to provide a more comprehensive insight into Norway’s peace diplomacy. The levels of analysis, which will be omitted from this study, will be addressed, followed by an in-depth look at interests, identity and ‘Nordicity’.

THE RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACH

The rational actor model (RAM) is one that is frequently used to assess decision-making processes in IR. It is based on the premise that all states are utility maximisers and that all decisions that they reach are made with this goal in mind. Allison and Zelikow state that “in its simplest form, the RAM links purpose and action,” stating that “if I know an actor’s objective, I have a major clue to his likely action.”133 The full RAM on the other hand “presents threats and opportunities that the agent packages as pros and cons. The actor chooses the alternative that best advances his interests.”134 Highlighting the shortcomings of the approach, however, they state that the heavy reliance on assumptions is dangerous with some analysts relying “on logical inferences alone, without any evidence about what the actor’s objectives, options, and estimates actually were.”135

The rational actor approach has been used by a number of scholars in order to understand third party mediation. Among these are Maoz and Terris, and Zartman.136 Maoz and Terris state that “a rational actor contemplating mediation defines her utility in terms of (1) the prospect of successful resolution of the conflict, (2) the benefits accrued to her from bringing about an agreement, and (3) mediation

134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
costs.”¹³⁷ The principal shortcoming of this approach is the fact that the authors rely on the assumption that the players are unitary rational actors.¹³⁸ Thus while there are clearly advantages to this model it is also apparent that it has many limitations. This is certainly the case in the context of Norway’s peace diplomacy. Although the hypothesis of this study is that Norway is primarily serving its own interests and thus could be classified as a rational actor, this approach will not form the theoretical base of this study. Rather, it will be argued that Norway’s decision-making is dependent on a range of factors, which not only include Norway’s economic and strategic interests but also its identity and behavioural norms. The principal problem with the rational actor approach in so far as Norway is concerned, is that Norway is represented by a range of actors and organisations when it comes to its interventions in intra-state conflicts. As such Norway is not a unitary actor but rather a multitude of players, albeit primarily state-sponsored or state-influenced, that act for the Norwegian state. These include government officials but also academics, NGOs and the Norwegian Church. Consequently, a multi-level analysis of Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts rather than a narrower rational choice analysis is deemed to be more appropriate for this study.

GROUP DECISION-MAKING AND BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The literature on group decision-making and bureaucratic politics is extensive and as such it is difficult to provide an overview of its applicability to the case of Norway’s peace diplomacy in the space available. Nevertheless, a brief outline of the model will be provided below. In terms of group decision-making one of the key issues is small group dynamics. The concept of groupthink, whereby group dynamics become more important than all other aspects of the decision-making process, plays a dominant role here. In terms of bureaucratic politics, Ripley states that this can best be understood as the examination of three related concepts - bureaucratic roles, procedural scripts and cultural rationale.¹³⁹ Christensen and Redd state that within the bureaucratic politics model, foreign policy decisions are

¹³⁸ Ibid.
the result of bargaining between individuals as representatives of organisations. Due to the lack of literature dealing with Norway’s foreign policy it is difficult to establish the extent to which this level of analysis is relevant. However, it seems likely that while these factors will play a role of some importance this cannot compare with the role that these factors play in more powerful states. This is in keeping with Handel’s argument that “because of the reduced scale of complexity of bureaucratic and decision-making structures of weak states, there are usually fewer bureaucratic influences on foreign policy making.” While defining Norway as a weak state would be inaccurate, it is certainly not a great power. As such, group decision-making and bureaucratic politics are not considered to play a sufficiently significant role in the country’s foreign policy decision-making to warrant inclusion in the conceptual framework for this study.

BELIEFS AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The literature on the role of the individual in foreign policy decision-making has a wide scope which often extends into the realm of psychology. Walker argues that the beliefs of individual leaders matter in three key ways. The first of these is that the actions of leaders “affect the formation, reinforcement and alteration of shared beliefs and interests within a state.” The second way is that the beliefs of a leader in one state also affect the strategic interactions between states. In doing so they have an impact on the beliefs and interests of leaders in other states. The argument for taking into account the characteristics and beliefs of individual leaders is clear. It is therefore worth noting Hudson’s assessment of the factors, which affect the degree to which the characteristics of an individual leader influence foreign policy decision-making. She argues that regime type is an important variable, stating that in more autocratic regimes the importance of the leader’s personal characteristics is more pronounced. She does however qualify this

143 Ibid. p.61.
144 Ibid. p.61.
argument by stating that in some cases a democratically elected leader’s personal characteristics can still play an important role in foreign policy decision-making. Hudson believes that a leader’s interest in foreign policy is also important, as is the level of the crisis facing the leader. In the case of a severe crisis a leader may feel that the situation is too serious for him or her to bear the burden of decision-making alone or vice versa. Hudson also cites Hermann’s argument that the level of diplomatic training a leader has received is a significant factor in determining the extent to which his or her personal characteristics have an impact on foreign policy decision-making. Hudson argues that in some cases a leader’s expertise in a certain field or region of the world may also prove important. She also claims that leadership style has an impact on the leader’s role in foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, focusing on beliefs alone would be remiss. Significantly, Hudson states that the influence of groups on the leader is an important factor in determining the extent to which his or her personal characteristics influence decision-making. This demonstrates a degree of overlap between this level of analysis and group decision-making, discussed above, validating the argument that a multi-level analysis is the only way in which a true portrait of the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts can be achieved.

For the purposes of this study it is important to note that while an individual leader’s beliefs can play an important role in shaping foreign policy, leaders in Norway, a liberal democracy, serve relatively short terms. An individual’s beliefs, therefore, are unlikely to be responsible for a long-lasting trend in the country’s foreign policy. It is also important to note that Norwegian leaders are chosen by their party and not by the electorate, giving them less of a mandate to impose their own beliefs on the country’s foreign policy. In addition, governments in Norway tend to be minority governments, which also renders it difficult for an individual leader to make policy decisions based on their own beliefs. In fact the

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146 Ibid. p.38.
147 Ibid. p.39.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Jens Stoltenberg has been in power since 2005, having previously served as Prime Minister from 2000 to 2001. Kjell Magne Bondevik served from 1997 to 2000 and subsequently from 2001 to 2005. Thorbjorn Jagland served for just a year between 1996 and 1997. Jens Stoltenberg and Gro Harlem Brundtland arguably had the greatest opportunity to have a decisive impact on Norwegian foreign policy. The latter was in office for a six month period in 1981, served again from 1986 to 1989 and served for a six year period between 1990 and 1996.
leader alone does not make decisions at all. Consensus is required to push through any decision with regard to foreign policy. However, Hermann’s argument that “leadership still matters” on the basis that “leaders are called on to interpret and frame what is happening in the international arena for their constituencies and governments,” suggests that the characteristics and beliefs of individual leaders cannot be omitted even when looking at the decision-making processes of a liberal democracy. It is however important to note that individual beliefs may play a much greater part in the decision-making processes of the warring parties. Sri Lanka for example has had a succession of strong leaders in recent years and Sudan’s Omar Bashir has been in power for decades. Beliefs, therefore, could be important in that they may have played a role in the warring parties’ decisions to request and/or accept Norway as a third party mediator. However, the emphasis that is being placed on Norway’s decision-making processes in this study renders the influence of individual beliefs in the conflict-affected countries a secondary consideration in this study. Beliefs will not therefore constitute a level of analysis to be included within the conceptual model.

THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

This study uses a tri-level approach in order to understand the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts. The conceptual model for this study demonstrates the role played by interests and influence in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. These are both considered to be ‘generic’ interests. Norwegian identity and ‘Nordicity’ are also considered to be important factors, which contribute to the shaping of Norway’s foreign policy. This study argues that the combination of all three factors has resulted in Norway’s choice of peace diplomacy as its principal foreign policy strategy.

INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE

As discussed in Chapter One, the first hypothesis of this study was that there is a strong correlation between the level of intervention undertaken by Norway in a given conflict and its economic interests. It was also hypothesised that Norway’s quest for greater influence on the global stage is a driving factor behind its mediation efforts. Katzenstein argues that there are interests, which fall “outside of specific social identities.” He describes these interests as being “relatively generic.” It will be argued here that economic interests fall into this category. No state aspires to destitution or even mediocrity when it comes to their economy. Instead, each and every state seeks prosperity, whether for the benefit of the population as a whole or whether for the benefit of individual leaders. Norway has been more successful than most on this front. In 2009, Norway had the world’s 23rd largest economy with a GDP of US$381,766 million, notwithstanding the fact that its population stands below 5 million. Norway is an exporter of crude oil, with oil and gas accounting for 45% of its total exports. Of even greater interest to this study is the fact that Norway has a burgeoning defence industry, with the country’s arms exports accounting for 3.5 per cent of the global weapons trade in 2007 and earning the country US$425 million. Subsequent news reports suggest that this figure may have increased significantly in recent years. This is a clear indication that economic interests trump humanitarian concerns when it comes to Norway’s foreign policy, especially as some of the recipients of Norwegian arms have been involved in armed conflict at the time of the transaction. Rendering this level of analysis important is also the fact that many of the Norwegian companies involved in the exploitation of natural resources are, at least in part, owned by the state. Statoil Hydro (formerly Statoil and NorskHydro) is among these, with the government owning a 62% stake in the company. Norwegian companies have become active in many of the countries in which Norway has been involved in conflict resolution either during or on conclusion of peace processes. The Norwegian oil company Hamla, for example, was awarded a 5% stake in an oil field

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156 Ibid.
(Block E) in Southern Sudan in 2010. These factors alone are sufficient to warrant an in-depth investigation of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts at this level of analysis.

This study argues that Norway’s quest for greater influence is as much a generic interest as its economic interests. That is not to say that this study is adopting the realist argument that all states seek power and dominance. Power and influence are two very different concepts. While the quest for power and hegemony is limited to those states, which are frequently categorised as great, every state aspires to leave its mark, be it the Maldives or the United Kingdom. Influence has already been addressed in some detail in the section on middle powerdom. While middle powerdom will not be used as an analytical framework for this study, Norway’s quest for influence is undoubtedly one of the factors behind its peace diplomacy. As previously argued, however, this quest for influence is not a direct consequence of Norway’s size or existing influence, but rather a characteristic of all states. Norway is a particularly interesting case as, despite its location and its relatively small population, it is not a member of the European Union (EU). This means that Norway does not have access to many of the multilateral forums that other members of the EU are represented in and as such it is missing an opportunity to be more involved in international affairs. However, Norway undoubtedly harbours a desire for a more prominent position on the global stage, as demonstrated by its repeated calls for greater Nordic influence in international forums and its criticism of the G20 for failing to represent countries like Norway. Norway’s significant contributions to the UN and its leadership in the field of conflict resolution are appear to be means of garnering such influence.

**NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS**

Culture and national identity are important factors in establishing the processes involved in a country’s foreign policy decision-making. Hudson argues that the

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157 The Embassy of Norway in Sudan – Oil and Economy. Available at http://www.norway-sudan.org/News_and_events/Business/Norwegian-colours-on-both-sides-of-cross-trading-borders/
158 Der Spiegel. 22.6.2010. “Norway takes aim at the G20” available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,druck-702104,00.html
ways in which identity and societal culture affect foreign policy decision-making have become more relevant since the end of the Cold War and constitute one of the least developed levels of analysis with the field of foreign policy analysis.\textsuperscript{159} She goes on to state that national identity and culture are factors, which shape the domestic motivations behind foreign policy decision-making.\textsuperscript{160} In *Interests, identity and action* Ringmar goes so far as to argue that identity is the most important factor in determining political action, outweighing interests.\textsuperscript{161} Wendt argues that “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests.”\textsuperscript{162} Wendt goes on to state that “without identities interests have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction.”\textsuperscript{163} Wendt argues that states “share essential properties in virtue of their corporate identities as states”\textsuperscript{164} and that these generate four types of national interest, which are universal: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem.\textsuperscript{165} In the context of this thesis both the third and fourth type of universal interest are applicable in that, they are interests, which as discussed in the previous section, could conceivably have played a role in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts. It must however be noted that Wendt argues that the form that these interests take will vary from state to state and is dependent on a state’s numerous different identities.\textsuperscript{166} In Chapter One it was hypothesised that Norwegian identity defines which economic and strategic interests are acceptable, and the policy options available for their pursuit. This fits in broadly with the arguments promulgated by Wendt.

In the Norwegian context, national identity is an important factor when it comes to determining foreign policy. Norway’s position on accession to the EU is indicative of this. While Norway has applied for EU membership on four separate occasions, the Norwegian people have twice rejected accession in a referendum. This may relate back to Norway’s break from the union with Sweden in 1905. While

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. p. 233.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid. pp. 233 – 237.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
peaceful, the secession marked the end of over 500 years of unions with neighbouring countries. Skånland argues that an important aspect of Norway’s identity and self-image is an exceptionalism, which “underlines its special abilities in promoting peace, international justice and humanitarian values.” Within the humanitarian context, Norway “has developed an informal and flexible cooperation model between state and non-state actors.” Tvedt describes this as a situation in which, “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, research institutions and non-governmental aid organizations cooperate in a symbiotic relationship as extensions of Norwegian influence.”

The extent to which other Scandinavian countries have developed similar relationships warrants further investigation. It does however appear that Norway has developed a rather unique approach. De Coning et al. argue that Norway’s position as a small state means that it is generally considered to be free of the type of national interests, associated with major powers. They claim that “this has made it easier for its NGOs and research institutions to be closely linked to the Norwegian government without being accused of losing their nongovernmental status.” Norwegian NGOs have a significant impact on the country’s foreign policy decision-making. Significantly, almost half of Norway’s bilateral development assistance is channelled through Norwegian NGOs. Moreover, “Norwegian NGOs also provide important input in the formulation as well as in the implementation of aspects of Norwegian foreign policy in relation to developing countries.” This is an interesting dynamic, which warrants further exploration. However, the unique relationship between state and non-state actors is unlikely to be a motivation behind Norway’s peace diplomacy. Rather it appears to have been developed as a means of pursuing its activities, which are motivated by economic interests. Within the framework of this level of analysis, Johnston’s study of the strategic culture approach warrants consideration. He argues that strategic culture:

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167 Prior to its union with Sweden, Norway was united with Denmark.
172 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
“fundamentally problematizes the concept of a universal, ahistorical, unitary state-as-rational-actor inherent in neorealism approaches to strategic analysis, and suggests that both conflict and cooperation in international politics are rooted in historically constructed and socially learned assumptions about the strategic environment and appropriate responses to it.”

While the strategic culture approach is principally concerned with decisions relating to the use of force, it also has the potential to be applied to decision-making in a non-combative context.

Putnam’s work on the two-level game is one of the key contributions to the foreign policy analysis literature. He argues that “at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.” Putnam goes on to state that “at the international level, governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.” These games are inextricably connected. In this vein, Mullenbach and Matthews provide an insight into the factors behind US interventions in intra-state conflicts, arguing that international factors outweigh domestic ones when it comes to deciding where and when to become involved.

It is clear that in the case of Norway’s foreign policy decisions, domestic politics cannot be ignored. Describing Norway’s domestic political scene, Kelleher describes it as a “highly educated, closely connected governing circle whose members move easily between public, private and semi-official roles.” This suggests that the consensus required to pass legislation is not difficult to achieve, given the homogenous nature of those responsible for foreign policy decision-making. Østerud touches on Norway’s domestic politics arguing that the Labour party’s dominance has had an impact on Norway’s peace diplomacy. He states that

177 Ibid.
“the call of mission has been stronger to the centre-left in the political landscape, while the centre-right, and the foreign policy bureaucracy, have been more sceptical to the missionary idealism in Norwegian diplomacy.”

While not providing any concrete examples, he goes on to state that the latter have pointed out that “the ‘country without interests’ has had a number of rather specific interests after all.”

It is however worth noting Finnemore’s argument that domestic politics can play a key role in determining and defining national interests but they can’t explain all decisions made by policy makers. This suggests that there is a need to carry out further investigation into the domestic motivations behind Norway’s extensive peace diplomacy as well as into external factors.

Using identity as a variable can be fraught with problems. Scholars working on the Harvard Identity Project have however been able to come up with an analytical framework for doing so. As this framework is used to operationalise identity for the purposes of this study it will be considered in some detail. Abdelal et al argue that a collective identity can be defined as “a social category that varies along two dimensions — content and contestation,” with content describing the meaning of a collective identity. They claim that the content of social identities may take the form of “four, non-mutually-exclusive types,” which will be discussed at some length for the purposes of establishing how identity will be operationalised within the context of this paper.

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<td>Constitutive Norms (normative content)</td>
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<td>Norms or rules that define group membership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Purposes (purposive content)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals or purposes shared by an identity group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational Comparisons (relational content)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views and beliefs about other identities or groups, which are shared by an identity group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


181 Ibid. p.93.


184 Ibid.
Cognitive Models (cognitive content) Worldviews or understandings of political and material conditions and interests, which are shared by an identity group

Table 2.2. Types of identity content

The first type of collective identity addressed by Abdelal et al. is ‘constitutive norms.’ They argue that constitutive norms do not “determine the preferences of a group; rather, they define the boundaries and distinctive practices of a group.” Moreover, the authors state that “in this conceptualisation, the reasons to act in a particular way are found in the decision to perform a role, not in a decision to choose between optimising paths to some preferred outcome.” This argument is relevant both in terms of Norway’s national identity and in terms of its ‘Nordicity.’ Due to its applicability in both contexts this form of collective identity will therefore be revisited in the Nordic context later on in this chapter.

According to Abdelal et al, the second type of collective identity is ‘social purposes.’ This pertains to the ways in which a group can attach specific goals to its identity. More specifically, a group creates “obligations to engage in practices that make the group’s achievement of a set of goals more likely.” While this is an interesting concept it does not encapsulate Norwegian identity in the way that the cognitive model, discussed below, is able to. Similarly, ‘relational comparisons,’ the third type of collective identity as conceptualised by Abdelal et al does not really apply in the case of Norwegian identity. ‘Relational comparisons’ pertains to the idea that an identity can be defined by what it is not. This is arguably the least relevant form of collective identity to this study as Norwegian identity does not appear to stem from competition with other groups.

The fourth and arguably most appropriate form of collective identity is the ‘cognitive model,’ more simply described as ‘worldview.’ Abdelal et al argue that “in the realm of politics identities can affect conceptions of legitimacy, shared

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186 Ibid. p.697.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid. p.698.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid. p.699.
interests, and policy choices as well as preferences for political leaders and parties.”192 Risse et al go further, arguing that “collective nation-state identities define the realm of instrumental or material interests considered legitimate and appropriate in a given political discourse” claiming that at the same time “consensual identity constructions can be used by political actors to further their perceived instrumental or material interests.”193 This is almost certainly the case when it comes to Norway’s peace diplomacy, explaining why it is impossible to consider the country’s third party interventions from either an interests or an identity perspective alone.

Abdelal et al argue that contestation refers to the degree of in-group agreement with regard to the content aspects of identity.194 This study will argue that a low degree of contestation within the Norwegian identity enables the pursuit of foreign policy strategies like peace diplomacy with little opposition. It is also important to consider Risse et al’s argument for the importance of ‘resonance,’ which they argue, explains which identity constructions are available in a given political discourse, while interests, on the other hand, account for which of these arguments is likely to win out.195 This concept will also be considered in some detail when looking at the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts. It is, however, important to note that the Norwegian identity does not just define the actions of the state, rather, it plays an important role in shaping public opinion. In a liberal democracy like Norway this is extremely important, as the people decide whether a government stays in power on the basis of whether they are happy with the policy decisions that that government has made.

Norwegian policy-makers and scholars often attribute Norway’s peace diplomacy to its identity – citing Norwegian moral values as one of the driving forces behind its peace engagements. While these assertions imply that identity has played an important role in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian third party interventions it is important to remember that they do not constitute fact. Rather,

192 Ibid.
they are demonstrative of the way in which Norway’s peace diplomacy is perceived and portrayed by interested parties. It is therefore necessary to search for more concrete examples of Norwegian identity in the context of Norway’s mediation efforts. Possible examples include evidence of peace diplomacy being tied to the idea of Norwegian ‘exceptionalism,’ and attempts to link specific aspects of Norwegian culture to Norway’s peace diplomacy. It must however be noted that these are also subjective measures. Examples of domestic politics influencing Norway’s foreign policy decision-making are easier to pinpoint. Differences in the way that different political parties approach the question of peace diplomacy, public opinion on the issue, and the role of domestic pressure groups, such as the church and NGOs, are also easily identified.

‘NORDICITY’ AND NORMS

It is important to consider not just Norway’s identity but also the concept of a Nordic identity when looking at the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace diplomacy. Nordic identity falls into the constitutive norms category as described by Abdelal et al and will therefore be viewed through this lens. Finnemore attempts to establish how states know what they want, arguing that the realist and neoliberal view that states seek power, wealth and security is too simplistic.196 While she accepts that these are valid interests, she argues that realists and neo-liberals fail to explain why states want these things and what form they would take.197 She claims that it is therefore necessary for us to understand the international social structure to which states belong, arguing that “states are ‘socialised’ to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them live.”198 This does not only apply to international society but can also apply to regional groupings with a strong sense of shared identity like the Nordic states. It will therefore be argued that while Nordic states act as ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ these states are also ‘socialising’ each other to behave in a certain way. Thus both Nordic identity or ‘Nordicity’ and norms play an important role in shaping Norway’s foreign policy decisions.

198 Ibid. p.2.
The term Nordic encompasses Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Grendstad argues that “domestically, communality prevails over specificity in that the development of these countries’ institutions has converged.” In terms of foreign policy, however, he claims that the Nordic countries “diverged.” All the Nordic countries are parliamentary democracies with unicameral parliaments and they all have a five-party political system, consisting of communists, social democrats, liberals, agrarians and conservatives. They all practice the Scandinavian welfare model in which “social rights are based on citizenship and not on participation in the labour market or on levels of income.” The existence of a Nordic Council, established in 1952, reaffirms the strength of the Nordic identity.

Figure 2.1: Three observations on diverging Nordic foreign policies along two dimensions.

However, there have been marked differences in the stances taken by these with regard to foreign policy. Figure 2.1 highlights these differences. There is however evidence to suggest that this divergence varies on an issue to issue basis. All of the Nordic states have embraced humanitarianism to a greater or lesser degree although Norway has, without doubt, been the most active in the field of peace diplomacy. Finland has sought to increase its activities in this domain following former President Martti Ahtisaari’s success in brokering a peace deal in Aceh. Sweden

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200 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid. p.8.

plays an active role in conflict prevention\textsuperscript{204} and has, to some extent, carved out a role very similar to Norway’s for itself in the field of humanitarian aid. Its foreign policy strategies remain more diverse, however, than those of its neighbour. Almost all of the countries in the region play host to world-class institutions conducting studies in the field of peace and conflict resolution. Iceland and Denmark, however, have played a much less prominent role in terms of peace diplomacy. Some scholars have argued that Nordic peace engagement stems, in part, from a strong sense of morality. Yet Norway has taken the concept further than its neighbours. This suggests that while its Nordic identity plays a part in the country’s choice of foreign policy strategy there are other factors, such as those discussed earlier on in this chapter, that have driven Norway to go the extra mile when it comes to conflict resolution.

Further developing the concept of a Nordic or Scandinavian identity, Ingebritsen describes Scandinavians as ‘norm entrepreneurs.’ She argues that “while some critics may view the role of norm entrepreneur as strategic action by a small state, this does not discount the effects of Scandinavia’s pursuit of different models of interaction, models that structure the choices available to states in international politics.”\textsuperscript{205} She goes on to state that “with the consistent efforts of Scandinavia to promote its views and strengthen particular international norms, states of the sub-region have earned a global reputation as trustworthy and effective negotiating partners. This reputation is consciously cultivated and deepened as a cornerstone of Scandinavian diplomatic relations. Scandinavia’s peripheral position in relation to Europe has historically permitted these states to remain aloof from international engagement.” Reiterating Grendstad’s arguments with regard to the importance of the political culture within the Nordic states she argues that “the prominence of social democratic institutions, with ‘ideologies of social partnership’ [Katzenstein, 1985] and a preference for consensus in policy-making, enables these states to maintain consistency as they seek to export their model abroad — in environmental policy-making, peacekeeping, and international aid policy.”\textsuperscript{206} Given these high levels of cohesion among Nordic states, the question arises, as to whether the


\textsuperscript{206} Ibid.
arguments presented earlier in this chapter, regarding the importance of Norway’s own national identity, have any currency. In keeping with those arguments, Ingebritsen highlights the fact that while Scandinavian states work together to create international norms, both Norway and Iceland frequently take their own initiatives as well as embracing their ‘Nordicity.’ This suggests that it is important to consider both the impact of Norwegian identity and of ‘Nordicity’ on the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts around the world.

The question of a declining Nordic identity must also be addressed. Browning discusses the notion of Nordic exceptionalism, arguing that the ‘Nordic model’ has been in decline since the end of the Cold War. He goes so far as to refer to these concepts as a Nordic brand. Browning states that this model served two purposes, the first being the construction of the idea that to be Nordic one has to be exceptional and the second being to serve as an idea that can be copied elsewhere. This argument is very similar to Ingebritsen’s arguments regarding Scandinavian norm entrepreneurship. Browning claims that the latter has generally applied to socio-economic organisation but that this concept has also come into play on the foreign policy scene. Skilling on the other hand argues that the Nordic ‘brand’ is more relevant than ever, pointing out that at the 2011 Davos World Economic Forum, the seminars that were the most popular were those relating to the Nordic states. As such, the relevance of the Nordic ‘brand’ and its impact on the decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts will also have to be considered.

At this stage it is important to consider the issue of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ in a little more depth. While a desire among Nordic countries to recreate their “successes” in other parts of the world is undoubtedly one of the factors, which has driven Norway to take the lead in the field of conflict resolution, it is important to

207 Ibid. pp.11-23.
209 Ibid. p.28
210 Ibid. p.27
212 Skilling, D. Seminar on “Small is Beautiful?” Presented at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. Singapore: 15.02.2011.
note that these norms also become increasingly internalised in Norway over time. Abdelal et al argue that the internalisation of constitutive norms can be referred to as ‘socialisation’, claiming that this can occur in three ways. The first of these is that norms can bias choice in that certain options are consciously ruled out because they are deemed to be incompatible with an identity. The second is considered to be semi-conscious, referring simply to a reduction in the level of consciousness in choice. The third way in which norms are internalised is that they are so deeply rooted that they acted on unconsciously or out of habit. While Nordic countries engage in ‘norm entrepreneurship’ they increasingly limit their own foreign policy strategies as these norms become internalised within their individual states. Thus the processes of norm creation and of norm internalisation are continuous and have a significant impact on foreign policy decision-making. Discussing the internalisation of norms, Checkel describes a slightly different process to the one laid out by Abdelal et al. He argues that there are two ways in which norms become empowered domestically, arguing that there is both a “bottom-up” and a “top-down” process. He argues that in the case of the “bottom-up” process, “nonstate actors and policy networks are united in their support for international norms [and they] mobilize and coerce decisionmakers to change state policy.” In the case of the “top-down” process, “social learning, not political pressure, leads agents—typically elite decisionmakers—to adopt prescriptions embodied in international norms.” Thus “norms become internalized and constitute a set of shared understandings that make behavioural claims.” Both of these processes are potentially relevant to the case of Norway’s peace diplomacy. It is however, important to note Finnemore’s argument that “norms create permissive conditions for action but do not determine action.” This highlights the importance of looking at a range of factors when considering the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts, rather than simply focusing on the

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214 Ibid. p.697.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
impact of norm entrepreneurship and internalisation. With this in mind, the importance of applying an integrated model in this study will be discussed below.

There are a number of ways in which Nordicity could manifest itself in the context of Norway’s peace diplomacy. These include examples of the Nordic countries cooperating together to achieve a common goal and a common Nordic approach to humanitarian matters, with particular emphasis being placed on peace and conflict-related issues. Evidence of Norway engaging in norm entrepreneurship would also support the hypothesis that Nordicity plays a role in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian third party interventions. Acts of norm entrepreneurship could be instances where Norway has developed a new way of approaching peacemaking and where Norway has actively sought to export this approach to others operating in the field. Norwegian attempts to export other aspects of Norwegian culture, such as its management of natural resources, its social welfare system or its system of governance to the conflict-afflicted countries in which it intervenes would also fall into this category.

**THE NORWEGIAN MODEL**

At this stage it is necessary to discuss the Norwegian model, which is often described as epitomising Norway’s unique approach to conflict resolution. There are many definitions of the Norwegian model. A NORAD report published in 1997 describes the model in the following terms:

“Broadly speaking, the main contribution of the Norwegian state is financial support. The non-state actors - academics, NGO workers and local politicians - will have been involved in the area long before conflict broke out or peace negotiations started, and for quite other reasons than peace facilitation. Their unique knowledge of the area, their networks and long-established relations of trust are assets which the funding from the Norwegian State permits them to exploit in the new situation.”

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Kelleher and Taunbee identify six characteristics of the model, which differ quite significantly from the description provided above. These are:

- Personal trust: legitimacy derived from personal contacts.
- Secrecy and confidentiality.
- Long-term commitment.
- Government funding at critical points.
- Active facilitation.
- Neutrality: acceptance of Norway’s role as an unbiased team player and with an ultimate interest in cooperation.  

Former Prime Minister Hanssen-Bauer also lists six characteristics of the Norwegian model. These overlap to some degree with those cited both by Kelleher and Taunbee and the description provided by the NORAD report, which is cited above. These are:

- Patient facilitator.
- Availability of resources.
- Cooperation with national and international NGOs.
- Interaction between diplomatic and humanitarian assistance and between government and non-state actors.
- Norway is regarded as neutral.
- Norway has close relations to those who are mediators and have international strength and leverage.

As demonstrated by the above definitions and characteristics of the Norwegian model, understandings of what the model constitutes vary. This makes it difficult to assess the implementation and effectiveness of the approach. Particularly interesting is Kelleher and Taunbee’s inclusion of neutrality as a characteristic of the Norwegian model. As discussed earlier on in this chapter, Norway is not neutral.

This leads one to question how accurate their description of the model is. If one dismisses Kelleher and Taunbee’s description of the model, then the key points that come across are that the Norwegian government cooperates with NGOs and other non-state actors and that they provide a lot of funding, although the latter is not necessarily unique. Cooperation and interaction with non-state actors will therefore be the main point considered when looking at the Norwegian model in the context of the three case studies addressed in this thesis.

While the Norwegian model is often cited as an example of Norway’s uniqueness it also constitutes an example of norm entrepreneurship suggesting that there is some overlap between this level of analysis and identity and domestic politics. It must also be noted that the extent to which the Norwegian model has been implemented during Norwegian peace engagements has varied significantly. In fact, there are indications that in some peace processes the model was almost completely sidelined in favour of government-led intervention. This phenomenon is looked at in detail in the context of the three cases studies due to its implications for the third hypothesis. If the Norwegian model has frequently been sidelined in favour of government-led intervention then this would suggest that Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship do not always determine the ways in which Norway engages in its peace efforts.

AN INTEGRATED MODEL

While the above breakdown is useful in understanding different approaches to foreign policy analysis, it is important to note that there is a certain degree of overlap when it comes to the levels of analysis outlined above. To mitigate the complications that such an overlap could cause, this study creates a new clearly defined model, within which to analyse the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts. This model takes into account the peculiarities of the Norwegian political system and the country’s foreign policy, some of which have been discussed in the evaluation of the existing levels of analysis above. However, the aim will be to attempt to create a model that can be applied to other states engaged in ‘niche diplomacy’ with a little modification. Such a model would require the substitution of Nordicity with a level of analysis, which
is more pertinent to the case in question, such as regional identity, but it would retain interests and influence and identity and domestic politics as key levels of analysis. Existing attempts at theoretical integration include Allison and Zelikow’s tri-model approach to explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,\textsuperscript{225} which looks at the crisis through three separate lenses – the rational actor model, organisational behaviour and bureaucratic politics. While the combination of approaches used by Allison and Zelikow is appropriate to the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, this approach cannot simply be applied to other issues, such as Norway’s peace diplomacy. This is due to the fact that the factors which play an important role in decision-making processes in the Norwegian case, such as those discussed above, are very different. In attempting to understand Norway’s peace diplomacy it is therefore necessary to take a different approach, which emphasises the importance of economic interests and influence as well as taking into account the influence that national identity and ‘Nordicity’ have on foreign policy decision-making. It is for this reason that the analytical framework for this study will consist of three levels of analysis, as outlined above.

The multi-level analysis chosen for this study will strive to establish the extent to which economic and strategic interests have played a direct role in determining the decision-making processes behind Norway’s mediation efforts. It is hypothesised that a direct connection will not be found and as such an attempt will also be made to establish whether Norway’s interests have been instrumental in driving Norwegian efforts to find a foreign policy niche. Efforts will then be made to establish whether Norway’s identity and domestic politics have played a role in creating the parameters for ‘acceptable’ foreign policy interests, and moreover, whether they have led to Norway’s choice of peace diplomacy over other strategies as a means of pursuing those interests. Thus, while this thesis argues that the existence of foreign policy interests is indisputable, they would perhaps have taken a different form and been pursued by other, possibly more aggressive, means were it not for Norway’s identity and domestic politics. Finally, this study will seek to establish whether a broader ‘Nordicity’ exists and whether this ‘Nordicity’ has been responsible for shaping the way in which Norway pursues its peace diplomacy. In

In this context, efforts will be made to determine whether the Norwegian approach to peace diplomacy, sometimes referred to as the ‘Norwegian model,’ constitutes norm entrepreneurship. It must be noted that there is some overlap between Norwegian identity and Nordicity. However, while it is likely that Nordicity has played a minor role in Norway’s choice of peace diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy, Nordicity’s major role is hypothesised to have been in determining the trajectory that Norway’s peace efforts have taken. The ways in which the levels of analysis relate to each other will be looked at in more detail in the context of the three case studies. Efforts will be made to look at the ways in which the relationship between interests, identity and Nordicity varies from case to case. The ways in which any differences in this relationship might have had an impact on the mediation processes looked at in this study, will also be considered.

Having outlined the conceptual framework to be applied for the purposes of this thesis, the next chapter of this study will consist of the quantitative element of this project. The purpose of Chapter Three will be to provide a holistic picture of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions in intra-state conflicts around the world. The emphasis will be on establishing whether there is a link between Norway’s economic interests and its mediation efforts as these are the variables, which can be quantified most convincingly. The subsequent chapters will address the other aspects of the conceptual framework discussed above by means of in-depth case studies.
CHAPTER 3

NORWAY'S PEACE DIPLOMACY

The idea of Norway as a peace nation is not an entirely modern construct. According to Derry, Norway has held a “special position” in the world peace movement since the late 19th century.226 Other scholars and policy-makers argue that Norway’s long history of peace work can be traced back to Fridtjof Nansen and his work with refugees at the turn of the 20th century.227 Despite early peace engagement, however, conflict resolution only became a significant aspect of Norway’s foreign policy following the signing of the Oslo Accords, in which Norway played a major role, in 1993. Since then Norway has been involved in at least 20 conflicts worldwide. A NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) report written in the mid-1990s suggests that Norway provided direct support for peace negotiations or mediation efforts in 14 countries between 1990 and 1996 alone.228 The actual number may be considerably higher given that some processes remain secret. This chapter will outline the history of Norway’s peace diplomacy before looking more closely at the extent of Norway’s peace efforts and the ways in which these fit into the country’s broader foreign policy. An attempt will then be made to establish the broad decision-making trends behind Norwegian mediation efforts. These will be looked at in terms of Norway’s interests, identity and Nordicity. Within these categories, key issues such as Norway’s aid policy and the country’s growing weapons industry will also be addressed.

HISTORY

The first Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in Oslo in 1901. This was arguably the first time that Norway, which, due to its union with Sweden, was not an independent state at this point in time, was associated with international peace.229 Fridtjof Nansen also contributed to the idea that Norway was a nation of peace, in

227 Interviews in Oslo and in Singapore.
229 The other Nobel prizes are awarded in Stockholm leading to much speculation as to why Oslo was chosen for the peace prize.
both the years prior to and post Norway’s independence, through his humanitarian work.\textsuperscript{230} Despite these early indications that Norway’s politics were to be tied to the question of peace, there was no specific effort made on Norway’s part to engage in conflict resolution in the immediate aftermath of Norwegian independence, which followed a referendum in 1905. The union with Sweden took the form of two countries, with their own parliaments and laws, sharing a king and a foreign policy. During the time of the union, foreign policy was conducted by the Swedish foreign minister. However, due to its extensive maritime interests, Norwegians felt that it was important to have control over their own foreign policy without interference from Sweden. This was one of the key factors behind the union’s dissolution. Scholars have placed a lot of emphasis on early Norwegian efforts to create a Norwegian identity and to emphasise ways in which Norwegians are different from other Scandinavians or Europeans.\textsuperscript{231} These attempts at Norwegian identity building began in the late 19th century and will be addressed again in the identity section of this chapter.

Norway’s post-independence history will now be summarised in brief before looking at Norwegian foreign policy in a little more detail. Norway remained neutral throughout World War I. This policy was easier to implement in theory than in practice and Norway faced substantial maritime losses, having sent supply ships to Britain throughout the war. When World War II broke out in 1939, Norway again declared its neutrality, however it was invaded by Germany in April 1940. Following the war, Norway joined NATO in 1949, essentially abandoning neutrality. Significant oil discoveries were made in Norway in the 1960s changing the shape of the country’s economy. This also marked the beginning of Norway’s interest in providing humanitarian aid to developing countries as well as its engagement on the question of decolonisation.

CONTEMPORARY NORWEGIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Norway’s foreign policy has been characterised by its focus on multilateral institutions, with a particular emphasis on the UN.232 Other aspects of Norway’s foreign policy have been bilateral humanitarian aid since the 1970s233 and its decision not to join the EU. Criticism of Norway’s foreign policy has been on the rise in recent years. Key issues of contention include a lack of coherence, an overly idealistic approach and a lack of pragmatism.234 Despite the increase in criticism, the prevailing literature still views Norway’s foreign policy in a positive light, with much emphasis being placed on Norway’s role in providing humanitarian aid. This contribution is indisputably significant, but it is dangerous to view Norway’s foreign policy through this prism alone. Other factors, such as Norway’s economic interests, its membership of NATO and growing interest in the Arctic are also of importance and should not be ignored.

An important aspect of Norway’s foreign policy is the question of trans-Atlantic ties. Norway’s foreign policy decisions are generally very closely tied to those of the US. However, there is evidence to suggest a distancing from US policy in the 2000s. A US diplomatic cable suggests that following the 2005 elections in Norway, the coalition of the Labour, Centre and Socialist Left parties immediately sought to distinguish its foreign policy from that of previous governments.235 Examples given include regular high-level meetings with Iranian officials, despite US disapproval, increased relations with leftist countries in Latin America, public criticism of President Bush and “an almost ideological emphasis on dialogue and on peace and reconciliation facilitation.”236 The same cable suggests that the ‘traditional consensus’ is beginning to fracture and that there are signs that Norway’s foreign policy is going to be increasingly contested.237 This is an important point given the fact that there has been much emphasis on the fact that Norway’s foreign policy is strongly consensus-based. One of the key aspects of the Norwegian system is that there is a Committee on Foreign Policy and Defence

233 Aid via multilateral institutions began in the 1960s.
235 Cable 08OSLO57. Not your father’s Norway. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08OSLO57
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
(CFPD) within the parliament. While all foreign policy issues must be discussed within the CFPD, it is a notable fact that the approval of parliament is not required when a decision is taken. The cross-party nature of this committee therefore means that Norway’s foreign policy is very constant as it is, to a greater or lesser degree, above party politics.\textsuperscript{238} This point is also made by former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Vidar Helgesen.\textsuperscript{239} This goes some way in explaining the Norwegian government’s continued commitment to peace and reconciliation work, regardless of the political orientation of the government in power.

A white paper on Norwegian foreign policy published in 2009 sought to upgrade the previous and somewhat out-dated foreign policy document published in 1989. A notable aspect of this paper is that it emphasises Norway’s foreign policy interests. The white paper states that “a considerable number of foreign policy areas that have until now been regarded as soft, or altruistic, must be upgraded to priority areas in order to safeguard Norwegian interests.”\textsuperscript{240} It goes on to state “we must recognise that expertise in peace-building, society-building and international structures is now an important resource for promoting our interests.”\textsuperscript{241} Going further, the paper states that in the future interests will “serve to enhance and strengthen the motivational basis, scope and effectiveness of a policy that is primarily altruistic.”\textsuperscript{242} These are important points, which serve to suggest that the Norwegian government is moving towards openly acknowledging the fact that a foreign policy cannot be based on idealism alone. It seems unlikely that the role of interests is new, but their acknowledgement is certainly a move away from past approaches. This could be due to the fact that the role of interests in Norway’s foreign policy is on the rise, or it could be an exercise in ensuring greater transparency, when it comes to foreign policy. This issue will be considered again in the context of the three case studies.

\textsuperscript{238} Joon Grane-Hetland, Norwegian diplomat, Oslo, 3 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{239} Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid. p. 23.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid. p. 97.
PEACE EFFORTS

Norway’s peace and reconciliation efforts have received a lot of media attention internationally. Peace diplomacy began to be an aspect of Norway’s foreign policy in the early 1990s. The most notable engagement at the time was the role it played in the Israel/Palestine peace process, which culminated in the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, but Norway also undertook peace-related activities in other conflict-afflicted countries ranging from El Salvador to Armenia/Azerbaijan. Despite Norway’s extensive peace activities, this aspect of its foreign policy was not formalised until 2004, at the height of Norway’s engagement in the Sri Lanka peace process, when the Peace and Reconciliation section of Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established. It must be noted that while the Norwegian MFA’s budget for peace and reconciliation is high, it does not constitute the MFA’s largest expenditure, as demonstrated by Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Reconciliation Budget (1000 NOK)</td>
<td>663,450</td>
<td>647,725</td>
<td>648,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total budget (1000 NOK)</td>
<td>33,904,595</td>
<td>33,645,654</td>
<td>32,632,899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Peace and Reconciliation budget as a proportion of the total Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget

Earlier peace and reconciliation efforts were characterised by strong non-governmental involvement such as the FAFO Foundation in Israel/Palestine and Norwegian Church Aid, which played a leading role in the peace processes in Mali and Guatemala. The Sri Lanka engagement marked a step away from that model, signifying a move towards greater state involvement in peace and reconciliation efforts. Table 3.2 is a list of Norwegian peace engagements provided by the Norwegian MFA in 2011. While it is fairly comprehensive, it does not include so-called ‘silent processes,’ which were kept secret due to a request made by the warring parties. It also fails to include some of Norway’s earlier peace engagements.

\[243\] Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
in Armenia/Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Mexico and South Africa. A notable omission is Norway’s role in brokering a ceasefire between the Spanish government and ETA. Interestingly, a 2006 diplomatic cable sent from the US embassy in Oslo expresses surprise at Støre’s decision not to disclose his personal role in this particular process, which was apparently unknown even to staff at the Norwegian MFA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NORWEGIAN EFFORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Support to the Afghan government’s own peace and reconciliation initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Support to the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Facilitator for negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>Facilitator for negotiations by establishing the back channel leading to the Oslo agreement. Leader of the international donor community, AHLC. In dialogue with all parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Supporting the reintegration process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Supporting the negotiations in connection with the border conflict with Ethiopia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Supporting the negotiations in connection with the border conflict with Eritrea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Facilitator for the negotiations between the GRP and the NDF. Establishing side agreements and monitoring of human rights, economic and social questions as a foundation for further progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Active support to the peace negotiations from 1989. Peace agreement in 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Supporting the confidence building process from the middle of the 1990s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Financial support to mediation in Aceh and monitoring the peace agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Supported the negotiations following the outbreak of violence following the elections in 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Peacekeeping forces under NATO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Work on dialogue with and between the parties and other support to the UN led peace process from 1996. Peace agreement in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Supporting religious dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Active member in the international contact group (ICG).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Key actor and part of the so-called Troika in the peace negotiations. Peace agreement achieved in 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Support for various DDR processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Support for dialogue and reconciliation efforts since 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Norway’s peace engagements.

Table 3.3 lists additional peace processes in which Norway was involved but which were not made public or about which very little information is available. These processes were publicised following Wikileaks’ release of thousands of leaked US diplomatic cables and through other newspaper articles or documents. The most

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247 Cable 06OSLO374, C) NORWAY HELPED BROKER THE SPAIN-ETA DEAL. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06OSLO374
248 Peace and Reconciliation Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway.
surprising Norwegian engagement is arguably Tibet, where Norway has been funding talks between the Tibetan Government in Exile and the Government of China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY/REGION</th>
<th>TYPE OF ENGAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Support to the peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Mediation/Facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan – East</td>
<td>Mediation/Facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan - Darfur</td>
<td>Mediation/Facilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet</td>
<td>Funding for negotiations between the Chinese government and the Tibetan Government in Exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Good offices for talks between the Turkish government and the PKK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Norway’s other peace engagements 1993-2011.

Norway has also offered to become involved in a number of additional processes, despite the fact that Norwegian policy-makers claim that they only respond to requests for engagement. One example is Sierra Leone, where Norway offered to host talks between the government and the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). There have also been cases when Norway has offered to play a greater role in a peace process, than it was initially assigned, such as in the Middle East in recent years.

It is now necessary to address the principal purpose of this study by looking at the factors behind Norwegian peace engagements. A good starting point in determining Norway’s motivations is this list of reasons behind the country’s interventions provided by Norways’ foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store in a speech in 2010, which can be found in Figure 3.1.

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249 Details of these peace engagements can be found in diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks in 2011. Other sources include NORAD. 1998. “Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict - The lesson of Experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi” and Financial Times. “Turkey Spy Chief summoned over PKK talks.” Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12733a09-5328-11e1-8aa1-00144feabd0c.html#axzz20uALBQde.

250 Agence-France Presse. 1999. “Four countries, including Britain willing to host S.Leone talks.” Available at http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/four-countries-including-britain-willing-host-sleone-talks
Because it is in our national interest: Globalisation brings the impact of conflicts elsewhere in the world onto our doorsteps.

Because it is important: Directly and indirectly, violent conflict kills millions of people.

Because we care: We have a strong humanitarian mandate from the Norwegian people.

Because we can: We have the experience, expertise, resources and networks to make a difference.

Because we are aware of the complexities: As a government partner in peace processes, we know from first-hand experience the painful trade-offs involved in policymaking in uncharted waters, including the dilemmas entailed in balancing ambitious human rights policies with the aspirations and demands of religious communities.

Because we offer a comprehensive approach: As a government, we have the opportunity to speak to other governments; we can promote combinations of soft and hard approaches – including military means; we pull the financial plugs; and we can offer tailor-made expertise, for example in natural resource and energy management in conflict zones.

Figure 3.1: Jonas Støre’s reasons for Norwegian peace engagement. 251

Støre followed this list up with the following statement: “of course Norway has certain interests, for example in the energy sector, but these must not be mixed up with our political engagement in conflict resolution.” 252 Despite this claim, there is evidence to suggest that Norway’s economic and strategic interests do play a part in determining whether Norway engages in a process. These interests will be looked at in more detail later on in this chapter. The MFA’s white paper on foreign policy ascribes its policy of engagement to Norwegian values and “an altruistic desire to promote the common interests of mankind.” 253 Despite this rather lofty justification, the paper later addresses other motivations for Norway’s peace engagement, including the opening of doors for Norway. 254 Helgesen states that there is a desire to address the underlying causes of conflict and underdevelopment. He also argues

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that Norway becomes involved in peace processes because humanitarian problems have political solutions.\textsuperscript{255} It is however difficult to dispute the argument that successful peace engagement fosters stronger economic ties even if this was not Norway’s intention in the early stages of its peace engagements. These issues will be analysed further later on in this chapter and in the context of the case studies in subsequent chapters.

A key factor worthy of consideration is the fact that there have been instances when Norway declines the role of facilitator or mediator in a peace process. While Norway has evidently been involved in a significant number of peace processes there are also processes in which Norway has refused to become involved. This raises questions about Norway’s claim that it has a moral obligation to help those countries which are experiencing armed conflict. It is important to assess the reasons behind this course of action in order to obtain a clearer picture of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions. According to Norwegian policy-makers, a simple exercise undertaken to determine whether Norway becomes involved in a given process is that two key questions are asked: 

\begin{quote}
Does this further Norway's interests? Can Norway play a useful role here?\textsuperscript{256}
\end{quote}

Admittedly, the process is not quite that simple, as the nature of Norway’s interests must be appropriately analysed.\textsuperscript{257} Moreover, “useful” must also be defined, especially given that the utility of Norway’s interventions in a number of conflicts has been called into question.\textsuperscript{258}

It is more difficult to obtain information about a process that never took place than it is about processes that have occurred. It is therefore also useful to obtain information about interventions, which were at a lower level than requested or required. An interesting case in this respect is that of Nepal. Norway declined to play an interventionist role in the peace process between the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) who had been waging an insurgency against the GON since 1996, opting for a supporting role instead. In this particular instance Norway’s decision was based on the fact that it

\textsuperscript{255} Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{256} Interview with Ture Lundh. Oslo. 3 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{257} Most Norwegian policy-makers describe these interests as being altruistic.
\textsuperscript{258} Examples include Sri Lanka and Israel/Palestine.
was felt that India would be unhappy with any significant form of third-party intervention there. Moreover, Tore Hattrem, who was the Deputy Director General of the Peace and Reconciliation Section at the time, made it clear that Norway would cease its peace-related activities in Nepal should India object, citing the importance of Indian-Norwegian relations as the reason for Norway’s stance on this issue.\textsuperscript{259} This clearly suggests that Norway’s interests, with regard to its growing relationship with India, outweighed idealistic considerations in this instance. Yet another example of Norway’s interests Constraining its peace engagements is the case of the Caucasus. In response to US suggestions in 2006 that Norway become more involved in the region, Solheim, the then Minister for International Development, stated that Norway could not become engaged in the region due to its concerns with regard to alienating Russia.\textsuperscript{260} Moreover, there are also instances when Norway has sought to become involved in a peace or reconciliation process but has had to abort its efforts because of external pressure from great powers. Norway was keen to engage in a security dialogue with Iran but was prevented from doing so by significant US pressure.\textsuperscript{261} Other factors also play an important role in determining whether Norway will become engaged in a peace process. The Pakistani diaspora in Norway have requested Norwegian involvement in the Kashmir issue on a number of occasions but given the ‘geopolitical situation’ in that part of the world this is not deemed to be realistic by the Norwegian government.\textsuperscript{262} Whether the Norwegian MFA has the necessary human resources to become engaged in a particular process is also a determining factor as is the prospect of success.\textsuperscript{263}

A unique aspect of Norway’s peace and reconciliation efforts, which will be discussed again in the context of Nordicity is that Norway is one of the few parties willing to negotiate with proscribed groups and to treat these groups as equals, thereby providing them with a chance to reach a negotiated settlement. On the subject of negotiating with proscribed groups Norway’s foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre, speaking in 2010, stated:

\textsuperscript{259} Cable 06OSLO427, NORWAY’S ROLE IN NEPAL. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06OSLO427
\textsuperscript{260} Cable 06OSLO72, AMBASSADOR’S CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06OSLO72.
\textsuperscript{261} Cable 08OSLO57. Not your father’s Norway. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08OSLO57
\textsuperscript{262} Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
“… I believe it is important to have envoys who maintain contact with Hamas in the Palestinian Territory and Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is why there is increasing support for talking to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Not in a way that suggests political recognition or legitimises unacceptable actions, but in a way that makes it clear what is required to achieve a political solution.”

As demonstrated by this statement, Norway is a third-party that is willing to take risks and this sets it apart from other mediators. This has on occasion put Norway at odds with many of its European neighbours and with the US who, if only officially, do not negotiate with terrorists. As will be demonstrated later on in this chapter, Norway often appears to be biased in favour of groups, which are proscribed by other countries. While this may not be the case, perceptions matter and can have a serious impact on the way in which Norway is received in the countries in which it becomes involved.

According to a US diplomatic cable “the Stoltenberg government's foreign policy mantra, with FM Jonas Støre leading the charge, is to (re)establish Norway as a leader in peace mediation efforts.” This is interesting given Riste’s argument that Norwegian attempts to broker peace in Sudan, Sri Lanka and Haiti “got nowhere.” Interestingly, despite US assertions to the contrary, recent years have seen some toning down of the rhetoric regarding Norway’s role as a “humanitarian great power.” There appears to be a greater willingness to be objective about Norway’s peace engagement. The MFA’s 2009 white paper on foreign policy states that there is a need to upgrade foreign policy areas such as peacebuilding, which have previously been considered to be altruistic, in order to safeguard and, more significantly, promote Norwegian interests. Open criticism of questionable policy decisions has also become more frequent, especially since the inception of the

265 Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
266 Cable 06OSLO95. Post-palestinian Election: Norway Seeking To Engage. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06OSLO95
MFA’s Refleks project, which was conceived by Støre as a means of encouraging debate on Norway’s foreign policy.

**SAMPLE RECONCILIATION EFFORTS**

This section attempts to highlight the sheer diversity of Norway’s peace engagements since 1993. While there is insufficient space to address all of these engagements in detail, there are some key factors, which are worth noting as they will contribute to the debate throughout this thesis. Emphasis will be placed on how, and where possible why, Norway became involved in these countries.

While Norway’s role in brokering the Oslo Accords will not constitute one of the case studies of this thesis it is nevertheless important to consider it in brief, as Norway’s involvement in the Israel-Palestine peace process is arguably the most well known of its interventions and also one of the most analysed. This is among the reasons why this particular process was not selected for an in-depth analysis in this thesis. However, a few key points are worth noting. Norway became involved in the peace process as a result of a suggestion made by Rød Larsen, the director of the FAFO Foundation, who had become a personal acquaintance of Yossi Beilin, the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, in 1992.

It was Rød Larsen who suggested that Norway could establish an alternative track to the US-led Washington process. This is an extremely unusual approach, which is indicative of the role that individuals have played in kick-starting Norwegian interventions, and of the influence that individual academics and NGOs have with the Norwegian government. Given the highly complex and sensitive nature of the Israel/Palestine conflict, Norway’s decision to take up Rød Larsen’s suggestion to establish an alternative track to the Washington process might be seen as surprising, especially as Norwegian foreign policy had until this time been very pro-Israeli. It is important

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269 The reasoning behind this decision is laid out in Chapter 1. In summary, a large number of countries have been involved in the Israel/Palestine conflict, which has been a dominant feature of international policy and conflict resolution efforts since the creation of Israel in 1948. As such, Norway’s decision to become involved in this conflict is relatively unsurprising. Norway’s decision to become involved in less prominent conflicts like the communist insurgency in the Philippines, the conflict in Sri Lanka and the conflicts in Sudan is therefore of greater interest and analytical value.


271 Ibid. p.8.
to note that few of the people involved in the initial talks were government representatives. Rather, Yair Hirschfield and Ron Pundak, the Israelis involved in the back-channel talks, were academics. The Palestinian participants were however PLO officials. Moreover, Marianne Heiberg, the wife of the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time that the Oslo Accords were signed and an academic at the FAFO institution, played a key role in the early stages of the talks. This suggests that individuals played a key role in the early stages of this peace process.

To date, Norway continues to play a role in the Middle East and in 2007 Norway was the first country to recognise the Hamas-led coalition government and to provide aid to Hamas controlled ministries. This move was extremely controversial and Norwegian politicians subsequently admitted that they may have been too hasty in forging ties with the group given Hamas’ intentions with regard to Israel. This is a rare example of the Norwegian government admitting that its approach to proscribed groups might be flawed.

Norway also played a defining role in the peace process in Guatemala in the mid 1990s. This case is an interesting example of the potential role played by interests in Norway’s peace and reconciliation efforts. A Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) report on Norwegian commercial interests in Central America states “Guatemala absorbs a yearly average value of US$ 20 million of Norwegian exports more than a country its size and income level would suggest, or four times predicted value.” The report goes on to state that there was a sharp surge in Guatemala’s share of Norway’s Central American trade. Without referring to Norway’s role in the peace process the dates suggest that a link between Norway’s business interests and its peace diplomacy is possible. The report goes on to state that during the 2000s Statoil Hydro’s export of liquefied petroleum gas to Guatemala, together with oil and gas related exports from competitors, accounted for almost 50% of

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273 Ibid.
274 Hamas did not waver from its position that Israel must be annihilated.
276 Ibid.
277 Statoil and NorskHydro merged in 2007.
Norwegian exports to the region in this period. While it cannot be taken for granted that this was a direct consequence of Norway’s peace diplomacy, it is the only factor that appears to set Guatemala apart from its Central American neighbours, with whom Norway has almost no commercial ties. It must be noted that there is no evidence to suggests that this development was pre-meditated. However, the possibility exists that it was so and as such further research into the relationship between Norway’s interests and its peace diplomacy is required. The connection between bilateral trade and Norwegian interventions will therefore be analysed in the quantitative part of this study.

The NORAD evaluation report on Norway’s engagement in Haiti in the period 1998-2008 touches upon the reasons behind Norway’s involvement in efforts to broker peace. Interestingly, Norway had almost no formal ties with Haiti prior to the intervention and the two countries did not have diplomatic relations. The report states that the most likely reason behind Norway’s engagement is that its involvement in an International Peacebuilding Academy peace process was suggested by US Secretary of State Albright in 1997. This role was subsequently expanded. Concrete reasons behind Norway’s decision to proceed with the project are not provided. Similarly, Norway’s ties to Burundi were almost non-existent when it first became involved in peace and reconciliation efforts there. Figure 3.2 shows that Norway had diplomatic representation in under half of the countries in which it engaged in peace and reconciliation work in the year prior to the intervention. This is interesting and demonstrates the fact that the Norwegian state did not have formal ties with a significant proportion of the countries in which it has intervened. This suggests that the Norwegian government may have intervened in these conflicts in order to forge such ties. Reasons behind such a move could include a desire to increase trade in the long-run, although such a suggestion is purely speculative. Another possible explanation, however, is that existing humanitarian efforts undertaken by Norwegian NGOs were sufficient motivation for the Norwegian state’s subsequent peace engagement.

279 A think-tank based in New York.
281 Ibid. p.9.
Figure 3.2: Pie chart depicting the proportion of conflict-afflicted countries in which Norway had diplomatic representation prior to its peace engagement.  

Norway held talks with the Taliban in 2010 and again in June 2011. These talks are a continuing source of controversy and have led to lively debates under the auspices of the MFA’s Refleks project. Norway also held talks with parties to the Libyan conflict during the popular uprising there in 2011, which is interesting as Norway simultaneously participated in the NATO-led air strikes. It is important to note that, just like Norway’s military presence in Afghanistan, this was not a popular foreign policy decision in Norway. There was significant division within the parliament on whether Norway should have been participating in the strikes in Libya at all. This serves as another example of the fact that Norway’s foreign policy is increasingly being contested.

Sri Lanka was not the only peace process to generate anti-Norwegian sentiment. An interesting case of Norway exceeding its mandate in a peace process is the case of the Eritrea/Ethiopia peace process. While this was not an intra-state conflict, it is worthy of consideration as it demonstrates the fact that Norway’s partiality can, on occasions, have serious consequences. According to a US diplomatic cable “[Ethiopian Foreign Minister] Tekeda [Alemu] stated that Norway had taken a “hubristic approach” to handling the border dispute and had become far to [sic]  

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283 Interviews conducted in Oslo in February 2012.
284 This refers to Dr Tekeda Alemu - Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
close to Asmara.” 285 Another cable reveals that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles claimed that Norwegian groups were providing indirect support for Eritrean funds to Sudan and that the Norwegian government had been involved with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) beyond its coordination with the Ethiopian government, as well as being involved with other insurgent groups. The Prime Minister also accused Norway of excessive support for Eritrean policy positions. 286 Similar complaints have been made in other conflicts, most notably in Sri Lanka, which will be discussed at length in Chapter Four.

As demonstrated by the above examples, Norway has been involved in inter- and intra-state conflicts, territorial disputes and post-conflict situations around the globe. The sheer scale of this involvement is quite astonishing given the size of the country. While this thesis places greater weight on the ‘why’ rather than the ‘how’ of Norway’s peace engagement, the impact of engaging in so many conflicts should be taken into consideration. It is possible that Norway’s engagements would have been more successful if its resources had not been spread so thinly. Moreover, it is apparent that Norway’s expertise on some of the countries in which it has become involved has been extremely limited. While Norway had a long history of engagement in Sudan, for example, Norway’s knowledge of Haiti and Burundi was elementary at best. 287

**INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE**

When analysing the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace diplomacy, it is important to take Norway’s interests into account. The hypothesis presented in Chapter One states that Norway’s interests are responsible for its need to find a foreign policy niche. This section will attempt to evaluate the role that Norway’s interests have played in driving Norway’s peace diplomacy in a bid to establish whether they have had a direct impact on Norway’s peace engagements or whether

286 Cable 07ADDISABABA2778. Ethiopia: Assistant Secretary Frazer And Prime Minister Meles Discuss Ogaden, Somalia, Norway And Eritrea. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07ADDISABABA2778
287 NORAD. 1998. “Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict - The lesson of Experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi.”
they have had a less direct impact on Norway’s decision to incorporate peace and reconciliation as key aspects of its foreign policy. According to Smith “the close connection between Norway’s own interests and its peacemaker role, since this is the way Norway stays on the policy radar for the big players, does not receive much if any international comment.” This is in keeping with the assessment provided in Chapters One and Two of this thesis. However, as suggested above, the publication of the MFA’s white paper on foreign policy indicates a shift away from this position, at least in terms of acknowledgement of interests on the part of the Norwegian government. Norway’s oil interests are arguably of most importance here. While Norwegian officials are quick to point out that private companies and the Norwegian government are not the same, this is in some cases inaccurate. According to Neumann, the Norwegian oil company Statoil “is quoted on the US stock market but [its] board still consists solely of the Norwegian minister for oil and energy.” Moreover, the Norwegian state currently owns a 67.5% share of Statoil Hydro.

Norway’s weapons industry has also come into the spotlight in recent years. According to Curtis “Norway’s position as a significant arms exporter, together with its high defence spending (the fifth highest out of 16 NATO countries during 2000-05, for example) means that the picture of Norway as a peace-loving nation deserves to be nuanced and debated.” One of the accusations that has been levelled against the Norwegian government, is that not enough is done to ensure that weapons exported by Norway to countries like the US and the Czech Republic are not then re-exported to countries, which are experiencing conflict. It must however be noted that Norway’s laws on weapons exports are still much stronger than those of the majority of countries, and that Norway was behind a number of key initiatives, including the universal ban on cluster munitions. Moreover, plans are in place to strengthen Norwegian laws with regard to the need for end-user certificates. Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that the export of weapons

by state-owned companies\textsuperscript{293} creates something of a paradox. Other examples of issues on which Norway is lacking in consistency are the fact that Norway purchases weapons from Lockheed Martin but bans its sovereign wealth fund from investing in the company. There are also contradictions between Norway’s oil industry and its green credentials.\textsuperscript{294} Discussing these issues, Helgesen states that it is impossible to have a consistent foreign policy.\textsuperscript{295}

**Statistical analysis**

A quantitative study has been undertaken in order to establish whether there is a correlation between Norwegian interests and the level of intervention it undertakes in conflict-afflicted countries. The advantages of a multi-method analysis have been discussed at length in Chapter One and as such they will not be repeated here. However, it is important to note that a more scientific analysis of the connection between tangible variables, like bilateral trade, will strengthen the arguments laid out above. The principal alternative hypothesis of this thesis is that there is a connection between Norway’s economic and strategic interests and the level of intervention undertaken in a particular conflict. Therefore, the null hypothesis for this study is that there is no connection between the existence and level of Norwegian economic and strategic interests in conflict-afflicted countries and the level of intervention in which Norway engages. This section uses an ordered logit model to establish whether the alternative hypothesis holds and the null hypothesis can be rejected. The variables used in this study are presented in Table 3.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of intervention</td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
<td>Factiva and Lexis Nexis databases, Norwegian government and NORAD reports, International Crisis Group reports, the Uppsala Conflict Database, US diplomatic cables made public by Wikileaks and interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{293} The Norwegian state represented by the Ministry of Trade and Industry owns 50% of the shares in Nammo. The state also owns a 50% share in Kongsberg Gruppen ASA.

\textsuperscript{294} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm – Sweden. 27 January 2012.

\textsuperscript{295} Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Data Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora from the conflict-affected country in the year prior to the intervention.</td>
<td>Continuous Statistics Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-religiosity (Christianity as the)</td>
<td>Discrete CIA Factbook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{296}\) The presence of a consulate/embassy from the conflict-affected country in Norway in the year prior to the intervention.

\(^{297}\) The presence of a Norwegian consulate/embassy in the conflict-affected country in the year prior to the intervention.
Table 3.4: Variables for the quantitative element of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norwegian politics</th>
<th>Discrete</th>
<th>Various</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Ordinal logit regression has been chosen as the preferred means of analysis as a linear regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) would have been inappropriate because the OLS analysis treats the dependent variable as continuous.\footnote{Norusis, M.2010. \textit{PASW Statistics 18 Advanced Statistical Procedures}. NJ: Prentice Hall. p.69.} Moreover, a multi-nominal logit model would not have taken the ordered nature of the dependent variable into account. The variables in this study are of both the nominal and the continuous variety. The link function used for this analysis was the logit function, which is an appropriate link function to use when there is a fairly even distribution of data across the ordinal categories, as demonstrated by Figure 3.3.\footnote{Ibid. p.84.} This is also cited as being the most reliable of the five link functions, which can be used when conducting an ordered logit analysis. The equation for the logit model is:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{\gamma_1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \ldots + \beta_n x_n
\]

…where \( \gamma \) is the probability that the event occurred, \( \beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_n \) are the regression coefficients and \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \) are the independent variables.
Figure 3.3: The distribution of data across the five categories of the DV.

The dependent variable is the degree of the intervention undertaken by the Norwegian government in the conflict-afflicted country with facilitation (with Norway as the principal or only actor) = 5, facilitation/membership of support group (with Norway playing a major role together with other actors) = 4, membership of a support group (which involves attending regular meetings and some input into the peace process) = 3, good offices/fact-finding = 2 and financial support = 1.\(^\text{300}\) The independent variables in this study are the difference in trade figures for the year before and the year following the intervention and the existence of oil reserves. The control variables are diplomatic exchange, co-religiosity, the amount of humanitarian aid provided to the conflict-afflicted country in the five years prior to the intervention, the size of the diaspora from the conflict-afflicted country living in Norway in the year prior to the intervention and Norway’s political orientation at the time of the intervention. These variables are presented in Table 3.4. The dataset for this study counts interventions on a year-to-year basis and multiple interventions in one calendar year are classified as one intervention, with the highest level of engagement being used to categorise the peace effort. The reasoning behind this is that the motivations behind mediation efforts in the same year are unlikely to differ significantly, but may differ from year to year due to changes in government and other such factors. Moreover, as a large proportion of the data was gathered from

\(^\text{300}\) While in some cases financial support would be deemed to be of more value than time expended in fact-finding missions and in providing good offices, this is arguably not the case in Norway, which has vast financial resources but with a population of just 5 million people, rather less human capital.
major world publications it must also be noted that media attention for specific conflicts and peace processes can vary from year to year and that the above method of accounting for Norway’s peace engagements significantly reduces the impact of this effect. A total of 107 cases are present in this dataset.

It must be noted that the reason for including both proven and potential oil reserves is that many of the countries in which Norway has been involved have recently made oil discoveries. In many cases, the scale of the discoveries is not yet clear and as such they have not yet been included in datasets covering proven oil reserves. For instance, oil was discovered in the Turkana region of Kenya in 2012, in Uganda in 2008\(^{301}\) and off the Northwest coast of Sri Lanka.\(^{302}\) Oil exploration is also currently underway in Somalia and in Afghanistan and Norwegian companies have been involved in many of these explorations. It must however be noted that some of the oil discoveries were made after Norway’s involvement in the conflicts in question had ended and that it is therefore difficult to prove causality.

Statistically significant results were found for the potential/proven oil reserves variable. The results displayed in Table 3.5 suggest that if a conflict-afflicted country has potential or proven oil reserves then the expected impact on the level of intervention is a 3.897 increase in the ordered log-odds scale as indicated by the regression coefficient. Put simply, the existence of oil in the conflict-afflicted country means that the degree of intervention undertaken by Norway is likely to be significantly higher. The P-value indicates that the findings for this analysis are statistically significant to the 1% level. It must however be noted that there could be various explanations for this outcome. One such explanation is that resources are often the cause of conflict and as such it is possible that the majority of global conflicts have occurred in countries with natural resources thus explaining the result. However, the correlation between potential/proven oil reserves and the level of intervention undertaken by Norway remains statistically significant even when control variables such as co-religiosity and Norwegian politics are added to the model. Neither the political orientation of the Norwegian government at the time of


intervention or co-religiosity were found to have a statistically significant impact on the level of intervention undertaken by the Norwegian government. The Pseudo $R^2$ (Nagelkerke) for the models, which include proven/potential oil reserves is in the range of 0.137 to 0.152, indicating that these models have an explanatory power of between 14% and 15%, which would suggest that these models are relatively weak. However, it must be noted that the utility of the Pseudo $R^2$ is much debated, and therefore the low Pseudo $R^2$ does not necessarily suggest that the above findings are irrelevant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
<th>Model D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threshold: Level 1</td>
<td>1.221</td>
<td>-2.527</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>1.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold: Level 2</td>
<td>2.585</td>
<td>-1.383</td>
<td>2.022</td>
<td>2.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold: Level 3</td>
<td>3.939</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>3.393</td>
<td>3.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold: Level 4</td>
<td>5.077</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>4.530</td>
<td>4.879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                          |          |         |         |         |
| Difference in trade flow A |          |         |         |         |
| Difference in trade flow B |          |         |         |         |
| Difference in total trade flow |        |         |         |         |

| Proven oil reserves          |          |         |         |         |
| Potential/proven oil reserves| 3.897    | 3.641   | 3.826   |         |
|                               | (0.001)***| (0.001)***| (0.001)***|         |

| Diplomatic exchange A        |          |         |         |         |
| Diplomatic exchange B        |          |         |         |         |
| Humanitarian aid (million NOK) |        |         |         |         |
| Religion                     | -0.446   |         |         |         |
|                              | (0.212)  |         |         |         |

| Diaspora                     |          |         |         |         |
| Norwegian politics           | -3.75    | -0.196  | -0.206  |         |
|                              | (0.307)  | (0.597) | (0.578) |         |
| Pseudo $R^2$ (Nagelkerke)    | 0.137    | 0.011   | 0.152   | 0.140   |

* statistically significant at the 5% level.
** statistically significant at the 2% level.
*** statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 3.5: Results of the ordinal logit regression analysis

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303 See the University of Warwick’s ReStore project for a discussion on this - http://www.restore.ac.uk/srme/www/iae/soc/wie/research-new/srme/index.html

304 This analysis was conducted using the SPSS software package.
One of the problems encountered during this analysis was the fact that many of the models did not pass the test of parallel lines. The possible reasons for this are numerous and include the large number of IVs and the fact that a significant number of the variables are continuous. In an attempt to mitigate the impact of these factors, models were limited to three IVs. However, this did not result in a greater number of models passing the test of parallel lines. The models, which passed the test of parallel lines consisted entirely of nominal variables.

The statistical analysis has been useful in that it demonstrates a strong correlation between potential/proven oil reserves and the level of intervention undertaken by Norway in conflict-affected countries. The analysis also suggests that there is no statistical correlation between co-religiosity and the level of intervention undertaken by Norway. Moreover the political orientation of Norway’s government has had no apparent impact on the level of peace engagement undertaken by Norway. The principal shortcoming of the study is that it is likely that some interventions are missing due to the fact that they were not publicised. Moreover, problems relating to the inclusion of continuous variables also led to the study being less comprehensive than initially planned.

NORWEGIAN IDENTITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

‘Norwegians are peaceful people’ was the spontaneous comment of a surprising number of people when the subject matter of this thesis was first broached. What is most surprising about this is the matter-of-fact way in which people, from many different walks of life, said this. Clearly this is a very commonly held view, the origins of which are not quite so obvious. Perhaps people think of Norway and then sub-consciously relate this to the Nobel Peace Prize. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Norwegian identity building began in the late 19th century. Discussing Norwegian nation-building at the time of the dissolution of the union with Sweden, Neumann states “in order to stand out in the line-up of European nation states, Norway needed some special characteristics, something to set it apart not only

quantitatively as a number in a series, but qualitatively as a unique cultural instantiation of the human spirit.” \(^{306}\) Norwegian identity building has taken many forms. An interesting example is cited by Maria-Pia Boëthius in *Mediernas Svarta Bok*, in which she describes how cross-country skiing was taken up by the Norwegians in an attempt to create something essentially Norwegian upon their independence from Sweden. \(^{307}\) Norway’s emphasis on peace has been described by many of those interviewed as falling into the same category. This is demonstrated by *Figure 3.4*, which shows the relationship between identity and peace diplomacy as described by two representatives of the Norwegian MFA interviewed for the purpose of this thesis. They argue that while identity is one of the factors behind Norway’s decision to pursue peace diplomacy, peace diplomacy also serves as a component of Norway’s identity building project. This would suggest that peace diplomacy serves Norway’s domestic interests as much as it is a means for Norway to pursue its foreign policy interests.

![Figure 3.4: The relationship between Norwegian identity and the country’s foreign policy.](image)

In Chapter One it was hypothesised that Norwegian identity has been responsible for the decision to engage in peace diplomacy as a key means of furthering Norwegian interests, rather than opting for alternative foreign policy strategies. The idea that peace diplomacy has also been used to shape Norwegian identity, as touched upon above, was therefore unexpected. Peace diplomacy’s dual role as a means of identity building and as a means of furthering Norway’s foreign policy interests will therefore be looked at in more detail. Discussing Norwegian identity,


\(^{308}\) Interviews with Joon Grane-Hetland and Ture Lundh. Oslo, 3 January 2012.
an American diplomat based in Oslo wrote the following in a diplomatic cable:

“Norwegians truly believe that there is something inherently good about being Norwegian and that Norway has a special role in promoting peace globally. Those who do not agree with Norway's priorities are viewed as at best misguided and at worst morally wrong.”309 In a similar vein, another American diplomat writes:

“At times Norwegian leaders can be so convinced of the rightness of their cause that they are unable to understand that like-minded leaders could think differently. The [Government of Norway] tends to dismiss critiques and characterize them as lacking legitimacy or out of step with international law (read UN) and ethical behavior. Failure of their policies does not seem to undermine belief in their goals and are often blamed by the failure of other parties to follow Norway's example.”310

While these cables merely reflect personal opinions and perceptions, they are interesting nevertheless, providing an insight into how Norwegians view themselves and into how they are viewed by external actors. Providing an example of the model shown in Figure 3.4 in action, Riste suggests that “the accolade earned by the “Oslo Process” towards peace in the Middle East appeared to give currency to the idea that Norway and Norwegians possessed special qualifications as mediators for peace and reconciliation.”311 In this context Riste’s argument that the belief that Norway has a special role to play in guiding the world “up the straight and narrow path towards a peace based on international justice and humanitarian values has remained stable”312 is very interesting as it suggests that this is the manifestation of Norway’s search for a way in which to be a unique nation.

In a Wikileaks cable dating back to 2006 an American diplomat wrote “Norway's new left-of-centre government, as is clear from its decision to disassociate itself from the EU terrorist listing, is eager to carve out even a greater role as an

309 Cable 09OSLO386, NORWAY IS GOOD: NORWEGIAN EXCEPTIONALISM. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09OSLO386
310 Ibid.
312 Ibid. p.255.
international mediator.”313 This is an extremely interesting insight into the role of domestic politics in shaping Norway’s peace efforts, but opinion on which party is the greatest advocate of Norway’s peace diplomacy is divided. While many argue that the political left has been the greatest proponent of Norway’s peace and reconciliation efforts, others argue that the Christian Democrats are responsible for raising the profile of its peace engagement. Interestingly the statistical analysis conducted for the purposes of this study suggests that there is little difference between their efforts. Lundh states that Norway often faces positive pressure from the international community to continue its negotiations with non-state actors.314 He does however state that administrations vary in this regard, and US diplomatic cables reveal that the Norwegian view that they receive tacit US support for some of their peace initiatives may be misplaced. This is important as one of the reasons given for negotiating with proscribed groups is the support of other countries, which are not able to engage in such negotiations.

Norwegian missionary work is a factor that has been raised by a significant number of those involved in Norway’s peace efforts. An article published in the New York Times in 2002, refers to Norway’s peace diplomacy as a combination of ‘Lutheran missionary work and socialist idealism.’315 Riste argues that “the decline and end of the Cold War seems to have brought Norway’s “missionary impulse” back with a vengeance.”316 In this context it is worth highlighting the fact that religion has played a role in many of Norway’s peace engagements. Links between Norwegian churches and ecumenical organisations in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Sudan have been one of the factors facilitating the Norwegian government’s peace engagements in those countries.

A question, which has been raised in Norway, pertains to the degree to which NGOs are in fact independent given the fact that a large proportion of their funding comes from the Norwegian government. According to Neumann, the five largest developmental organisations in Norway consider themselves to be non-
governmental despite the fact that “the state has at times funded more than 90 percent of their work.” Some argue that this can be attributed to the fact that there are often no alternative sources of NGO funding in Norway. The causality here must however be examined - has this situation been created by the amount of funding provided by the Norwegian government or is the amount of funding due to a lack of philanthropists in Norway? There is a growing literature on GONGOs (Government organised non-governmental organisations), which to a certain extent is relevant to the Norwegian case. While GONGOs are generally associated with undemocratic governments seeking to disguise the lack of a civil society in their countries, many of their characteristics converge with those of NGOs operating in Norway. Most notable among these is their financial dependence on the government, but other factors include the government’s ability to influence the projects, which the organisations take on. Norwegian NGOs must report directly to the MFA and they are given five key fields within which they must work. On occasion this affords them less flexibility than they would like. There have also been instances when the MFA has told an NGO to terminate a project, most notably when the MFA intervened to stop Norwegian Church Aid from operating in the Nuba Mountains region of South Sudan. This is something, which will be explored in greater detail with respect to those Norwegian NGOs, which are working specifically in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

The question of why Norway is so frequently viewed as being supportive of terrorist groups and of why Norwegian politicians are so susceptible to requests for assistance from proscribed groups has been raised by those following Norway’s peace engagement. An example of this is the fact that there have been Turkish concerns about PKK influence with Norwegian parliamentarians. Riste states that “the kind of political activism displayed by successive Norwegian governments in favour of left-of-centre and preferably social democratic movements and governments, or liberation movements fighting against their erstwhile colonial overlords, reflected a genuine conviction that the forces they supported were the

318 Interview with Tor Birkelund, Marianne Brekken and Lars Gaupset, Oslo. 3 February 2012.
319 Ibid.
320 See Chapter Six.
321 Cable 06OSLO829. PKK TERRORISM DEMARCHE DELIVERED – NORWAY. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/06/06OSLO829
best hopes for the future of the countries in question.” Some Norwegians have suggested that Norway’s experiences during the unions with Sweden and Denmark have been a factor behind its peace efforts. This is due to the fact that they view Norway to have been a colony of Sweden and thus believe that Norway is able to empathise with other countries, which have been colonised. This view is not however shared by the majority of historians or politicians.

This chapter suggests that Norwegian identity has had an impact on foreign-policy decision-making, even to the extent that it defines how Norway’s interests can be pursued. However the way in which this has occurred differs slightly from the hypothesis in that the construction of a Norwegian identity around Norway’s peace diplomacy appears to be a continuing project. Thus, the way in which the pursuit of interests is undertaken appears to be constrained by the identity, which Norway is still in the process of building, rather than by an already established Norwegian identity. In Chapter One it was hypothesised that this study would show that low levels of contestation within the Norwegian identity and high levels of resonance have played a role in leading Norway to pursue peace diplomacy rather than using other means to further its interests in different parts of the world. Looking at the data outlined above, in the context of the theoretical framework provided in Chapter Two, it becomes clear that Norway’s identity as a peace nation and its foreign policy thinking are becoming increasingly contested. This is demonstrated by opposition to the presence of Norwegian troops in Afghanistan and in Libya and by a more general anti-Americanism in Norway. The utility of Norway’s peace efforts has also been increasingly questioned, most notably as a result of the MFA’s Refleks initiative. Most importantly, the MFA’s white paper on foreign policy states that Norway’s “identities and [its] understanding of Norwegian values and views, and of how they are perceived in the world, are facing new challenges and opportunities as a result of migration and the increasingly heterogeneous composition of Norwegian society.” As this contestation is a relatively recent phenomenon, it was not a factor in the earlier decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace engagements. It may however play a greater role in the future of

323 This project was conceived by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2007 as a means of gauging public opinion of Norway’s foreign policy.
Norway’s peace and reconciliation efforts, perhaps serving to increase the direct role of interests in the decision-making processes behind mediation efforts, which may become, if they have not already, an easier point of consensus than the increasingly contested Norwegian identity. It must also be noted that the argument that Norwegian moral values are a driving force behind its peace engagements is called into question by Norway’s decision not to engage in certain peace processes because of its relationship with interested third countries. It is also important to note that while this chapter finds that there is little difference between the degree to which the political left and the political right have engaged in peace diplomacy, their motives may differ, with identity potentially playing a greater role for the left than it does for the right. This idea will be considered in greater depth in the context of the three case studies.

**NORDICITY AND NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

Identities are not mutually exclusive. In the same way that it is possible for an individual to hold multiple identities, it is also possible for a nation to do so. In the case of Norway it is possible to be Norwegian but also Nordic at the same time. Historically, there have been numerous efforts to forge a Nordic identity. These date back to the 19th century, when there was a movement referred to as Scandinavianism, which ultimately failed as a result of Norway and Sweden’s failure to support Denmark in its conflicts with Germany.\(^325\) Opinion on the existence of a contemporary Nordic identity is divided. Bondeson argues that “the [Nordic] countries are fairly homogenous and a common language group prevails, but the question as to the existence of a uniquely Nordic identity remains open.”\(^326\) However, arguing for the existence of Nordicity, Archer states that “as the domestic habit of consensus and ending conflict by negotiations grew within the Nordic societies so it spread through a number of agencies into the dealings between Nordic states.”\(^327\) He goes on to argue that “this behaviour has spread to relations

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with other states.”\textsuperscript{328} This supports the argument presented in Chapter Two, that the Nordic states have ‘socialised’ each other to behave in the way that they do.\textsuperscript{329} As discussed in Chapter Two, socialisation can take place in a number of ways. The first of these is that norms can bias choice in that certain options are consciously ruled out because they are deemed to be incompatible with an identity.\textsuperscript{330} The second is considered to be semi-conscious, referring simply to a reduction in the level of consciousness in choice.\textsuperscript{331} The third way in which norms are internalised is that they are so deeply rooted that they are acted on unconsciously or out of habit.\textsuperscript{332}

Discussing current levels of Nordic cooperation, a US diplomatic cable written in 2008 states that “Nordic cooperation appeals to the [Government of Norway] but lacks sufficient weight and substance to replace the traditional bedrocks of Norwegian foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{333} It goes on to state that “the Nordic arena also would not provide Norwegian foreign policy priorities with the international impact that Støre and others seek.”\textsuperscript{334} On Nordic cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, the MFA’s white paper states that “the institutional dividing lines in the Nordic region remain, but today the countries are increasingly involved in mutually beneficial cooperation within the framework of the UN, NATO and the EU.”\textsuperscript{335}

Archer argues that the way in which the Nordic states see each other was shaped by the feeling that the others were not foreign, adding however that “the approach to non-Nordic states was perhaps based more on externalisation of the domestic values of consensus and peace-building.”\textsuperscript{336} Browning refers to Nordic countries’ efforts to “teach outsiders how to settle conflicts and build a peaceful security community.”\textsuperscript{337} These arguments serve to support the argument that the Nordic countries engage in norm entrepreneurship, also suggesting a Nordic emphasis on peace. It must however be noted that while all the Nordic countries have emphasised peace-related

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 328 Ibid.
\item 330 Ibid. p.697.
\item 331 Ibid.
\item 332 Ibid.
\item 333 Cable 08OSLO57. Not your father’s Norway. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08OSLO57
\item 334 Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
activities in their foreign policies to a greater or lesser extent, Norway has taken this much further than its neighbours, emphasising its identity as a ‘peace nation’ as discussed in the previous section. As discussed in Chapter Two, Browning outlines the argument for the existence of a Nordic brand, arguing for the differences between this and Nordic identity. However, he fails to compare this Nordicity with individual Nordic identities. Archer lists the core values of Nordic societies, which include political consensus, social democratic institutions and Nordic cultural affinity.\textsuperscript{338} Many of these attributes have also become part of the Norwegian identity, giving substance to the argument that the Norwegian identity is a more recent construct.

Ingebritsen argues that “much to the dismay of prominent Swedes, many of the Scandinavian innovations in international politics are credited to Norwegian diplomacy and individual leaders who have made a difference in world politics.”\textsuperscript{339} This is an interesting aspect of the Nordicity question. Helgesen argues that Norway’s foreign policy now looks very much like Sweden’s foreign policy did in the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{340} He builds on this, arguing that in many ways Norway has taken up Sweden’s mantle from the Olof Palme days.\textsuperscript{341} It is however worth noting that not all officials agree with this point of view. Lundh, for example, does not see Norway as following Sweden.\textsuperscript{342} It is also important to note that Sweden continues to play a significant role in peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts around the globe, despite the fact that it tends to keep a much-lower profile. This indicates that there is a degree of overlap between Norwegian and other Scandinavian foreign policies and also suggests that Norway’s self-promotion in this field is related to both identity-building and interests. Another indicator of a greater Nordicity is the claim that Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark are like cousins, working together for similar goals.\textsuperscript{343} Interestingly, while also a Nordic country, Iceland is seldom mentioned in the context of the Nordic identity. This can perhaps be attributed to its great distance from the other Nordic countries or due to its very

\begin{itemize}
\item Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
\item Olaf Palme was Prime Minister of Sweden from 1969-1976 and from 1982 until his assassination in 1986. Palme was the leader of the Social Democratic Party and was known for his support of ‘liberation movements’ and decolonization.
\item Interview with Ture Lundh. Oslo, 3 January 2012.
\item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
small population, which numbers just 330,000. Despite the indisputable existence of a Nordic identity, it is however important to note the fact that, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Norwegians are very nationalistic and as such also have a very starkly defined identity of their own.\textsuperscript{344}

An interesting way to establish the extent to which the concept of Nordicity exists is to look at how the Nordic countries vote at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The data for this aspect of this study was gathered from the UNGA voting records for resolutions, which were passed during the time period covered by this thesis.\textsuperscript{345} Data was only available for the UN resolutions, which were passed by the UN and this must be taken into account when considering the subsequent analysis. In order to ensure that we are not just seeing a united European stance at the UN, the results were juxtaposed against the stance of the majority of the non-Nordic EU member states and against the US vote. The results illustrate how often the Nordic countries took a united stance at the UN, how often that stance differed from that of other European countries and from that of the US, as well as on which issues the four countries were most united and most divided. While the issues discussed at the UN represent just a small fraction of all the issues, which must be considered when looking at a country’s identity, this exercise nevertheless enables us to tease out which issues unite and divide the Nordic countries. Given that the focus of this thesis is Norway’s peace diplomacy, emphasis is placed on peace and conflict-related issues.

The dataset used for this study included 1320 data points. Voting was divided into four categories: a yes vote, a no vote, an abstention and cases in which a country did not participate in the vote. The principal themes on which the countries voted were divided into twenty categories. The results reveal that the Nordic states are relatively homogenous in their voting at the UN. While this could be taken to be indicative of a shared Nordic approach, it is important to note that \textit{Figure 3.6a} shows that the Nordic votes are in keeping with the majority vote of the non-Nordic EU member states. This suggests that the Nordic stance at the UN is frequently also a European one, especially given that there is a stark difference between the

\textsuperscript{344} Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
positions adopted by the Nordic states, the other European states and the US. A comparison of the Nordic stance on particular issue areas has therefore been undertaken.

Figure 3.5: The percentage of times in which each Nordic country votes with the majority of the other Nordic countries at the UNGA.\textsuperscript{346}

Figures 3.6a and 3.6b: How Nordic countries vote at the UNGA in comparison to the EU majority and the US.\textsuperscript{347}

\textsuperscript{346} From a dataset created by the author for the purposes of this thesis.
Figure 3.7 shows that there is a high-level of consensus among the Nordic countries on all key conflict-related issues voted on within the UN General Assembly. The issue area on which the Nordic countries are the most divided is nuclear issues, while the highest levels of consensus can be found on the issue of landmines and the question of international security, terrorism and crime. The split on nuclear issues can be explained in part by the fact that the Nordic states disagree on the resolutions, which deal with the question of how the International Court of Justice’s ruling on the legality of nuclear threats should be interpreted.

In Chapter One it was hypothesised that ‘Nordicity’ determines the manner in which Norway engages in its interventions. This hypothesis is easier to assess in the context of peace diplomacy in general than it is in the context of specific interventions and as such this chapter has looked at Nordicity in more depth than the chapters dealing with the individual case studies. This section has demonstrated that there is a Nordic tendency to engage in foreign policy while taking ‘moral’ considerations into account. This is demonstrated by Olof Palme’s anti-Americanism and support for ‘liberation’ movements in the 1970s and 1980s, and the strong consensus among the Nordic countries on questions of human rights and landmines, for example, when voting at the UNGA. Yet despite these similarities

347 From a dataset created by the author for the purposes of this thesis.
between the Nordic countries there are also clear differences, as outlined in the identity component of this chapter. Self-perception is an important aspect of this, and if Norway perceives itself to have a unique identity then it must be accepted that this is so.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the key conclusions, which can be drawn from the evidence laid out in this chapter is that it is extremely difficult to put precise definitions on something as intangible as identity. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence to suggest that there is a dichotomy between Norwegian identity and the broader Nordicity, despite the fact that some overlap between the two exists. This is demonstrated by the emphasis placed on Norwegian identity within Norway itself and Norway’s reluctance to become too deeply entrenched in Nordic and European, integration efforts. Moreover, there seems to be little reason to doubt that Norwegian identity is a relatively recent phenomenon, constructed as part of a broader nation-building project.

The quantitative aspect of this study reveals that there is a strong correlation between the existence of oil and the level of intervention undertaken by the Norwegian government. Due to problems running an ordinal regression analysis on continuous variables within SPSS, it was not possible to establish whether there is a connection between the level of intervention undertaken and diaspora or bilateral trade figures. Thus, these are aspects of this study, which could be improved. One possibility would be to run the regressions using an alternative statistical software package such as STATA. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, problems with SPSS with regard to continuous IVs in ordinal regressions have been highlighted by a number of authors. Moreover, there are undoubtedly further examples of Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts and some of the engagements included in the dataset may have been of a higher level. While the search undertaken was very comprehensive it is nevertheless possible that less publicised conflicts and Norwegian involvement in them will have received little if any media attention and will therefore have been missed in the research undertaken for this project.
Moreover details of the ‘silent processes’ have been hard to find. In this respect, this dataset must to a certain degree be viewed as a work in progress, which can be improved upon when new evidence of interventions arises.

Arguably, one of the most important findings in this chapter has been the discovery that external pressure has had a significant impact on the decision-making processes behind Norway’s mediation efforts. In particular, US influence, or even pressure, appears to have had a significant degree of influence on Norwegian foreign policy decision-making. While the degree of this pressure has varied from administration to administration and from intervention to intervention, and its impact has varied depending on the political orientation of the Norwegian government, the impact of American influence has been felt throughout the period covered by this thesis. The key question that arises from this finding pertains to whether the impact of US influence falls into the interests category or whether it constitutes an additional driving force behind Norway’s peace engagements. The argument for its falling into the interests category is that Norway’s bid for influence on the global stage, and therefore with the world’s greatest power, constitutes one of its strategic interests. This is the approach that will be adopted during the case studies for this thesis. With this in mind, it is necessary to consider the impact of this finding for the hypotheses. Moral and ethical arguments are put into question by the fact that Norway has been willing to step away from some peace processes due to its relationship with other interested parties. This bears out the argument, promulgated in Chapter One, that while identity may be responsible for the choice of peace diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy, and while identity sets the parameters of Norway’s foreign policy interests and how they are pursued, interests do play an important role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace diplomacy.

Another interesting revelation has been information regarding the role played by individuals in driving Norway’s peace diplomacy. While this level of analysis was rejected in Chapter Two on the basis that it was unlikely to have played a major role in foreign policy decision-making in a democratic, consensual state like Norway, there is evidence to suggest that it should not have been dismissed so lightly. While the opinions of American diplomats must be treated with caution, there has been frequent mention of Støre’s personal desire to ‘revive’ Norway’s position as a
leading player in the field of conflict resolution. Moreover, his personal desire to mediate and to play a major role in resolving conflicts in the Middle East has been highlighted. While this does not explain Norway’s earlier interventions, there is evidence to suggest that other individuals involved in Norway’s peace processes have had a personal drive to play a significant role in a particular conflict. Hilde Frafjord Johnson describes her personal desire to make a difference in Sudan in her book *Waging Peace in Sudan.*\(^{348}\) Erik Solheim has also been described as ‘driven’ to play a role in peace processes and dating back further is the example of Jan Egeland, who wrote his Master’s thesis on the role that Norway could play in global politics in the 1980s and who later went on to become State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, putting his thesis into practice.

It must be noted that there have been significant developments in Norway’s attitude to its foreign policy, and to its peace diplomacy in particular, and a number of initiatives have been launched to look at these issues more critically. Among these is the Norwegian MFA’s Refleks project, which is mentioned earlier on in this paper. The willingness to open itself up to, sometimes scathing, criticism is something that the Norwegian government must be given credit for. The project indicates a willingness to use public debate as a means of promoting learning and a genuine desire to improve in areas where it falls short. However, the extent to which the outcome of this project will be heeded is as yet unknown. It is important to remember that the motivations for Norway’s peace engagement might change over time. Reasons behind involvement in peace processes in the early 1990s might be very different from those in the 2010s. As demonstrated above, the political orientation of the government in power seems to have had no impact on the level of interventions undertaken by the Norwegian government. However, the motivations from administration to administration may vary significantly.

While this chapter has not looked at specific case studies in detail, it has provided a broad overview of Norway’s peace engagements to date. This makes it possible to draw a number of conclusions, with regard to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter

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One. First and foremost, while there is evidence to suggest that economic interests have played a role in determining the trajectory of Norway’s foreign policy, concrete examples have been hard to come by. The correlation between existing and potential oil reserves and the level of intervention engaged in by Norway goes some way in substantiating Hypothesis One, but it does not go far enough. The purpose of the case studies, therefore, is to find more concrete evidence with regard to the role of economic interests in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian peace efforts. In terms of Norway’s desire for international influence, there is a greater body of evidence to suggest that this is a driving factor behind Norway’s peace diplomacy. It does however seem possible that the utility of this foreign policy strategy only became clear following the international acclaim that Norway received for its role in the Oslo Accords. Given the fact that many of Norway’s earliest mediation efforts were NGO and church led, it seems likely that the moralistic aspect of Norway’s national identity played a larger and more direct role in the early years of its peace diplomacy then it did in the 2000s. This idea is looked at in more detail in the context of the individual case studies.

The extent to which identity shaped Norway’s foreign policy interests in the early years of its peace engagements is debatable. As mentioned above, there is evidence to suggest that identity and other domestic factors played an important role in Norway’s peace engagements in the early 1990s. However, the role of interests at that stage is less apparent, despite the fact that the quantitative study indicates that there is a correlation between the existence of proven/potential oil reserves and the level of intervention engaged in by Norway in conflict-afflicted countries. The findings of this chapter suggest that in its early stages, Norwegian peace diplomacy was driven by identity and more specifically Norwegian moral values while at the same time, Norway’s peace efforts were contributing to the Norwegian identity-building project. Interests, whether strategic or economic, appear to have played a more prominent role, although not a defining one, in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace efforts in later years. The exact date for this shift remains unclear but this is an issue, which will be considered in the context of the individual case studies.
The findings of this chapter also suggest that Nordicity has played a role in determining where and how Norway engages in conflict resolution efforts. This role is however more difficult to define than is suggested by Hypothesis Three. The overlap between Norwegian identity and Nordicity has arguably been greater than anticipated although significant differences between the two do exist. Moreover, Nordicity arguably played a role, albeit a minor one, in bringing about Norway’s peace diplomacy in the 1990s. Thus Nordicity has not just been limited to determining how Norway engages in peace diplomacy, as hypothesised. Rather, Nordicity has also been a factor behind Norway’s peace engagements. However, Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship have also shaped the way in which Norway pursues its peace engagements, although this role, as in the case of identity, appears to have varied significantly from case to case. This may be linked to the extent to which interests have played a role in a particular process but, as this is a general chapter rather than a more focused case study, this is difficult to determine at this stage. The connection between interests, identity and Nordicity will be considered in greater detail in the individual case study chapters.

Prior to moving on to the chapters, which assess individual case studies, a number of points must be made. This thesis cannot and does not claim to provide a definitive reason for Norway’s international peace engagements. Rather, it seeks to contribute to the growing debate on this particular aspect of Norway’s foreign policy while highlighting some specific trends in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian peace efforts. Motivations will inevitably differ on a conflict-to-conflict basis, as well as from Norwegian administration to administration. Global political developments and even acts of God will also influence foreign policy decision-making in the field of peace and reconciliation. That is not to say that it is impossible to generate a deeper understanding of the motivations and thus decision-making processes behind Norway’s interventions, but rather to be pragmatic about what can be achieved in a study such as this one.

The next chapter looks at Norway’s role in the peace process between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam. This was arguably one of Norway’s more controversial peace engagements, especially from the Sri Lankan populace’s point of view. Attempts will be made to assess the
motivations behind the facilitation effort through the lenses of interests, Norwegian domestic politics and identity, and Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship. In keeping with the findings of this and the previous chapter, an attempt will also be made to establish whether individuals and their personal beliefs had any impact on the decision-making processes behind Norwegian peace engagement in Sri Lanka.
CHAPTER 4

SRI LANKA: A COMPLEX CASE?

Sri Lanka,349 an island state located in the Indian Ocean, was embroiled in a 26-year ethnic conflict between the government and Tamil separatists from 1983 to 2009. The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), founded in the mid-1970s, led a violent campaign against the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) in a bid to establish an independent Tamil state in the north and east of the ethnically diverse island nation. The conflict finally ended as a result of an internationally condemned government military offensive in May 2009.350 Norway played a major role in efforts to foster peace in the country in the 1990s and 2000s but was eventually sidelined following a change of government in Sri Lanka in 2005, when Mahinda Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), a hard-line nationalist, became president. In the later years of Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka, public opinion turned against the Norwegians and there was widespread condemnation of their involvement in the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) -LTTE peace process. This chapter will provide a brief overview of the history of the conflict before focusing more specifically on Norway’s involvement. Norway’s mediation efforts will then be looked at through the lenses of interests, identity and Nordicity respectively. Conclusions will then be drawn on the extent to which the Sri Lanka case supports or disproves the hypotheses outlined in the first two chapters of this thesis.

DATA

The majority of the data used in this chapter comes from government reports, interviews conducted in Norway and in Sweden, and books and journal articles. Fieldwork was not conducted in Sri Lanka. Attempts were made to contact Sri Lankan officials working in Sri Lanka and at diplomatic missions abroad, however those contacted did not respond to requests for interviews. The post-conflict period

349 Known as Ceylon until 1972. For the purposes of this thesis Ceylon will be used when referring to events pre-1977 and Sri Lanka will be used when discussing events, which occurred post-name change.
350 Casualty figures for the final four months of the conflict vary significantly but the UN has suggested that anywhere between 6,500 and 20,000 people were killed. An additional 300,000 people were displaced in the final stages of the conflict.
has seen a plethora of reports and evaluations of the Sri Lankan peace process being published. The 2011 NORAD evaluation of Norway’s involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process, in particular, has been an invaluable resource. In addition, leaked US diplomatic cables\(^{351}\) have also provided a valuable insight into Norway’s role in the peace process. The arguments promulgated in this chapter have also been informed by earlier fieldwork conducted by the author in Sri Lanka in 2007 for the purposes of completing her Master’s thesis on the impact of Sinhalese nationalism on the political role of Sri Lanka’s Muslims in the ethnic conflict.

**HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT**

Inter-communal tensions pre-date Ceylonese independence\(^{352}\) and go back to the early 20\(^{th}\) century, when both the Tamil and the Sinhalese communities began to engage in the building of separate political identities.\(^{353}\) However, as argued by De Votta, Sinhalese and Tamil leaders maintained a united front in order to achieve their independence from the British.\(^{354}\) The Tamil community had occupied a privileged position during colonial rule and this had fomented resentment among the Sinhalese, who felt that their rightful position as the country’s majority group had been usurped. As a result, post-colonial Ceylon saw the rapid rise of Sinhalese nationalism and the introduction of a series of legislative measures, which put increasing pressure on the Tamil community. These included the 1956 Sinhala Only Act and the raising of entry requirements for Tamils wishing to go to university. In 1972 Buddhism was given a privileged status in the new constitution. The rise of Sinhalese nationalism also led to an increase in violence. Ethnic riots targeting the Tamil community broke out in 1956 in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, following protests in Colombo against the legislation discussed above. Further ethnic riots took place in 1958. Anti-Tamil sentiment grew throughout the 1970s, a decade which saw the foundation of a number of armed Tamil groups, amongst them the LTTE. Ethnic violence erupted again in 1977 and in 1981. In July 1983 anti-Tamil

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\(^{351}\) A number of the US diplomatic cables, leaked by Wikileaks in 2011, originated from the US Embassy in Colombo.

\(^{352}\) Ceylon obtained independence from the United Kingdom in 1948.


sentiments reached their peak when nationwide race riots resulted in the deaths of several thousand Tamils at the hands of the Sinhalese population. Reports covering these events suggest that the police and the military were complicit in the violence.355 The events of 1983 marked the beginning of what was to be a bloody conflict between the LTTE and the GoSL, which would stretch for 26 years. The 1980s also saw the rise of the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP), a Marxist-Leninist party, which opposed efforts to bring about a peaceful end to the conflict between the LTTE and the GoSL. A parallel insurgency was waged by the JVP in the centre and the south of the country from 1987-1989. With the security forces engaged in fighting two separate conflicts the LTTE was able to grow in strength and influence, gradually eradicating rival Tamil groups and gaining de facto control of the North and East of the country. It must however be noted, that neither of the warring parties stands out as having occupied a position of strength throughout the conflict, rather, there was considerable fluctuation with regard to whether the GoSL or the LTTE had the upper-hand. An example is that of Elephant Pass, which was held by the Sri Lankan government, then lost to the LTTE in 2000, and subsequently regained by the government in the final stages of the conflict.356 This situation, whereby the warring parties were relatively evenly matched, goes some way in explaining why it was so difficult to reach a negotiated settlement between the GoSL and the LTTE.

When analysing the Sri Lankan civil conflict, it is important to note that the Tamil community is not a homogenous group. Rather, there are two distinct Tamil groups, one of which consists of ethnic Tamils from the Northern and Eastern provinces of the country and the other which is made up of Indian Tamils brought to Sri Lanka by the British under colonial-rule to work on the country’s tea estates. The former group makes up about 18% of the population while the latter numbers just under 1 million (4.6% of the total population of Sri Lanka). Other minority groups in Sri Lanka are the Muslims (7.2% of Sri Lanka’s population), who are also divided into those living in Tamil dominated areas, those living in the predominantly Sinhalese parts of the country, and those of Malay ancestry. The smallest minority, the

356 Elephant Pass is a strategically important military base on the strip of land connecting the Jaffna Peninsula with the rest of Sri Lanka.
Burgher community, which consists of people of European descent, makes up around 0.22% of the population. The Sinhalese population constitutes 73.8% of the total population of Sri Lanka. The Muslim community, due to its linguistic ties with the Tamil community, was inadvertently drawn into the conflict and was often placed under pressure by militant Tamil groups. It is worth noting that a significant number of Muslims from the Eastern provinces joined the LTTE for reasons of regional solidarity in the 1980s. However, Muslim support for the LTTE dwindled following attacks against Muslims, carried out by members of the LTTE in the early 1990s. Research conducted in Sri Lanka in 2007 suggests that Muslims living in dominantly Sinhalese areas were less affected by and therefore less interested in the conflict than those living in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

**HISTORY OF PEACE ENGAGEMENT**

External intervention in Sri Lanka’s conflict had been very limited until Norway took on the role of official ‘facilitator’ in 2000. While there had been four earlier peace processes, little progress had been made in finding a lasting solution to the conflict. The Thimpu talks, which were held in Bhutan and in which India played the role of third-party, saw the GoSL negotiating with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a political organisation, throughout 1986 and 1987. Less moderate groups like the LTTE and the People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) were also party to the talks but subsequently withdrew. In 1987 the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement (ISPA) was signed, culminating in the deployment of the 50,000 strong Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in the same year. Tamil groups were not party to the agreement and as a result the LTTE refused to disarm. The IPKF tried to force them into compliance, sparking further conflict. This attempt at conflict resolution proved to be an unmitigated disaster, leading to the JVP insurgency against the incumbent UNP (United National Party) government. The Premadasa-LTTE talks, held in 1989-90, followed and in 1994-95 talks were held between Kumaratunga and the LTTE. The last two peace processes

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358 Ibid.
did not involve a third-party. Following his attempts to reach a peace agreement President Premadasa was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber in 1993. The Kumaratunga-LTTE talks culminated in the January 1995 ceasefire agreement, which was based on the premise that significant power would be devolved to the Tamil community. However, Sinhalese nationalists and the LTTE were opposed to the agreement.\footnote{Sisk, T.D. International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets. Abingdon: Routledge. pp.154 -155.} According to the 2011 NORAD report on Sri Lanka, the process never moved beyond “talks about talks.”\footnote{NORAD. 2011. “Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009.” p. 26.} Following the short-lived ceasefire, Kumaratunga pursued a ‘war for peace’ strategy, which involved the pursuit of a military defeat of the LTTE, while at the same time trying to reach a political agreement with Tamil leaders.\footnote{Ibid.} This strategy was ultimately unsuccessful, leading the GoSL to opt for another attempt at an internationalised peace process in 1999.

**NORWEIGAN INVOLVEMENT**

There is a lack of consensus on how Norway came to be involved in the GoSL-LTTE conflict. According to the 2011 NORAD report, which provides the most comprehensive account of the events leading up to Norwegian peace engagement in Sri Lanka, Norway offered its services to the GoSL and the LTTE following the departure of the IPKF in 1991.\footnote{Ibid. p.29.} This is interesting as Norwegian officials have been keen to emphasise the fact that they never offer to become involved in a peace process,\footnote{Interviews with Thea Ottman, Vidar Helgesen and Ture Lundh in Singapore, Stockholm and Oslo in 2011 and 2012.} stating that they have to be asked by both the warring parties. This was clearly not the case in Sri Lanka. Norway’s role in the early 1990s was founded on personal relationships. Moreover, other countries and organisations, including the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the Catholic Church and the UK and the US, amongst others, also played minor roles in trying to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table.\footnote{NORAD. 2011. “Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009.” p. 29.} According to Helgesen, a religious dialogue between the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform (NEPP) and the warring parties in Sri Lanka had already taken place by the time the Norwegian state became
involved.\textsuperscript{366} This suggests that the early stages of Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka closely resemble Norwegian efforts to broker peace in Guatemala and in Israel/Palestine. The NORAD report also describes the role played by Arne Fjørtoft, a former politician and an aid worker who had spent many years living in Sri Lanka. According to the report, the Norwegian government approached Fjørtoft, who had contacts with LTTE associates, to see whether a Norwegian back-channel could be opened with the LTTE.\textsuperscript{367} Helgesen, however, states that Fjørtoft had approached the Norwegian embassy early on in the conflict.\textsuperscript{368} Other sources state that Norway acted as an observer to the 1994-1995 peace process.\textsuperscript{369,370} Due to the lack of substantiating evidence on this point, it has been impossible to verify the extent to which Norway was involved in this process. In the international context, Norway was also involved in Guatemala and in the Israel/Palestine back-channel negotiations in the early 1990s. That process culminated in the signing of the much-lauded Oslo Accords in 1993 and gave Norway’s reputation as a peacemaker a substantial boost. It is therefore possible that this success was one of the factors, which led Norway to attempt to resolve the GoSL-LTTE conflict in Sri Lanka.

Norwegian NGOs played an important role in the early stages of Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka. A key example is that of FORUT, who were involved in Norway throughout the conflict years. According to Stavrum, the primary utility of FORUT was to signal to both parties “a genuine intent, concern and will from the Norwegian Government’s side.” Thus the humanitarian aid channelled through FORUT was a way of showing that Norway was “putting its money where its mouth was” in terms of trying to make a positive contribution towards reducing the suffering of people in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{371} Stavrum goes on to state that “a secondary utility of channelling support through FORUT was that the Norwegian Embassy could consult [FORUT] for [its] observations with regard to the prevailing conditions within Vanni, thus providing them with independent information that they would use to supplement and compare with information they obtained from other sources.” He states that such consultations were relatively frequent. According

\textsuperscript{365} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.  
\textsuperscript{368} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.  
\textsuperscript{369} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.  
\textsuperscript{370} Correspondence with Ståle Stavrum, International Programme Director, FORUT in July 2012.
to the 2011 NORAD evaluation of Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka, there was also at least one instance when FORUT conveyed a message from the LTTE to the Norwegian government.\(^{372}\) The role of Norwegian NGOs in the 1990s was supplemented by the Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka at the time, who was actively supporting a number of grassroots initiatives in Sri Lanka. Helgesen states that this type of existing engagement led to the LTTE requesting Norwegian involvement in the peace process, which began with a request to bring Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s chief political strategist, out of Sri Lanka for a kidney transplant.\(^{373}\) He goes on to state that President Kumaratunga subsequently requested Norwegian involvement in 1998.\(^{374}\) Sisk provides a slightly different account of the beginnings of Norway’s mediation efforts in Sri Lanka, stating that Norway accepted invitations from all sides and became the official mediator in February 2000, following a number of “secret unofficial or “track-two” initiatives held in Bergen, Norway.”\(^{375}\)

Sisk reasons that the GoSL turned to Norway because of its success in brokering the 1993 Oslo Accords and for its “identity as a neutral facilitator.”\(^{376}\) With regard to the LTTE, Sisk argues that they needed legitimacy and that “recognition from an upstanding UN member state such as Norway would help achieve this.”\(^{377}\) According to the 2011 NORAD report, the choice of Norway as third-party facilitator was the result of a mutual dialogue with the Catholic Church in 1999.\(^{378}\) This is in keeping with other reports, which mention various forms of church involvement. Kumaratunga reportedly asked the LTTE to make a list of third parties, which would be acceptable to them and they subsequently provided a list of five countries, which included Norway, the UK and Canada.\(^{379}\) The government then chose Norway from the list as it believed that the other countries might have “stronger interests and leverage.”\(^{380}\) The LTTE, on the other hand, considered Norway to be acceptable because it was a state actor with more power than an NGO or an informal mediator. The fact that Norway was willing to engage with them was

\(^{373}\) Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.
\(^{374}\) Ibid.
\(^{376}\) Ibid.
\(^{377}\) Ibid.
\(^{378}\) Ibid.
\(^{379}\) Ibid.
\(^{380}\) Ibid.
also extremely important.\textsuperscript{381} It is unclear whether Norway’s earlier offer to play a role in attempts to reach a peace agreement played a role in both parties’ decisions to opt for Norway as the official third-party mediator. Following this process, the Norwegians held several secret exploratory meetings with representatives of the GoSL, including President Kumaratunga, throughout 1999, most of which were held in Switzerland.\textsuperscript{382} Efforts to broker peace in Sri Lanka constituted a “silent process” at the time but Kumaratunga leaked information about Norway’s role as facilitator in a press interview in December 1999 following the LTTE’s attempt to assassinate her, without informing Norway.\textsuperscript{383}

Norway subsequently sought to involve the US and India in the peace process, sensing that it needed more leverage to make headway with its facilitation efforts. However, India did not want to become involved and the US’ designation of the LTTE as a terrorist group limited its ability to play a proactive role in the Norwegian led peace effort.\textsuperscript{384} According to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission’s (SLMM) report, the Norwegian government’s role at this stage “was essentially to be a channel for communication and to serve as a discussion partner between the GoSL and the LTTE.” The SLMM’s principal task is described as being “to stay in regular contact with the Parties, suggest confidence-building measures while gauging their true interest for peace, attempt to further rouse their motivation for a halt in hostilities and eventual negotiations.”\textsuperscript{385} The report states that the task of using diplomatic pressure in order to convince the warring parties to opt for a negotiated settlement of the conflict, fell upon other countries.\textsuperscript{386} The many references to Norway’s lack of leverage raise questions about its effectiveness as a mediator, not least because Norway itself sought to increase its leverage from the early stages of its involvement in Sri Lanka, by using aid as an incentive to cooperate.

Shanmugaratnam argues that in the Sri Lankan peace process “the protagonists agreed to address jointly the more immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid. p. 32.
\textsuperscript{383} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.
of the war-affected civilians in the North-East province first and then to explore a permanent political settlement based on a federal arrangement.”

Providing more detail, Shanmugaratnam and Stokke outline four distinct features of the 2001 peace process. These were:

i) the existence of dual power and a certain parity of status in the North East.
ii) the recognition of the LTTE as the representative of the Tamil people.
iii) the internationalisation of the peace process.
iv) the sequencing of developmental, administrative and constitutional issues.

The second feature highlighted above is arguably the most controversial. Just because the LTTE had taken it upon itself to represent the Tamil people it does not mean that this is what the Tamil people of Sri Lanka desired. This issue will be touched upon again in the context of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) and the SLMM as these formally legitimised the LTTE as the ‘voice’ of Sri Lanka’s Tamils. De Votta highlights the fact that many Tamils were opposed to the LTTE, suggesting that accepting the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka was a serious error on the part of the Norwegian facilitators. How this error was made remains unclear. Perhaps it was simply the result of a desire to simplify the peace process or perhaps it was down to the fact that background knowledge about the key players in the conflict was lacking during the initial stages of the peace process. The latter seems less likely than the former as Norway was engaged in fact-finding missions before it formally became involved in the process.

Bandarage argues that “Norway […] used its economic aid to pressure the Sri Lankan government to engage in political negotiations with the LTTE since the 1980s, and in the 1990s it was involved in shaping international policy on the Sri

Lankan separatist conflict.”

This approach to enforcing its will is similar to the way in which Norway approached conflict resolution in Guatemala in the 1990s. Supporting this argument is Stavrum’s statement that Norway put money into a number of institutions and mechanisms, other than FORUT and other aid organisations, during the ceasefire period (2002-2008). He states that the purpose of this funding was to convince the warring parties of the benefit of continuing the peace process until a peaceful resolution of the conflict was reached. He makes this point to highlight the fact that support through FORUT was just one part of a multi-faceted strategy to demonstrate a sustained and serious commitment.

The church also played a role in the early stages of the Norwegian peace engagement in Sri Lanka. The Norwegian Inter-Religious Support Group for Peace in Sri Lanka was established by Reverend Stig Utnem in 2001. The initiative was a response to requests from Sri Lankan religious leaders who felt that as Norway was a Christian country, it was important that Norwegian Buddhists and Muslims should also be involved in supporting the peace process. As a result the support group consisted of the Norwegian Buddhist Association, Caritas Norway, the Church of Norway, Norwegian Church Aid and the Christian Council of Norway. The group was responsible for three main initiatives all of which were sponsored by the Norwegian MFA. The first of these was an international conference on Buddhism and peace planned by the Norwegian Buddhist Association. Participants included Buddhist monks and religious leaders from Sri Lanka, Europe and the US. The Church of Norway also facilitated a national ecumenical consultation in Sri Lanka in which all churches sent representatives. The third initiative was a study visit to South Africa for a group of 10 high ranking religious leaders from Sri Lanka, which was facilitated by the Church of Norway. Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu and Christian leaders from all over the country participated. These activities demonstrate that the church played an important role in Sri Lanka, similar to the one played in Sudan and the Philippines.

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391 See Chapter Three.
392 Correspondence with Ståle Stavrum, International Programme Director, FORUT in July 2012.
394 Ibid.
395 Ibid.
The Norwegian facilitated CFA was signed by the GoSL and the LTTE in February 2002. Five rounds of peace talks were held in Thailand, Japan, Germany and Norway, before the negotiations were suspended in April 2003.\textsuperscript{396} Details of these are provided in Table 4.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When, where</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Substance and outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 April 2002, Vanni, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Meeting between Hakeem Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and LTTE leader Prabhakaran, without Norwegian involvement</td>
<td>The two leaders discuss Muslim issues and reach a groundbreaking agreement, which is never implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 2002, Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Government and LTTE representatives</td>
<td>In their first meeting, the approach to the peace talks is discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 August 2002, Oslo, Norway</td>
<td>Government and LTTE representatives</td>
<td>The parties agree on modalities for talks. The government agrees to de-proscribe the LTTE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-18 September 2002, Sattahip, Thailand</td>
<td>First round of formal talks between the government and LTTE representatives</td>
<td>Main points of discussion: 1. Implementation of CFA 2. Economic development and normalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October – 3 November 2002, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand</td>
<td>Second round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives</td>
<td>The parties establish three sub-committees: 1. Sub-committee on Political Affairs (SPA), to engage with the core political issues. 2. Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization (SDN). 3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN). None of the committees produce lasting results. The most significant one (SPA) in fact never meets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date/Government</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-5 December 2002, Oslo, Norway</td>
<td>Third round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives</td>
<td>The parties agree to develop an ‘Action Plan for Children Affected by War’ and discuss substantive political issues. The meeting ends with a press statement that the parties agree to explore a federal solution. Meanwhile, Hakeem rushes back to Colombo to resolve an internal Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) revolt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9 January, 2003, Rose Garden Resort, Thailand</td>
<td>Fourth round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives</td>
<td>High Security Zones, military issues and the malfunctioning of Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) are discussed, but without agreement. The Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization (SDN) becomes defunct. The parties agree to create a gender sub-committee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
127-29 January, 2003, Tokyo, Japan
Meeting between Solheim and the Japanese government
Prepare a donor conference in Tokyo.

7-8 February, 2003, Berlin, Germany
Fifth round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives
Problems with Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), LTTE child recruitment, and a naval clash that coincides with the talks.

18-21 March, Hakone, Japan
Sixth round of formal talks between government and LTTE representatives
Naval issue, Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), Tamil-Muslim relations in the east. With the help of Ian Martin, a session is held on human rights.

Table 4.1 Overview of the GoSL – LTTE peace talks

One of the issues, which arises in conflict-afflicted countries in which democratic elections are held, is the question of what happens to a peace process when there is a change of government. In the case of Sri Lanka, President Rajapaksa reaffirmed Norway’s role in the peace process following his election in 2005. However, he changed his mind a year later, setting in motion the train of events, which would ultimately result in the LTTE’s military defeat in 2009.

Opposition to Norway’s involvement was quick to evolve. Sinhalese nationalists had been opposed to the peace process from the outset and in November 2000, Sinhala nationalists burnt an effigy of Erik Solheim outside the Norwegian embassy. Figure 5.2 illustrates the decline in popular support in Sri Lanka for the Norwegian-led peace process, showing that Sinhalese support had been much lower than Tamil support from the process’ inception. The JVP were critical of the

398 Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.
399 Ibid.
Norwegian facilitators, arguing that “liberal peace-builders violated the country’s sovereignty, appeased the LTTE, and were intent on imposing an unjust political settlement.”\textsuperscript{401} This resentment of Norway was to carry on throughout its role in the peace process. In 2001 the GoSL demanded that Solheim be removed from his post as Special Envoy to Sri Lanka as he was deemed to be acting without keeping Kumaratunga informed and going against “etiquette.”\textsuperscript{402} However, the LTTE opposed Solheim’s removal. A compromise was reached and Solheim remained in his post but State Secretary Raymond Johansen was appointed to take over as head of the Norwegian facilitation team. This incident severely damaged Norway’s relationship with both of the warring parties.\textsuperscript{403} Moreover, as early as 2003, and despite the LTTE’s initial enthusiasm for Norwegian involvement, Anton Balasingham stated that the LTTE felt trapped by the peace process, which had not met their expectations. The LTTE argued that international actors, biased in favour of the government “had led to new power asymmetries between the two sides.”\textsuperscript{404} This is interesting because many of the arguments criticising Norway’s role in the peace process said the opposite, accusing Norway of creating an unjust parity between the LTTE and the GoSL. Norwegian NGOs were also accused of supporting the LTTE. While the Norwegian branch of Save the Children was frequently accused of being pro-LTTE, Norwegian People’s Aid was arguably the organisation, which faced the most criticism from the GoSL.\textsuperscript{405} Writing in 2007 De Votta stated that “it is puzzling why the Norwegians have not walked away from trying to facilitate peace, given how they have been excoriated by all levels of Sinhalese society.”\textsuperscript{406} This question should not be taken lightly, especially in view of the fact that a satisfactory answer to it has yet to be found. Norwegian policymakers have repeatedly emphasised the need for both parties to want Norwegian involvement. As indicated by the evidence above, however, Norway does not appear to have applied this rule in the Sri Lanka case. The 2011 NORAD report


\textsuperscript{403} Ibid. p.34.


\textsuperscript{405} Interview with Henrik Stabell and Trude Falch. Norwegian People’s Aid, Oslo. 2 February 2012. See also Jayawardhana, W. 2008. “Norwegian NGO used by LTTE, also delivered arms to an insurgency in Sudan.” Available at www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=22080728.

cites Solheim as stating that “if one day we become convinced that one side or both sides are not serious and only use our efforts as a cover for fooling the world, we will discontinue our efforts.”\textsuperscript{407} Despite evidence to suggest that this is precisely what occurred Norway did not pull out of the peace process, believing that it still had a role to play even if this role was to be limited to humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{408} The NORAD evaluation is critical of this decision stating that, while it had little impact on the actual outcome of Norway’s attempts to broker peace, its continued involvement in Sri Lanka post-2006 served little purpose.\textsuperscript{409}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.1.png}
\caption{Public Support for Norway’s Role in the Sri Lankan Peace Process\textsuperscript{410}}
\end{figure}

As well as playing the role of chief mediator, Norway was also the leading member of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which was responsible for monitoring ceasefire violations in Sri Lanka and which was active from 2002 to 2008. Norway’s role in the SLMM will be discussed again later on in this chapter in the context of the role of Nordicity in Norway’s peacemaking activities due to the fact that the SLMM was a pan-Nordic initiative involving all five of the Nordic countries. The SLMM will, however, also be considered here. This will be done from a purely operational perspective. Samset highlights a number of problems with the mandate of the SLMM, arguing that the Mission’s mandate gave an immediate

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid. pp.91-92.
\end{flushleft}
impression of bias.\footnote{Samset, I. 2004. “Trapped in the peace process: Ceasefire monitoring in Sri Lanka.” \textit{AFO Paper}. No.5. CMI: Bergen. p.11.} This was due to the fact that the SLMM’s deployment was limited to the Northern and Eastern provinces, despite the fact that it was to monitor “any” ceasefire violations.\footnote{Ibid.} Samset acknowledges that the SLMM was constrained by resource limitations but argues convincingly for the fact that by deploying in LTTE dominated areas alone “the SLMM sent a signal that abuses in the north and east would matter more than abuses in the south and west.”\footnote{Ibid.} She goes on to state that this was unfortunate given that the North East - South West divide was also an ethnic one.\footnote{Ibid.} Discussing the SLMM, the 2011 NORAD report highlights a lack of knowledge about Sri Lanka and the limited expertise of the Mission’s staff.\footnote{NORAD. 2011. “Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009.” pp. 97-98.} While there is evidence to suggest that a stronger mandate or a larger staff would have been unacceptable to the parties involved in the conflict, it seems clear that the SLMM, as mandated, had limited utility.\footnote{Ibid. p. 96.} Another highly controversial aspect of the CFA was the fact that it mandated the SLMM to oversee the disarmament of non-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups. Samset states that “the ceasefire agreement helped the LTTE to win: first a symbolic victory of being recognised as sole representative and second, a very real, on-the-ground victory against its internal contenders.”\footnote{Samset, I. 2004. “Trapped in the peace process: Ceasefire monitoring in Sri Lanka.” \textit{AFO Paper}. No.5. CMI: Bergen. p.12.} The question of legitimacy with regard to the LTTE’s role as representative of the Tamil people was discussed in brief earlier on in this chapter.

Höglund and Svensson argue that Norway’s involvement in the peace process in Sri Lanka was “based on a specific idea of non-imposed negotiation processes,” which they refer to as the ‘peace ownership approach.’\footnote{Höglund, K. and Svensson, I. 2011. “Fallacies of the Peace Ownership Approach: Exploring Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka” in K. Stokke and J. Uyangoda (eds.) \textit{Liberal Peace in Question: Politics of State and Market Reform in Sri Lanka}. London: Anthem Press. p.63.} It is useful at this stage to note Höglund and Svensson’s detailed description of the peace ownership approach:

“[There is] an underlying assumption on which third-parties act and which implies that the responsibility for peace has to be in the hands of the primary parties in the conflict, if it is to be durable. One key to the peace ownership approach lies in its
non-imposed nature: the peace is imagined as growing from below and standing in harmony with the interests of the parties in conflict. Thereby the likelihood of sustainability is increased.”

As demonstrated by the discussion in this chapter, the peace ownership approach proved to be inherently weak. In the case of the Sri Lanka conflict the two parties were so polarised that there was no prospect of the type of peace described by Höglund and Svensson. Norway’s failure to understand this, or to act on its understanding if this did exist, is difficult to comprehend.

Bandarage argues that “the 2002 CFA elevated the LTTE, an internationally banned terrorist organization, to an equivalent status with the lawful and democratically elected Sri Lankan government.” While this is undoubtedly true, this has to be seen in the context of the Norwegian conflict resolution model. According to the 2011 NORAD report “building the LTTE’s capacity to engage in negotiation was central to the Norwegian idea of transforming the movement.” Helgesen argues that money shows groups like the LTTE the possibilities of a different way of life. This is in keeping with descriptions of Norway’s activities in Sri Lanka, which mention Norwegian funding of training courses and exposure visits for LTTE cadres as well as paying for flights around the world. The purpose of this strategy was to make it difficult for the LTTE to return to war. However, it also had negative consequences, principal among which was the perception that the LTTE was being rewarded for its use of violence. Norway also provided initial funding for the GoSL’s Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and the Peace Secretariat of the LTTE in 2003. A year later, funding was also provided for the establishment of the Muslim Peace Secretariat, in a bid to involve the Muslim

419 Ibid. p.64.
422 Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.
424 Ibid. p.86.
425 Ibid. p.112.
community in the peace process. Once again, the question of who constituted a legitimate representative of a community, which was itself divided, arose.\footnote{Strachan, A.L. 2007. “The Impact of Sinhalese Nationalism on the Political Role of Sri Lanka’s Muslims in the Country’s ongoing Ethnic Conflict.” Master’s thesis - SOAS. p. 21.}

**INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE**

According to Burke and Mulakala, “donor policies towards Sri Lanka have generally been driven by international interests and agendas as much as (or more than) the needs and concerns of the country itself.”\footnote{Burke, A. and Mulakala, A. 2011. “An insider’s view of donor support for the Sri Lankan peace process, 2000-2005” in J. Goodhand, J. Spencer and B. Korf (eds.) Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap? Abingdon: Routledge. p.161.} The exact nature of these interests is not discussed but this is an interesting claim, which is worth exploring in further detail in the Norwegian context. The description of FORUT’s role in the early stages of Norwegian involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process cited earlier in this chapter suggests that there is a degree of truth in Burke and Mulakala’s argument. It must however be noted, that Norway’s interest in this instance was the continuation of the peace process between the GoSL and the LTTE. Other interests may have been behind Norway’s humanitarian aid to Sri Lanka but as the purpose of this paper is to establish the decision-making processes behind Norway’s mediation efforts and not to establish the factors determining the allocation of humanitarian aid, these will not be explored in this thesis. This would however constitute an interesting topic for further research on Norway’s foreign policy and development assistance.
Prior to looking at the economic relationship between the two countries, it must be noted that Sri Lanka has never been one of Norway’s significant trading partners. An effort will however be made to ascertain the extent of Norway’s economic interests in Sri Lanka in order to establish whether such interests could have played a part in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s intervention in the country’s civil war. Figure 4.2 shows a steady increase in imports from Sri Lanka to Norway over the period 2001-2011. However, this can most likely be attributed to the Business Matchmaking programme between the two countries. Moreover, there appears to be no discernible pattern to Norway’s exports to Sri Lanka. Norway does have some significant commercial interests in Sri Lanka. These include renewable energy and waste management technologies. SN Power (previously called Norfund) had a brief minority holding in a mini hydropower company in Sri Lanka until 2002. According to a 2009 NORAD report evaluating Norwegian business-related assistance, this was initially believed to have been the beginning of a major investment but SN Power subsequently moved its operations to other Asian countries.

Figure 4.2 Norway – Sri Lanka trade figures (in NOK1000) for the years 2001-2011

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428 Statistics Norway. “External Trade in Commodities, by trade area, continents and commodity groups, time and contents – Sri Lanka.”

429 Information about the project is available at the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce’s website: http://www.chamber.lk/projects/business-matchmaking-project.html
markets.\textsuperscript{430} ABB Norway ended its investment in Sri Lanka in 2005 and Norway’s \textit{mixed credit scheme} in the country also came to an end, resulting in a relatively low Norwegian involvement in the country’s hydropower sector.\textsuperscript{431} It is therefore apparent that Norway’s economic interests in Sri Lanka were not important enough to serve as a real motivation for Norway’s decision to become involved in the Sri Lankan peace process.

There is evidence to suggest that, on some levels, there was a conflict between Norway’s business activities and its peace agenda in Sri Lanka in the 1990s. NORAD’s ‘Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study’ report highlights these problems by identifying shortcomings of the Private Sector Development (PSD) strategy. According to the report, PSD support in Sri Lanka was not well aligned with the 1998 PSD Strategy or with the Norwegian 1998 Sri Lanka policy because of the Norwegian focus on conflict resolution. However, the report also states that the PSD portfolio was quite ‘apolitical’ with regard to Norway’s conflict resolution activities, stating that it was largely “market-driven, determined by the interests of Norwegian and Sri Lankan entrepreneurs, rather than governed by political directives.”\textsuperscript{432} NORAD concludes that this was inadvertently advantageous for Norway given the strained relationship between the Norwegian and Sri Lankan governments, which ensued following the election of Mahinda Rajapaksa to the presidency in 2005.\textsuperscript{433}

Helgesen cites the Sri Lanka case as an example of the fact that third party engagement does not always result in better relations.\textsuperscript{434} The statement was made in response to questions about the extent to which commercial and strategic interests influence the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts. His argument is that Norway cannot count on economic or strategic gains as a result of its peace engagement because there is no way of telling what the outcome of an intervention will be.\textsuperscript{435} In the Sri Lanka case, for example, relations between the GoSL and Norway were extremely strained by the end of Norway’s involvement in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{430} NORAD. 2009. “Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance – Sri Lanka Case Study.” p.xviii.
\item \textsuperscript{431} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{432} Ibid. pp.xxi-xxii.
\item \textsuperscript{433} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{434} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm, Sweden. 27 January 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{435} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the peace process. Despite this, one could however argue that Norway’s engagement leads to such a strong relationship being built up between it and the warring government that even problems resulting from the peace engagement will not reset relations between the two countries to their pre-intervention level. The Sri Lanka case could be said to support this hypothesis as, as demonstrated by the graph above, trade relations between the two countries continued to grow despite their difficult history. Both imports from Sri Lanka and exports from Norway stood at their highest levels in the two years following the termination of the conflict (see Figure 4.2). As discussed in the previous chapter, it is difficult to provide evidence for causality in this instance. It is however clear that Norway’s trade relations with Sri Lanka do not appear to have suffered as a result of the failed peace process. However, while Norway had some interests in Sri Lanka and it seems that its economic ties with the country grew significantly since it first became involved in the GoSL-LTTE peace process, it must be noted that Sri Lanka’s economy has also grown significantly in the post-conflict era and that Norway is not alone in seeing the country’s potential for investment.

In terms of influence, Helgesen points out that Norway’s involvement in the Sri Lanka process meant that policy makers from around the world were coming to Norway for updates and advice.\textsuperscript{436} This argument is underscored by information available in diplomatic cables originating from the US Embassy in Colombo, made available by Wikileaks in 2011. This position as expert on a situation, of which other countries had little understanding, was no mean achievement for a country of Norway’s size. This argument is borne out by the fact that Jan Petersen, the newly appointed Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001, was initially opposed to a continuation of Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka, changing his mind when realising that US government officials were more interested in hearing about Sri Lanka than they were in hearing about “developments in Norway’s European neighbourhood.”\textsuperscript{437} The evidence in this section suggests that the desire for greater influence on the global stage played a part in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka. However, this aspect of Norway’s Sri Lanka policy appears to have developed after the initial decision to become involved in the

\textsuperscript{436} Ibid.
The evidence in this section supports the hypothesis that Norway needs a foreign policy niche in order for it to be able to pursue its interests abroad, in that the Sri Lanka process has served to facilitate Norway’s pursuit of its strategic interests. The gains made by Norway, in terms of influence, would arguably have been impossible were it not for its engagement in this peace process. However, there appears to be insufficient evidence to suggest that Norway actively sought out a foreign policy niche, in this case peace diplomacy, as a means of pursuing its interests in Sri Lanka. The potential benefits of the Sri Lanka engagement appear to have come as something of a surprise to Norwegian policy-makers, which suggests that they were not a factor in the initial decision-making processes behind the engagement. Moreover, the interests that stand out as being important in the later stages of the process, take the form of influence with countries like the US and India, thus proving the point that Norway did not choose to intervene in the Sri Lanka conflict because of specific interests there. Moreover, as argued in Chapter Two, there are any number of foreign policy strategies which could have been implemented by Norway if interests and a quest for influence were the only factors at play. It is therefore necessary to look beyond interests when seeking to establish the driving forces behind Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka.
IDENTITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

As cited in Chapter Two, Abdelal et al argue that “in the realm of politics identities can affect conceptions of legitimacy, shared interests, and policy choices as well as preferences for political leaders and parties.”

Risse et al go further, arguing that “collective nation-state identities define the realm of instrumental or material interests considered legitimate and appropriate in a given political discourse” claiming that at the same time “consensual identity constructions can be used by political actors to further their perceived instrumental or material interests.”

The Sri Lanka case suggests that Norwegian identity had a more direct impact on the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka than hypothesised in Chapter One. The previous section suggests that interests were not an important factor in the initial decision-making processes behind Norway’s involvement in the GoSL - LTTE peace process. Thus rather than identity being responsible for the choice of peace diplomacy as an acceptable means of pursuing Norway’s interests in Sri Lanka, as hypothesised, identity appears to have been directly responsible for Norway’s decision to become engaged in the GoSL – LTTE peace process, for altruistic rather than more pragmatic reasons. Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka in the years prior to the start of the official peace engagement were characterised by significant activity on the part of Norwegian NGOs. Moreover a religious dialogue organised by the NEPP also predated the official peace process. These activities are strongly tied in with the moral aspects of Norwegian identity, although there is some overlap with Nordicity, which will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter.

The Sri Lanka case, in the context of Norway’s identity, is particularly interesting as it inadvertently led to an unprecedented questioning of that very same identity by Norwegians themselves. In Chapter Two it was hypothesised that a low degree of contestation within the Norwegian identity enables the pursuit of foreign policy strategies like peace diplomacy with little opposition. However, the events presented in this chapter resulted in the degree of contestation within the Norwegian identity, although there is some overlap with Nordicity, which will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter.


identity slowly increasing. Norwegians themselves have increasingly begun to question their government’s foreign policy decision-making and the previously sacred peace and reconciliation efforts have also been criticised. In order to establish whether this is an ongoing trend or whether criticism is limited to the highly publicised Norwegian peace engagement in Sri Lanka it will be necessary to look at levels of contestation within Norway’s identity in the context of Norway’s involvement in the Philippines and Sudan. However, it is worth noting that contestation only appears to have been on the rise in the final years of Norway’s peace engagement and therefore does not appear to have had any impact on Norway’s original decision to serve as facilitator in the Sri Lanka peace process.

It is also important to reconsider Risse et al’s argument for the importance of ‘resonance,’ which they argue, “explains which identity constructions are available in a given political discourse, while interests, on the other hand, account for which of these arguments is likely to win out.” Tying in the discussion on the role of interests in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s intervention in Sri Lanka earlier in this chapter, it has been argued that Norway’s desire for influence with major powers like the US led Norwegian politicians like Petersen to go along with suggestions that Norway continue to be involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. Thus, it could be argued that, while the original idea of becoming involved in the Sri Lanka peace process was not motivated by interests, the decision to continue to pursue this policy option over other foreign policy strategies was based on the fact that peace engagement in Sri Lanka offered a means of achieving altruistic goals while at the same time presenting an opportunity to pursue Norway’s foreign policy interests. It must however be noted that the key factor here must have been the fact that the peace engagement in Sri Lanka was already underway. Had this not been the case, then perhaps the choice of peace diplomacy as a means of garnering influence with major powers, would have been less likely. Thus, the Sri Lanka case in its early stages does not appear to bear out Risse et al’s argument with regard to resonance. However, one could argue that the argument holds true when it came to the question of whether Norway should remain engaged in Sri Lanka.

440 An example of this is the Norwegian MFA’s Refleks project, which aims to bring about debate on key foreign policy issues, including Norway’s peace diplomacy.
Lanka or whether it should give up its role in the peace process, with Norway deciding to continue with its peace diplomacy, a foreign policy strategy firmly rooted in its identity, because it also served to promote Norway’s interests.

Looking at Norwegian identity more closely, it must be noted that some of Norway’s policy decisions were highly controversial, and often stood apart from those of other European countries. An interesting point that was raised in discussion with Helgesen was that during the Sri Lanka process a number of European countries were unsupportive of Norwegian efforts to try and resolve the long-standing conflict between the government and the LTTE due to the fact that they considered the LTTE to be a terrorist group. Thus Norway stood apart from the other countries in Europe as something of a pioneer.\textsuperscript{443} This is in keeping with arguments relating to Norway’s sense of ‘exceptionalism.’\textsuperscript{444} Bandarage states that Norway’s own ‘secessionist’ history might have been one of the factors behind its sympathy for the cause of Tamil separatism.\textsuperscript{445} It is however very difficult to draw parallels between Norway’s relatively peaceful secession from Sweden and the LTTE’s conflict with the GoSL. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the fact that there was no violent conflict between the Norwegians and the Swedes.

Discussing Norwegian domestic politics, Bandarage argues that the Sri Lankan diaspora was very successful in lobbying Norwegian politicians.\textsuperscript{446} However, Helgesen argues that while there is a significant Sri Lankan diaspora in Norway, they were not involved in the peace process as Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s political strategist, had asked them not to become involved.\textsuperscript{447} This contradicts information provided by the 2011 NORAD evaluation of Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka, which states that the diaspora played a minor role in raising awareness of the peace process in Norway. In terms of party politics, a labour coalition was in power in the early days of Norway’s involvement in the Sri Lanka peace process. The Christian Democrats, however, continued the work begun under the leftist government with equal vigour. Subsequent changes in government

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\textsuperscript{443} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm. 27 January 2012.
\textsuperscript{444} See for example Skånland and Ingebritsen.
\textsuperscript{446} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{447} Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm. 27 January 2012.
\end{flushright}
had little impact on the degree of Norwegian involvement in the GoSL-LTTE peace process, suggesting that the Sri Lankan engagement was a cross-party initiative, despite the fact that there is evidence to suggest that their motivations for it might have differed. It must however be noted that while 2001 seems to be the year in which Norway’s decision-making on Sri Lanka began to be influenced by interests, the election of a leftist government in 2005 does not appear to have changed this new trend. Statements and documents published by the Norwegian MFA, such as the 2009 white paper on foreign policy, which acknowledges a growing focus on interests in foreign policy decision-making, support this argument.

**NORDICITY AND NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

The evidence provided in this chapter is in keeping with Finnemore’s argument that “norms create permissive conditions for action but do not determine action.”\(^{448}\) However, while a pervasive culture of humanitarianism in the Nordic states has arguably enabled Norway to pursue its peace diplomacy, the reality is in fact far more complex.

There is certainly a degree to which Norway fulfilled the role of ‘norm entrepreneur’ while engaging in peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka. Norway’s establishment of peace secretariats in Sri Lanka and its willingness to negotiate with the LTTE are examples of this. Another example of Norwegian norm entrepreneurship is the fact that in 2000, as a result of the Norwegian intervention, the LTTE agreed to halt the use of suicide bombers.\(^{449}\) This has been described as the development of political understanding through the peace process.\(^{450}\) It must however be noted that the LTTE did return to the use of this tactic in later years so the degree to which Norway can claim credit for this particular ‘innovation’ is limited. This raises the question of whether Norway’s role as a norm entrepreneur has been exaggerated. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that arguments that the Norwegian model was applied in the Sri Lanka case do not


\(^{449}\) Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.

\(^{450}\) Ibid.
withstand rigorous scrutiny. This argument is also promulgated by Goodhand et al, who argue that Norway’s decision to replace “an approach of NGO proxies for an official state engagement [...] indicates that the Norwegian model may be a misguided political construct or has become less relevant since the 1990s.”\textsuperscript{451} The reasoning behind Norway’s decision-making on this issue remains unclear and is worthy of further investigation. However, it is worth noting that the unilateral state-led attempt to broker peace in Sudan in 1993/1994, which is discussed at length in Chapter Six, suggests an early abandonment of the Norwegian model. The Philippines case, which will be assessed in the next chapter, looks at the Norwegian model in its later stages. One of the purposes of this case study will be to establish whether some of the earlier flaws in the Norwegian approach to peacemaking, and the way in which the Norwegian model was or was not applied, were ironed out in later years and to ascertain whether Norway opted to return to the proxy system or whether it decided to opt for another state-led peace engagement in the Philippines and in its second attempt to broker peace in Sudan.

It is possible that the Norwegian model is merely a branding exercise similar to the Norwegian decision to establish itself as a ‘peace nation’\textsuperscript{452} rather than a manifestation of norm entrepreneurship. Were this to be the case, it would suggest that Nordicity has not played a major role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka. However, it must be noted that norm entrepreneurship in the Norwegian context is not necessarily limited to the Norwegian model, as demonstrated by the examples provided in the previous paragraph. Moreover, the use of NGOs in the pre-engagement period suggests that elements of the Norwegian model were still in tact prior to the official commencement of Norway’s facilitation efforts in Sri Lanka. The subsequent move away from the use of NGOs, towards a state-led intervention, could be attributed to changes in government and possibly even to the realisation that Norwegian interests could be furthered via Norway’s activities in Sri Lanka. The potential for using discussions of the peace process with representatives of countries like the US as an entry point for discussions on other subjects may perhaps have encouraged the

government to retain sole control of the process rather than using a system of proxies.

While Norway was the official facilitator in the Sri Lanka peace process, it also worked together with the other Nordic nations to form the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). All five Nordic states were initially represented however Denmark, Finland and Sweden subsequently had to terminate their involvement in the SLMM due to the fact that their EU membership was seen as impeding their impartiality. All the Nordic countries had developed bilateral relations with Sri Lanka by the time of the SLMM’s inception. These relationships generally took the form of development cooperation and in the Swedish case development cooperation with Sri Lanka dated back to 1958. Funding was provided by all five Nordic countries involved in the mission. The first Head of Mission was a Swede, with subsequent Heads of Mission hailing from Norway due to the three EU member states leaving the SLMM in 2006. The total number of staff from each of the Nordic countries was relatively equal. Höglund provides an assessment of monitor’s perceptions of Norway’s role as both mediator and member of the SLMM. Interestingly, the Swedes were most critical of this dual role, followed by Norwegians themselves. What is most interesting about this initiative is the way that it brought the Nordic countries together to work on a specific peace initiative. What is clear from the SLMM report and from other reports of the mission, is that representatives of all five countries shared a very similar outlook with regard to the way in which the mission should be carried out and with regard to how they viewed the warring parties. This suggests that, in keeping with Hypothesis Three, Nordicity played a role in determining how Norway engaged in its peace activities in Sri Lanka, despite its move away from the Norwegian model.

453 The EU had declared the LTTE to be a terrorist organization in 2002.
455 Ibid. p.46.
CONCLUSIONS

Before embarking on an analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norwegians mediation efforts in Sri Lanka, a few words must be said about the limitations and obstacles encountered while conducting the research for this chapter. The principal shortcoming is that it was not possible to interview representatives of the LTTE, involved in the early stages of the Norwegian involvement in the GoSL-LTTE peace process, as many of them were killed in the final stages of the war in 2009. This problem was also identified by the authors of the 2011 NORAD evaluation of Norway’s involvement. Moreover, representatives of the GoSL who were contacted for interviews failed to respond to requests. The negative effects of this were however mitigated by the relative abundance of articles and books on the subject and the recent publication of the NORAD report on Norway’s engagement.

The findings laid out in this chapter contradict one of the key premises of the Norwegian approach to conflict resolution. There is evidence to suggest that the first step towards Norwegian involvement in the peace process was in fact undertaken by the Norwegians themselves. One could argue that since the Norwegian approach took place in 1991 subsequent governments may have changed the way in which Norway becomes involved. This issue will be looked at again in the context of the other case studies. Another important question raised in this chapter pertains to when Norway chooses to terminate its involvement in a peace process. In the Sri Lanka case, there were early signs that both parties to the conflict were turning against the Norwegian facilitators and their role in the peace process. Yet, despite this development, Norway continued acting as third-party facilitator until Rajapaksa’s government finally opted for a military solution to the conflict in 2009. Given the emphasis on local ownership of the peace process and the fact that Norwegian policy-makers make much of the importance of both parties actively wanting Norwegian involvement, it is difficult to understand why they did not choose to discontinue their involvement at an earlier stage, when the warring parties began to express their doubts about Norwegian efforts to broker peace in Sri Lanka. The possible link between Norway’s decision to remain engaged in Sri Lanka despite the failing peace process and its new found influence with major
powers was discussed in the section on interests and influence earlier on in this chapter. Norway’s decision to remain engaged in Sri Lanka in the final years of the conflict also raises the question of whether Norway adheres to its own rules of engagement with regard to its involvement in peace processes. Much is made of Norway’s unique approach but the reality seems to suggest that Norway responds to events in an *ad hoc* manner, much in the same way that other states conduct their foreign policy, rather than strictly adhering to a predetermined model of engagement. Despite this failure to stick to a specific conflict resolution model, it must however be noted that there were a number of examples of Norway engaging in norm entrepreneurship outwith the framework of the Norwegian model, suggesting that Nordicity did play a role in Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka, even if this has at times been exaggerated.

This leads on to, arguably, one of the most interesting aspects of the Norwegian involvement in Sri Lanka. How did Norway fail to consider the possible consequences of its intervention in Sri Lanka? As late as 2012, several years after Norway’s involvement in the peace process ended and two years after the conflict came to an end, Norway was still being heavily criticised by the Sri Lankan government and the media. At the time of Erik Solheim’s unexpected departure from government in March 2012, vitriolic Sri Lankan newspaper articles detailing a range of conspiracies involving Solheim were rife. One argument is that Norway had little experience of the political situation in Sri Lanka, or of broader South Asian politics, at the time of its engagement in Sri Lanka. Despite its cooperation with Norwegians on the ground and especially with Norwegian NGOs, the Norwegian government was insufficiently prepared for the scale of the task that it had set itself. Establishing why this happened has not been easy, but perhaps the 1993 Oslo Accords gave Norway an inflated sense of its own abilities and a feeling that nothing was impossible. This was also apparent in Norway’s first attempt to broker peace in Sudan, which failed because the warring parties were not committed to the peace process and because another peace process was already underway.

Norway’s interests in this case appear to have been of the strategic variety. The Norwegian role in the Sri Lanka peace process arguably gave Norway access to a broad range of international policy-makers, as demonstrated by the emphasis placed on Norwegian cooperation with the US. There does not however appear to be any evidence to suggest that major economic interests are behind Norway’s mediation efforts in Sri Lanka. The relationship between Norwegian identity and interests in this case is not clear-cut. It seems that Norwegian identity and domestic politics were important in different stages of the Norwegian intervention. In the early stages identity appears to have played a defining role in Norway’s engagement. Whether interests were at play at this stage, however, seems less certain. Thus identity and domestic politics appear to have had a direct impact on Norway’s decision to engage in Sri Lanka and the role of interests appears to have evolved more gradually. This change does however appear to have occurred relatively early on in Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka dating back to 2001 and the election of a conservative government in Norway. The findings in Chapter Three suggest that the government’s political orientation has little impact on the extent to which Norway engages in peace processes. However, this case suggests that while the level of engagement may not differ from government to government, the motivations do. The return of a centre-left government in 2005 did not necessarily mean a return to an altruistic role in Sri Lanka although the level of idealism arguably increased. This suggests that the Sri Lanka case diverges from the model outlined in Chapters One and Two in that peace diplomacy does not appear to have been adopted as a morally viable means of pursuing Norway’s foreign policy. Rather peace diplomacy was a foreign policy strategy, which was already in place, and which became multi-functional.

The Norwegian engagement in Sri Lanka was characterised by attempts to implement a unique approach to conflict resolution, although the Norwegian model was sidelined early on. As discussed in the Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship section of this chapter, Norway’s decision to abandon the Norwegian model may have been linked to its strategic interests, with the degree of government cooperation with NGOs decreasing as the role of Norwegian interests increased. Norm entrepreneurship does however appear to have played a role in shaping the
way in which Norway engaged in its mediation efforts in Sri Lanka, even if this occurred to a lesser degree than anticipated. The establishment of peace secretariats, the SLMM and Norway’s peace ownership approach constitute some examples of this. There does however appear to be some overlap between the identity and Nordicity variables in the Sri Lanka case. This is due to the fact that attempts at innovative peacemaking constitute manifestations of both the Norwegian and the Nordic identities. Moreover, both identity and, to a lesser degree, Nordicity, in terms of the broader Scandinavian stance on issues pertaining to peace and conflict resolution, were factors behind Norway’s original decision to engage in Sri Lanka.

While beliefs and the role of the individual do not constitute one of the levels of analysis considered in this thesis, they do appear to have played a role in Norway’s decision to become engaged in the Sri Lanka peace process and in the decision to remain involved in the process until the Sri Lankan government opted for a military solution to the conflict. In the run-up to the engagement, Arne Fjørtoft appears to have played a key role in convincing the Norwegian government to become involved in the peace process. Moreover, the commitment of a number of individuals, including Erik Solheim, despite the controversy that he sometimes provoked, also played a part in determining the trajectory of Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka.

At this stage it is important to consider the possibility that a different relationship between interests, identity and Nordicity might have led to a different outcome for Norwegian mediation efforts in Sri Lanka. The idealism that seems to have been behind the decision to engage in Sri Lanka in the late 1990s appears to have led Norway to become involved in a peace process, which given the conflict history, was unlikely to succeed. The fact that the conservative government, which was elected in 2001, was initially eager to end Norway’s involvement but opted to remain engaged because of the strategic benefits that could be gained from such a move, suggests that both idealism and pragmatism can lead to the same result. Perhaps if interests had not come into play then Norway would have stuck more closely to the Norwegian model, which had been effective in Guatemala and in Mali. Ultimately, however, it seems that Norway’s chances of success in the Sri Lanka case were poor from the outset and that only a greater desire for peace on the
part of the warring parties could have changed the outcome. Norway’s principal error appears to have been its failure to see this. With regard to what can be learnt from Norway’s intervention in Sri Lanka, it seems clear that mediators must know at which stage in a failing process it is necessary to withdraw. Failure to do so leads to a loss of credibility on the part of the mediator and does nothing to further the peace process. Moreover, Norway’s perceived attributes as a mediator, which are often discussed in the context of Norwegian identity, only appear to have had an impact in the short-run. While a ceasefire was brokered in the early stages of Norway’s involvement, Norway quickly realised that it lacked sufficient clout and as a result requested US and Indian assistance. This suggests that stronger mediators are more likely to be successful than weaker ones and that single state interventions by smaller states should always have support from stronger mediators.

While the Sri Lanka case has provided a useful insight into the factors driving Norway’s peace engagement, it has also served to confirm some of the unexpected complexities of the decision-making processes, which were highlighted in Chapter Three. As a result there are questions, which remain unanswered. One of the purposes of the next chapter, which looks at Norway’s involvement in the peace process between communist insurgents and the Government of the Philippines, is to establish whether Norway opted for a state-led approach in the Philippines or whether it returned to the model of using NGOs and academics as proxies. The degree to which the Norwegian approach to conflict resolution has evolved will also be considered as will the role of individuals in the early stages of the peace process. An attempt will also be made to establish whether any lessons were learnt from the Sri Lanka case and applied in Norway’s attempts to broker peace in the Philippines.
CHAPTER 5

NORWAY IN THE PHILIPPINES

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, the conflict between the Moro groups and the government of the Philippines in the southern provinces of Mindanao received considerable media attention. With all eyes on Mindanao and the Islamist separatists who are active there, the long-standing communist insurgency in the Philippines, which dates back to the 1960s, was all but forgotten by the international community. Yet, according to the International Crisis Group, “some in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continue to see the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA) as the bigger threat, and the 42-year-old conflict provides a justification for an array of paramilitary forces and militia groups that complicate prospects for peace in Mindanao.”

US government officials appear to share this view, as demonstrated by a Wikileaks cable dating back to March 2005 in which staff at the US embassy in Manila describe the NPA as a formidable threat to the government security forces and local officials for the foreseeable future. Further evidence of the threat posed by the NPA is the fact that the conflict has resulted in approximately 40,000 fatalities since its inception. In addition, an estimated 105,000 people have been displaced as a result of the insurgency.

Norway has been one of the few countries to work actively on finding a lasting solution to this conflict. The Norwegian involvement dates back to the 1990s although their engagement has not been continuous. This chapter will provide an overview of the historical background of the conflict before looking at the strength and status of the NPA today. Subsequently, Norway’s role in the CPP-NPA-NDFP peace process will be looked at in the context of the three hypotheses outlined in Chapter One. An attempt will be made to establish the extent to which Norway’s interests and identity have played a role in driving its peacemaking initiatives.

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459 Cable 05MANILA1451, TERRORIST NPA STEPS UP ANTI US THREATS ON ITS 36TH. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05MANILA1451.html
461 National Democratic Front for the Philippines is an umbrella organization for the CPP and the NPA as well as for a number of other leftist groups.
activities in the Philippines. This chapter will also seek to ascertain the extent to which Nordicity has determined the way in which Norway has engaged in peace diplomacy in the Philippines.

**DATA**

This chapter is the result of interviews conducted in Manila - Philippines, Utrecht - Netherlands (headquarters of the CPP), Oslo – Norway, and Stockholm - Sweden. Data was also gathered from government and NGO reports. Journal articles and books have also been consulted, but to a lesser extent due to the limited availability of literature discussing the communist insurgency in the Philippines.

**HISTORY**

Communist insurgents, led by Jose-Maria Sison, began their campaign against the Government of the Philippines (GPH) in 1969. Sison had founded the CPP in December 1968, having been expelled from the Partido Komunista Ng Pilipinas (PKP), which he had joined in the early 1960s. The NPA, the armed branch of the CPP, was founded in 1969. Coronel-Ferrer states that the CPP’s “party and organization is Leninist, but its class analysis and adopted strategy is overtly Maoist.” The CPP-NPA conflict was not the first communist insurgency in the Philippines. In the 1940s the PKP had allied with the Hobo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Huks) in a bid to overthrow the government in Manila. In 1950 the Huks changed their name to Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People’s Liberation Army), marking the beginning of a full-scale insurgency, which was to continue for four years.

At this point it is important to consider the CPP’s ideology in order to facilitate an understanding of the conflict’s dynamics. At the time of its inception the CPP deemed the Philippines to be suffering from three fundamental problems. These

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were US imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism.\textsuperscript{466} The CPP’s solution to these problems was to wage a peasant-led revolution.\textsuperscript{467} At the height of its activities, the CPP had supporters from many sectors of Philippine society. These included, government officials, lawyers, priests, teachers, farmers and students, amongst others.\textsuperscript{468} This is indicative of the fact that the CPP enjoyed extremely high levels of support during the Marcos era. The decline in this support will be discussed later on in this section.

Relatively early on, the NDFP realised the importance of international support for the movement and in the 1970s and 1980s they succeeded in establishing an extensive international network of support.\textsuperscript{469} This network included Filipino political refugees, migrant workers and spouses of foreigners as well as non-Filipinos who supported the movement.\textsuperscript{470} Quimpo argues that despite the scale of the network, the NDFP was never as successful in garnering international support as other revolutionary groups such as South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), citing the NDFP’s failure to obtain substantial amounts of arms abroad and its inability to make headway in the diplomatic arena as examples of this.\textsuperscript{471} The internationalisation of the NDFP began with non-Filipino supporters. Returning missionaries and aid workers as well as some Europe-based Filipino sympathisers began gathering material support and propaganda activities in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{472} Quimpo states that the first “Philippine Support Group” in Western Europe was established in the Netherlands in 1975.\textsuperscript{473} He argues that conditions for the CPP-NDFP’s international work were much more favourable in Western Europe than they were in the US, where communists were marginalised and in China, which had established diplomatic relations with the Philippines.\textsuperscript{474} He cites the welfare state as being a major factor behind this, his argument being that members were able to live in Western Europe as refugees, receiving state benefits while being able to continue to

\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{470} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{471} Ibid. pp 348-349.
\textsuperscript{472} Ibid. p. 352.
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{474} Ibid. pp.355-356.
work for the revolution. In fact, Jose Maria Sison is currently in self-imposed exile in the Netherlands, where he has been based since 1987. According to US officials, his status as a political refugee and the fact that the Netherlands doesn’t have an extradition treaty with the Philippines have enabled him to continue his CPP activities in Europe, largely without interruption.

According to the International Crisis Group it was during the mid-1980s that Sison tried to procure arms and to gain international support, suggesting a later attempt at internationalisation. They argue that these attempts came too late as the global decline of communism had already begun. Sison himself refers to extensive international support for his movement, but is unwilling to identify specific supporters. In this context Coronel Ferrer mentions the NDFP’s early ties with the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China. She argues, however, that global developments and China’s support for the Marcos regime, soon served to render these ties useless. She also states that the NDFP does not have strong ties with the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Discussing the late 1980s and early 1990s, the International Crisis Group argues, “within less than a decade, the CPP-NPA contended with Marcos’s downfall, a first attempt at peace talks under the Cory Aquino government, internal purges and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.” This argument is supported by Abinales who argues that during the Marcos dictatorship, “the CPP expanded enormously because the shift to authoritarianism polarized Philippine society and simplified political battles.” He goes on to state that following the collapse of the Marcos regime “the revolutionary movement also began to

475 Ibid. p.357.
476 Cable 05MANILA5506, PERCEPTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT IN THE PHILIPPINES. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05MANILA5506.html
478 Ibid.
479 Interview with Jose-Maria Sison, Utrecht, Netherlands, 25 January 2012.
unravel,” adding that the communist movement “declined in power and influence in the 1980s.”

Explaining the growth of the CPP-NPA in Mindanao, Abinales argues that communism flourished in Mindanao due to the “strongly interventionist state,” which was committed to destroying the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). He argues that this resulted in the militarisation of Mindanao society. Abinales states “the party could easily attract fresh recruits from the victims of these brutal changes, individuals whose family, clan, and class ties were shattered in militarization.” This argument is echoed by many scholars writing about the insurgency in the context of both Mindanao and the Philippines.

**THE NPA TODAY**

At the height of the conflict the NPA is believed to have numbered 25,200 armed combatants. However, as mentioned above, following the reintroduction of democracy and the collapse of the Marcos regime this number dropped significantly. Official GPH estimates suggest that the NPA is currently around 5000 strong. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states that membership has been on the rise again in recent years, however there is little evidence to support this argument. The most specific figures come from the Rand Corporation, which puts armed membership at 4,874 and states that the NPA has access to somewhere in the region of 5,390 firearms. It is important to note that some of the figures quoted above are disputed by the CPP’s founder Jose-Maria Sison who states that the group has never had more than 6,000 members. It is possible that this claim is based on a desire to mask the decline of the NPA by insisting that membership numbers have not changed significantly over the years.

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483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.
485 See for example Tañada and Coronel-Ferrer.
487 Interview with Chito Gascon. 26 October 2011.
490 Interview with Jose-Maria Sison, Utrecht, Netherlands, 25 January 2012.
The IISS states that the government addressed the rebels’ main grievance, land distribution, in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{491} Tañada, however, states that progress on land reform has been too slow.\textsuperscript{492} This viewpoint is supported by Rabasa \textit{et al} who state “of considerable importance for the longevity of the insurgency are the deep, systemic problems that have contributed to the insurgency and undermined the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of much of the population.”\textsuperscript{493} Addressing some of the criticism faced by the NPA, Tañada notes that the NPA’s ‘revolutionary taxes’\textsuperscript{494} do not benefit individuals but rather go towards funding the movement as a whole. This, she states, is in sharp contrast with the ASG, who kidnap and extort for personal gain.\textsuperscript{495} Other activists and scholars also point out that the CPP-NPA carries out a range of social development programmes, which have benefited impoverished rural communities significantly.

The NPA’s current stronghold is the Compostela Valley in Mindanao and the organisation is relatively centralised, although there are a number of breakaway groups. These include the Cordillera Liberation People’s Army, with whom the government signed a peace agreement in 1986, and the Chamson Faction. Despite the 25-year old peace agreement, disarmament of the CLPA only began in 2011. Other breakaway groups are the Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA), the RPNP and the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB), which have also split into further splinter factions. The GPH has been negotiating a peace agreement with these groups in a separate peace process to the CPP-NPA-NDFP process. It is important to note that the NPA conflict is further complicated by the presence of warring clans in many of its strongholds. Examples include Masbate, Mindanao and Abra.\textsuperscript{496} The MILF operates in many of the same areas as the NPA, further complicating AFP attempts to combat the rebels and efforts to gather accurate statistics for the individual conflicts. According to Sison there is an alliance between the NPA and the MILF. He states that the two groups respect each other as they have a common enemy. He

\textsuperscript{491} International Institute for Strategic Studies. Armed Conflict Database. Available at www.iiss.org.
\textsuperscript{492} Interview with Karen Tañada, 25 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{494} NPA members collect ‘taxes’ from individuals and companies living and working in the areas in which they operate.
\textsuperscript{495} Interview with Karen Tañada, Manila, 25 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{496} Ibid.
adds that there is also a need for cooperation as it ensures that errors don’t occur, such as combatants from the two groups accidentally targeting each other.  

**HISTORY OF PEACE ENGAGEMENT**

The first attempt at peace talks between the NDFP and the government took place in 1986 between the rebels and the Cory Aquino government. The process was short-lived with a breakdown of the historic ceasefire occurring just two months after the signing of the agreement between the warring parties. The International Crisis Group states that “twelve agreements and 25 years later, [the NDFP and the GPH] have scarcely touched on substantive issues.” This section will consider these agreements in some detail in a bid to establish the chain of events that led to Norway’s involvement in the peace process.

It is worth noting that prior to Norwegian involvement in the peace process, the Netherlands had hosted and facilitated several rounds of talks. These talks resulted in the signing of a number of agreements including The Hague Joint Declaration in 1992, the Breukelen Joint Statement in 1994, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) in 1995 and the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) in The Hague in 1998. Switzerland (April and May 1991), Vietnam (1993) and the European Parliament (1990, 1991 and 1992) also offered good offices prior to Norwegian involvement and the Belgians briefly served as hosts in 1995. Dutch involvement continued sporadically until 2002 despite the fact that the Norwegians had by that time already taken up the role of facilitator. Both representatives of the NDFP and the GPH state that this was due to the fact that the Netherlands was only providing good offices, whereas Norway played a more substantial role from the outset. Dumanjug-Palo states that Spain also expressed an interest and that informal discussions about their possible involvement were held in 2005. This was

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497 Interview with Jose-Maria Sison, Utrecht, Netherlands, 25 January 2012.
501 Interviews with Marissa P. Dumanjug-Palo NDFP and Chito Gascon GPH. 26 October 2011.
not however pursued further and Spain was never formally involved in the peace process.\textsuperscript{502}

Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that even in the early 1990s the NDFP wanted talks to be held abroad as it wanted to ensure the safety of its negotiators. The government at the time was however opposed to such a move stating that the conflict was an internal matter. As a compromise the government offered to hold talks in the mountains or at Philippine embassies abroad.\textsuperscript{503} Former President Ramos turned down NDFP requests to invite foreign mediators such as the UN, international NGOs and the European Parliament.\textsuperscript{504} However, in 2005 Diosinio suggested that there was a need for the question of a local third-party mediator to be addressed. She argued that the NDFP were not in favour of this, as they believed that neutrality meant siding with the GPH. She also argued that the NDFP believed that a local mediator would either be naïve or acting as an agent of the state.\textsuperscript{505} Diosinio added that in 2005 the NDFP still viewed peacebuilding as a counter-insurgency or counter-revolutionary tactic.\textsuperscript{506} Coronel Ferrer ascribes government reluctance to allow foreign intervention to a fear that such intervention would grant the NPA ‘a status of belligerency.’\textsuperscript{507} She also notes that the NDFP has few international links, with its activities abroad limited to building solidarity groups and generating logistical support.\textsuperscript{508} This is in keeping with some of the arguments, discussed earlier in this chapter, regarding the history of the NDFP and its international support. Coronel Ferrer notes that this is in contrast to the Moro conflict, which led oil producing/labour importing countries to exert their ‘natural leverage’ on the Philippine government. She argues that only the US could have exerted this type of pressure on the government to negotiate with the communists and rather than being in favour of the talks, they were in fact steadfastly opposed to any peace process.\textsuperscript{509} Coronel Ferrer also notes that European governments and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) do not have much political

\textsuperscript{502} Interview with Marissa P. Dumanjug-Palo NDFP. 26 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{506} Ibid. p.61.
\textsuperscript{509} Ibid. pp. 32-33.
or economic clout over the Philippine government. She argues that much the same as local groups; they only have ‘moral clout.’ This may be one of the reasons behind the failure to reach a lasting peace agreement to date.

**NORWEGIAN ENGAGEMENT**

Dumanjug-Palo of the NDFP suggests that the Norwegians approached the two warring parties regarding the possibility of assuming the role of third party mediator. Chito Gascon of the GPH however suggests that this is extremely unlikely. He states that Norway’s involvement can only go back as far as the Arroyo administration (2001-2010) as the Estrada administration was completely opposed to foreign involvement in internal matters. Tañada suggests that the Norwegians may have been keen to become involved in the peace process as Gloria Arroyo had a very good reputation at the time, being seen as a positive change in the period following the corrupt Estrada regime. It has also been suggested that in the late 1990s Norwegian politicians from the Social Congress met with both parties to the conflict prior to formalising an agreement. What is certain, is that the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) was one of the convenors of the ‘International Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Philippines’ held in Quezon City in December 1990. Moreover, all those interviewed agree that Norwegian involvement in the peace process only officially began in 2001, when they facilitated two rounds of talks, the first in April and the second in June. Prior to the official talks, Erik Solheim held a number of orientation talks for the participants.

In 2002, the CPP and the NPA as well as Sison himself were declared “terrorists” by the US, the EU, Canada and Australia and their assets were frozen. The move to ban the NPA led to a breakdown of the peace talks being facilitated by Norway.

510 Ibid. pp. 34.
511 Interview with Marissa P. Dumanjug-Palo, NDFP, Quezon City, 26 October 2011.
512 Interview with Chito Gascon, GPH, 26 October 2011.
514 Interview with Ture Lundh. 3 February 2011.
Talks resumed informally in 2003 and formally in 2004, but according to Tañada the peace process was dead by 2005.\textsuperscript{517} This was due to the fact that the GPH suspended the JASIG in August 2005 on the basis that “since talks were suspended after the NDFP unilaterally withdrew from the negotiating table, the JASIG need not be in force.”\textsuperscript{518} Tañada \textit{et al} argue that the result of this was that the safe conduct passes of 97 NDFP peace negotiators were lifted, leaving them at risk of arrest.\textsuperscript{519} The Norwegian Ambassador to the Philippines at the time was heavily involved in the talks, taking a strong personal interest.\textsuperscript{520} According to Tañada, this set him apart from subsequent ambassadors, who have been less involved in the peace process.\textsuperscript{521} According to a leaked diplomatic cable, the Norwegians facilitated a return to the negotiating table in August 2005, despite the difficulties facing the parties to the peace process. The cable states that this included a commitment by both parties to adhere to the hitherto suspended JASIG agreement.\textsuperscript{522} Alternative reports however, suggest that re-implementation of the JASIG did not occur until 17 July 2009.\textsuperscript{523} Following the collapse of the 2005 talks, the conflict continued and no further talks took place until 2008 when the Norwegian government hosted two rounds of informal talks in which they once again fulfilled the role of third-party facilitator.\textsuperscript{524} Once again, Norway’s involvement in the Philippines all but ceased for the next two years. In January 2011, following the election of Benigno Aquino III to the presidency in June 2010, informal talks were held between the warring parties. The GPH and the NDFP did not however return to the negotiating table formally until February of that year. The first round of talks was deemed a success by the Norwegians and the warring parties. However, despite progress being made, the NPA continued to commit acts of violence. Further talks were expected to take place in August 2011, but the NPA’s unilateral postponement of the talks meant that they did not transpire. At the time of writing the two parties have reached an impasse.

\textsuperscript{517} Interview with Karen Tañada. 25 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{519} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{520} Interview with Karen Tañada 25 October 2011.
\textsuperscript{521} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{522} Cable 05MANILA4137, COMMUNISTS COMMIT TO FORMAL TALKS BUT BREAKTHROUGH. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05MANILA4137.html
\textsuperscript{524} Ibid.
ANNEX A. THE ROLE OF THE THIRD PARTY FACILITATOR

The Negotiating Panels have agreed that, subject at any time to the acceptance of the Royal Norwegian Government, the following will guide the role of the Third Party Facilitator:

1. To facilitate the holding of the talks of the two negotiating Panels.

2. To attend formal talks as Third Facilitator and to provide advice, opinions & suggestions to the two negotiating parties subject to the inherent prerogative of the negotiating parties to maintain mutual control of the process.

3. To receive updates on the progress of the talks from the two parties as may be deemed necessary.

4. (To extend assistance to facilitate the work of the RWCs and subcommittees).

5. (To provide support, as may be requested, for the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee, when duly constituted, and the general implementation of the CARHRIHL).

Note: the Norwegian facilitators’ approval of Numbers 4 & 5 of the above was deferred pending clarification on expected and detailed specifics on the roles to be played by them. Meanwhile, the agreement of the parties on Numbers 4 & 5 stands.

6. To perform other functions as Third Party Facilitator that the two parties may agree upon based on their continuing assessment of the progress and emerging needs of the talks.

Figure 5.1: The official description of the role of the third party facilitator.

It is important to note that there are currently two parallel GPH – NDFP peace processes. The first is the panel-to-panel process facilitated by the Norwegians, which is sometimes referred to as the ‘concise track.’ Simultaneously, there are ongoing principal-to-principal negotiations taking place in Utrecht between Sison and the Secretary for Political Affairs. These are referred to as the ‘special track’ and revolve around a very “pragmatic” one page document presented to the GPH by Sison. Chito Gascon refers to the special track as ‘doable.’ As part of these negotiations, Ronald Liamas, Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs met Jose Maria Sison in Utrecht in 2011. It is believed that discussions looked at the possibility of the NDFP reducing their demands on nationalisation to just a few

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525 Interview with Chito Gascon. 26 October 2011.
select industries. General opinion seems to be that Aquino is somewhat sceptical of the prospects for the peace process, but he is still willing to release NDFP prisoners. However, the question of terminology has led to the failure to reach an agreement on this issue. The government refers to the release as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) whereas the NDFP say that such a release would simply constitute compliance with previous agreements. According to Gascon, the Norwegians are aware of the special track negotiations but play no role in them. However, when asked about the special-track, Norwegian officials responded by describing it as being complimentary to the ordinary negotiations. The need for a parallel process suggests that the Norwegian-led peace process has not been making sufficient progress in the eyes of the warring parties. It also suggests a genuine desire for peace among elements on both sides of the conflict.

Norway’s involvement in this peace process could be construed as a risky endeavour. Chito Gascon says that if the current chair of the GPH Peace Panel, Alex Padilla, resigns there is a good chance that the peace negotiation option will close and that a Sri Lanka style military surge will ensue. He puts this down to the fact that the military has been trained by the US and has a strongly anti-communist mind-set. He also notes that current levels of violence only serve to contribute to the argument for a military solution to the conflict. A Sri Lanka style solution to the problem would be extremely damaging for the Norwegians. However, the risk associated with involvement in this particular process may have been one of the factors, which drove Norway to become involved in the first place. The idea that Norway can resolve conflicts where others have failed appears to appeal to them.

While the principal purpose of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the decision-making processes behind Norway’s third-party mediation efforts, it is also necessary to understand how Norway implements its peace diplomacy. Such an understanding has the potential to provide an insight into the links between Norway’s identity and Nordicity and its involvement in peace processes around the

527 Ibid.  
528 Ibid.  
529 Interview with Chito Gascon. 26 October 2011. 
530 Interview with Ture Lundh. 3 February 2012. 
531 Interview with Chito Gascon. 26 October 2011. 
532 This came across in most of my interviews with Norwegian officials and representatives of Norwegian NGOs.
world. In the case of the Philippines, the Norwegian facilitators undertake three visits per year to the country, during which they visit representatives of both sides to the conflict. During each visit, the continuation of their role as third party facilitator is reaffirmed. The delegation passes through Utrecht on the way to and from the negotiations in order to meet with the senior figures of the NDFP who are in exile there. Bilateral meetings with either side are designed to be exploratory, enabling the Norwegians to gain a clearer insight into the stance of one or the other party. The NDFP describe Lundh as a very adept facilitator, who appears to be more open to material assistance than those previously fulfilling that role. This viewpoint is understandable, given that the Norwegians seem to have a very egalitarian approach to their engagement with both of the warring parties. This is a situation, which must be unprecedented for the CPP-NPA-NDFP, who, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, have been declared terrorists by the EU and a number of other countries. Moreover, material assistance is of great importance to the NDFP, who have limited sources of funding.

Building on the question of material assistance, it is important to note that a key aspect of Norway’s peace engagement in the Philippines has been the financial support it has provided throughout the peace process. While funding in itself is not unusual, it is the way in which it is used that arguably makes the Norwegian approach to conflict resolution so unique. Financial assistance for the peace process has taken many forms, including the funding of the NDFP-GPH Joint-Secretariat in Quezon City. This funding includes the rent for the offices, as well as staff salaries. One of the conditions of the funding is that both sides receive exactly the same amount. The Norwegian government does however administer the funding itself, as that aspect of the arrangement is dealt with by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD). Dumanjug-Palo states that this is due to the fact that the Norwegian government does not want to be seen to be funding terrorists. On the Norwegian side this is attributed, in part, to the need for deniability. However, the collaboration between the CHD and the Norwegian government is long-standing

533 Interview with Marissa P. Dumanjug-Palo NDFP, 26 October 2011.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 The NPA and the CPP are proscribed groups both in the US and in the EU.
and as such their involvement is also described as being natural.\textsuperscript{538} The arrangement is also described as being purely administrative.\textsuperscript{539} It is worth noting that a significant proportion of the CHD’s funding comes from Norway,\textsuperscript{540} demonstrating the diverse range of organisations receiving financial aid. Interestingly, similar secretariats were established in Sri Lanka, as discussed in the previous chapter. This suggests that the idea of having the warring parties work out of the same building is an example of the Norwegian approach in Sri Lanka being refined and implemented in the Philippines in its new form, although this was not confirmed by any of the Norwegian officials, who were interviewed during the research for this chapter.

\textbf{Figure 5.2: Structure of the Joint-Secretariat\textsuperscript{541}}

As part of its engagement in the Philippines Norway also funds Sulong CARHRIHL, a national network established in 2004 to promote peace, with an emphasis on indigenous peoples, youth and women. They organise seminars and training programmes and run radio advertisements. The Sulong CARHRIHL is generally seen as being pro-government.\textsuperscript{542} Norway’s funding of civil society organisations and its relationship with the church in the Philippines suggests that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{538} Interview with Vidar Helgesen, Stockholm, 27 January 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{539} Interview with Ture Lundh, Oslo, 3 January 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{540} Exact figures are provided in Chapter Three.
\item \textsuperscript{541} The original version of this diagram was provided by Marissa P. Dumanjug-Palo of the NDFP in October 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{542} Interview with Karen Tañada, 25 October 2011.
\end{itemize}
their approach to peacemaking is extremely comprehensive. This too, can be viewed as somewhat unique. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Norwegian NGOs have at times received up to 90% of their funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which consequently also means that it has a say in which projects these NGOs undertake. This suggests that the comprehensive approach to the peace process is very deliberate.

Figure 5.3: Norwegian assistance to the PEPP.543

Coronel Ferrer describes the Church’s ‘institutional clout’ in the Philippines as being ‘unparalleled.’ 544 This might explain why, in 2002, the Norwegian government asked the Norwegian churches about the possibility of a second-track. As a result, representatives of the Philippines’ churches came to Norway. The MFA was keen to have a programme for them in order to establish whether it would be possible for them to have a more formal role. Subsequently, the NEPP and the NCA undertook two fact-finding missions to the Philippines in 2004 and 2005. It took several years before Fr. Michel Beckers founded the Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform (PEPP) in 2007.545 The PEPP is multi-denominational, comprising members from the Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), Catholic Bishop’s Conference (CBCP), Ecumenical Bishop’s Forum

543 The original version of this diagram was provided by Marianne Brekken at Caritas in February 2012.
545 Interview with Tor Birkeland, Marianne Brekken and Lars Gaupset. Oslo, Norway. 3 February 2012.
(EBF), National Council of Churches (NCCP) and the Philippine Conference of Evangelical Churches (PCEC). There was some scepticism about the PEPP in its early stages as it was widely thought that Fr. Beckers was a representative of the MFA. While this was not the case, the NEPP’s involvement in the Philippines is via the PEPP and the NEPP and officials from the MFA meet regularly to discuss developments in the Philippines. This shows that there is a substantial connection between the MFA and the various ecumenical organisations.

Those working at the NEPP in Oslo state that, in general, church leaders are sympathetic to the NDFP’s cause but that they do not believe that armed conflict should be the way in which the NDFP achieves their goals. Protestant church leaders tend to be more pro-NDFP than evangelical leaders who tend to be more pro-government. In terms of specific organisations, the Ecumenical Bishop’s Forum can be placed on the political left. The GPH feels that the PEPP are slightly pro-left but their chief negotiator Alex Padilla is nevertheless pleased with their activities. According to the staff at NEPP, Norway’s key achievement, in this area was to make the church platform in the Philippines broader and more united. The PEPP requested to participate in the official negotiations in 2009, but they are not at the negotiating table as there is no funding for their participation. Given Coronel-Ferrer’s argument regarding the clout of the churches in the Philippines, the decision to involve religious figures in the peace process appears to have been a clever move on the part of the Norwegian MFA. It also reflects Norway’s flexibility and innovativeness when it comes to trying new methods in order to help a peace process move forward.

When interviewed, Lundh highlighted the fact that this is an asymmetrical conflict, stating the inevitability of the fact that in such cases the weaker party receives more funding. While this could be seen as legitimising the CPP-NPA-NDFP, Norwegian officials state that this is not the case. Despite their assertions to the contrary, it does however seem that the NPA has been afforded a status that it did
not hold prior to the Norwegian facilitated peace process. This view is reinforced by Quimpo’s argument that “mediation or arbitration by a third party as prestigious as Norway, which played the broker’s role in the Israel-PLO peace accords of 1993/94, would have meant that the NDF had ‘arrived’ on the diplomatic scene [sic].”\textsuperscript{553} Moreover, the NDFP now have a well-funded platform for their propaganda, which they did not have before Norwegian involvement in the conflict. The Norwegians pay for the printing of NDF information leaflets, brochures and books.\textsuperscript{554} The value of these two factors to the NPA must not be underestimated and they lead to speculation on the extent to which the rebels are truly committed to a lasting peace. It also brings into question the extent to which they are simply enjoying generous funding and a heightened degree of ‘legitimacy.’

Norway’s role as an impartial mediator in the GPH-NDFP peace process was called into question when it was revealed that Vidar Brynildsen, Norway’s former Special Envoy to the Philippines, had revealed information about the ongoing peace process to US diplomats. In a meeting with US officials, Brynildsen expressed his doubts about the influence that Sison holds in the NDFP, stating that in 2010 the NDFP leadership in the Philippines refused to abide by Sison's commitment to formal talks.\textsuperscript{555} Sison condemned Brynildsen’s disclosures on his website, but when discussing the issue in person he appeared to take it less seriously.\textsuperscript{556} While one must be careful not to read too much into this particular incident, it does shed some light on how the Norwegians really feel about the two parties in the peace process. Despite the very deliberate display of egalitarianism in public, the tone of the conversation described in the leaked diplomatic cable suggests that behind the scenes the Norwegians take a pro-government stance. It is worth noting Luis Jalandoni’s very pragmatic comment on the matter. In an interview in Utrecht he stated that while Norway tries to be neutral, “statehood creates a bond.”\textsuperscript{557} However, while this incident undoubtedly damaged the Norwegian’s image temporarily, it seems unlikely that it will have a negative impact on their involvement in the Philippines or on their other peace engagements in the long-


\textsuperscript{554} Interview with Marissa P. Dumanjeg-Palo NDFP, 26 October 2011.

\textsuperscript{555} Cable 10MANILA235, NO SIGN OF PROGRESS IN PEACE TALKS WITH COMMUNISTS. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10MANILA235.html

\textsuperscript{556} Interview with Jose-Maria Sison, Utrecht. 25 January 2012.

\textsuperscript{557} Interview with Luis Jalandoni, Utrecht. 25 January 2012.
term. This is due to the fact that the NDF and non-state actors in other parts of the world are unlikely to find another third-party who provides the same level of funding or support as Norway.

One of the most prominent themes in the literature on the communist insurgency in the Philippines, as well as a recurring point in discussions with policy-makers and even representatives of the warring parties themselves, is the unlikelihood of finding a solution to this conflict. This leads one to question why the Norwegians continue to sink significant resources into this process. One of the key points, made by all the Norwegian officials interviewed for the purposes of this thesis, is that the warring parties need to be genuinely committed to reaching a lasting peace agreement for Norway to be involved. All the evidence seems to suggest that this is not the case in the Philippines and that even those involved in the process are doubtful of the prospects for peace. The NPA’s unwillingness to agree to a ceasefire and their persistent use of violence even in the midst of negotiations is indicative of this. According to Coronel-Ferrer “the public perceives [the CPP-NPA] as using the talks to score propaganda points, bolster its presence and legitimacy in the public sphere, or gain other tactical advantages that will support its politico-military agenda of the moment.”558 This once again demonstrates the importance of determining the point at which Norwegian policy-makers decide to terminate their involvement in a peace process. In Sri Lanka, Norway’s withdrawal was long overdue by the time that the conflict ended. Given the lack of progress in the Philippines the same may hold true in this case.

Norway’s peace engagement in the Philippines is not limited to its role as facilitator in the GPH-NPA conflict. Since 2011 Norway has also been a member of the International Monitoring Team for the ceasefire between the GPH and the MILF. Norway assured the NPA that their role in the Moro conflict would be minor and that it would not detract from their efforts to resolve the former. As Norway is just one of many members of the IMT, there has been little indication that there has been a conflict of interests to date. However, the taking on of multiple roles in a country in which Norway is engaged in peace diplomacy is reminiscent of

Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka, where it played a number of roles. This approach led to heavy criticism from Norwegians, the greater international community, and Sri Lankans alike. There is therefore a danger that Norway may face similar criticism for its decision to play a role in the IMT at a later date. It also suggests a failure on the part of the Norwegians to learn from past mistakes.

The following sections of this chapter will look specifically at Norway’s peace engagement in the Philippines in the context of the three hypotheses outlined in Chapter One, addressing them in turn. The relationship between the three hypotheses, in the context of this case study, will be looked at in the concluding section of this chapter.

**INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE**

This section will look at the level of Norway’s material interests in the Philippines and will seek to establish the extent to which they may have influenced the Norwegian government’s decision-making with regard to the conflict. An attempt will also be made to look at whether Norway stands to gain from its involvement in the GPH-NDFP peace process in terms of influence on the global stage. It is important to note that it is very difficult to measure potential gains both in the economic sense and in terms of prominence. As such, emphasis will be placed on determining whether there have been any material benefits for Norway from its engagement to date. Moreover, causality in this case is very difficult to prove. While the evidence discussed below can paint a general picture of the impact of interests and influence on Norway’s decision to become involved in the GPH-NDFP peace process, there is no concrete proof that the one has influenced the other.

As outlined in Chapter Three, Norway’s interests are not limited to the economy. Rather, Norway also has strategic interests. Given the extent of US involvement in the Philippines it might also be reasoned that Norway’s engagement provides it with

559 See Chapter Four.
access to US decision-makers. Such cooperation can be of extreme value to a small country like Norway, which might otherwise be sidelined on the international arena. This does not however mean that Norway’s involvement can be explained away by theories of middle powerdom. The reasons for this have been laid out in Chapter Two.

As demonstrated by Figure 5.4 Norway’s exports to the Philippines have increased significantly with an almost 50% increase on the previous year (2010), since Norway’s latest reengagement in the GPH-NDFP peace process. Norway’s exports to the Philippines were also significantly higher than the average for the period 2001-2011 in 2001 when Norway’s official engagement in the peace process and in 2008 when Norway became involved in the peace process following several years in which there had been no engagement. There could be any number of factors behind this pattern, but it does suggest that Norway’s efforts to broker peace

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*Figure 5.4: Norway – Philippines trade figures (in 1000NOK) for the years 2001-2011*\(^{560}\)

\(^{560}\) Statistics Norway. 2012. “External Trade in Commodities, by trade area, continents and commodity groups, time and contents – Philippines.” Available at http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/Default_FR.asp?PXSid=0&nv1=true&PLanguage=1&tilside=selectvarval/define.asp&Tabellid=06766
between the GPH and the NDFP may be linked to a boost in Norwegian exports to the Philippines.

The Philippines established its first embassy in Norway in 2007 as a result of the growing opportunities and cooperation in the energy and maritime sectors as well as the growing number of Filipinos in Norway.\footnote{Embassy of the Philippines in Norway - http://www.philembassy.no/about-the-embassy/diplomatic-relations/philippines-norway-relations} One could argue that this is rather late considering Norway’s significant involvement in the peace process since 2001. A potential reason for this might be that economic interests are a greater incentive for the establishment of a diplomatic mission than peace engagement. In contrast, the Philippines established its embassy in Stockholm in 1978. It is however, important to note that the Philippines is not one of Norway’s most significant trade partners. In terms of the size of its trade with Norway, it ranked 46\textsuperscript{th} in Norway’s list of international trade partners in 2010. This does however appear to be changing and there has been a lot of emphasis on boosting trade relations between the two countries in the last few years. Norway, as part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), began negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Philippines in November 2011.\footnote{Torres, E. 2012. “4 rich Europe nations eye free trade with PHL [sic].” Business Mirror. Available at http://businessmirror.com.ph/home/top-news/25181-4-rich-europe-nations-eye-free-trade-with-phl} Moreover a Philippines Norway Business Council (PNBC) was established in 2012. The recently established PNBC’s website lists Norway’s key industries as being the offshore industry, renewable energy, the maritime industry, the seafood industry and the information, communication and technology industry.\footnote{Philippines Norway Business Council - http://www.pnbc.ph/invest.php?id=82} There is evidence to suggest that Norway is seeking to expand its trade within these sectors in the Philippines. In January 2005, a delegation from Norsk Hydro of Norway visited the Philippines and held meetings with the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) regarding Norsk Hydro’s interest in developing oil reserves in the Malampaya area.\footnote{Available at http://www.philembassy.no/diplomatic-relations/philippines-norway-relations} In addition, Statkraft and Norfund of Norway were successful in their bidding for projects in two of Philippines’s hydroelectric dams (Ambuklao and Binga hydroelectric dams), bringing investments to PHP3.8 million.\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, the Magat Dam in the Philippines is, in part, operated by SN Power.\footnote{Philippines Norway Business Council - http://www.pnbc.ph/invest.php?id=82}\footnote{A joint venture established in 2002 between Norfund and the Norwegian power company Statkraft, exclusively focusing on hydroelectric projects.}
growth in Norwegian interests in the Philippines. While these interests are not always directly linked to the state, Støre’s speech on the need for the Norwegian MFA to play a greater role in promoting and protecting Norwegian business interests, which was also echoed by the MFA’s 2009 white paper on foreign policy, needs to be taken into account here.

Norway also has significant mining interests in the Philippines. These interests, and most significantly the INTEX Resources nickel mine in Mindoro, have caused significant resentment among the local population.568 Luis Jalandoni of the NDFP claims that Norway’s significant nickel mining interests, as well as its energy and shipping interests in the Philippines, have been a driving force behind Norway’s involvement in the peace process there.569 An official from the MFA responded to questions on this issue by stating that the indigenous people in the area are benefiting from development in the vicinity of the mine. Moreover, one Norwegian official stated that those who are protesting actually live on other islands and are doing so because they also want to benefit from the development of the island.570 This statement is not keeping with the majority of articles published on this matter and raises the question of why the Norwegian MFA is defending INTEX’s activities. Moreover, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently found INTEX guilty of violating its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by being unable to include all stakeholders in their consultations and by not having a transparent system for allocating community funds.571 INTEX was also accused of failing to provide adequate information on the environmental and social impact of their mining operations.572 Economic interests aside, there is no getting away from the fact that INTEX’s activities have caused significant damage to Norway’s image in the Philippines. Arguably, the prevalence of a discourse, which portrays Norway as one of the most ethical and egalitarian countries in the world, has made the impact of the INTEX debate even worse. This

569 Interview with Luis Jalandoni, Chief Negotiator NDFP, Utrecht, 25 January 2012.
570 Interview with Ture Lundh, Oslo, 3 February 2012.
is due to the fact that the average person in the Philippines will not distinguish between Norway and Norwegian business regardless of whether a link exists or not.

Norwegian officials describe interests as being a bonus rather than a motivation when it comes to peace engagement. They discuss Norway’s interests in more altruistic terms, citing the possibility of making a difference, rather than financial incentives. While there is undoubtedly an element of truth in such statements, the figures suggest that both Norway and the Philippines have benefited from the strengthening relationship between the two countries. The MFA’s acknowledgement of the growing role of interests in the more ‘altruistic’ aspects of its foreign policy must also be considered in this context.

In terms of influence, there are a number of arguments, which could explain Norway’s involvement in the Philippines. The US presence in the Philippines is significant and the diplomatic cables studied for the purposes of this thesis suggest that the US not only views the CPP-NPA as a threat to peace and security, but that it views the group as the most serious threat faced by the GPH. If Norway seeks access to senior US policy-makers, as argued by Helgesen, then playing a leading role in the resolution of this conflict could arguably be deemed a means of achieving this goal. It must however be noted that in terms of the threat posed to US interests, the Islamist groups operating in the southern Philippines are seen as more dangerous to US interests than the communists are. In terms of international influence, it is hard to say to what degree Norway’s involvement in the Philippines has an impact on Norway’s status. This is due to the fact that, while long-standing, the conflict has little impact on the international community. It is a low-intensity conflict and the annual number of refugees resulting from the conflict is hard to measure due to the difficulty of establishing which of the many conflicts in the Philippines is responsible for people fleeing a particular area. Moreover, there is no danger of the conflict spilling over into neighbouring countries. Furthermore, as mentioned on several occasions in this chapter, the general knowledge about this conflict is very low both in Norway and internationally. International recognition of

573 Interview with Ture Lundh, Oslo, 3 February 2012.
574 Ibid.
Norway’s role or of any progress made on resolving the GPH-NPA conflict is therefore likely to be extremely limited, although a successful resolution of the conflict would arguably boost Norway’s position as a ‘peace nation’ within international organisations like the UN. Norway’s success rate in a field, which is admittedly fraught with difficulty, has not been high. Thus, improved statistics can only serve to improve Norway’s standing. However, given the intractability of this particular conflict, it is worth asking whether this gamble is really one worth taking, given the very limited prospects of success.

The evidence presented in this section suggests that interests are a factor behind Norway’s continuing engagement in the Philippines. It is difficult to determine the precise extent to which this is the case and there is also insufficient evidence to determine when interests began to have an impact on Norway’s decision-making with regard to its involvement in the GPH-NDFP peace process. It is possible that interests played a role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace efforts in the Philippines from the outset, but it is also plausible that altruistic factors lay behind the original engagement and that interests came later, much in the same way that they did in Sri Lanka. As there is insufficient evidence to suggest that interests have been the driving force behind Norway’s peace activities in the Philippines, the role of identity and domestic politics in Norway’s decision-making will now be considered.

**IDENTITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS**

This is arguably the most difficult hypothesis to prove or disprove in the context of one particular case study. Abdelal *et al*’s model for operationalising identity will therefore be applied in an attempt to approach the question of Norway’s identity as scientifically as possible. It is however clear from the evidence provided in Chapter Three that Norway’s identity has been one of the driving forces behind Norway’s decision to pursue peace diplomacy. This section will therefore attempt to demonstrate how Norwegian identity has manifested itself in Norway’s decision to become involved in the GPH-NDFP peace process.
Skånland argues that an important aspect of Norway’s identity and self-image is a sense of exceptionalism.\textsuperscript{576} In this context, the relative lack of international interest in the communist insurgency in the Philippines undoubtedly appealed to Norway. While several other European states had hosted talks and served as facilitators, their efforts were generally short-lived. Even the Dutch peace engagement, which lasted longer than most, did not equal Norway’s in terms of financial support or duration, being limited to the provision of good offices. The intractability of the conflict may also have served as a contributing factor in Norway’s decision-making on this issue, as there is arguably more international kudos to be gained from resolving a conflict that others have deemed insoluble. While it is difficult to discern a pattern in the type of conflicts in which Norway opts to mediate, longevity and intractability appear to be common characteristics. The communist insurgency in the Philippines possesses both of these features. These arguments are in keeping with the argument promulgated in Chapter Three that Norway’s peace activities are part of an ongoing attempt to build a Norwegian identity around this aspect of its foreign policy. The idea that Norway could succeed where others have failed feeds into the idea that Norwegians have ‘special qualifications’ with regard to peacemaking.

Religion has also played a significant role in Norway’s engagement in the Philippines. Norwegian religious groups have a long history of working in the Philippines and religious groups are particularly prominent in the Norwegian development/aid sector. The central role of religion in the Philippines meant that it was easy for religiously-affiliated NGOs to build up a network of contacts there and it has been suggested that this may have been one of the factors behind Norway’s decision to become involved in the GPH-NDFP peace process. In the context of Sudan, it will be argued that pressure from the church and NGOs played a significant role in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian efforts to broker peace between the North and the South. While there has been no mention of this in the Philippines context it seems clear that religious groups have played a role in informing Norway’s policy on peace and reconciliation in the country.

In the context of domestic politics, it is worth noting that Norway has a growing Filipino diaspora. This has been one of the reasons behind the strengthening of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The diaspora do not however appear to have played a significant role in lobbying the Norwegian government to engage in the GPH-NDFP peace process. Other factors worthy of consideration include the fact that the centre-left coalition, which came to power in 2005 and remains in power in 2012, was keen to increase Norway’s peace and reconciliation activities. The left was also in power in late 2000 and early 2001, at the time when Norway first became involved in the Philippines peace process. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, most Norwegian officials claim that the country’s peace engagement is a cross-party initiative, despite claims that either the left or the conservatives have been most committed. At this point it is worth reiterating Østerud’s argument that “the call of mission has been stronger to the centre-left in the political landscape, while the centre-right, and the foreign policy bureaucracy, have been more sceptical to the missionary idealism in Norwegian diplomacy.”

However, while there does appear to be an ideological element to Norway’s engagement in the Philippines, there is also significant evidence to suggest that Norwegian foreign policy is becoming increasingly pragmatic, as demonstrated by evidence presented in the previous section and by the MFA’s 2009 white paper on foreign policy and the growing emphasis on business interests, which stands in contrast to earlier claims of purely altruistic goals. This suggests that, like in the Sri Lanka case, Norwegian identity and identity-building activities may have been the key factors behind the Norwegian decision to become involved in the GPH-NDFP peace process, but Norway’s continued involvement is the result of growing interests in the Philippines and an increasingly pragmatic foreign policy.

An interesting aspect of the Philippines case is that it has not received much coverage in the Norwegian media, which suggests that public opinion has had little impact on Norway’s Philippines policy. This may be due to a conscious decision to limit media coverage due to the intense media scrutiny faced by the government over its involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process. This is not to suggest that the

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577 Available at http://www.philembassy.no/about-the-embassy/diplomatic-relations/philippines-norway-relations
578 Cable 06OSLO18, NORWAY HOPES TO JUMPSTART SRI LANKA PEACE TALKS. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06OSLO18.html#
media was censored in any way but rather to suggest that there were fewer press statements made and less interviews given on the subject of the Philippines intervention than there were on the Sri Lanka peace process. It may also be due to the lack of public knowledge about the conflict in the Philippines. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is the Moro conflicts in Mindanao, which have captured the attention of the international community and not the communist insurgency, of which little is known. This means that the idea of Norway as a peace nation has not been contested in the specific context of the Philippines case study.

**NORDICITY AND NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

This section seeks to establish how Norway’s involvement in the Philippines characterises the aspects of Nordicity, which have been discussed earlier on in this thesis. The purpose will be to establish whether Nordicity has played a role in Norway’s decision to become involved in the GPH-NDFP peace process and in determining the nature of Norway’s intervention in the Philippines.

The style of peacemaking, which the Norwegians engaged in in this conflict, suggests that the Philippines peace process was viewed as an opportunity to implement and promote what has oft been described as the Norwegian model. Norway’s extensive support of, and collaboration with, NGOs and civil society organisations in the Philippines is indicative of this. Other examples include Norway’s funding of international NGOs such as International Alert and the previously mentioned CHD, which are also actively participating in peacemaking processes in the Philippines. Moreover, its establishment of the NDFP – GPH Joint-Secretariat, also suggests that Norway was engaging in norm entrepreneurship in the Philippines. Most interestingly, in the Philippines’ case, Norway appears to be refining some of the elements of its approach to peacemaking, which it has implemented in other peace processes. The NDFP – GPH Joint-Secretariat appears to be an example of this. While Norwegians deny suggestions that they seek to export the Norwegian model there is evidence to suggest that they are engaged in a learning process, the goal of which is presumably to perfect their approach to resolving international conflicts. Interviews with policy-makers also reveal that they
truly believe in the Norwegian approach to conflict resolution and, more significantly that they also believe that other states would benefit from implementing it. References to the potential for countries like Sweden and Finland to follow in Norway’s footsteps, serve as an example of this.\textsuperscript{580} This is interesting as it suggests a revival of the Norwegian model, which appears to have been more or less abandoned in Sri Lanka and in Sudan. While the engagement in the Philippines is still very much state-led it seems clear that NGOs have regained some of their former status in peace and reconciliation efforts, in this case. This may be down to a realisation that the state-led approach in Sri Lanka was flawed, leaving the MFA far too open to criticism from the warring parties.

In keeping with the discussion of ‘Nordicity’ in Chapter Two, it seems clear that Norwegians have internalised regional norms regarding peace and peacemaking activities overseas to the same extent that they have been responsible for creating them. This was particularly apparent in discussions with employees of Norwegian NGOs working in the Philippines and in other parts of the world. While not everybody agreed with every aspect of Norway’s engagements, there was strong support for peace diplomacy and it was generally felt that this was something that Norway should be doing. There was also a sense that Norway, and to a certain degree the other Nordic countries, could make their own rules with regard to their foreign policy, rather than adhering to rules and norms established by the EU or the US, for example. This argument was especially strong in the context of the US’ and the EU’s terrorist listings.\textsuperscript{581} Moreover, a pan-Scandinavian worldview was often referred to in discussions of peace and conflict resolution. This suggests that, in keeping with Hypothesis Three, the way in which Norway has undertaken this particular peace engagement has been shaped by its Nordicity. Moreover, Nordicity also appears to have played a more direct, albeit minor, role in the actual decision-making processes leading up to its engagement in the Philippines due to the impact of the Scandinavian worldview discussed above. The concluding section of this chapter will consider the relationship between interests, identity and Nordicity in the context of this case study.

\textsuperscript{580} Interview with Ture Lundh. Oslo. 3 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{581} Interviews conducted in Oslo in February 2012.
CONCLUSIONS

Norway’s involvement in the Philippines is interesting for a number of reasons. The first of these is that this is one of the few processes in which Norway has had a truly interventionist role. The second is that this is a process, which is still ongoing and as such its outcome is still to be determined. This sets it apart from the other cases in this study. Considering the Philippines case in the context of the three hypotheses outlined in Chapter One it seems clear that interests have played a role in Norway’s long-standing efforts to broker peace between the GPH and the NDFP. Despite assertions to the contrary, it seems clear that in addition to Norway’s altruistic aims, it also has more tangible material interests. One could argue that a peace process inevitably leads to a deeper bilateral relationship between the states involved and that as a consequence stronger ties in other areas, such as trade, are bound to follow. Doors are inevitably opened by the new relationships forged as a result of the increased engagement between the two countries. As demonstrated above, Norway and the Philippines share many common industries and as such this kind of involvement may have been seen as a natural extension of existing ties between the two countries into new areas. While there is insufficient evidence to prove that Norway’s involvement in the Philippines is motivated by economic and strategic interests, the evidence outlined in this chapter makes it possible to extrapolate that such interests have played a part in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s continued engagement in the country, even if they did not play a significant role in the original decision to undertake the role of facilitator in the GPH-NDFP peace process. This suggests a strong similarity between this case and the Sri Lanka case study, where identity appears to have been the driving force behind the engagement, but interests played a growing role in Norway’s continuation of its peace efforts. In Chapter One, it was also argued that identity serves to define the parameters of which interests are considered acceptable for Norway and of how these are pursued. The Philippines case appears to suggest that, in recent years, either identity is playing less of a part in this respect or that Norway’s identity itself is changing. The INTEX mine case for example appears to stand in contrast to how Norway usually portrays itself. Thus, while identity and altruism do appear to have been important factors in the early stages of Norway’s engagement, their role appears to have
reduced and transformed in the later years of Norway’s involvement in the Philippines.

It must however be noted that the significant role played by religious organisations such as the NEPP and Caritas of Norway in the conflict can also be related back to issues pertaining to Norway’s own identity. Much is made of Norwegian missionary work in Norwegian culture and the continuing importance of religious organisations with respect to peace engagement and development aid shone through while conducting the research for this chapter. As mentioned above, the existence of Norwegian foreign policy interests in the Philippines is indisputable but the degree to which they influenced the government’s original decision to pursue peace diplomacy in the country is open to question. Thus, it seems unlikely that peace diplomacy was chosen as an acceptable means of pursuing Norway’s interests in this case. Rather it seems that the furthering of interests has been an added benefit of Norway’s peace engagement, which has grown in importance over time and has perhaps begun to surpass identity in terms of importance in recent years. With regard to levels of contestation within Norwegian identity, it is difficult to assess whether these have had a direct impact on Norway’s engagement in the Philippines as the involvement has been a relatively low-profile one receiving little media attention. It has not therefore generated strong opinions in the same way that Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka did. This can also be attributed to the lack of general knowledge about the communist insurgency in the Philippines, which is often forgotten because of excessive attention to the Moro conflicts in Mindanao.

The Philippines case has seen Norwegian officials apply refined versions of approaches and methods used in other conflicts, most notably in Sri Lanka. An example of this is the establishment of a Joint Secretariat for the warring parties. In the Sri Lanka case separate peace secretariats were established for the warring parties and later also for the Muslim community. The decision to establish a joint secretariat can therefore be seen as an extension of the approach used in Sri Lanka. This suggests that Norway is attempting to develop and improve the way in which it engages in peace diplomacy, even if this is not always successful. This is also demonstrated by the fact that while Norway did not apply the Norwegian model in its original form, there has been significant collaboration with Norwegian NGOs
operating in the Philippines. In fact, one could go so far as to say that, Norwegian NGOs have played an extraordinary role in building civil-society networks and in supporting local NGOs and religious organisations in the Philippines. The interaction between Norwegian NGOs, ecumenical organisations and the government is uniquely Norwegian. Moreover the process of creating similar networks in the Philippines can be seen as an attempt to export the Norwegian approach, which in turn constitutes an act of norm entrepreneurship. This suggests that there has been a revival of the Norwegian model, which had been more or less abandoned in the previous case study. The Philippines process is also state-led but there seems to be a greater input from NGOs and the church than there was in Sri Lanka. The reasons for the revival of the Norwegian model are unclear but may be linked to the problems that the government-oriented approach in Sri Lanka encountered. Norway’s engagement in norm entrepreneurship suggests that Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship have played an important role in determining how Norway engages in the Philippines. As, in the previous case study, there has also been some overlap between identity and Nordicity, in that the Norwegian model, while serving as an example of norm entrepreneurship, is also a manifestation of Norwegian identity. There is however, less evidence of Nordic countries working together to resolve this conflict. Contrary to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One, it seems that Nordicity not only determines how Norway engages in the Philippines, but it also played a part in the decision-making processes behind the original intervention. This is demonstrated by the emphasis that those interviewed for the purposes of this chapter placed on a pan-Scandinavian attitude the issues of peace and conflict.

In contrast to the Sri Lanka case study, there is little evidence to suggest that beliefs and the role of specific individuals have had a significant impact on Norway’s involvement in the GPH – NDFP peace process. No single figure stands out as having played an extraordinary role in proceedings or as having been a driving force behind Norway’s peace engagement in the Philippines.

A different relationship between the levels of analysis discussed in this chapter would have been unlikely to increase the chances of reaching a peace agreement between the NDFP and the GPH. There are a number of reasons for this. First and
foremost the parties to a peace process need to believe in, and desire, a sustainable peace. Whether this desire exists in the Philippine case is open to debate. One could argue that a greater emphasis on interests could have led Norway to put more pressure on the warring parties to achieve a peace deal, but an imposed peace is not necessarily a lasting one. Moreover, greater emphasis on Norwegian interests might also have served to reduce trust between the warring parties and Norway. It also seems unlikely that a more constrictive Norwegian identity, which provided less room for the pursuit of material interests, would have served to improve the chances of reaching a peaceful end to the communist insurgency in the Philippines. Moral values alone do not bring about peace and a lack of interests can sometimes serve to make a third-party a weak mediator. A more conventional approach to peacemaking might arguably have been more successful than the more entrepreneurial peace efforts engaged in by the Norwegians, but the Norwegian model has been successfully applied in the past so there are arguments both for and against Norwegian norm entrepreneurship as a means of pursuing a peace process. Moreover, the perception that Norway has gone too far in creating parity between the warring parties has not had as much of a negative impact on the peace process as one might have imagined. This may be due to the fact that conventional approaches have failed in the past and that without the incentives for participation provided by the Norwegian facilitators the NDFP might have chosen to abandon the peace process much sooner.

In terms of the lessons that can be learned from Norway’s engagement in the Philippines, this is difficult to assess at this stage, as the peace process is ongoing. Norway’s engagement in the Philippines seems to be viewed in a relatively positive light, and such many of the issues highlighted in the Sri Lanka chapter do not apply here. Moreover, the relationship between the Norwegian government and CSOs and NGOs operating in the Philippines appears to be seen as a positive aspect of the Norwegian engagement. As such, the failure to reach a peace agreement to date seems to be the result of a lack of will on the part of the warring parties, and in particular the NDFP, rather than a failure on the part of the Norwegians. A stronger mediator might have been more successful in this case, but whether such a mediator would have been acceptable to the warring parties remains open to debate.
The next chapter constitutes an in-depth case study looking at Norwegian involvement in the peace process between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. An attempt will be made to assess the findings of this chapter through the lens of the Sudan/South Sudan conflict in order to establish whether the arguments laid out here hold true in the context of specific cases. Norway’s role in the Darfur peace process and the peace process in Eastern Sudan will also be considered as the three different intra-state conflicts in Sudan are closely inter-related.
CHAPTER 6

NORWAY AND THE BIRTH OF SOUTH SUDAN

In July 2011 Sudan was partitioned when South Sudan gained independence following a referendum held earlier in the year. Despite a temporary lull in the immediate aftermath of the South’s independence, the conflict between the North and South continues. This is due to the fact that a number of unresolved issues between the North and the South remain outstanding.

Norway attempted to broker peace in Sudan on two occasions, the first of which was a unilateral Norwegian initiative in the early 1990s. Although this engagement was unsuccessful, Norway became involved in the peace process in Sudan again in 2002 as part of the so-called Troika, the other members of which were the United States and the United Kingdom. The Sudan case is particularly interesting as it not only spanned almost two decades and involved varying levels of Norwegian engagement, but also because Norway was involved in several peace processes involving different actors in the country. In addition to its involvement in efforts to broker peace between the North and the South, Norway also played a role in the Darfur peace process and in Eritrean attempts to reach a peace agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Front, operating in Sudan’s eastern provinces. While the case studies discussed in Chapters Four and Five are examples of peace processes in which Norway has very much been a lone actor, the Sudan case differs in that major powers and international organisations were heavily involved in efforts to resolve the conflict.

Sudan also differs from the other cases considered in this thesis in a number of other ways. First and foremost, Sudan’s immediate strategic importance is much greater than that of either the Philippines of Sri Lanka. Sudan and South Sudan have 6.7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, accounting for 0.4% of global oil supplies.\textsuperscript{582} Although the actual share of global supplies is small, the size does not necessarily reflect the oil’s profitability, which is governed by a number of factors.

\textsuperscript{582} BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012. p.6.
The second issue in Sudan is the potential for conflicts to spill over. Both the Philippines and Sri Lanka are island nations and as such the risk of conflict spreading to neighbouring nations was always very small. In Sudan however, conflict has afflicted a number of bordering countries, including Uganda. Both of these issues have arguably combined to make the resolution of this conflict more pressing to the international community than the conflicts in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. This is demonstrated by the amount of attention received by these conflicts at the UN.

This chapter will start by considering the historical context of the conflict before looking at the roles played by the international community, and in particular Norway, in trying to resolve it. The driving factors behind Norway’s engagement will then be analysed, with emphasis being placed on interests, identity and the concept of Nordicity. This will be followed by a conclusion, which looks at the ways in which the different levels of analysis come together in the context of the Norway’s intervention in Sudan.

DATA

The data used in this chapter is the result of interviews carried out in Oslo. Journal articles, books and government reports were also consulted. Due to the scale of the internationalisation of this conflict, a significant amount of information on the peace process was available. Norway’s role, however, barely received a mention in many of the works discussing the role played by the Troika in the run up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks in 2011 helped build a picture of Norwegian peace engagement in Sudan. One of the points highlighted during the interviews undertaken for this chapter, was that many of Norway’s peace-related activities in Sudan have been quite informal, with meetings often occurring opportunistically on the sidelines of other meetings or in other informal settings. This has meant that many of these activities have not been documented. It has therefore been difficult to map events accurately as people’s recollections of events tend to vary quite significantly. Despite this

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583 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
obstacle, it has been possible to piece together a fairly accurate description of the events leading up to Norway’s official engagement in the North-South peace process as well as of the peace process itself.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT

Colonial rule had a significant impact on post-independence Sudan creating the circumstances, which were later to lead to the country’s prolonged civil conflict. Egyptian control over Sudan began in the early to mid 1800s. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 but subsequently lost control over Sudan when it was liberated by the Madhi in 1883. In 1899 Anglo-Egyptian control over Sudan was restored following the defeat of the Mahdi and his forces by General Kitchener and his army. The British-Egyptian Condominium was established with Britain administering Sudan on behalf of the Egyptian King. In practice however, the Condominium was heavily dominated by Britain. Johnson argues that “the nature of co-dominial rivalry was such that much of the time Britain was trying to balance or curb the power of Egypt in the Sudan, and no more so than at the end of the Condominium.”

According to Natsios, British and Egyptian rule resulted in a marked increase in the disparity between the development of the Nile River Valley and the neglect of the periphery. Interestingly, he argues that while the British limited development and modernisation in the South, the South saw the British as protectors against Northern Arabisation and Islamisation. One of the Anglo-Egyptian prerequisites for Sudanese independence was a policy of Sudanisation. According to Johnson, this policy essentially constituted re-colonisation for the people of the South. Administrators from the North with no knowledge of local languages and culture were sent to replace British administrators who were fluent in the local languages.

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586 Ibid. p. 35.
588 Ibid.
The first signs of conflict in Sudan emerged in 1955 when a mutiny occurred in the South, accelerating Britain’s departure. This departure occurred before a constitutional arrangement had been put into place. The causes of the conflict were manifold but Northern attempts to Islamize the South were principal among them. The southern guerrillas formed the Anyanya army, which was riven by ethnic divisions. The rebels began to receive external support in 1969 when Israel began assisting them. Idi Amin of Uganda also supported the rebels in the South. In 1971 the various guerrilla movements were gathered under the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SLMM). The conflict lasted until 1972, when the Addis Ababa Agreement, which will be discussed in the History of Peace Engagement element of this chapter, was signed. The Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was founded in 1983. Conflict between the group and the Government of Sudan broke out in 1983, following an eleven-year period of peace in the aftermath of the Addis Ababa Agreement. There were a number of reasons behind the re-emergence of conflict. Among these was the decision to implement Sharia law and the division of South Sudan into three regional administrations, ending regional self-government for the South. Iyob and Khadiagala argue that the ‘Muslim-Christian’ or ‘African-Arab’ lenses are not the correct way to view the conflict between the North and the South as they fail to take into account the historical complexities of Sudan, also ignoring economic and social inequalities. In 1991 the SPLM/A established effective control over the south. However, a subsequent leadership split within the SPLM/A enabled the government to make considerable gains in the region. The 2002-2005 peace process, which paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011 will be discussed in the context of Norwegian peace engagement in Sudan.

The North-South conflict was just one of several conflicts plaguing Sudan in the period covered by this thesis. Conflict in the western region of Darfur began in 2003 and reached its peak in 2010. Eastern Sudan was also afflicted by conflict until 2006, when a peace agreement was signed between the Eastern Front and the Government of Sudan. In addition to conventional conflicts between state and non-

589 Ibid.
state actors, there have also been an increasing number of nomadic conflicts in Sudan/South Sudan. Johnson states that the situation in Sudan “resembled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in complexity and animosity.”\footnote{Johnson, H.F. 2011. \textit{Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War}. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. p.2.} This is an interesting parallel given Norway’s involvement in that conflict.

\textbf{HISTORY OF PEACE ENGAGEMENT}

Attempts to resolve the North-South conflict in Sudan were manifold and complex and there was significant international involvement in attempts at conflict resolution. In 1972 the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SLMM) and the Government of Sudan signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, following a successful mediation effort by the Ethiopian leader, Emperor Haile Selassie. The World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches participated as co-mediators. The agreement laid out provisions for southern autonomy, which included the establishment of a southern Regional Government and a National Assembly at Juba. Limited autonomy for the South was also provided for in the agreement.

In 1989 former US President Jimmy Carter launched a peace initiative and attempted to mediate between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan during talks held in Nairobi, Kenya. In 1990, the Sudanese government requested a new US-led peace initiative, however while the assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen held separate exploratory talks with the warring parties, nothing came of the initiative.

The early 1990s saw former President of Nigeria, Obasanjo, attempt to mediate between the North and the South in the Abuja I and II talks.\footnote{Ibid. p.22.} The then President of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida was also involved in efforts to broker peace, serving as mediator in the Abuja talks held in 1992 and 1993. President Museveni of Uganda also played a role in bringing the parties to the negotiating table. Moreover, Norway’s failed attempt to broker peace between the warring parties in 1993/1994
was not the only attempt at a parallel process to the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) peace process. In 1999 an Egyptian peace initiative was launched, which later became the Joint Libyan-Egyptian Initiative. This initiative grew in 2001, but the SPLM/A were opposed to it, as compliance would have signified the end for Southern autonomy.\(^{595}\)

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US displayed a renewed interest in resolving the North-South conflict in Sudan.\(^{596}\) This coincided with the realisation on the parts of both the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan that a military victory in this conflict would be impossible.\(^{597}\) Both these factors contributed to the push for the 2002-2005 peace process, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

**NORWAY’S PEACE ENGAGEMENT IN SUDAN**

As mentioned above, Norway has played a role in a number of peace processes in Sudan. Emphasis will be placed on Norway’s role in resolving the North-South conflict as this arguably constitutes Norway’s most significant engagement in the country and it is certainly the most publicised. Subsequently, a discussion of Norway’s peace efforts in relation to Darfur and Eastern Sudan will ensue.

Norway’s involvement in South Sudan has a long history. According to Norwegian Envoy Thorkildsen, Norway’s involvement in Sudan dates back to the 1972 Addis Ababa peace accords.\(^{598}\) The engagement referred to is almost certainly Norwegian Church Aid’s (NCA) presence in the country. According to a NORAD report published in 1998, cooperation between Norway and Sudan dates back even further to 1965, beginning with an initiative between the University of Bergen and the University of Khartoum.\(^{599}\) According to the report, this type of cooperation led on to other initiatives, which were more closely related to political developments in

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\(^{596}\) Ibid. p.3.

\(^{597}\) Ibid.

\(^{598}\) Cable 06KHARTOUM578.2006. Sudan Briefs: Trade/aid To Kenya; Norway In Darfur; China Or Taiwan In South; New Pa Ambassador. Available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06KHARTOUM578&q=thorkildsen

\(^{599}\) NORAD. 1998. “Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict - The lesson of Experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi.” p.27.
Sudan.\textsuperscript{600} Norwegian People’s Aid began its involvement in Sudan in 1985/1986 and its largest project in 1986 was in South Sudan. It must be noted that Norwegian People’s Aid is a solidarity organisation and as such it was biased in favour of the SPLM/A from the outset. Its purpose was to operate in southern Sudan and as such its partiality was no secret. Both NCA and Norwegian People’s Aid played a role in supporting peace and reconciliation efforts in Sudan. NCA is credited with supporting the Sudan Working Group, whose work was closely linked with the IGAD peace initiative, and also with attempts to reconcile oppositional groups in government dominated areas.\textsuperscript{601} NCA also provided support to the New Sudan Council of Churches, enabling it to play a greater role in efforts to foster a lasting peace and in addition it provided support for peace meetings between representatives of different ethnic groups in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{602} Norwegian People’s Aid provided training in international humanitarian law for members of the SPLM.\textsuperscript{603} As Norwegian People’s Aid’s involvement in Sudan deepened so did their relationship with “liberation movements.”\textsuperscript{604} When Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was established in 1989, Norwegian People’s Aid did not join as Khartoum had a veto over deliveries of humanitarian relief. This move was heavily criticised at the time.\textsuperscript{605} NCA was more neutral than Norwegian People’s Aid but despite this the SPLM also trusted them.\textsuperscript{606} This was important as it paved the way for Norwegian involvement in the peace process in later years.

In the 1990s Norway and the Netherlands founded the ‘Friends of Sudan’ group. This led onto the IGAD Partners Forum in later years. Norway was also involved in the Sudan Committee, which was the donor support group for the peace negotiations. Norway also made a failed attempt to create a back-channel for negotiations in Sudan in 1993/1994. This, ultimately unsuccessful peace effort, was initiated by the labour government in power at the time and followed on the heels of the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. It has been suggested that this attempt may have been a bid to emulate the Israel/Palestine success in the hope that a model had

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{600} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{602} Ibid. p.29.
\textsuperscript{603} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{604} Interview with Henrik Stabell and Trude Falch, Oslo, 2 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{605} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{606} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
been found, which could be applied to all peace processes. Very little information is available about the decision-making processes behind this attempt to broker peace in Sudan. However, it does seem clear that the Norwegian effort ran in parallel to the official Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) peace process. A 1997 NORAD evaluation states that it can be argued that “the unilateral initiative taken by the Norwegian Government at best confused the parallel peace effort by IGADD, at worst undermined or derailed it.” The state-led nature of this intervention highlights a key point in that it suggests that the Norwegian model may already have begun to be redundant at the time of Norwegian efforts to negotiate a peace settlement in Sudan in 1993/1994. The decline of the Norwegian model will be discussed again in the context of the role played by Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions and has already been discussed in relation to Norwegian peace engagement in the Philippines and in Sri Lanka. Of importance here is the fact that Norway chose to initiate a peace process in parallel to the initiative, led by regional actors, which was already underway, and in the face of scepticism and reluctance on the part of the SPLM/A. This appears to fly in the face of Norway’s own stated requirements for a peace engagement and thus requires explanation.

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607 Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
608 IGADD became IGAD in 1996 as a result of a decision to expand the areas on which it would cooperate.
### Table 6.1 The ‘Oslo Back-Channel’ – Chronology of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 1993</strong></td>
<td>The SPLA leader, Dr. John Garang, had talks in Oslo with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oct 1993</strong></td>
<td>Dr. Riak Marchar (the then leader of SPLA United) had talks in Oslo with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intensive Peace Facilitation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nov/Dec 1993</strong></td>
<td>The MFA is approached twice by the Government of Sudan (GOS). Norway is expressing her willingness to help to establish contact between GOS and the SPLA. A Norwegian Delegation secretly travels to Khartoum to discuss the basis for a Norwegian initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jan 1994</strong></td>
<td>A Norwegian Delegation secretly travels to Khartoum to discuss the basis for a Norwegian initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mar 1994</strong></td>
<td>A Norwegian Delegation is visiting Southern Sudan and has lengthy discussions with Garang, who has reservations about the «timing» of the Norwegian initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 1994</strong></td>
<td>A first round of exploratory talks with representatives of SPLA and GOS takes place outside Oslo. Agreement is reached to meet again, but meetings at expert level to deal with a number of legal issues have to take place first.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beginning of May 1994</strong></td>
<td>Two Norwegian experts visit Khartoum for meetings with Sudanese legal experts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End of May 1994</strong></td>
<td>SPLA failed to attend a prearranged Norwegian/SPLA meeting of experts in Oslo as well as the subsequent joint meeting where representatives from Khartoum participated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beginning of June 1994</strong></td>
<td>A new joint meeting of representatives of SPLA and GOS takes place in Oslo. Despite the fact that the talks actually broke down, it is agreed that MFA is to draft a peace proposal for comments by both parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June/July 1994</strong></td>
<td>A proposal drafted by MFA is sent to the parties. Comments are received from GOS but not from SPLA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 1994</strong></td>
<td>Norway gives a contribution of USD 100.000 in support of the Sudan peace negotiations under the auspices of IGADD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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611 Ibid. p.23.
Despite the extensive international involvement in efforts to resolve the North-South conflict in Sudan, Baltrop argues that the Machakos Protocol was the “birth of the internationalized peace process for Sudan.”

Hilde Frafjord Johnson describes her own personal desire to end the long-standing conflict between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA in her account of the peace process in her account of events. In order to achieve this, Johnson used the NCA’s contacts to facilitate the peace process. At the same time, Norwegian People’s Aid facilitated contact with the SPLM/A as they worked with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, the movement’s humanitarian branch. Johnson had previously visited Sudan in 1998 while serving as the Norwegian Minister of Development. It seems clear that Johnson’s personality and her conviction had a significant impact on the process. However, the role played by other individuals has also been emphasised. Endre Stiansson’s personal connections have been very important in shaping Norway’s role in the Sudanese peace process. Former minister for Development and the Environment, Erik Solheim, also took on a major personal role in the peace process, as did Foreign Minister Støre. It has been said that these relationships have led to a very laid back approach to the peace process on the part of the Norwegians. Critics have argued that a more official approach is required, involving more stick and less carrot.

Johnson’s account of events appears to suggest that Norway was the driving force behind the formation of the Troika. It is however also possible that the US was behind the idea. The exact sequence of events has not been made public so the roles played by the individual actors cannot be confirmed. The US’s principal source of motivation appears to have been the 9/11 attacks and the war on terrorism, while Britain is described as having strategic interests dating back to its rule over Sudan during colonial times. While Norway’s connections with the South are highlighted, its motivation for involvement remains unclear. This will be discussed

614 Ibid. p.7.
615 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid.
618 Ibid.
619 Ibid.
in greater detail in the context of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One later on in this chapter.

The discussions leading up to the peace process took place in the autumn of 2001 following the 9/11 attacks, at a time when the US was keen to rekindle the peace process at the earliest possible date. As mentioned above, Norway was already deeply involved in Sudan in terms of humanitarian assistance. In terms of the actual format of the 2002-2005 peace process, Barltrop states that individual representatives of the Troika sometimes attended the talks.621 The Troika’s and consequently Norway’s role in the peace process grew steadily, to the point where concerns were raised about the extent of their involvement in the peace negotiations.622 Norway’s role has been described as that of a mediator between the US and the UK, whose approaches to the conflict were quite different.623 This leads to the question of whether there would have been a CPA at all had Norway not been involved in the peace process. The CPA, which was signed in 2005, marked a new stage in the North-South peace process. The agreement resulted in the appointment of John Garang as Vice President of Sudan. The sense of hope fostered amongst the Sudanese population by the CPA was to be short-lived as Garang died in a plane crash just two weeks after his appointment. Salva Kiir subsequently took up the role of Vice-President.

Discussing the peace process in Sudan, Johnson argues that “international intervention ignored the multiplicity of issues, which fed into the country’s interlocking civil wars and that the focus on securing an accommodation between two warring parties was at the expense of a comprehensive peace for the whole country.”624 This argument was reiterated by individuals working on South Sudan in the humanitarian sector.625 Norway chose to compartmentalise the conflicts being played out in Sudan, seeking to resolve each one separately in independent peace processes rather than involving all the warring parties, many of whom shared

623 Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
625 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
grievances, in one comprehensive peace process. It must be noted that the fault does not lie with Norway alone. As previously noted there were other actors involved in Sudan. It has also been suggested that the CPA was part of a strategy, the purpose of which was to use it as a model for the Darfur peace process and the process in Eastern Sudan. Thus it has been argued that it was not the CPA itself, which was flawed but the strategy. Young is critical of the CPA and the role played by the Troika in efforts to bring peace to Sudan. He argues that the Troika “marginalised the IGAD Partners’ Forum (IPF), a group of European countries which had backed IGAD’s efforts financially and politically over the years.” He also argues that

“the Troika states, which espouse separation of religion and state in their own countries, have endorsed the forceful implementation of sharia on Moslems in northern Sudan. Either due to a desire for a quick agreement, or the simplistic characterisation of Southerners – of whom only a minority are Christians – as the only victims of the war, the backers of the peace process have denied the Moslem majority of northern Sudan the basic right to decide whether they want the version of Islam which has been imposed on them.”

Young argues that rather than giving authority to the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, to represent other groups affected by the conflict in the peace process, other groups such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sudan’s oldest political party, which he describes as having ‘democratic legitimacy’ should have been involved. The legitimisation of one particular group to represent a people is highly questionable. However, others have described the Norwegian approach to conflict in Sudan as fairly even-handed. Despite this, it has been argued that while Norway’s dealings with the South have been extremely transparent, the same

626 Ibid.
627 Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
628 Ibid.
631 Ibid. p.110.
632 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
cannot be said for dealings with the North. The reasons behind this difference are unclear.

It is worth noting that the Norwegian involvement in South Sudan, and especially the role played by Norwegian People’s Aid was highly controversial at times. The 1997 NORAD evaluation of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to Sudan, describes Norwegian People Aid’s assistance to the SPLM/A as being extraordinary to the point of going well beyond humanitarian assistance. In 1999 Norwegian People’s Aid was accused of transporting arms to the SPLM/A. The NORAD evaluation mentioned above states that instances where military equipment was supplied to the SPLM/A by Norwegian People’s Aid staff can generally be ascribed to the actions of individuals and that this practice was not policy within the organisation. Nevertheless, as a result of the revelations the MFA stopped funding the organisation for the years 1998 and 1999. To date, Norwegian People’s Aid is still viewed as politically controversial. The organisation was, for example, also accused of supporting the LTTE in Sri Lanka. While conspiracy theories can be expected in such situations the extent of the controversies surrounding NPA has been unusual. According to Schumann, “other countries, such as South Africa and Norway, played an important role in support of the SPLM/A during the “liberation struggle” in Southern Sudan.” This is important as it suggests that Norwegian People’s Aid was not alone in its partiality but rather that the Norwegian government was also biased in favour of the SPLM/A. This is in keeping with the arguments made in Chapter Three, regarding Norway’s tendency to support ‘liberation movements.’

The 2002-2005 peace process received a large amount of funding from the Norwegian government and in 2006 Sudan was the largest recipient of Norwegian

633 Ibid.
637 Interview with Henrik Stabell and Trude Falch, Oslo, 2 February 2012.
638 Ibid.
aid.\textsuperscript{640} Norway’s budget for South Sudan in the period 2005-2009 was US$277 million, constituting 6.8% of the total donor budget for South Sudan in that period.\textsuperscript{641} Norway also funded the South Sudan Peace Commission. Haug states that “because the government in Khartoum had not received government-to-government Western development assistance during the war, the international peace mediators were able to use the lure of such assistance as a future good that would flow into the country as soon as a peace agreement was signed.”\textsuperscript{642} This is reminiscent of the approach used by Norway in other peace processes, most notably Guatemala. According to Oden “Norway now has the most politicised aid programme among the Nordics.”\textsuperscript{643} This is interesting point, which fits in with the idea that identity and interests are closely linked in the context of Norway’s peace diplomacy. At the time when this thesis was being written, the MFA met with all the major NGOs on a monthly basis to discuss the situation in South Sudan. In addition, the MFA held bilateral meetings with individual NGOs. The atmosphere has been described as one of ‘mutual respect.’\textsuperscript{644} It must be noted that the relationship between NGOs and the Norwegian MFA is particularly strong when it comes to South Sudan. NGOs play a key role in South Sudan due to the fact that they operate at the grassroots level, whereas the MFA really only operates at the top levels. In recent years emphasis has been on Civil Society Organisations (CSO), which are only just emerging in Sudan. As a result Norway has been funding this development with Norwegian People’s Aid serving as the main source of funding for CSOs in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{645} While Norwegian NGOs generally have a great deal of freedom, despite the fact that a large proportion of their funding comes from the government, the MFA did on one occasion in 2011 tell the NCA that they could no longer continue their work in the Nuba Mountains following the re-eruption of conflict in the area.\textsuperscript{646} This is in keeping with statements regarding the Norwegian government’s ability to determine which projects NGOs undertake, made by representatives of other organisations.

\textsuperscript{640} Cable 06KHARTOUM578.2006. Sudan Briefs: Trade/aid To Kenya; Norway In Darfur; China Or Taiwan In South; New Pa Ambassador. Available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06KHARTOUM578&q=thorkildsen
\textsuperscript{644} Interview with Henrik Stabell and Trude Falch, Oslo, 2 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{645} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{646} Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
As in the Philippines, the church is very strong in South Sudan. The Sudanese Council of Churches has played a significant role in the South Sudan process and cooperates with the Norwegian MFA, which funds its work. NCA has close ties with the churches in Sudan and with other ecumenical organisations operating in the country. The church is described as having provided a ‘way-in’ for them in Sudan. Emphasis is however placed on the fact that NCA collaborates with all faith organisations and that it does not limit itself to Christian communities. At this stage is important to note that church pressure in Norway appears to have had a significant impact on government decision-making with regard to Sudan.

Despite the fact that South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the conflict is not resolved. There are a number of outstanding issues between the north and the south and violence continues. These include, demarcating the actual border between Sudan and South Sudan, the disputed Abyei region, issues pertaining to citizenship and debt sharing. Norway continues to play a role in the process but is only involved in negotiations on oil. They have not been allowed to be involved in other aspects of the negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, in which the African Union (AU) is the principal negotiator. According to an International Crisis Group report, Norway is leading a parallel process toward arrangements on future petroleum sector management, while also “providing technical support and advice on petroleum sector management, assisting the National Petroleum Commission in preparation for an audit, and supporting assessment of prospects in the face of declining production.” It has engaged both parties on models for cooperation and optimisation of economic potential, regardless of the referendum outcome. There has however been some criticism of Norway’s oil-related activities in Sudan. According to Curtis, the international NGO Global Witness has criticized the Oil for Development programme for giving money to Sudan, which it describes as having an extremely poor human rights record and an oil sector, which is severely lacking in terms of transparency. They state that Sudan does not appear to fulfil the programme’s requirement for recipients to be committed to good

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647 Interview with Tor Birkeland, Marianne Brekken and Lars Gaupset. Oslo. 3 February 2012.
648 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
649 Ibid.
650 Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
651 Interview with Henrik Stabell and Trude Falch, Oslo, 2 February 2012.
652 Ibid.
government and transparency. This is interesting as it fits in with the theory promulgated by Rolandsen that Norway’s development-oriented oil-related activities in Sudan distract attention away from Norway’s less altruistic energy-related activities in other countries.

Norway’s involvement in the Darfur conflict has not been well documented. Evidence of the engagement became available when US diplomatic cables pertaining to the conflict were released, but details have been difficult to come by. Similarly, little information is available about the role played by Norway in resolving the conflict between the Eastern Front and the Government of Sudan. However, the evidence available suggests that Norway played a relatively active role in bringing the two parties together. According to a leaked US diplomatic cable dating back to 2006 Norwegian representative Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen made it known that Norway had offered to facilitate or observe the negotiations if all the parties agreed. She also said that the SPLM, the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Eritreans had requested Norwegian participation in the negotiations. According to the cable it was suggested that the Norwegian Chargé d'Affairs in Asmara might represent Norway in the talks because he had been heavily involved in Eastern Sudan. Another possibility that was mooted was that the Deputy Minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has been closely following the situation in the East could play an active role. However, it is clear from the cable that Norway was waiting for a formal invitation before determining their representatives for the negotiations. While further details of the engagement are not available it would seem that the high-level involvement was being considered, demonstrating that Norway’s peace-related activities in Sudan were not limited to the North-South conflict alone.

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655 Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
656 Cable 06KHARTOUM1209. Sudan: Eastern Front - Gnu Negotiation Preparations. Available at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06KHARTOUM1209
INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE

This section seeks to establish the extent to which interests and a quest for greater influence on the international stage have played a role in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian peace engagement in Sudan/South Sudan. It must be noted that this task is complicated by the fact that there were two Norwegian attempts to broker peace between the North and the South and by the fact that Norway was also involved in the Darfur peace process and in negotiations between the GOS and the Eastern Front. Due to the lack of information about Norway’s role in the latter two processes, these will only be considered in the broader context of Norwegian engagement in Sudan in this section. Moreover, the lack of reliable bilateral trade data for the period prior to Norway’s attempt to create a back-channel in Sudan in 1993/1994 means that emphasis will be placed on Norway’s involvement in the 2002-2005 peace process with regard to economic interests as a motivation for Norwegian engagement.

![Figure 6.1: Norway – Sudan trade figures (in 1000NOK) for the years 2001-2011](http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/09/05/)

There is evidence to suggest that Norway’s involvement in Sudan was not entirely interest-free even if there are academics who argue that Norway’s peace engagement was almost entirely altruistic. Oden argues that “[Nordic] efforts to integrate African countries into a globalising world can also be seen as a means to include Nordic countries in the ongoing international race for African natural resources. This aspect is most apparent in the case of Norway.”

He goes on to describe Norway as being “in the vanguard regarding initiatives and programmes to provide or strengthen global public goods and international governance, at the same time opening up markets for internationally competitive Norwegian companies.”

Oden argues that the Oil for Development and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative projects are combined with the aim of promoting national commercial interests. While this is not confirmed explicitly in the MFA’s 2009 white paper on foreign policy, there are hints to suggest that this is one of the purposes of the initiative.

Looking at the parties to the CPA peace process, Schaffer places Norway in the EU category in terms of interests in the Sudan peace process. While technically inaccurate, her argument is important in that it suggests that Norway, among other nations, had commercial interests in Sudan rather than because of its accuracy concerning Norway’s membership of international institutions. Schafer describes the EU’s (in which category she includes Norway) interests as being peace, development, oil access and human rights. While the majority of these interests are indisputably altruistic, oil access stands out as a thoroughly commercial interest. Schafer also describes how the European countries’ oil interests served as an obstacle to using sanctions as a means of resolving the conflict. Grawert also discusses Norway’s oil interests in Sudan arguing “the scramble for oil can be considered as one of the reasons why the USA, Norway and Great Britain hurried up the peace negotiations between the GOS and SPLA after 2003.”

She adds that “in a pacified South Sudan, opportunities for investment by western oil companies may increase without them being involved in

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659 Ibid. p.48.
660 Ibid. p.45.
663 Ibid.
It has been suggested that Norway is unlikely to become involved in exploiting oil in South Sudan because of the Lundin oil scandal, which saw a Swedish oil company being accused of being complicit in crimes against humanity. However, in 2010 Hamla, a Norwegian oil company, which is part of the AGR Group, was awarded a 5% stake in Block E, an oil field, which covers four states in South Sudan as well as South Darfur in Sudan. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) is another Norwegian company, which is actively engaged in the Sudanese oil and shipping sectors. This suggests that Norwegian companies have not been deterred by scandals or by the human rights situation in Sudan.

Figure 6.1 shows a marked increase in Norwegian exports to Sudan in 2005, the year in which the CPA was signed. This could be a coincidence or it could be attributed to a rise in confidence among businesses at the prospect of peace. It must however be noted that there was a sharp decline in Norway-Sudan trade in the years following the CPA. This could be attributed to Norway’s support for an independent South Sudan and its subsequent focus on building up relations with the new nation, at the cost of its relationship with Khartoum.

When the issue of Norwegian commercial interests is discussed with policy-makers they are often quick to highlight the fact that one should not confuse Norwegian interests and those of Norwegian businesses. However, 67% of Statoil Hydro is owned by the state. Citing a speech made by Støre to Statoil’s Chief Executives in 2007 in which he states that Norway’s foreign policy will accommodate the needs of the oil industry, Curtis argues that “the government’s willingness to put Norway’s diplomacy and foreign policy at the service of business interests is noticeable, and concerning.” It is important to note that the need for maintaining high standards with regards to human rights was also noted in the aforementioned speech by Støre. It is also noteworthy that Støre’s speech was made in 2007. By then the CPA had already been signed and Norway had been involved in Sudan, in one capacity or another, for over two decades. Thus, Støre’s words cannot be taken

Ibid.

Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.


Ibid.

as evidence that commercial interests played a role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace engagement in Sudan.

In terms of influence, Norway’s role as a member of the Troika gave it regular access to senior policy-makers from the UK and the US. Norway’s role in the Darfur peace process and its facilitation efforts in Eastern Sudan helped establish its position as an expert on all things Sudanese. The importance of influence, especially with the US, has been raised repeatedly in interviews and as such should not be under-estimated. It is important to note that the 2002-2005 peace process took place while there was a conservative government in power in Norway and as such this process took place before the attempts to distance Norway from the US following the election of a labour government in 2005, which were touched upon in Chapter Three. Norwegian involvement in the Darfur peace process and in the peace process between the Eastern Front and the GOS must be seen as closely tied to the North-South engagement for the purposes of this section. This is due to the fact that there was a significant overlap, both in terms of the time periods in question and in terms of the actors involved. It is more difficult to establish whether a desire for greater influence was behind the 1993/1994 attempt to broker peace between the North and the South. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a desire to build on the prominence Norway gained following its involvement in the Israel/Palestine conflict may have been a factor behind its engagement. Whether Norway had a desire to gain influence with specific international actors is however more difficult to determine given the lack of information available pertaining to the intervention.

**IDENTITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS**

Norway’s long history of humanitarian engagement in Sudan was one of the key factors leading up to the country’s involvement in the peace process. This is in keeping with the Norwegian approach to peacebuilding outlined in previous chapters. Norway’s engagements in Guatemala and in Mali were also the consequence of a significant Norwegian NGO presence in those countries. It must however be noted that Norway’s first attempt to broker peace in Sudan in
1993/1994 was very much state-led and that the MFA’s cooperation with NGOs on the 2002-2005 peace process was also limited, despite their extensive expertise in the region. This suggests that despite the fact that Norway’s approach to peacemaking is often described as unique, many aspects of its engagements in Sudan were very similar to the approaches used by other states. It must however, be noted that the church, NGOs and academics played a key role in encouraging Norwegian engagement, exerting their considerable influence on the MFA to ensure that Norway pursued an active foreign policy in Sudan.\textsuperscript{670} This suggests that in addition to its role in shaping Norwegian foreign policy interests in Sudan, identity also played a more direct role in the decision-making processes leading up to Norway’s involvement in the 2002-2005 peace process.

It is difficult to establish the precise extent to which Norway’s identity has shaped its foreign policy interests in Sudan. However, the fact that Norway’s oil interests have been pursued via the Oil for Development programme, and not solely via the usual route, suggests that the preservation and promotion of Norway’s image and thus Norwegian identity has played a role in defining the interests available to Norway and the ways in which they are pursued. In the context of Abdelal \textit{et al}’s framework for operationalising identity this identity falls into the cognitive category.

The question of contestation is not easy to assess in the context of Norway’s peace efforts in Sudan. Media coverage of the involvement was limited and the engagement did not receive the same amount of attention as Norway’s involvement in Sri Lanka. Moreover, it was more difficult to have an opinion on Norway’s decision-making during this engagement as Norway was acting with the US and the UK as part of the Troika rather than acting alone.

From a domestic politics perspective it is worth noting that key figures involved in the peace process were tied to the Labour Party and the Labour Unions.\textsuperscript{671} This suggests strong support for the engagement from the political left in Norway. This theory is also supported by the fact that there was a strong link between the Labour

\textsuperscript{670} Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
\textsuperscript{671} Interview with Henrik Stabell and Trude Falch, Oslo, 2 February 2012.
Party and the SPLM/A. However, at the time when the peace process began in earnest, the Christian Democrats were in office in Norway. Moreover, Frafjord Johnson, the Norwegian Minister for Development at the time, was personally very committed to the process. Interestingly, Stabell and Falch argue that the political left tends to be less committed to Norway’s peace activities. Perhaps the difference can be attributed to the fact that interests have been a greater source of motivation for the conservatives than they have for the political left, which has traditionally been seen as being motivated by ideology and morality. This certainly appears to have been the case in Sri Lanka and as such may have played a part in determining the amount of energy devoted to other peace processes as well, although there is no evidence to confirm this theory. Ding does however state that all the parties tend to follow through on processes, which began under a different government. Others have argued that there would have been no Norwegian participation in the Troika had a different government been in power, both because key individuals such as Hilde Frafjord Johnson would not have held the positions that they did but also because powerful constituencies related to the church had a lot of influence with the conservative government.

The findings in this chapter suggest that identity and domestic politics did play a significant role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s involvement in the 2002-2005 peace process. Domestic actors, such as the church and NGOs, as well as the political left, appear to have pushed for Norwegian peace engagement in Sudan. Moreover, while it seems clear that interests also played an important role in driving this particular peace engagement, Norwegian identity and domestic politics do appear to have played an important role in leading the government to choose altruistic means to pursue these interests.

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672 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
676 Interview with Øystein Rolandsen. Oslo. 30 July 2012.
NORDICITY AND NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The principal indicator that Nordicity played a role in the manner in which Norway pursued its peace diplomacy in Sudan, is the government’s engagement with Norwegian NGOs operating in different parts of the country prior to assuming its role as a facilitator. It could be argued that this is indicative of the fact that the Norwegian model, which was a manifestation of Nordic norm entrepreneurship, was being implemented in order to achieve a lasting peace in Sudan. However, the fact that Norway’s first attempt to broker peace in Sudan in 1993/1994 was a government-led initiative, with no NGO input, suggests that the hypothesis does not hold true in this case. This is supported by the fact that Norwegian NGOs were well placed to play a role in the peace process, given that NCA, for example, had been operating in Sudan for over two decades. The role played by NCA in resolving conflicts in Guatemala and Mali, also suggests that it would have been a useful contributor in Norwegian efforts to broker peace between the North and the South. The decision to move away from the Norwegian model is therefore somewhat surprising. Strong state involvement in the 2002-2005 peace process suggests that there had been no attempt to resurrect the Norwegian model by the time that Norway became a member of the Troika. As discussed in the context of Sri Lanka in Chapter Four, this raises the question of why the Norwegian model receives so much attention in the literature given its very early abandonment. Perhaps this is also part of a broader attempt at Norwegian identity building as discussed in Chapter Three.

While Norway’s move away from the Norwegian model suggests that it may not have engaged in norm entrepreneurship in the Sudanese case, it is important to consider other aspects of Norway’s engagement to establish whether they could be seen as an exemplifying norm entrepreneurship. Norway’s support for the SPLM/A could be viewed as falling into this category, were it not for the fact that other countries also actively backed the group.677 Thus, this support does not fall into the same category as Norway’s alleged bias towards the LTTE or its engagement with other armed groups. Norwegian efforts to support the effective management of

677 These include South Africa, South Sudan’s neighbours, and at times the US.
Sudan’s oil resources are arguably unique, suggesting that Norwegian identity played a role in defining Norway’s Sudan policy, as discussed above. Whether they constitute norm entrepreneurship is however open to debate. On the one hand this could constitute an example of Norway exporting its way of managing revenues from the exploitation of natural resources. On the other, one could argue that this is simply a form of development aid or as suggested earlier in this chapter, a means of promoting Norwegian business interests.

While Norway was the Nordic country, which was most heavily involved in the peace process in Sudan, both Sweden and Denmark also provided substantial sums in humanitarian assistance and participated in a number of key peacebuilding initiatives. Interestingly, the perception of the Nordic countries as a single entity was to have negative effects on its image in the Muslim world. Following the publication of Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed, representatives of all the Nordic countries operating in Sudan were targeted by Muslim extremists. Thorkildsen “denied that relations with Sudan were negatively affected by the Danish cartoon controversy, though he did not [sic] mention a Norwegian NGO's decision to suspend operations in Darfur on February 2 after one of its cars was stoned.”678 This is indicative of the way in which Nordic cooperation has in some cases led to a failure to distinguish between the individual Nordic states.

As demonstrated by the arguments promulgated in Chapter Three, each of the Nordic countries operating in Sudan may have engaged in some form of ‘norm entrepreneurship’. In addition to its peace engagement, Norway has played a key role in the Sudanese oil industry, both in the context of the CPA but also from a commercial perspective. Sweden’s role has focused on the promotion of good governance and on promoting coherence in the field of development policy. Sweden’s presence in Sudan was significant during the course of Norway’s peace engagement. It has however been argued that this role, while not insignificant, had a much lower profile than Norway’s.679 This raises the question of why Sweden has chosen to keep its engagements at a much lower profile. This relates back to earlier claims that Norway’s involvement in Sudan is in part motivated by a desire to

678 Cable 06KHARTOUM578.2006. Sudan Briefs: Trade/aid To Kenya; Norway In Darfur; China Or Taiwan In South; New Pa Ambassador. Available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06KHARTOUM578&q=thorkildsen
679 Interview with Pio Ding. Oslo. 16 July 2012.
garner greater influence with major powers like the US. This is only possible if attention is drawn to Norway’s peace engagement. Norway’s decision to draw attention to its peace-related activities also fits in with the argument that Norway is still engaged in identity building and that this involves constructing its identity around the idea of Norway as a ‘peace nation.’ This can only be achieved if there is a broad awareness of Norway’s peace-related activities.

The findings in this chapter suggest that Nordicity played less of a role in shaping how Norway engaged in Sudan, than it did in the other case studies. This can in part be attributed to the fact that Norway was not acting alone in this process and was therefore constrained, to some extent, by its membership of the Troika. It must however be noted that Norway still cooperated with NGOs throughout the process, even if this cooperation was not as extensive as it could have been. It must also be noted that the arguments outlined in the previous case study chapters, with regard to Nordicity’s role in the original decision to engage in a particular peace process, also carry some weight in this case. The broader Nordic stance on peace and conflict-related issues undoubtedly played some part in Norway’s decision to work towards resolving the long-standing North/South conflict in Sudan.

CONCLUSIONS

Norway’s peace effort in Sudan constituted one its most complex peace engagements. This was partly due to the nature of the Sudanese conflict and partly due to the sheer number of actors involved in efforts to broker a lasting peace agreement. Moreover, Norwegian engagement has to be divided into two separate episodes, the first of which involved a unilateral Norwegian attempt to reach a peace agreement and the second of which involved a multi-party intervention in which Norway played a key role. Norway bears a greater responsibility for the outcome of its first attempt to broker peace than it does for the second. The fact that Norway was just one of many actors, despite its heightened involvement as part of the Troika, means that responsibility for the successes and failures of the peace negotiations cannot be attributed to Norway alone. It is however, clear that Norway played a significant role in determining the path of the peace process. The decision
to support US policy decisions is important in itself. Norway may well have succeeded in making US initiatives more palatable to the warring parties simply because it was perceived to be more impartial.

Norway’s commercial interests in Sudan and South Sudan must be taken into account when considering its involvement in the North-South peace process. The Norwegian Oil for Development initiative and its role in brokering an agreement on the division of oil revenues between Sudan and South Sudan have been praised by policy-makers. However, Norway has also faced some criticism, not least because these activities are believed to be tied to the interests of Norwegian industry players. Some analysts have claimed that Norwegian oil companies are not engaged in exploration in Sudan. However, a Norwegian company was granted a 5% stake in an oil field in 2010, located mainly in the South. Moreover other Norwegian companies are also engaged in the oil and shipping sectors in Sudan and South Sudan. As such, claims that Norway has no business interests in Sudan are flawed.

Norway’s strategic interests have also been a factor behind its peace engagement in Sudan. Norway’s very active role in Sudan served to boost its presence on the international stage. Leaked US diplomatic cables reveal the extent of Norwegian cooperation with US policy-makers on this issue. While not always supportive of the Norwegian approach, it is clear that the US viewed Norwegian involvement as very important, especially in the cases of Darfur and of Eastern Sudan. It must however be noted that the nature of Norway’s engagement in Sudan supports the theory that identity is responsible for the fact that Norway chooses peace diplomacy over other means of pursuing its foreign policy interests. This is due to the fact that Norway’s current engagement in Sudan consists of initiatives like the Oil for Development programme rather than a more aggressive pursuit of its own interests.

Norwegian policy-makers and NGOs have been quick to dismiss allegations of bias. Yet, perceptions matter. Even if such allegations are based on pure speculation, speculation is still problematic as it erodes trust. There is significant evidence to suggest that Norway supported the SPLM/A from an early stage. This raises the question of whether Norway was therefore a suitable member of the Troika, which had significant influence throughout the negotiations leading up to the signing of
the CPA. It is clear that the US’ pro-SPLM/A stance played a role in shaping Norwegian policy towards Sudan. However, this chapter suggests that Norway’s support for the SPLM/A is closely linked to pressure from NGOs, academics and church figures. This pressure arguably falls into the domestic politics category and suggests that identity and domestic politics have played a significant role in determining how Norway pursues its foreign policy interests. It is unlikely that Norway would have engaged in Sudan in response to domestic pressure alone, however the presence of strategic and commercial interests combined with pressure from NGOs, academics and members of the church might well have led to the decision to engage in Sudan as it would have been a means of pursuing Norwegian interests in a manner which was compatible with the wishes of domestic pressure groups and in keeping with Norwegian values. The degree of contestation is however worth looking at this point. Despite the fact that the legitimisation of a rebel group would be considered controversial in many countries, there has been little contestation of this aspect of Norway’s peace diplomacy.

With regard to the question of Nordicity and Norway’s engagement in norm entrepreneurship, it seems that these factors played a very minor role in determining how Norway engaged in Sudan. In contrast to Norwegian peace engagements in Guatemala, Mali and Israel/Palestine, which were taking place at around this time and in which NGOs played a major role, the 1993/1994 Oslo back-channel was an entirely state-led process. This raises the question of why the Norwegian government chose to move away from the Norwegian model in a country, where Norwegian NGOs had over twenty years of expertise. Norway’s second peace engagement in Sudan as part of a Troika did not see a return to the Norwegian model, although NGOs do provide regular reports on the situation in Sudan to the Norwegian MFA. While, Norway was arguably constrained, to some degree, by the fact that it was not acting alone in the way that it did in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, its reluctance to use the expertise available is somewhat puzzling. At this stage, it must be noted that significant problems with the Norwegian model have also been highlighted in this chapter. While these have no bearing on arguments regarding the role played by Nordicity in determining where and to what extent Norway engages in peace diplomacy, they are of interest as they contribute to the discussion on the validity of the Norwegian approach. Most notable is the fact
that Norwegian People’s Aid, an NGO, which has received significant funding from the Norwegian government, was engaged in questionable practices. This may have played a part in the government’s reluctance to afford Norwegian NGOs a greater role in the peace process.

Contrary to the other two case studies, it seems likely that interests played a role in Norway’s decision to engage in Sudan from the very outset. The evidence laid out in this chapter also suggests that Norwegian identity and Norway’s long-standing humanitarian engagement in Sudan led to its choice of peace diplomacy over other means of pursuing its interests in Sudan. Thus the Sudan case supports the hypotheses outlined in Chapter One more closely than the other two case studies. It must however be noted that other factors also contributed to Norway’s decision to become involved in the 2002-2005 peace process. While Nordicity appears to have played a very minor role in shaping how Norway engaged in peace diplomacy in Sudan, it seems likely that it also played a role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s involvement in the 2002-2005 peace process. As in the other case studies, this suggests that Nordicity’s role has not been limited to determining how Norway engages in peace diplomacy and that it plays a role, however minor, in Norway’s decision to become involved in peace efforts around the world.

In addition to the levels of analysis discussed in the hypotheses presented in Chapter One, the aspirations and the personal beliefs of a number of individuals appear to have had a much more decisive part to play in the events leading up to Norway’s peace engagement in Sudan as well as in the way that the peace engagement was undertaken, than they did in Norway’s engagements in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Johnson’s aspirations with regard to the resolution of the conflict are particularly noteworthy. The fact that individual beliefs played such a decisive role in Norway’s peace efforts in Sudan suggests that the model presented in Chapters One and Two is not comprehensive enough to explain Norway’s engagement in Sudan despite its ability to account for the relationship between interests and identity in this case.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which a different relationship between the levels of analysis discussed in this chapter would have had an impact on the
trajectory of the peace process between the GOS and the SPLM/A. The Norwegian engagement, as part of the Troika, resulted in the CPA and ultimately in the independence of South Sudan. As such, it could be argued that the intervention was a successful one. However, as discussed before both Sudan and South Sudan remain plagued by conflict and relations between the two states remain tense. Whether these problems can be attributed to the mediators and facilitators is however a complex question. As discussed earlier on in this chapter, critics have argued that the Troika could have done more to mitigate the problems facing the two countries today. Whether Norway alone could have influenced the outcome is however questionable. Norway was the member of the Troika with the least clout and as such its ability to influence the US and Britain was undoubtedly limited. As such a different relationship between the levels of analysis is unlikely to have changed the outcome of the peace process although greater use of the expertise available might have resulted in a slightly more comprehensive CPA.

The next chapter will provide a brief overview of this thesis before embarking on a discussion of the conclusions, which can be drawn from this analysis. An attempt will be made to assess the degree to which the findings presented in this work agree with the hypotheses presented in Chapter One. The ways in which the relationship between interests, identity and Nordicity varies from case study to case study will also be considered. Moreover, potential shortcomings of this thesis as well as possibilities for further research will also be discussed.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This study has sought to determine the decision-making processes behind Norway’s extensive peace engagements in the period 1993-2011. It was hypothesised that interests, Norwegian identity and domestic politics, as well as Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship, had all played a part in determining where and how Norway engages in peace diplomacy. It was therefore decided that a multi-level analysis would be undertaken in order to establish the extent to which these factors have influenced Norwegian foreign policy decision-making in the field of peace and reconciliation. Following an assessment of the methodological approaches, which could be used in this study, the decision was taken to conduct a multi-method analysis in order to ensure that the findings of this study would be as accurate as possible without being hampered by theoretical or methodological constraints.

PEACE DIPLOMACY IN THE PHILIPPINES, SRI LANKA AND SUDAN

This study found evidence of Norwegian involvement in over 25 conflicts around the world. These conflicts were both intra-state and inter-state and were geographically diverse. Norwegian peace engagement in some of these conflicts had been widely publicised but in many cases the peace effort had received little, if any, media attention. These include Norwegian involvement in the peace process between the Spanish government and ETA, the provision of good offices for talks between the Turkish government and the PKK and funding for talks between the Chinese government and the Tibetan Government in Exile. A brief assessment of some of these interventions was undertaken in Chapter Three in a bid to establish whether there were any commonalities, which could be identified. While some of the conflicts shared attributes it seems clear that the conflicts in which Norway became involved were extremely diverse.

The path to Norwegian involvement in all three peace processes discussed in this thesis was very similar. In Sudan and Sri Lanka the presence of Norwegian NGOs paved the way for a Norwegian engagement, although in Sri Lanka evidence
suggests that Arne Fjørtøft, a Norwegian development worker, played the most significant part in kick-starting Norway’s involvement in the GoSL – LTTE peace process. In the Philippines the presence of Norwegian church organisations seems to have helped in building ties between the two countries. Norway’s long-standing humanitarian engagement in Sudan also facilitated Norway’s entry into the North/South peace process. The finer details regarding the initiation of Norwegian peace engagement have however been difficult to pin down. This is largely due to the fact that there are many versions of events. Earlier examples of Norwegian engagement, including Mali and Israel/Palestine appear to have occurred because of the presence of one motivated individual. This does not however serve to explain why Norway heeded these suggestions and chose to become involved. The quest for the answer to this question prompted the multi-level analysis undertaken for the purposes of this paper, which will be discussed below in the context of each of the levels of analysis.

The views of the warring parties, with regard to Norwegian involvement, were difficult to elicit. This was in part due to constraints with regard to interviews and in part due to the plethora of viewpoints and perceptions, which were encountered when interviewing those involved in the peace processes or when reading their personal accounts. Members of the NPA were generally positive about Norwegian involvement in the peace process between them and the GPH. However, while not seeing it as a problem, they were not convinced by claims that Norwegian involvement is entirely altruistic. Representatives and supporters of the GPH were less sceptical of Norway’s motivations but more inclined to believe that the conflict would end in a military solution. In the Sri Lanka case, evidence suggests that the GoSL became increasingly negative about the Norwegian engagement at a fairly early stage in the peace process. The LTTE on the other hand began to voice its doubts about the process in 2003, following the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Both parties accused the Norwegians of bias, however the GoSL’s concerns were arguably more well founded than those of the LTTE. In the Sudan case, Norway faced very little criticism from the warring parties. This may have been due to the fact that it was not acting alone and it may have been due to the fact that the other members of the Troika, the US and the UK, were more likely to engage in activities which were deemed to be problematic by the warring parties. Norway’s earlier
attempt to broker peace in Sudan was viewed critically by the SPLM/A as they failed to see the utility of a peace process, which would run in parallel to the IGADD process, which was already underway at the time.

Intra-state conflicts are, by their very nature, asymmetrical. This means that if peace negotiations are to take place between two warring parties, one of which is a state and the other of which is a non-state actor, then the non-state actor’s position is going to be elevated to the status of equal with the government with which it is fighting. Norway’s approach to conflict resolution, which involves providing significant amounts of funding for non-state actors participating in peace processes, has been controversial, especially in countries like Sri Lanka, where the warring party has been responsible for large numbers of civilian deaths. Norwegian policy-makers argue that such funding is necessary in asymmetrical conflicts, where the government involved has recourse to far larger sums than the non-state actors. Moreover, the question of legitimisation has been discussed at length in the context of the three case studies looked at in this thesis. Governments involved in the peace processes, in which Norway is mediating were the most prone to viewing this as problematic, although the Sri Lankan government stands out as the one, which objected the most to this approach. Non-state actors involved in these processes appear to view Norway as the third party most likely to guarantee a good outcome for them. This was apparent in the case of the LTTE, although their stance did vary during the course of the peace process, but even more so in the case of the NDFP. Other states have tended to view Norwegian approaches to non-state actors, and in particular those who have been classified as terrorist groups by the EU or the US, with mixed feelings. On the one hand there are cases when there has been significant opposition to the way in which Norway has acted, such as in the case of Norway’s dealings with the LTTE and Hamas. On the other hand, there have also been instances when Norway’s ability to engage in dialogue with such actors has been viewed as helpful, in the greater scheme of things. The research conducted for the purposes of this thesis did however reveal that Norwegian perceptions, with regard to the latter, tend not to reflect reality.

An interesting question that arose during the course of this study was the question of when Norway pulls out of a peace process, which is failing. In the Philippines
case talks broke down soon after Norway’s initial involvement, however Norway continued to play a background role, eventually succeeding in bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. The talks broke down on a number of subsequent occasions and little progress has been made during the ten years in which Norway has held the position of third-party facilitator. Despite this lack of progress and despite statements made by the former Norwegian Special Envoy to the Philippines, Vegar Brynildsen, to the effect that progress was unlikely, Norway has not pulled out of the process. Norway’s decision not to pull out of Sri Lanka following Mahinda Rajapaksa’s election to the presidency in 2005 is even more surprising. By that point in time, Norway was deeply unpopular in Sri Lanka and was facing vitriolic attacks from the media and the government alike. Even as the ceasefire collapsed and fighting between the GoSL and the LTTE resumed, Norway insisted that it still had a role to play. Norway’s actions in both the Philippines and Sri Lanka contradict its official stance with regard to its interventions. As argued in the individual case study chapters, the growing role of interests as a factor in decision-making in the later stages of Norway’s engagement in these conflicts may be behind its decision to remain involved in peace processes, which showed little prospect of success. Norway’s role in Sudan was less controversial and received much less publicity, as there were a significant number of other actors involved. Moreover, Norway’s role as a facilitator between Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan continues, albeit in a significantly reduced role, despite the fact that the conflict is officially over. Areas of tension remain and Norway is playing a significant role in resolving differences on the subject of oil.

**INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE**

One of the hypotheses of this thesis, laid out in Chapter One, was that Norway’s interests and quest for influence on the global stage, led it to seek out a foreign policy niche. Identity and domestic politics were deemed to be responsible for Norway’s choice of peace diplomacy as the means to pursue its foreign policy. Nordicity was hypothesised to have been responsible for the way in which Norway implemented its peace diplomacy.
This study has found that, despite many arguments to the contrary, Norway, as all other states, has interests. For the purposes of this thesis, interests were considered to be of the economic and strategic variety. Altruistic interests were not considered in this part of the analysis. Norway’s economic interests are principally in the energy sector, but also include mining, shipping and fisheries. While there has been a tendency to avoid discussion of these interests by policy-makers in Norway, recent years have shown a move away from this attitude and a shift towards a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy decision-making.

The quantitative element of this study found a strong correlation between the existence of potential or proven oil reserves in a conflict-afflicted country and the level of intervention undertaken by Norway. Technical issues related to the quantitative study meant that it was not possible to find out whether there is a strong correlation between differences in bilateral trade in the years before and after a Norwegian intervention and the level of intervention undertaken by Norway. However, a look at bilateral trade figures for the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Sudan shows an increase in bilateral trade between each country and Norway, following Norwegian peace engagement, although peace diplomacy is unlikely to have been the only factor behind these increases. There was no correlation between co-religiosity or Norway’s political orientation at the time of the intervention and the level of the intervention undertaken.

Strategic interests, such as a quest for greater influence on the global stage, have also played a role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace diplomacy. Peace diplomacy has been described as making Norway interesting. It has also been argued that Norway’s peace engagements have given it unprecedented access to senior policy-makers from the world’s major powers. US pressure, as well as pressure from other major powers such as India, has also had an impact on the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts. The degree of pressure has varied. In the case of the US for example, Norway was advised to stop engaging in talks with Iran. The US has also encouraged Norway to engage in certain peace processes with varying degrees of success. Leaked diplomatic cables

680 Interview with Vidar Helgesen. Stockholm. 27 January 2012.
suggest that Norway was reluctant to become involved in Iraq and the Caucasus despite US requests to do so. In the case of the Caucasus this decision was related to concerns about Russia. Moreover, Indian influence had an impact on Norway’s decision-making in Nepal, where it chose to play only a minor role in conflict resolution due to fears of antagonising India, with which Norway had a growing trade relationship.

In terms of the individual case studies assessed in this thesis, Sudan appears to present the strongest evidence of economic interests as a motivation for Norwegian involvement. The findings laid out in the Sudan chapter suggest that interests are likely to have played an important role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s engagement in the 2002-2005 peace process. In contrast, economic interests in the Philippines appear to have had little impact on the original decision to become involved in the GPH-NDFP peace process, but they do appear to have played a growing role in Norway’s decisions to remain engaged in the Philippines in later years. This is in keeping with the substantial body of evidence, which suggests that Norway’s foreign policy has become more pragmatic and less idealistic in recent years. There is little indication that economic interests played a part in Norway’s decision to become and remain involved in the Sri Lanka conflict, either in the early stages of its engagement or in the final years of the war. However, the Sri Lanka case presents the strongest evidence for the importance of strategic interests, and particularly influence with great powers, as being a factor in its decision-making with regard to the peace process. It must however be noted that this does not appear to have been the case when Norway first decided to facilitate between the GoSL and the LTTE. Rather, the importance of strategic interests appears to have evolved over time. The election of a conservative government in 2001 does however appear to have been the turning point with regard to the motivations behind Norway’s continued engagement in Sri Lanka. The quest for influence also appears to have played a role in the Philippines and in Sudan. While influence appears to have played a relatively minor role in Norway’s decision-making on the Philippines conflict, the Sudan engagement provided Norway with regular access to US policy-makers. This suggests that strategic interests were of greater importance in the Sudan case, although it is difficult to determine whether they were a consideration in initial discussions regarding possible Norwegian
involvement in Sudan or whether they became a factor at a later stage. While there is evidence to suggest that interests have played a part in different stages of Norway’s involvement in the peace processes, which constitute the case studies for this thesis, interests do not go far enough in explaining Norway’s decision to engage in peace diplomacy. It is therefore necessary to look at the role of identity and domestic politics in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s mediation efforts in more detail.

**IDENTITY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS**

The hypothesis presented in Chapter One suggests that Norwegian identity creates the parameters of acceptable foreign policy interests. While, both the general assessment of Norway’s peace diplomacy and the case studies suggest that this hypothesis holds true, the role of identity in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s mediation efforts has been more complex than anticipated. As discussed above, interests have influenced Norway’s decision-making with regard to its peace diplomacy. However, even the more pragmatic aspects of Norwegian interventions appear to have been constrained by Norwegian identity and moral values. It must however be noted that these moral values do not necessarily coincide with those of other, even European, countries. Examples of this being the case include Norway’s willingness to negotiate with proscribed groups. While the paradox between Norwegian weapons exports and energy interests and the more altruistic aspects of its foreign policy have been highlighted, they should not be seen as evidence to contradict this theory. This is because, in contrast to many other countries, these interests are governed by extremely tight rules and regulations.

With regard to Norwegian identity, this study found that the identity-building project appears to be ongoing, with attempts to build an identity around the idea of Norway as a peace nation being a key feature. In the earlier years of Norway’s peace engagements, this identity was largely uncontested, however recent years have shown a steady rise in those prepared to question the Norwegian self-image. In the context of foreign policy, this process was accelerated by the Norwegian MFA’s Refleks project, which was designed to encourage open discussion and debate on
key aspects of Norway’s foreign policy, including its humanitarian projects, peace and reconciliation efforts and Norway’s energy interests. It is important to note that Norwegian identity is constantly evolving and as such moral values can also change over time. Policies that may have been considered incompatible with Norwegian identity and values in the 1990s for example, may now be deemed acceptable. Thus the growing role of economic and strategic interests in Norwegian foreign policy decision-making, which was discussed in the previous section, may not necessarily indicate a decline in the importance of Norwegian identity and its ability to shape interests but may simply be the result of a changing identity, which is less idealistic than it has previously been.

Domestic politics have also had an impact on the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions, but in an unexpected way. At the outset, it was argued that one political party or orientation may have been more committed to peace diplomacy than the other, thus affecting the number of interventions undertaken by different governments. This turned out not to be the case. The motivations behind interventions under the leadership of different governments have however varied. Governments in the 1990s emphasised the moral aspects of Norway’s peace engagement, drawing on unique Norwegian characteristics and Norway’s ‘goodness’ when explaining Norway’s extensive activities within the field of peace and reconciliation. While these arguments have been put forward by successive Norwegian governments, there has been a move towards greater pragmatism, most notably under the current labour government, led by Jens Stoltenberg. The shift in approaches appears to have occurred in 2001, with the election of a conservative government and their realisation that there were strategic benefits associated with engaging in peace diplomacy. Domestic pressure groups also seem to have had an impact on the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions. This was particularly apparent in the case of Norway’s peace engagement in Sudan, which was encouraged by the church, NGOs and academics. Domestic opinion has generally been in favour of Norway’s peace diplomacy, which has received very little criticism in the country’s media. Despite the fact that popular opinion has generally been in favour of Norway’s peace engagements, or at least not opposed to them, this does not appear to have had a significant impact on foreign policy decision-making.
It seems clear that identity has played a more direct role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace diplomacy, than originally anticipated. Rather than simply serving to define which foreign policy interests are acceptable for Norway, identity and domestic politics appear to have played a direct role in driving Norway’s peace diplomacy. This will be looked at in more detail in the section looking at how the variables interact with each other across the three case studies. The next section will look at whether Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship have served to determine how Norway has engaged in its peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Sudan, as hypothesised in Chapter One.

**NORDICITY AND NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

Arguments both for and against the existence of a Nordic identity are rife. This study finds that a Nordic identity, which is distinctly separate from the Norwegian identity, exists. This also holds true for Norway, which can be both Nordic and Norwegian, and even European. The interplay between these overlapping but also rival identities is extremely interesting.

The accession of Denmark, Finland and Sweden to the EU has constrained their foreign policy options and has arguably led to a greater dichotomy between their stance on certain policy issues and the Norwegian approach to the same questions. While Norway generally goes along with the European stance on major foreign policy issues, there are a number of issues on which Norway has chosen to strike its own path. Among these is Norway’s decision not to abide by the EU’s terrorist listing. Norway’s stated reason for this was that abiding by the listing would have made it impossible for it to engage in dialogue with groups such as Hamas and the LTTE. An assessment of Nordic voting in the UNGA was undertaken in Chapter Three, with the aim of establishing the extent to which the Nordic countries have a shared stance on key foreign policy issues and more specifically on conflict-related issues. This analysis found that the Nordic countries voted the same way in the majority of cases but it also found that while Nordic voting was also very similar to the position taken by the majority of the non-Nordic EU member states, it differed
significantly from the US stance on key issues. This suggests that rather than there being a shared Nordic stance at the UN, there is in fact a shared European position on key issues. Therefore, while the findings of this analysis do not disprove the theory that a Nordic identity exists, they also fail to confirm that this identity differs from a broader European one.

Nordic identity has played a role, albeit of varying importance, in shaping the way in which Norway engages in its peace engagements. In Chapter Two, it was argued that Norway’s norm entrepreneurship has manifested itself in the Norwegian model, which emphasises interaction between the government and academics and NGOs. One of the most interesting outcomes of this project, was the finding that the Norwegian model appears to have become more or less redundant relatively early on in the history of Norway’s peace engagements. In the early 1990s, most notably in Mali, the Norwegian model consisted of NGO-led involvement in peace processes, with the MFA providing little more than financial support. Engagement in Israel/Palestine took a similar form although, academics rather than NGOs were the initiators and the MFA was also involved in the back-channel negotiations. The first Norwegian attempt at resolving the North-South conflict in Sudan came at what might be regarded as the height of the Norwegian model. However, in the case of Sudan, Norway opted for a government-led intervention, suggesting that the Norwegian model was sidelined in this instance. The second Norwegian peace engagement in Sudan differs from the others in that it was a multi-party intervention. However, while NGOs provided the way in, it was the then Norwegian Minister of Development, Hilde Frafjord Johnson, who actually played a role in facilitating negotiations between the warring parties. The Sri Lanka case also saw the NGO-led approach being, to all intents and purposes, abandoned in favour of a state-led engagement. This model was also applied in the Philippines, where the MFA has played the leading role in the peace process. However this case study also saw NGOs and ecumenical organisations playing a significant role in supporting the peace process, suggesting that the ‘Norwegian model’ was experiencing something of a revival. Little information is available about Norway’s most recent peace engagements, however evidence suggests that Norwegian talks with the Taliban and talks with parties to the 2011 Libyan conflict were both state-led interventions. The reasons behind this seemingly ad hoc use of the Norwegian model remain unclear.
and warrant further investigation. It is however possible that the application of the Norwegian model is linked to the role played by interests in a particular peace process. This will be discussed in more detail in the section on how the hypotheses relate to each other.

While the Norwegian model constitutes an important example of norm entrepreneurship, it must be noted that the case study chapters show there have been other examples of Norwegian norm entrepreneurship. The establishment of peace secretariats in conflict-afflicted countries constitutes an example of this. Thus, despite the fact that the Norwegian model appears to have been sidelined in Sri Lanka and Sudan, and to a lesser degree, in the Philippines, Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship still appear to have played a role in determining how Norway engages in its peace diplomacy. It must however be noted that that role appears to have been greater in the Philippines and Sri Lanka than it was in Sudan, where Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship appear to have been relatively unimportant. This can be attributed to the fact that Norway was acting as part of the Troika, rather than leading the peace process in Sudan, as it did in the other two cases.

In addition to the role of Nordicity in shaping how Norway has engaged in its peace diplomacy, it has also been a factor in the initial decision-making processes behind each of the interventions looked at in the case study chapters. This is due to the fact that broader Nordic norms with regard to peace and conflict-related issues have also played a part in Norway’s decision to undertake specific conflict resolution efforts.

**BELIEFS AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL - ANOTHER LEVEL OF ANALYSIS?**

In addition to the factors affecting the decision-making processes behind Norwegian peace efforts laid out in Chapter One, this thesis has also found evidence to suggest that personal beliefs and the role of the individual have also played a role in driving both Norway’s peace diplomacy in general and Norway’s peace engagement in specific countries. The Norwegian government has been surprisingly receptive to suggestions about possible peace engagements promulgated by interested
individuals. Often, these individuals have been Norwegians, with a particular interest in a specific conflict situation. Both the Sudan chapter, and to a lesser degree the Sri Lanka case, provided significant evidence to suggest that individuals played an important role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s peace engagements. Moreover, individuals continued to play an important role throughout the peace processes in question, although the degree of their involvement was not always consistent. Accounts of the work carried out by these individuals, and of the personal commitment to peace efforts displayed by Norwegian politicians like Hilde Frafjord Johnson, Jan Egeland and Jonas Gahr Støre, suggest that the decision to dismiss this level of analysis in Chapter Two was misguided. It must however be noted that details about the role played by these individuals have often been kept secret and much of the information presented in this thesis only became available as a result of interviews and Wikileaks’ release of thousands of US diplomatic cables.

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS**

In Chapters One and Two it was argued that identity and domestic politics shape Norway’s interests, while also determining the way in which these interests are pursued. The interests themselves were deemed to be the principal reason behind Norway’s need to find a foreign policy niche and were therefore considered to be the key factor behind Norway’s decision to engage in conflict mediation efforts worldwide. Identity was seen as being responsible for the choice of peace diplomacy over other means of pursuing foreign policy interests. Moreover, it was argued that Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship are responsible for determining how Norway engages in peacebuilding activities around the world. While the case studies have shown that this model broadly reflects reality in the peace engagements chosen for this thesis, it has also become clear that the way in which the three variables relate to each other is rather more complicated in reality than it is in theory. The revelation that individual beliefs have played an important role in the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts, for example, has significantly complicated the original model. Evidence to the effect that Norwegian peacebuilding efforts actually serve to shape Norwegian identity is another factor, which detracts from the original hypotheses laid out in Chapter One of this thesis.
In order to establish more definitely the extent to which the model outlined in Chapters One and Two accurately reflects the reality of Norwegian conflict interventions this section will look at the ways in which interests, identity and Nordicity relate to each other in the context of the three case studies.

There is no real indication that there was a relationship between interests and identity or interests and Nordicity at the time that Norway decided to play a role in resolving the conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE. This is due to the fact that interests do not appear to have played a part in Norway’s decision-making on Sri Lanka at that stage. There does however appear to have been a relationship between Nordicity and Norwegian identity. This can, in part, be attributed to the fact that there is some overlap between these two levels of analysis, especially with regard to the moral aspects of conflict resolution, which are important components of both the Norwegian and the broader Nordic identities. Following a change of government in 2001, interests began to play a larger role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s continued involvement in the GoSL-LTTE peace process. At this point it is however important to note that while identity was responsible for the initial decision to engage in Sri Lanka, it did not lead to the selection of peace diplomacy as a means of pursuing Norway’s foreign policy interests. Rather, it seems that the decision to facilitate the Sri Lanka peace process was taken for altruistic reasons and the engagement subsequently became multifunctional when it became apparent that the peace engagement also served Norway’s strategic interests. It would not have been possible to choose an alternative means of pursuing those interests at this stage, as peace diplomacy in Sri Lanka was what made this possible. Without its role in the Sri Lanka peace process, Norway would no longer have been interesting to countries like the US. Thus while identity and interests began to converge during the course of the Sri Lanka peace process, this relationship differed from the one hypothesised in Chapters One and Two.

The relationship between Nordicity and interests in the later stages of the Sri Lankan intervention is a little more difficult to pinpoint. Norway did engage in norm entrepreneurship throughout the peace process, but it did decide to move away from the Norwegian model, although NGOs played an important role in
period leading up to the start of the official engagement. It is possible that on realising the extent to which its activities in Sri Lanka were interesting to other states, Norway decided that the government should lead all aspects of the process in order to ensure that it had all the information necessary for it to be able to discuss the conflict in detail with representatives of other countries. There is however no evidence to confirm this theory and as such the link between Nordicity and interests is relatively tenuous.

The Philippines case, arguably bares a closer resemblance to the model outlined in Chapters One and Two than Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka. Norway has significant, and growing, interests in the Philippines and as such the idea that peace diplomacy is being used as an ‘acceptable’ means of furthering these interests within the framework of the moral values proscribed by Norway’s identity appears to be plausible. However, as in the Sri Lanka case, it seems likely that interests only began to influence decision-making when the peace process was already underway. Moreover, Nordicity and norm entrepreneurship appear to have played a much more important role in determining how Norway engaged in the peace process in the Philippines than they did in Sri Lanka. This manifests itself in the renaissance of the Norwegian model and its implementation, despite the state-led nature of the intervention. It must however be noted that the lines between identity and Nordicity are somewhat blurred in this case and as such the use of the Norwegian model could also be seen as Norwegian identity in action. It must however be noted that there are also differences between the original model and the relationship between the levels of analysis discussed in the hypotheses in Chapter One. While identity has arguably played a role in determining the way in which Norway pursues its foreign policy interests in the Philippines, peace diplomacy has also been described as playing a role in the Norwegian identity-building project. Thus the relationship between peace diplomacy and identity appears to be a two-way one.

The evidence presented in Chapter Six, suggests that interests played a significant role in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s intervention in Sudan. This is the only case where the evidence suggests that interests constituted a factor behind Norway’s original decision to engage in the peace process. This makes the relationship between interests, identity and Nordicity particularly interesting.
Identity and domestic politics have also played a very important role in the Sudan engagement. Norway had a long history of humanitarian engagement in the country and there were a number of domestic groups who pushed the government to engage. This suggests that the Sudan case constitutes an example of identity being responsible for the choice of peace diplomacy as the optimal foreign policy strategy for pursuing Norway’s interests. As in the other two cases, Nordicity also played a part in the decision-making processes behind Norway’s intervention in Sudan. This can again, be attributed to the overlap between Nordicity and Norwegian identity. However, Nordicity played less of a role in shaping how Norway engaged in Sudan. The Norwegian model was not applied in this instance and there was little evidence of Norway fulfilling the role of norm entrepreneur in this case. As such, there appears to be no relationship between Nordicity and interests in the Sudan case.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

The case study chapters in this thesis have provided an overview of three mediation processes. While the Sudan case was arguably a success, the Norwegian effort to reach a peaceful resolution to the Sri Lanka conflict failed and Norway’s efforts to end the conflict between the GPH and the NDFP in the Philippines are still ongoing. Why was the Sudan intervention the only one to end in a peace agreement? While the variables considered in this thesis played different roles in each of the three cases, the Sudan peace process stands out as the only one in which Norway worked together with other states. This suggests that the multi-actor approach is more likely to succeed than single state interventions. It must however be noted that the other states involved in the Sudan peace process, were the US and the UK. This suggests that the strength of the other mediators may also play an important role in determining the outcome of a multi-actor mediation effort. The most successful mediation effort was also the one in which both individuals and interests appear to have played the largest role. This suggests that strong incentives for success whether they are collective or for a specific individual may play an important part in reaching a peaceful settlement. However, it must be noted that interests do appear to have taken on an important role in the latter stages of Norway’s engagements in Sri Lanka, and to a lesser degree, in the Philippines. Despite this, there is no indication
that the chances of successfully resolving those conflicts increased once interests began to influence decision-making on Norway’s involvement in the two peace processes.

Accepting the fact, that the Sudan case is different from the other two, as multiple actors were involved, it is necessary to look at the Philippines and Sri Lanka cases more closely in order to elicit whether any other lessons can be learned from these two processes. While both these interventions have been state-led, there are indications that the fact that the Norwegian engagement in the Philippines more closely resembles Norway’s early peace efforts, during which the Norwegian model was applied, may be linked to the relative lack of controversy surrounding the engagement. There is a sense that the Philippines engagement is much more inclusive, encompassing a broader spectrum of actors than Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka. This has arguably led to less suspicion of Norwegian motivations. This would suggest that involving local and international NGOs and CSOs is a useful strategy for states engaging in conflict resolution efforts. While Norway, arguably, created parity between the warring parties involved in the negotiations in both cases, this has proved to be much less controversial in the Philippines than it was in Sri Lanka. The reasons for this are unclear but Norway’s actions do not appear to have been responsible for this outcome. Rather, the conflict dynamics in each case appear to have been responsible for the way in which Norway’s conflict resolution strategy was perceived. While both the conflicts considered, were long-standing, the LTTE was arguably a much stronger opponent, than the NDFP. This may be a factor behind the levels of controversy caused by Norway’s engagement in Sri Lanka, while Norway’s reputation in the Philippines has remained relatively unscathed. This suggests that it is important for mediators to have a solid understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts in which they intend to mediate, and emphasises the importance of tailoring each conflict resolution strategy to the situation on the ground, rather than applying a pre-conceived model of engagement, which may be poorly received by one, or both, of the warring parties.
THE WAYS IN WHICH THE MODEL CAN BE USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF OTHER MEDIATION PROCESSES

The model used in this thesis could be used to assess the mediation activities of other state actors. While Nordicity does not apply to non-Nordic countries, the idea of a regional or sub-regional identity influencing the decision-making processes behind mediation efforts can be applied to other states. An example would be the way in which European identity affects the decision-making of EU member states or the way in which Arab identity affects the decision-making of states like Qatar in their peacemaking efforts. The concepts of identity and interests are directly transferrable. It is also possible to apply the level of analysis looking at beliefs in other cases. Such a comparison would be extremely interesting and could look at both established peacemakers such as Switzerland or at emerging peacemakers such as Turkey or Qatar. The full model, including the Nordicity component, could also be applied to other Nordic countries such as Sweden and Finland, which have also engaged in peacemaking activities around the world.

POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENT OF THIS STUDY

This study would have benefited from more extensive fieldwork, in particular in Sri Lanka and Sudan. It would have been interesting to interview representatives of the government in Khartoum as well as senior members of the SPLM/A. Further fieldwork in the Philippines would have been unlikely to improve this study much as interviews were conducted with representatives of all the major players in this peace process. Access to documents pertaining to the early stages of Norway’s engagements would also have been of use. The diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks have been of some use in this respect, but access to Norwegian documents would have been of even greater value.

More detailed information on the nature of individual interventions would arguably have served to increase the quality of the quantitative study. The existence of possible gaps in the data means that the dataset should be treated as a work in progress. It must however be noted that the dataset is fairly comprehensive and as
such additional information is unlikely to have a significant impact on the nature of the findings presented in Chapter Three.

**POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER STUDY**

Further avenues for study could include a thorough analysis of the impact of perception on peace processes involving third-party mediators. The Norwegian case highlights the fact that the truth matters very little when compared with the weight given to the perceived sequence of events. Other possibilities include an investigation into the extent to which other third-party mediators have adopted the Norwegian model in its original form and which third parties have been most open to the Norwegian approach. Further studies into the danger of ‘legitimising’ non-state actors who claim to represent a people, but may not do so in reality, would also be of interest to scholars in the field of conflict resolution. Taking a less theoretical approach, deeper investigation of Norway’s less publicised engagements such as its activities in the Great Lakes Region would also provide a deeper insight into the engagements themselves. Finally an assessment of the role played by individuals in bringing about Norwegian peace engagements would be an extremely interesting contribution to the literature on conflict resolution.
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